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EQ1:  To what extent have the EU interventions through budget support con-
tributed to improve the framework for public policy, expenditure and aid 
management? 
JC 1.1:  GBS and SBSs induced an increase in size and share of EU funding subject to government’s 
budgetary processes 
JC 1.2:  GBS and SBSs improved the predictability of aid flows overall, and particularly of EU contri-
bution 
JC 1.3:  GBS and SBSs facilitated the establishment of a framework of policy dialogue, focused on 
key government strategies and priorities 
JC 1.4:  GBS and SBS facilitated the delivery of strategic and demand driven non-financial inputs 
(e.g. TA and capacity development) that are aligned to government priorities 
JC 1.5:  GBS and other EU interventions have assisted in improving core indicators for primary edu-
cation service delivery 
 
JC 1.1:  GBS and SBSs induced an increase in size and share of EU funding subject to 
government’s budgetary processes 
 Indicator 1.1.1: Extent of delivery of financial inputs (EU contribution and overall) 
The Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) and a number of Cooperating Partners signed a 
memorandum for the provision of Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) in 2005. This Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MoU) stipulates to (a) enhance ownership and promote the effective implemen-
tation of the National Development Plan; (b) increase the predictability of aid flows; (c) promote alloca-
tive efficiency in public spending; d) reduce the administrative burden on the government; and (e) im-
prove domestic accountability and GRZ‘s institutional capabilities. In turn, GRZ has committed itself to 
(a) the fight against poverty, including public expenditure patterns consistent with poverty reduction 
priorities; (b) the implementation of sound macroeconomic policies, as evidenced by a positive Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) assessment; (c) public financial management (PFM) reforms; (d) the re-
spect for and promotion of peace, democratic principles, rule of law, good governance and the fight 
against corruption. 
The Government has indicated in all its policy documents –Aid Policy and the National development 
Plan that general budget support is its preferred aid modality. Over the years, budget support has in-
creased from USD100m in 2005 to USD216m in 2009.The delivery of financial inputs towards general 
budget support processes is provided by the PRBS group of six bilateral donors: the European Com-
mission (EC), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank. Sector budget support is 
provided by the EC in roads, health and in support of the PEMFA (Public Expenditure Management and 
Financial Accountability) reform programme, and by the United Kingdom in the Health. The EC had 
undertaken a pilot sector budget support programme from 2006-2008 and from 2009 is implementing a 
larger sector budget support programme. DFID earmarked some (US$5m ) of its general budget sup-
port (GBS) allocation to the Health sector from 2006-2007, although from 2008-2010 – whilst there is 
additional funding provided for health within the general budget support allocation – it has only broad 
earmarking for the Ministry of Health (MoH). 
Zambia qualified for Budget Support in 2004, after which a first tranche of General Budget Support was 
disbursed under the EDF9. Consequently, a combination of all the EDF Budget Support operations, 
with a total of €361m has been disbursed on an average of €51.7m per year. In December 2007, the 
Government of the Republic of Zambia and the European Commission signed the EDF10 CSP-NIP 
(2008-2013) under which the EU provides €475m to Zambia. The funds are earmarked for three focal 
sectors namely; Poverty Reduction Budget Support, Transport Infrastructure with particular emphasis 
on Road infrastructure and Health. Funds have also been set aside for non-focal sectors such as Food 
Security and Agricultural Diversification and Governance. These sectors are in line with the Govern-
ment's National Development Plan and the Cooperating Partner's Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia 
(JASZ).  
Subsequently, in 2009, the EC increased Zambia’s allocation by €30m allocation under the V-FLEX 
programme (General Budget Support), which added the EDF total to €505m. Zambia is also a benefi-
ciary of other EU funding sources such as, the Water and Energy Facilities, Thematic budget lines, 
Food Facility and the accompanying measures for sugar producing countries which harmonize other 
interventions that are financed under the EDF. There is consensus among cooperating partners and 
government that budget support has evolved to a highly visible and relevant instrument of development 
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cooperation. The government of Zambia has indicated in its policy documents (National Development 
Plan (NDP) and Aid policy) that budget support is its preferred mode of aid delivery.  
Data, figures, tables: 
Table 1.Total External Financing to Zambia, 2006–2009  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), US$ million 10,702 11,541 14,705 12,805 
Total Assistance, US$ million 588.7 668.5 856.9 857.0 
Assistance as % of GDP 5.5% 5.8% 5.8% 6.7% 
Assistance per capita, US$ 49 54 68 66 
Assistance as % of Central Government Expenditure 23.4% 23.9% 24.5% 28.7% 
Source: IMF, World Bank and Ministry of Finance and National Planning  
Table 2. Overall Budget Support, 2006 – 2009, US$ million 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
General Budget Support Grants  Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual 
EU 39.5 41.6 32.9 77.4
1
 191.4 
Finland 0.0 6.8 7.9 7.1 21.8 
Germany 0.0 6.8 6.8 12.9 26.5 
Netherlands 7.8 13.6 14.7 13.5 49.6 
Norway 14.4 19.0 33.9 27.1 94.4 
Sweden 6.8 14.3 15.0 0.0 36.1 
UK 42.2 47.4 52.8 47.4 189.8 
Sub Total 110.7 149.5 164.0 185.4 609.6 
Kwacha Equivalent – billion 398.7 597.9 614.5 935.5 2,546.6 
General Budget Support Loans           
Africa Development Bank 0.0 0.0 31.8 23.0 54.8 
World Bank 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.6 9.6 
Sub Total 0.0 0.0 31.8 32.6 64.4 
Total General Budget Support 110.7 149.5 195.8 218.0 674.0 
Kwacha Equivalent – billion 398.7 597.9 733.7 1,099.8 2,830.0 
Sector Budget Support Grants           
EU Roads 23.6 0.0 37.9 0.0 61.5 
EU PEMFA 0.0 2.1 0.0 5.2 7.3 
EU Health   6.5 4.3 14.8
2
 25.6 
The Global Fund – MOF 1.9 0.6 5.9 0.2 8.6 
Sub Total 25.5 9.2 48.1 20.2 103.0 
Total Budget Support 136.2 158.7 243.9 238.2 777.0 
Kwacha Equivalent – billion 490.5 634.8 914.0 1,201.7 3,240.9 
Total Budget Support - Grants Only 136.2 158.7 212.1 205.6 712.7 
Kwacha Equivalent – billion 490.5 634.7 794.9 1,037.4 2,957.5 
Source: Ministry of Finance and National Planning and CPs 
                                               
1
  EU disbursed these funds in December 2009. MoFNP only recorded US$ 45.2 m as being disbursed in 2009, with the 
balance of US$ 32.2 m being recorded as disbursed in 2010, due to macro-economic considerations. Since, by definition, 
the DCR measures aid flows the total amount has to be recorded in the year it is disbursed.  
2
  A similar issue to footnote 7 arose with disbursements for EU Health SBS. 
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Extracts: 
“External and Domestic Resource Mobilisation Patterns indicate that according to the Ministry of Fi-
nance, 28 different donors are providing Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Zambia, but there 
are many more who are giving aid through NGOs. The actual numbers is not well documented. There-
fore, the ODA total as presented in Table 3 is less than the total ODA flows to Zambia but how signifi-
cantly less this is remains an empirical question. ODA to Zambia is very concentrated such that the top 
three donors provided 34.0% of ODA between 2006 and 2009. The ten largest donors between 2006 
and 2009 were; EU (14.3%); USA (10.7%); United Kingdom (9.0%); UN system (8.9%); World Bank 
(8.7%); Netherlands (7.6%); Norway (5.6%); Denmark (5.2); AfDB (4.4%); Germany (4.3%) and Japan 
(4.3%). The rest provided 17%.” (PRBS Annual Review, 2010: page 9) 
 
“A number of events have affected aid relations in Zambia. The country's huge external debt situation 
estimated at US$7.2 billion before 2005 had compromised the funding of public sector activities as a big 
part of export earnings had to be set aside to service debt. In recognition of the constraints that debt 
servicing imposed on public expenditure and her economic reform efforts, Zambia accessed the Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in December 2000. In April 2005 Zambia attained the HIPC 
completion point which saw her external debt stock reducing from US$7.2 billion to US$3.5 billion. Addi-
tionally debt write off under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative reached at the Gleneagles G8 Summit 
in 2005 further reduced the debt stock to less than US$600m. From that time onwards the Zambian 
Government has tried to follow strict debt sustainability criteria in contracting new debt. Grants are pre-
ferred to loans. Where loans are procured, they are to be preferably targeted at infrastructure develop-
ment.” (Evaluation of the Implementation of Paris Declaration, 2010: page 14). 
 
“Relative financial weight: Two trends have to be considered. Firstly, the modality has become more 
important as a percentage of total aid. In 2009, budget support accounted for about 20% of total aid and 
32% of the grants to GRZ. Secondly, however, the total share of external support has decreased rapidly 
from around 30% at the beginning of the last decade to less than 20% in 2010 as a result of an in-
crease in domestic revenue. Nevertheless, the funding dimension of PRBS in Zambia has still been 
considerable and has therefore been politically important. Budget support disbursements represented 
the lion share of the government‘s fiscal space. Thus, the financial component of budget support – if 
combined properly with the instrument‘s non-financial components – has had the potential to promote 
policy and institutional reforms beyond the mere financing of poverty reduction.” (Evaluation of budget 
support, 2010: page iii) 
 Indicator 1.1.2: Increase in size and share of external funding transferred through national 
financial mechanisms 
The size and share of external funding through the national budgetary processes over the last ten years 
varies according to the source of the data. There are data disparities which makes it challenging to 
ascertain the actual trends for aid inflows in Zambia. Government is cognisant of this fact and attributes 
it to lack of capacity to accurately document these trends. 
However, according to Whitworth, 2010 using IMF data on GRZ receipts of grants indicate the propor-
tion of budget support in total grants as 29% of during the period 2005-2009 compared to 19% during 
2002-2004. The Evaluation of General Budget Support, 2010 notes that ‘Using Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning (MoFNP) data on grants from the annual financial reports and the figures on budget 
support disbursements collected from various sources, the share of budget support in total grants is 
significantly higher, peaking in 2006 with PRBS grants accounting for 53 % of grants and total budget 
support (including SBS) for 68 % of grants. In the following two years, this share fell 43 % and 53 % for 
total budget support receipts. However, these figures overestimate the relative role of budget in total aid 
receipts, as they include only aid flows that are recorded in the government budget. Taking OECD/DAC 
data on ODA flows since 2003 puts the relative importance of budget support in a more realistic per-
spective: As a proportion of total ODA receipts (excluding debt relief), budget support has continuously 
risen since 2003 from 6.5% to 21.9 % in 2008, before it fell again to 19.7 % in 2009. For OECD/DAC 
donors only, the share of budget support in total ODA (excluding debt relief) rose from 9.4% in 2003 to 
31.0 % in 2009’ (BS evaluation, 2010;page 36).  
The Ministry of Finance indicate that 28 different donors are providing ODA to Zambia, but there are 
many more who are giving aid through NGOs. The actual numbers are not well documented. ODA to 
Zambia is very concentrated such that the top three donors provided 34.0% of ODA between 2006 and 
2009. The ten largest donors between 2006 and 2009 were; EU (14.3%); USA (10.7%); United King-
dom (9.0%); UN system (8.9%); World Bank (8.7%); Netherlands (7.6%); Norway (5.6%); Denmark 
(5.2); AfDB (4.4%); Germany (4.3%) and Japan (4.3%). The rest provided 17%. 
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The EC disbursements were lower in 2010 as both the Road (€24m) and Health Sector (€8.5m) budget 
support transfers could not be authorised by year-end. If those disbursements had been processed, the 
level of disbursements in 2010 would have exceeded that of 2008. Following PFM issues in the road 
sector which prevented the disbursement of the corresponding Sector Budget Support, 'only' €40.3m 
was disbursed in 2010. Since the launch of the EDF10 National Indicative Programme in 2008, and out 
of the initial €475m, €406.9m (86%) has been committed and €81.8m (17%) disbursed.  
An intermediate indicator for measuring size and share of aid cooperation is the extent to which direct 
budget support and sector budget support delivered through SWAps which are the preferred aid mo-
dalities for the GRZ are increasing in the total share of ODA. According to the 2008 PD Monitoring Sur-
vey, a score of 54% of “aid in the form of programme-based approaches” was recorded compared to 
42% in 2006. The target for 2010 was 66% and this indicator seems to be on track. This upward trend 
can be attributed partly to the increased number of donors using direct budget support, increased 
awareness in various sectors that Programme based approaches can deliver more effective results and 
improved donor coordination, in general.  
The Paris Declaration encourages CPs to increasingly utilize country systems when they deliver their 
aid. The PD Monitoring Survey of 2008 measured the extent to which donors made use of country sys-
tems for budget execution, financial reporting and audit. On average across the three systems, 59% of 
aid channelled to Zambia was through country systems with 11 donors using all three systems, repre-
senting 41% of all ODA channelled to the government. Nevertheless, some CPs are still sceptical of the 
national procurement systems and continue to use their own systems. The finalisation of Procurement 
Guidelines has been delayed due to internal procedures between the Ministry of Finance and the Minis-
try of Justice. There is pressure from many stakeholders for government to finalise them. These guide-
lines will be the basis for developing the Procurement Manual that will standardize all public procure-
ments in the country (see PD Monitoring Survey 2008 Report; and Fifth National Development Plan 
(FNDP) Annual Progress Reports for 2007 and 2008). 
In 2010, Zambia remained broadly compliant with the eligibility criteria for Poverty Reduction Budget 
Support (PRBS), and received $218 from the AfDB, DFID, Finland, Germany, Norway, the World Bank, 
the Netherlands and the EU (approximately 20% of total aid). The EU disbursement as part of the 
EDF10 Millennium Development Goal (MDG)-Contract was €32.81m. Sweden withdrew from the PRBS 
group in 2010. 
Data, figures, tables: 
Table 3. EU instruments for budget support in Zambia 
Instrument  Period Amount Euros million 
PRBSI 2003-2006 117 
PRBSII 2007-2008 62 
PRBS/ MDG-Contract 2008- 255 
Table 4. EC disbursements: 2004-2011 
EC Budget support (EURO Million) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
GENERAL BUDGET SUPPORT 
PRBS1: 1
ST
 fixed tranche 10        
PRBS1: 2
nd 
and 3
rd
 tranches 29.5        
PRBS1: 4
th 
tranche  9       
PRBS1: 5
th 
variable tranche (PFM) –up to  17.5       
PRBS1: 6
th 
variable tranche (PFM)- up to   35.2      
PRBS2: 62 euro million 2007 and 2008 (2 m TA)    27.083 24.166 0   
MDG C: 225 euro million for 2009-2014      30.00 32.81 32.81 
V-Flex tranche      30   
Food facility GBS       0  
PEMFA (9 EDF)  2.5 0 1.5 0 4 7.5  
SECTOR BUDGET SUPPORT         
Health (fixed and variable tranches)9 EDF    5 3.57    
Roads (variable tranches)-up to: 9 EDF  25.4 21  21.4    
Roads rider n. 1: extra 20 million for 2007-2009       0  
Roads rider n.2: extra 8.5 million for 2008     8    
Roads SBS 10 EDF (77 million , o/w 69.3 SBS)       0  
Health SBS 10 EDF (35 million)      11.5 0 8.5 
TOTAL 39.5 54.4 56.2 33.583 57.137 75.5 40.312 41.312 
GBS 39.5 26.5 35.2 27.083 24.166 60 32.812 32.812 
GBS % 100% 48.7% 62.6% 80.6% 42.3% 79.5% 81.4% 79.4% 
SBS 0.0 27.9 21.0 6.5 33.0 15.5 7.5  
FX EUR/USD SBS   1.25 1.43 1.52 1.43 1.33  
FX EUR/USD GBS   1.28 1.46 1.56 1.45 1.35  
GBS in USD   45.06 39.54 37.70 87.00 44.30  
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SBS in USD   26.25 9.295 50.11 22.165 9.975  
PROJECT GRANTS       44.6 59.1  
ODA      120.1 99.4  
% GBS      50.0% 33.0%  
% DBS         
 
Extracts: 
“In 2009, the funding for Zambia was topped-up by a €30m allocation under the V-FLEX programme 
(General Budget Support) bringing the EDF total to €505m. Finally, Zambia also benefits from financial 
support through other EU funding sources (such as the Water and Energy Facilities, Thematic budget 
lines, Food Facility and the accompanying measures for sugar producing countries) which complement 
the interventions financed under the EDF.” (Cooperation between the European Union and Zambia -
Joint Annual Report, 2010: page 5). 
 Indicator 1.1.3: Increase in size and share of external funding subject to Government's 
budget process and PFM system 
The government has in the last few years made some progress by strengthening fiduciary systems, 
especially the financial management systems, through the launch of the Public Expenditure Manage-
ment and Financial Accounting Reforms (PEMFA). PEMFA was launched in 2005 and is aimed at im-
proving fiscal discipline, effectiveness in resource allocation and realisation of value for money in the 
execution of expenditures. Specific measures introduced under PEMFA are the Integrated Financial 
Management and Information System (IFMIS) and the Commitment Control System (CCS) which at-
tempts to match expenditure with revenue. According to the 2008 PD Monitoring Survey, the total budg-
et is approximately USD74m and is funded by 11 CPs under a PEMFA Memorandum of Understanding. 
Zambia has also adopted the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), a medium-term (three-
year) budget framework within which resources from government and cooperating partners are allocat-
ed to achieve approved objectives of the national development plan.  
Other measures to strengthen treasury management include strides towards the creation of the Treas-
ury Management Department, the establishment of the Treasury Single Account and the modification of 
the budget management cycle described above. Despite some minimal administrative challenges, the 
reforms have already been rolled out at the Bank of Zambia and Ministry of Finance and National Plan-
ning. The government is optimistic to roll this out to sector ministries, with Ministry of Health slotted as a 
pilot phase to enhance effective budget accounting and management for results. In 2006, the World 
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating for Zambia was a score of 3.5 for the 
quality of its Public Finance Management systems. The reform of the budget calendar approved by the 
end of 2009 and implemented in 2010 can be partly attributable to the budget support High Level Policy 
Dialogue (HLPD). In the follow up of the scandal in the health scandal the PRBS Cooperating Partners 
put strong emphasis on the issue of reforming the budget calendar and the subsequent reform by GRZ 
will most likely improve budget planning and policy implementation through the budget.  
The two performance assessments of Zambia‘s PFM system using the Public Expenditure and Financial 
Accountability (PEFA) set of indicators reveal significant improvements in various dimensions of PFM 
such as an improved basis for strategic budgeting, greater comprehensiveness of fiscal information 
(including systematic reporting of arrears), improvements in internal audit, and improved oversight 
through better coverage and improved methodology for external audit, and the opening up of public 
access to the Public Accounts Committee hearings. The overall positive assessment of GRZ‘s efforts to 
strengthen its PFM system is largely shared by the IMF. However, Zambia‘s PFM system continues to 
exhibit significant weaknesses, even in those areas that are arguably of particular relevance PRBS ef-
fectiveness and the minimisation of fiduciary risks such as policy-based budgeting, budget variance, 
and expenditure controls. 
According to the PD Monitoring Survey of 2008, 81% of donors utilized procurement country systems 
compared to 41% recorded by the PD Monitoring Survey of 2006. The 2010 target of aid using country 
systems for procurement purposes has thus already been attained. This upward trend has been at-
tributed to dialogue and improved national procurement management under the Public Procurement 
Authority. 
The EU disbursed its last €11.5m tranche of EDF9 Sector Budget Support in support to the PEMFA 
programme. The 2009 PEFA assessment had already shown some encouraging tangible results at-
tributable notably to PEMFA. 
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Data, figures, tables: 
 
Extracts: 
“Zambia has been eligible to Budget Support since 2004, when a first tranche of General Budget Sup-
port was disbursed under the EDF9. Since then, and combining all the EDF Budget Support operations, 
a total of €361m has been transferred to Zambia (an average of €51.7m per year). Following issues in 
the road sector which prevented the disbursement of the corresponding Sector Budget Support, 'only' 
€40.3m was disbursed in 2010.” (Cooperation between European Union and Zambian government, 
2010, page 7) 
 
JC 1.1:  GBS and SBSs induced an increase in size and share of EU funding subject to govern-
ment’s budgetary processes 
A considerable portion of EC funding towards budget support has been channelled through govern-
ment’s budgetary processes. In 2009, the EC increased Zambia’s allocation by €30m allocation under 
the V-FLEX programme (General Budget Support), which added the EDF total to €505m (indicator 
1.1.1). However, the EC disbursements were lower in 2010 as both the Road (€24m) and Health Sector 
(€8.5m) budget support transfers could not be authorised by year-end. If those disbursements had been 
processed, the level of disbursements in 2010 would have exceeded that of 2008. Following PFM is-
sues in the road sector which prevented the disbursement of the corresponding Sector Budget Support, 
'only' €40.3m was disbursed in 2010(indicator 1.1.2).  
PFM reforms are a major aspect of budget support in Zambia and have been debated in several dia-
logue forums between government and cooperating partners. The overall positive assessment of GRZ‘s 
efforts to strengthen its PFM system is largely shared by the IMF. However, Zambia‘s PFM system 
continues to exhibit significant weaknesses, even in those areas that are arguably of particular rele-
vance PRBS effectiveness and the minimisation of fiduciary risks such as policy-based budgeting, 
budget variance, and expenditure controls. Disbursements have been withdrawn due to PFM issues - 
for instance, in the absence of progress on the revision of the Road Sector Investment Programme 
(ROADSIP) II policy framework, EDF Sector Budget Support could not be disbursed in 2010 which re-
sulted in Zambia losing out €23.95m (4th & 5th variable tranches floating from 2009 - €8.5m & €3.15m - 
and release of the 1st fixed tranche floating from 2009 - €12.3m).” 
 
JC 1.2: GBS and SBSs improved the predictability of aid flows overall, and particularly of EU 
contribution 
 Indicator 1.2.1: Increase in the predictability of disbursements of GBS/SBS payments from 
both EU and Cooperation Partners (deviation of actual disbursed from the forecast and 
timeliness) 
The 2008 PD Monitoring Survey revealed that CPs in Zambia had made significant progress on pre-
dictability of aid moving from a baseline of 50% in 2005 to an impressive 85% in 2007, which surpassed 
the 2010 targets. These impressive results are attributed to better notification of aid disbursements by 
CPs to GRZ, and improved ability to accurately record aid disbursements at a centralized level. But it 
also noted that some donors are only able to commit funding projections for one year which affects 
planning. While they provide some projections for 2-3 years, there is a clause on subjectivity to availa-
bility.  
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Despite the progress noted in the 2008 PD Monitoring Survey, there was still concern among govern-
ment officials in both agriculture and health who in interviews expressed frustration that CPs were not 
disbursing their pledges according to the agreed time frames. The seemingly contradictory perception 
from that of the findings in the 2008 PD Monitoring Survey was related to the more difficult donor rela-
tions of 2010 arising from the alleged theft of funds in the health sector which reversed the above stated 
progress. 
According to the Evaluation of budget support, 2010; aid predictability in Zambia in general is fairly 
poor, seriously undermining the effectiveness of GRZ planning and cash flow management. According 
to the internal analysis of one Cooperating Partner, for instance, in 2007 only 58% of the planned donor 
funded investments recorded in the budget were actually disbursed. PRBS predictability has been rela-
tively poor as well: in 2007, actual disbursements reached a mere 77% of commitments, while in 2008; 
disbursements were 15% higher than what had been committed.  
The evaluation further noted that a number of agencies experienced important delays in releasing re-
sources. The Cooperating partner with the largest delays among those who actually disbursed was the 
European Commission (on average 5.6 months in 2009, 3.0 in 2008, and 6.61 in 2007). Finland per-
formed best in 2007 and 2008, with no delay, in 2009 (when some Cooperating Partners withheld dis-
bursement after the corruption scandal in the Health sector) only the UK, Norway and the AfDB dis-
bursed without delay. The world bank does not disburse until al conditionalities are met –‘no results; no 
money’. 
Extracts: 
“The increasing size and share of aid subject to GRZ‘s budgetary processes has facilitated planning, 
accounting, and reporting procedures for the Government with regard to aid inflows. However, this did 
not lead to a substantial reduction of overall transaction costs because GRZ still faced the challenge of 
administrating huge off-budget inflows from Cooperating Partners. Similarly, aid predictability – which 
has traditionally been poor in Zambia – did not improve substantially’ (Evaluation of budget support, 
2010: ‘Transaction costs and predictability: page iii) 
 Indicator 1.2.2: Existence of a medium term external resources framework for the national 
budget and sectors supported by EU 
In Zambia, it is widely acknowledged by many assessments that the direct contribution of budget sup-
port on national budget is minimal, but rather essential to fill the national fiscal gap. However, it is im-
portant to note that budget support has contributed to an increased expenditure in social sectors partic-
ularly in education and health.  
According to the Evaluation of general budget support, 2010 (pg.68), as a share of GDP, general budg-
et support was expected to average 1.8 % (2.1 % including budget support loans) for the 2006-2010 
period (1.6% for 2006-2009). FNDP projections were based on an assumed annual growth rate of 7 % 
during the implementation period. Given that actual growth rates in the first four years of the implemen-
tation period were considerably lower (2006: 6.2 %, 2007: 6.3 %, 2008: 5.7 %, 2009: 6.3%) this implies 
that budget support as well total aid resources fell significantly short of levels deemed necessary to 
fund the FNDP. In fact, budget support levels remained much closer to the level of the FNDP baseline 
scenario extrapolating current funding levels in 2005. The FNDP also includes projections for budget 
support loans at 0.3% of GDP for all years except 2006. Outturn was 0.08% (2006), 0% (2007), 0.21% 
(2008), and 0.25% (2009).  
Despite budget support becoming more important as a percentage of total aid to Zambia , its share in 
total national budget expenditure is minimal, with an average of 5.4% between 2005 and 2009, with the 
highest share of 6.5% in 2005 (Whitworth; 2010) However, despite the relatively small share of budget 
support in government budget and its low performance against FNDP fiscal targets, there is evidence 
that the provided resources are decidedly more important for the government‘s fiscal space than the 
relatively small budget share would suggest. This is because domestic revenue barely covers – mostly 
statutory – recurrent expenditure. 
Extracts: 
“After it was finalised, donors in developing their subsequent country strategies took cognisance of the 
strategic direction provided in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP) as an attempt to line up 
their aid behind Zambia’s own set priorities. For example, the PRSP indicated that the commercialisa-
tion of smallholder agriculture was to be the main pillar for developing agriculture in subsequent years. 
A number of donors in the sector took cognisance of this with a new generation of projects that had 
commercialisation as the core of their support coming in place. Sweden developed the Agriculture Sup-
port Programme (ASP) under the theme of “agriculture as a business”, IFAD came up with the Small-
holder Enterprise and Marketing Programme (SHEMP) while the United States of America had the 
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Productivity, Finance and Trade (PROFIT) all tackling different aspects of smallholder commercialisa-
tion’ (Evaluation of Implementation of Paris Declaration in Zambia, 2010: page 17). 
JC 1.2:  GBS and SBSs improved the predictability of aid flows overall, and particularly of EU 
contribution 
Budget support disbursements in Zambia in general are fairly poor, seriously undermining the effective-
ness of GRZ planning and cash flow management. According to the internal analysis of one Cooperat-
ing Partner, for instance, in 2007 only 58% of the planned donor funded investments recorded in the 
budget were actually disbursed (indicator 1.2.1).  
However, budget support impact on national budget is minimal but rather essential to fill the national 
fiscal gap. This is mainly because the domestic revenue base has been growing over the years and 
hence reducing budget support to an average of 5.4% between 2005 and 2009; with the highest share 
of 6.5% in 2005 (Whitworth 2010) (indicator 1.2.2). 
In conclusion, it is worth noting that predictability of budget support is slightly better than predictability of 
project aid. 
 
JC 1.3: GBS and SBSs facilitated the establishment of a framework of policy dialogue, focused 
on key government strategies and priorities 
 Indicator 1.3.1: Shift in the focus of policy dialogue, towards more strategic issues, includ-
ing government strategy, aid management and performance assessment 
The budget support policy dialogue in Zambia originates from Part 5 of the memorandum of under-
standing, (MoU) of Poverty Reduction Budget Support signed in 2005 between the government and the 
cooperating partners. Policy dialogue architecture is very formal and elaborate, which comprises of 
Joint Steering Committee (JSC), the Joint Executive Committee (JEC), and the bi-annual meetings 
taking place as part of the Joint Annual Review (JAR) process.  
The Joint Steering Committee (JSC) is the major steering component of PRBS plan and comprises of 
both the government and cooperating partners representatives. The JSC, which is co-chaired by GRZ 
and Cooperating Partners, convenes every quarter. According to the MoU, the JSC quarterly meetings 
discuss progress made with respect to the performance indicators as agreed in the Performance As-
sessment Framework (PAF); prepare for review meetings; act as a forum for dialogue as specified in 
Part 5 of the MoU and mediate in dispute settlement as specified in Part 11 of the MoU.  
The implementation of the JSC meetings is coordinated by a Joint Executive Committee (JEC), which 
comprises of three government officials and two PRBS Group members. These members are selected 
from amongst the members of the JSC and they rotate on an annual basis. The JEC also prepares the 
joint reviews and the follow up on management activities, such as deciding on relevant issues for dia-
logue. 
The Joint Annual Review (JAR) meetings are jointly organised by government and cooperating partners 
and are held twice a year in June and October respectively. Participation at the JAR meetings is open 
to parliamentarians and civil society and the attendance is often good. According to the MoU, the main 
focus of the June meeting is performance assessment Framework (PAF), which serves as the basis for 
commitments by cooperating partners for the subsequent budget year. The October meeting focuses 
on dialogue to reach consensus on PAF indicators for the next year and also on future budgetary plan-
ning. According to the MoU, this dialogue will be based on the government‘s annual financial reports of 
the previous budget year, the annual PEMFA evaluation and the ceilings in the annual budget for the 
next budget year (GRZ 2005b, 11).  
It is worth noting that the PRBS policy dialogue is closely linked to the annual High Level Policy Dia-
logue (HLPD).The HLPD is between government and the Group of Cooperating Partners (CPG) whom 
are signatories to the Joint Assistance Strategy (JASZ), and is chaired by the Minister of Finance and 
National Planning. The CPG is subdivided into two sub-groups, namely, the Heads of Cooperation 
(HoC) and the Heads of Mission (HoM). The HoC focuses on operational multi-sectoral issues including 
strategic developmental policy matters. It is led by a Troika of two bilateral and one multi-lateral agency 
and meet once monthly with the Secretary to the Treasury at the Ministry of Finance. The HoM are in 
charge of the general strategic and political dialogue at the highest level to discuss a diversity of issues 
with government. 
Extracts: 
“During the JAR 2007, GRZ was well-represented at the technical level but largely absent at the politi-
cal level. The Secretary to the Treasury (ST) as the highest civil servant in the MoFNP chaired the 
meetings. Many problems can be solved at an intermediate level but on a number of occasions it be-
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came evident in the WG that key problems have to be referred to the political level (e.g. agricultural 
subsidies). The PRBS CPs view the FNDP as a credible plan behind which to align their support but 
some inconsistencies have emerged between FNDP priorities, budget allocation and execution. This 
perception is of a fundamental nature and tends to undermine the credibility of the FNDP and the rela-
tions of trust between the GRZ and CPs. It is of crucial importance to address this in an appropriate 
manner. The PRBS MoU in 2005 created the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) as the core structure that 
is supposed to meet at least quarterly. Such high level meetings have not taken place so far, while the 
Joint Executive Committee (JEC) at the technical level meets frequently. The Zambian way of dealing 
with the policy dialogue is not without risks. Even during good weather it may be wise to invest into an 
umbrella. 
The participation of civil society and the private sector in the PRBS process has improved but is still 
weak. During the JAR 2007, some NGO and private sector representatives were present in the themat-
ic working groups on Tuesday but not during the plenary session on Thursday. NGO and private sector 
presence was negatively affected by the late invitations. The invitations were despatched only a few 
days before the event and the documents were only partly available beforehand. An exception to that 
experience was a stronger private sector participation in the macroeconomic group on pro-poor growth 
and agriculture. Members of Parliament were entirely absent. Independent of the PRBS process, at the 
Sector Advisory Group (SAG) level, participation is open to all institutions having expertise on the sub-
ject matter, including civil society.” (PRBS learning Assessment 2007: page 13). 
 Indicator 1.3.2: Existence of monitoring of the progress on achieving the agreed results in 
education, health and agriculture (in a way that promotes mutual accountability and part-
nerships) 
The Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) was signed by government and the cooperating part-
ners in May 2007 for the period 2007-2010. It aligns donor’s response to the Fifth National Develop-
ment Plan (FNDP) and includes a country context analysis including a strategy to enhance ownership, 
alignment, mutual accountability and improved donor coordination. The JASZ outlines a Division of 
Labour which aims at decongesting sectors which are crowded by cooperating partners such as health 
and education and spread them across sectors evenly. These developments encouraged the formula-
tion and implementation of ambitious sector plans that aimed at restructuring and revitalisation of the 
dilapidated sectors. According to the JASZ Evaluation, 2010, the objective of replacing separate CP 
country strategies with the JASZ was not realised. However, 25% of CPs interviewed in an online sur-
vey held the view that there was substantial change in their strategies in Zambia as a result of the 
JASZ, and 62.5% considered there was some change. These changes related largely to changes in 
sector engagement (and in the provision of GBS) as a result of the Division of Labour (DOL), although 
in two cases it was considered that this was driven more by agency head office decisions than by the 
JASZ as such (OPM, March 2010). 
Education sector: In line with the JASZ, the ministry of education and the cooperating partners signed a 
new MoU in 2008. The MoU indicates that both general budget support and sector budget sector as 
funding modalities for the sector. In 2008, the education sector stopped using the Ministry of education 
sector plan (MoESP) and developed the National Implementation Framework (NIF), which is the major 
instrument for implementing the national development plan for the education sector. It has prioritised 
education as a key social sector by targeting a minimum allocation of 20.5 per cent of the total annual 
discretionary budget for the sector. Other stakeholders such as international NGOs and local civil socie-
ty organisations support the sector through projects and / or provision of technical assistance.  
Health sector: The health sector developed the National Health Strategic Plan IV for 2006-2010, which 
identified “governance” as one of its 12 priority intervention areas, the objective being ‘to provide a 
comprehensive policy and legal framework and systems for effective coordination, implementation and 
monitoring of health services’. The MoU of 2006 was revised in 2009 with an addendum that included 
scaling up support towards the MDGs and strengthening country-owned strategies. Despite having a 
Swap, the sector has mixed aid modalities basket funding, projects, sector budget support and general 
budget support which poses management challenges for the government.  
The sector continued to experience effects of the 2009 misappropriation of funds scandal into 2010, 
when the ministry of Health embarked on a Governance road map in collaboration with cooperating 
partners to remedy the problem. The Netherlands and Sweden had interrupted their contributions to-
wards the basket fund which led to many planned activities to be cancelled. As part of the Governance 
road map, the government rolled out the 'Integrated Financial Management System' (IFMIS) which is 
spearheaded by MoFNP with EC support. Even though implementation of the Governance road map 
was recognised, governments request from the EU Sector Budget Support tranche (fixed tranche of 
€8.5m and variable tranche of €1.5m) was only received in December 2010. It was challenging for the 
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Commission to disburse these funds in-year and this situation contributed to the poor performance of 
the health indicators. Furthermore, in spite of overall economic development, attainment of MDG Goals 
4 and 5 remains a challenge but, there is a general reduction in the incidence prevalence of tuberculo-
sis and malaria. 
Agriculture sector: The National Agricultural Policy was developed in 2004 for the period 2004-2015 
and was also aligned to the FNDP in 2006. The FNDP recognised the sector as an engine of rural 
growth and poverty reduction, with a 90% target for household food security by 2015. There are eight 
active cooperating partners in the sector. The donor-government relationship has been challenging due 
to contentious issues surrounding fertilizer subsidies and the role of the state in maize marketing. How-
ever, there has not been a complete cessation in the flow of external assistance to the sector, although 
it remains segmented due to the predominance of project funding in the absence of a sector basket. 
The situation might improve with the signing of the CAADP Compact in 2010. CPs support specific are-
as within the overall strategies, for instance conservation, irrigation and agri-business programmes. 
Under the EDF9, the European Union (EU) was supporting extension (Support to Agriculture Diversifi-
cation and Food Security Programme (SADFSP, 2006 to 2010) in North-Western and Western provinc-
es with a cost of €15m. There is a general perception in MACO and among CPs that alignment is inad-
equate at the operational level. As part of the EDF10, a comprehensive capacity development pro-
gramme called Performance Enhancement Programme worth €8.9m was developed for the two Minis-
tries (Agriculture and Livestock).The programme will aim at supporting change management and im-
proving service delivery, sector policy, planning, financial management, human resources management 
as well as monitoring and evaluation. 
Water sector: A large number of Cooperating Partners and NGOs support the water sector mainly in 
form of projects. Additionally, a good number of international non-governmental organisations such as 
Water Aid, Care International, World Vision and ActionAid significantly support the sector. There have 
been attempts by almost all multi and bilateral Cooperating Partners to align their activities to national 
policies but there are still challenges especially regarding procurement, tendering and the role of tech-
nical assistance in capacity building.  
Under the Integrated Water Resources Action Programme (EU: €3.75m), a significant milestone was 
the completion of the necessary steps in Parliament for the enactment of the Water Bill, which was as-
sented by the President in early 2011. 
Extracts: 
“In 2010, and as part of the EDF10, a comprehensive capacity development programme – the Perfor-
mance Enhancement Programme (EU: €8.9m) – for the two Ministries (Agriculture and Livestock) for a 
total of. Based on a participatory performance self-assessment carried out in early 2009, the pro-
gramme will aim at supporting change management and improving service delivery, sector policy, plan-
ning, financial management, human resources management as well as monitoring and evaluation. 
The EDF9 project on Food Security and Agricultural Diversification in Western and North Western Prov-
inces (EU: €15m) came to an end in December 2010. Overall, it enhanced both the capacity of the Min-
istry of Agriculture and Co-operatives (MACO) to develop food security action plans in Western and 
North Western Provinces and extension services in targeted districts. It also supported Non State Ac-
tors on the Provincial food security action plans. The project was based on the assumption that MACO 
only needed financial support in order to deliver good extension services to the farmer. However, it 
appeared during implementation that MACO's capacity to analyse the needs of the sector and translate 
them into coordinated interventions was a limitation to the project. Consequently, implementation was 
seriously delayed, specifically policy formulation and the development of strategic plans. However, 
training and input distributions have been implemented smoothly. The project trained significant num-
bers of extension officers and farmers and given them the necessary inputs to improve extension ser-
vice delivery and productivity. However, the long-term impact on the farmers' livelihood should be con-
solidated by addressing additional structural issues like professionalisation of farmers and marketing.3 
(Cooperation between European Commission and Zambia, Joint Annual Report, 2010:page 10) 
 
“There is very limited engagement on mutual accountability mainly because the Mutual Accountability 
Framework has not yet been developed by the donor group although there have been some discus-
sions towards this. It is nevertheless noted that the PAF for 2010 included three indicators on PRBS 
donor performance. This will go a long way towards addressing concerns that accountability was not 
mutual as it seemed that it was only the performance of the GRZ that was at stake and not that of do-
nors. Some Zambian officials have even asked when the civil society would be brought into this matrix 
of accountability since they too are recipients of donor aid.” Evaluation of Implementation of Paris Dec-
laration, 2010. 
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 Indicator 1.3.3: Increased degree of involvement of relevant ministries both at central and 
sector level, and especially of decentralised institutions 
Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) were established during the preparation of the PRSP and have been 
the main vehicle for sector stakeholder consultations. They provide a forum for discussions on policy 
and budgetary planning processes. For instance, the agriculture SAG spearheaded the design of the 
Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) Compact signed between the 
GRZ, donors and civil society on 18th January 2011.  
However, their success is mixed as some SAGs are more active and meet regularly, while others are 
dormant. There is consensus amongst stakeholders that dialogue at sector level is weak, largely due to 
lack of active involvement of SAGs in reviewing sector outcomes and performance. According to the 
JASZ Evaluation, 2010, SAG meeting which are supposed to take place at least three times a year only 
take place on average of once a year. SAG reports are distributed months after meetings and key 
background papers for onward meetings are delayed and sometimes not even prepared at all (OPM 
2010). Consequently, the SAGs as well as the annual joint SAG conference have not functioned 
properly in building a link between specific sector issues and the core mechanisms of the budget sup-
port dialogue.  
As a result of weak SAGs, the PRBS review meeting are overloaded with sector issues which could 
have been dealt with at sector level. This has also hindered the Government‘s capacity to take owner-
ship in the setting of new sector targets for the Performance Assessment Framework. 
Extracts: 
“The role of Sector Advisory Groups can and should be enhanced instead of just extending dialogue 
opportunities between GRZ and CPs. The generic terms of reference for the SAG role provide a good 
start, complemented by more specific ToRs at the individual SAG level. An open but more formalised 
and standardised SAG methodology (co-chairs GRZ/CPs, regular meetings, joint agenda setting, sys-
tematic follow-up and monitoring) could be a big step forward. As foreseen in the FNDP, SAGs at the 
district and provincial level should become operational. The Annual Poverty Conference (Annual SAG 
Conference) provides cross-fertilisation and serves to distil various aspects of poverty challenges. Be-
yond the annual conference, the quality and frequency of dialogue amongst the SAGs throughout the 
year should be strengthened. The functions of the sector desk officers in the MoFNP should be re-
viewed and strengthened. They ought to serve as a sustainable link between the MoFNP and the sector 
ministries. Desk officers should also participate in policy meetings to enhance their knowledge of the 
challenges in their respective sectors. There is also a need to expand their TORs to include sectoral 
linkages in their duties.”( PRBS Learning Assessment 2007: Page 15) 
 
“Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) which were established during the preparation of the PRSP have been 
the main vehicle for stakeholder consultation. During the implementation of these development plans, 
SAGs are the main entry point for cooperation between the stakeholders at sector level. They provide a 
forum for discussions on policy and budget planning processes. However, their success is mixed as 
some SAGs are more active and meet regularly, while others are dormant.” (Evaluation of Implementa-
tion of Paris Declaration, 2010: page 22 ) 
 
JC 1.3:  GBS and SBSs facilitated the establishment of a framework of policy dialogue, focused 
on key government strategies and priorities 
One of the major weaknesses in the design of the Policy Dialogue in Zambia is the lack of active partic-
ipation of third party such as Civil Society Organisations, Parliamentarians as well as private actors. 
Furthermore, representation of CSOs, parliamentarians, representatives of sub-national entities is com-
paratively weak both in SAG meetings and PRBS annual reviews. Sub-national actors have mostly 
been absent from the dialogue process, reflecting the overall (political) weakness of sub-national enti-
ties respectively their coordinating mechanisms such as the Local Government Association of Zambia. 
Furthermore, collaboration between MoFNP and sector ministries has been weak in the dialogue pro-
cess. Active participation of sector ministries in the core dialogue mechanisms of budget support has 
been inconsistent, in addition to lack of capacity to fulfil their role in the complex dialogue structure.  
The policy dialogue framework provided government and Cooperating Partners a platform to deal with 
highly controversial issues. In this regard, dialogue mechanism indeed was fruitful in preventing the 
implosion of harmonisation and alignment attempts during times of crisis. 
For instance; After the alleged embezzlement of resources in the health sector, the PRBS group re-
sponded swiftly and homogeneously indicating their discomfort about corruption and the overall slow 
pace of reforms. They quickly suspended the PRBS disbursement and basket funding to the health 
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sector and jointly initiated a HLPD on the Underlying Principles as stipulated in the PRBS MoU. The 
Cooperating Partners successfully managed to bring back outstanding reforms to the table. This was a 
display of an effective policy dialogue platform that the cooperating partners used to dialogue with gov-
ernment.  
However, sometimes it has been challenging for cooperating partners to engage in dialogue with a 
united approach. This is well illustrated by the different reactions by Sweden and the EC in response to 
the 2009 corruption case in the health sector. The Swedish decision to suspend disbursements was 
based on the interpretation that the Underlying Principles had been violated. In contrast, the EC as-
sessed the fact that the case was brought to the attention of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) by 
members of the administration and followed up upon as positive signs for the functioning of domestic 
institutions to fight corruption. Accordingly, in the same year, the EC even augmented its disbursements 
through the Vulnerability Flex Support in 2009 (Evaluation of Budget Support, 2010). 
Therefore, this often implicit value of the dialogue structure should not be underestimated despite all 
deficiencies of the dialogue process itself. Setting up a complex dialogue structure with important func-
tions for an ambitious aid instrument such a budget support requires strong capacity and the political 
will to manage these dialogue structures in an effective and efficient manner. Cooperating Partners and 
GRZ continuously have expressed their intention to do so, although capacity on both sides has been 
limited. 
 
JC 1.4: GBS and SBS facilitated the delivery of strategic and demand driven non-financial in-
puts (e.g. TA and capacity development) that are aligned to government priorities 
 Indicator 1.4.1: Timely and effective delivery of GBS/SBS non-financial inputs 
The European Commission, which is part of the Cooperating Partner Group developed and signed a 
code of conduct on capacity Development in 2008, which aims at strengthening the effectiveness, effi-
ciency and impact of technical assistance from both project support and direct budget support to Zam-
bia (CPG 2008, 1). Cooperating partners acknowledged that effective government institutions would 
facilitate efficient management of public resources and external funds and they embarked on a number 
of programmes and initiatives of technical assistance and capacity building. 
The non-financial inputs have focused on in education and health sector. However, even in the relative-
ly well-performing education sector, Cooperating Partners have recently become more critical on the 
effectiveness of Cooperation in the education sector. There is a strong sense that the current sector 
dialogue mechanisms are not working effectively, because meetings are regularly delayed or cancelled 
and because of inadequate representation at appropriate levels. An example is the move towards tar-
geted budget support (sector budget support), as proposed by the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) Assess-
ment: In 2008, it was agreed that Zambia would receive Zambia USD 60m from the Fast Track Initiative 
(FTI) Catalytic Fund. USD 30m was disbursed in 2009. However, by the end of 2010, Cooperating 
Partners showed serious concerns about the lack of progress on the introduction of targeted budget 
support. Also alarmed by possible irregularities in the education sector, under investigation by the Audi-
tor General, they suspended the contribution to the sector pool as well as the second tranche of the 
Catalytic Fund.  
For instance, in the health sector there is a growing resentment that the presence of donors in other-
wise routine Government decision-making processes threatens national ownership. On the other hand, 
the general perception of the Ministry of Health (MoH) staff is that sector and general budget support 
have eroded their ownership due to the shift away from direct receipt of funds (as is the case under the 
MoH-controlled SWAp/basket funding) to receipt of donor support through the Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning (MFNP). In particular, MoH officials have expressed fears that basket funds will be 
severely depleted as a result of a shift to GBS. On the positive side, the smaller working groups func-
tion better. In education for example, overall harmonisation and Ministry leadership have advanced 
considerably from where the sector had been ten years ago (OPM 2010).  
Extracts: 
“With regard to other central government agencies, ownership of the existing dialogue structures has 
been heterogeneous and the collaboration between MoFNP and sector ministries has been weak in the 
dialogue process. The participation of sector ministries in the core dialogue mechanisms of budget 
support has been uneven at best. Beyond a lack of the capacity in several ministries to fulfil their role in 
the complex dialogue structure, political interests played also against it. From a sector ministry‘s per-
spective, accepting the dialogue structure and the underlying intervention logic of budget support would 
also have meant the acceptance of the finance ministry as the core state agency in regulating the dis-
tribution of external and domestic funds – with serious implications for the existing formal and informal 
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distribution mechanism that increased the political weight of the leadership of these ministries.  
Accordingly, sector ministries aligning to the logic of budget support would have had to give a up their 
privileged position in negotiating and receiving resources directly from Cooperating Partners.26 There-
fore, sector ministries had a very rational perspective on not seriously trying to overcome the collective 
action problem of organisational fragmentation with the GRZ.” (Evaluation of Budget Support, 2010: 
page 40) 
 Indicator 1.4.2: TA and capacity development initiatives are increasingly coordinated and 
focused on key government strategic priorities 
The PEMFA Programme was initially a five year programme (2005-2009) with 13 components, namely: 
(1) Commitment Control System (CCS) and Financial Management System (FMS); (2) IFMIS (Integrat-
ed Financial Management System) implementation; (3) Improved Fiscal Policy and Economic Planning; 
(4) Reformed Budget Preparation and Budget Execution; (5) Improved Debt Management; (6) Improved 
Internal Audit; (7) Better External Finance and Coordination; (8) Legal and Regulatory Framework; (9) 
Strengthened External Audit; (10) Enhancing Parliamentary Oversight; (11) Accountancy Training and 
Regulation; (12) Public Procurement Reform; and (13) Centralized Computer Services Department. The 
contribution to the budget for the programme for the five year period by co-operating partners amounts 
to USD 72.2m. By March 2009, 55% or USD 39.7m had been utilized (MoFNP 2009, 3). The PEMFA 
Programme was (cost-neutrally) extended for one year and will end in 2010 (PEMFA 2010). The gov-
ernment also provides counterpart funding to the PEMFA programme to meet recurrent costs. 
The EU disbursed its last €11.5m tranche of EDF9 Sector Budget Support in support to the programme. 
The 2009 PEFA assessment had already shown some encouraging tangible results attributable notably 
to PEMFA. According to the PEMFA evaluation of 2010, some successes such as establishment of the 
new Public Procurement Agency; strengthening of the Institute of Chartered Accountants and creation 
of the Zambia Macroeconomic Model have been noted. Furthermore, the new provincial offices of the 
Office of the Auditor General (AGO) have been built, which has increased the audit coverage of budget 
and institutions. Audit coverage is currently at 79% (similar to 2008), while irregularities were found to 
have significantly reduced with transactions amounting to 2.29% of actual 2009 expenditure (3.28 % for 
2008). 
The objective of PEMFA is to complement the efforts of the Government in improving efficiency, effec-
tiveness and accountability in the financial management of public resources at central and sub-national 
levels. This is essential in order to improve public expenditure management and to strengthen the over-
all national financial accountability. With regard to budget support, positive results of the programme 
would impact on Cooperating Partners confidence in using GRZs own country and PFM systems 
(Hedvall et al. 2007, 6). The Programme is supported by the signatories to the PEMFA MoU, which 
includes all nine PRBS donors: Norway, The Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Den-
mark, United Kingdom, European Commission, World Bank (IDA), United Nations, African Development 
Bank (AfDB) and the Government of the United States of America. GRZ is also providing counterpart 
funding to meet recurrent costs (PEMFA 2010, 1). 
Table 8: EU Capacity building initiatives  
Amount  Programme 
PRBS 1 : Allocation of €7 million for Capacity building activities  
€2.5 m PFM reform to the Ministry of Finance to bridge the gap before the EDF9 Institutional Development and Capacity 
Building Programme is launched, and to provide support for annual assessments of progress with PFM, reviews, 
annual compliance testing. This component will also make available support for a gender analysis of the budget.  
€4 m PRSP monitoring in general, including specifically support to Ministry of Education and Health for strategic plan-
ning in line with the PRSP, results monitoring, and financial management, notably connecting with the MTEF, in 
the context of the sector plans and programmes. This component also covers support for regular quality assur-
ance of the information systems, indicators, and management responses. 
€0.25 m Transparency and visibility activities, including funding for seminars at political level including Parliament, and 
with media/civil society to enhance discussion of results reported in the annual reviews/evaluations. 
€0.25 m EC audit/evaluation of the programme including activities funded under the capacity building component. 
PRBSII: Allocation of €1.8 million for Capacity building activities 
€1.3 m Strengthening data quality, through support to the Health ministry .Activities implemented through direct labour 
operations 
€0.25 m Capacity building activities such as research, studies, training and workshops in the areas of parliament –via a 
contribution agreement with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
€0.25 m Training of civil society on budget tracking issues via a grant awarded to the local CSO umbrella called Civil 
Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR), which is a suitable interlocutor in areas of intervention and relationship 
between government and CPs.  
€0.2 m Allocated for audits and evaluations 
MDG-Contract  
 Parliamentary Reform Programme for 2008-2011 was launched, covering Capacity Building activities on the 
oversight role of Parliament in the budgetary process. The EC is contributing to the Programme with resources 
from PRBS 2. 
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Extracts: 
“Whilst a number of Zambia’s Cooperating Partners (CPs) have supported PFM reform directly through 
the PEMFA, some have continued to provide bi-lateral support for PFM reform outside of the PEMFA 
arrangement. This has meant that support within a number of the PEMFA components (e.g. Compo-
nent 9 – Strengthening External Audit; Component 10 – Enhanced Parliamentary Oversight) has been 
provided through bi-lateral cooperation and through the PEMFA arrangements together. On the whole, 
there has been a clear division of labour in the provision of support which has largely avoided the in-
herent risk of duplication and waste. In these cases, the division of labour has largely been one where-
by new systems, processes, procedures and the corresponding development of human resource ca-
pacities has been carried out through bi-lateral support and where complementary physical infrastruc-
ture has been provided through PEMFA funding. 
This arrangement has meant that leadership for PFM reform through a given PEMFA component has 
amounted to overseeing a works building programme (which has been successfully delivered in the 
case of components 9 and 10, though delivered late in each case), whilst support for complementary 
aspects of reform (dealing with institutional strengthening and capacity building) operated outside of the 
PEMFA management framework. It has also created a situation whereby (current) demonstrable PFM 
progress within a given PEMFA component area may only be attributable to PEMFA activities to a lim-
ited degree (although the impact of the PEMFA measures are likely to be more apparent over subse-
quent years). 
Over the PEMFA period, in fact, there appears to have been demonstrable improvement in key PFM 
areas, as measured by the high level PEFA indicator set, through assessments carried out in 2005 and 
2008. Moreover, to the extent that data has been made available to the PEMFA assessment team, 
analysis of Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) indicators in 2010 suggests that 
these gains have largely been consolidated in the later years of the PEMFA period.” (PEMFA Evalua-
tion, 2010: page v). 
 Indicator 1.4.3: TA and capacity development initiatives are increasingly demand-led (gov-
ernment, line ministries and local authorities) 
It is important to note that one significant element of PEMFA is the strengthening of existing oversight 
mechanisms especially the OAG and parliament. In the quest to streamline the role of the Auditor Gen-
eral Office, in 2004 government decentralised the office to all districts countrywide. The government 
has set the pace for capacity building reforms and encouraged cooperating partners to complement its 
efforts. Several cooperating partners have responded and provide technical assistance in various as-
pects of capacity building programmes to fight corruption, which are not within the PEMFA programme. 
Norway and the Netherlands provide assistance to the OAG aside the PEMFA, which aims at guaran-
teeing independence of the Auditor General (NORAD 2007, 56).  
The EDF9 Capacity Building for Private Sector Development worth EU: €15m was provided to the Min-
istry of Commerce, Trade, and Industry (MCTI) to assist with the development of a policy and regulatory 
framework for the business environment, and improve dialogue between the public and the private sec-
tor. It is recognized that the support to Zambia Bureau of Standards and Zambia Weights and 
Measures Agency which included the provision of equipment to provide fee-generating services to 
business had some positive impact. Interventions with the Zambian Development Agency were aimed 
at building capacity and removing impediments to business start-up. The programme came to an end in 
December 2010. 
The European Commission programme on technical assistance consists of three phases; Phase one 
provides capacity building for MPs, Phase two proves hardware and office construction and Phase 
three will establish constituency offices. Some donors such as Finland, Germany, USAID and the Unit-
ed Kingdom have capacity building projects, which have been targeted at Members of Parliament 
(MPs) during the last ten years.  
USAID has a five year support programme in conjunction with the Economic Association of Zambia 
(EAZ), which has developed budget literacy guidelines, conducted training courses for relevant Parlia-
ment Committees such as the Public Accounts Committees on budget execution. Germany, through 
GTZ has been providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Finance and National Planning since 
2006, which is aimed at incorporating the Poverty Reduction Strategy into the budgetary process by 
providing Technical assistants to various MoFNP departments. This programme is relevant to PRBS 
programme because it aims at enhancing the budgetary process which would strengthen management 
of national resources. In addition, this programme also contributes to PRBS processes by generating 
and improving data for monitoring and evaluation of government performance. 
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Extracts: 
“The EDF9 Capacity Building for Private Sector Development (EU: €15m) came to an end in December 
2010. Funding was made available in support to the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and Industry (MCTI) 
so that it could develop a policy and regulatory framework for the business environment, and improve 
dialogue between the public and the private sector. The latter part of the project was characterised by 
greater enthusiasm and ownership after the appointment of a new Permanent Secretary in the benefi-
ciary MCTI. An evaluation will in 2011 provide lessons learnt. It is acknowledged that the support to 
Zambia Bureau of Standards and Zambia Weights and Measures Agency which included the provision 
of equipment to provide fee-generating services to business did have some positive impact. Interven-
tions with the Zambian Development Agency were aimed at building capacity and removing impedi-
ments to business start-up. Results to date have been mixed mainly due to the Zambian Development 
Agency (ZDA) being only recently established, however at broader sectoral level there has been an 
improvement with regard to policy and regulatory review for entry into the business sector (as evi-
denced by the WB Doing Business Reports over time). Some mix results were produced by grants to 
Non-State Actors (NSA) which included many of the business associations present in Zambia.” (Coop-
eration between European Union and Zambia- Joint Annual Report, 2010: page 11)  
 
“Budget support related capacity building activities  
• U.K. Department for International Development. Providing support to the Anti-Corruption Com-
mission. Strengthening of political parties. Offering technical assistance to the Secretary to Cabi-
net. Supporting professionalisation of the public service.  
• Millennium Challenge Account. Providing support to the Anti-Corruption Commission and Zambia 
Revenue Authority. Helping government implement provisions of the National Corruption Preven-
tion Policy and Strategy (setting up of integrity committees in a few ministries). Re-engineering 
work processes in the Department of Immigration, Patents and Company Registration, Zambia 
Revenue Authority, and the Ministry of Lands.  
• U.S. Agency for International Development, DFID, EU and Others. Providing support in the im-
plementation of parliamentary reforms.  
• Norway and Netherlands. Supporting the Office of the Auditor General in implementing reforms in 
audit practices and effectiveness.  
• Norway, UNDP, Denmark and Others. Supporting access to justice and judicial reforms. Building 
courts and supporting the recently set up Governance Secretariat.  
• European Union. Supporting capacity development in civil society organisations. Supporting the 
government in electoral reforms  
• Consortium of Donors. Providing financial and capacity development support to the Task Force 
on Corruption.” (World Bank 2008) 
 Indicator 1.4.4: Evidence of increased capacity of GRZ to design and implement macroeco-
nomic and sector policies 
Despite human development playing an important catalytic role in poverty reduction and economic de-
velopment, the quality of human capital in government continued to be low. This was evidenced by 
increased scarcity of skilled manpower mainly due to lack of coordinated internal training system, inad-
equate infrastructure and resources for skills development and limited access to higher and tertiary 
education. Additionally, without appropriate and effective linkages in place, the existing supply of skills 
did not adequately meet the demand in the labour market. 
Job creation was not commensurate with the gains registered from economic growth. In addition, eco-
nomic growth and poverty reduction was further constrained by several factors, among which were the 
following: poor infrastructure; low quality of human capital; high cost of financial services; inefficiencies 
in public expenditure management and limited access to land. However, if fully utilised, the population 
can contribute to economic growth for sustainable development.  
Furthermore, the low quality human development, the focus of the Sixth National Development Plan 
(SNDP) will be to improve existing capacities through quality training, jobs creation, labour productivity, 
increasing access to health and higher and tertiary education and facilitate the distribution of skilled 
labour within and across sectors throughout the country.  
Extracts : 
In view of the low quality human development, the focus of the Sixth National Development Plan 
(SNDP) will be to improve existing capacities through quality training, jobs creation, labour productivity, 
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increasing access to health and higher and tertiary education and facilitate the distribution of skilled 
labour within and across sectors throughout the country. (Sixth National Development Plan 20112-
2015) 
 
JC 1.4:  GBS and SBS facilitated the delivery of strategic and demand driven non-financial in-
puts (e.g. TA and capacity development) that are aligned to government priorities 
The support provided through the PEMFA programme and to the Office of the Auditor General Office 
has assisted to develop essential capacities that are necessary to enhance the use and control of ex-
ternal resources that are channelled through country systems. As observed by the PEMFA Evaluation 
Report of 2010; that assessing the relevance of training provided under PEMFA is relatively straightfor-
ward. Assessing the effectiveness of technical assistance and training received by component staff, 
however, is far from straightforward. Whilst the Annual Progress reports provide comprehensive infor-
mation on the type of training that has been planned each year, the duration, the target numbers to be 
trained and the numbers actually receiving training, there is little or no information reported on the quali-
ty or effectiveness of the training (through user or management feedback or otherwise).(PEMFA Evalu-
ation Report, August 2010) 
In sum, the fundamental gap in the delivery of strategic and demand driven TA and capacity develop-
ment is the lack of coordinated implementation of the Code of Practice on Capacity Development (CPG 
2008). The code lacks a coherent and harmonised approach to Capacity Development under which a 
formalized coordination and dialogue process could be established. As a consequence, no formalised 
coordination and information exchange mechanisms were established with other technical assistance 
activities outside PEMFA programme have been established. 
 
JC 1.5: GBS and other EU interventions have assisted in improving core indicators for primary 
education service delivery 
 Indicator 1.5.1: Improved capacity for planning, management, and monitoring to develop-
ment and enforcement of polices in the education sector 
In Zambia, sector cooperation in the education sector dates from the end of the 1990s. By then, GRZ 
implemented an ambitious plan, the Basic Education Sub-Sector Programme (BESSIP) for 1999-2002, 
to improve access to and quality of basic education. This plan sought to redress the dilapidation of the 
basic education subsector. In the 1980s and 1990s, economic developments and a heavy debt burden 
had forced the Government to cut budgets for education. As a result, enrolment rates decreased even 
though the school-age population was growing fast. Literacy rates did not improve but tended to deteri-
orate.  
BESSIP marked the start of more intensive sector cooperation which also highlighted the ownership 
role of government. The plan created a model for Zambian ownership; more effectively coordinated 
support, and thus improved the effectiveness of interventions. In 2003, BESSIP was followed by a se-
cond development plan, the Ministry of Education Strategic Plan (MoESP) for 2003-2007. This plan 
covered the whole education sector. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), also signed in 2003, 
marked a new stage in the development of sector cooperation. Until 2003, sector support had mainly 
been restricted to funding basic education, but the new sector plan of 2003 covered the whole educa-
tion sector and contributed an increase in donor funding and improved coordination. In 2008, the Na-
tional Implementation Framework 2008-2010 (NIF) followed. This Framework functions as the main 
vehicle for the implementation of the objectives of the Fifth National Development Plan for the educa-
tion sector. GRZ and cooperating partners are now moving towards targeted budget support (sector 
budget support), as proposed by the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) Assessment. In 2008, it was agreed that 
Zambia would receive Zambia USD 60m from the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) Catalytic Fund. 
As a result of the implementation of the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) and the move 
towards General Budget Support, four cooperating partners (Norway, DFID, EC and Finland) have 
withdrawn from direct involvement in the education sector through the sector pool. They remain in-
volved in the sector and contribute to the funding through GBS. Four cooperating partners (Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Germany) still provide support through the sector pool. In 2006, 10% of the 
total budget was funded through the sector pool and 4% through designated project accounts (World 
Bank, 2008). The remaining part (86%) was funded by GRZ (including GBS). Partly as a result of these 
developments, the sector contribution of cooperating partners decreased from 38 per cent in 2005 to 12 
per cent in 2008 (MoFNP 2009, p 63). 
In 2007, the Ministry of Education (MoE) concluded the implementation of the Education Strategic Plan 
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2003-2007. The EDF9 pool funding mechanism, supported through a €10m programme was concluded 
also in 2007. The EC also supported in 2007 the Education Management Information System (EMIS), in 
coordination with USAID. Considering the division of labour under the JASZ, the EC participation in 
sector dialogue was reduced from 2008, support being limited to short-term consultancies, through the 
Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF). In this regard, the Commission agreed to fund a consultancy – 
‘Review of the Decentralised Procurement of Text Books in Zambia’, with the MoE as the supervising 
agent. The tender and awarding of the contract was concluded by the Delegation in December 2008. 
Although the shift to GBS has not reduced the allocations to the Ministry of Education and domestic 
spending has increased enormously since 2007, Zambia’s spending on education is still low. The coun-
try spends 4.0% of its GDP on education against an average spending of 5.3% in comparator countries 
(HLPD/PRBS, 2009). The lack of resources contributed to the backlog in infrastructure (World Bank 
2006 and 2008). 
Figure 4.1: Development of the sector pool 2005-2009 (million USD) 
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Source: MoFNP / MoE; De kemp calculations, 2010 
Extracts: 
“ ‘One important reason for this divergence relates to a similar collective action problem that has been 
identified on the side of the GRZ . This collective action problem has to do with the specific sector inter-
ests of individual Cooperating Partners. A strong move towards harmonisation and alignment compati-
ble with the intervention logic of budget support would weaken many Cooperating Partners‘ special 
relations with sector ministries and would subordinate their sector interests under a coherent national 
planning system with the finance ministry as the prime player. In this regard sector interests of individu-
al Cooperating Partners and the interests of sector ministries to restrain the coordinating function of the 
finance ministry come together in an ‘unholy‘ alliance against the intervention logic of budget support.” 
(Evaluation of budget support in Zambia,2010: page 48) 
 Indicator 1.5.2: Increased number of classrooms 
There is consensus from stakeholders in the education sector that government through the Ministry of 
education has performed exceptionally well. The problem is that population increase and some policies 
(transfer to Grade 10 for all grade 9 graduates) means that pupil/classroom ratios do not decrease. 
Indeed at Grade 10 classrooms sizes of 70-80 are reported. As Chapter 1 shows access without ad-
dressing equity is unsustainable. The increased focus on improving high school education during the 
National Implementation Framework 2008-2010 period has led to increased access in the sub-sector. 
With effect from 2009, MoE introduced a policy allowing all pupils with full certificates at Grade 9 to 
proceed to Grade 10 with no cut off point.  
Infrastructure development was accelerated; MoE developed the 2008 and 2009 Infrastructure Opera-
tional Plans to construct 45 high schools, which are still under construction. For Grades 10 to 12 the 
Gender Parity Index was 0.81 in 2007; in 2008 it rose to 0.83; in 2009, however, it dropped to 0.76 
against a target of 0.82 for 2010. 
The introduction of the Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) created the financial preconditions for large in-
vestments in basic education and for the abolition of school fees in 2002. In 2000, there were approxi-
mately 5,300 basic schools in Zambia; in 2009 this number had increased to more than 8,000 (with the 
largest growth coming from community schools). Over the same period, the total number of classrooms 
increased from 25,000 to 44,000. 
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Extracts: 
“Infrastructure development was accelerated; MoE developed the 2008 and 2009 Infrastructure Opera-
tional Plans to construct 45 high schools, which are still under construction”. (National Implementation 
Framework Evaluation, 2010, page 24). 
“Enrolment in basic education increased from 1.8m to 3.4m. Investments in teachers and teacher train-
ing, in schools and classrooms and in school facilities and books have been and are important instru-
ments for reducing dropout and repetition and improving progression and completion rates.” (De kemp 
2010: IOB, 2008). 
“The process to revise the PAF commenced in second half of 2010, which focused mainly on the reduc-
tion of the indicators. As a result, targets reduced from 36 indicators in 2009 downwards to 25 in 2010. 
Based on 24 indicators assessed, government performance improved in 2010 to 68.7% .This is largely 
explained by the fact that in 2010, there were fewer targets in 2010 which were not met compared to 
2009, when 10 targets were completely not met. The preparation of the new PAF in currently underway 
which will be aligned to the new Sixth National Development plan (SNDP). However, one of the chal-
lenges of this process will be to formulate the indicators which will be responsive to the needs of all 
stakeholders. This will be subject to the availability of reliable data and the type of indicators used es-
pecially in health and education sectors.”( Report of Progress under the performance Assessment 
Framework , 2009-2010: page19) 
 
”The mechanisms by which the individual Cooperating Partners link their disbursements to the PAF 
vary substantially:  
 Germany and Finland disburse their budget support as a fixed tranche based on an overall posi-
tive assessment of PAF performance as a measure for the Underlying Principle of government 
commitment to poverty reduction.  
 The Netherlands disburse a fixed tranche based on overall positive PAF performance and commit 
an additional ‗incentive tranche‘ to be disbursed if the overall PAF score exceeds 80 %.33  
 The United Kingdom also disburses a fixed tranche based on overall positive performance and 
commits an additional performance tranche linked to overall PAF performance, but with different 
thresholds: For an overall PAF score below 50 %, no performance tranche is disbursed. For PAF 
scores between 50 % and 80 %, a linear disbursement rule is applied (rounded up to the nearest 
£ 0.5 million).34 At a PAF score above 80 %, the full variable tranche would be disbursed.35  
 Sweden and Norway also both operate a fixed and variable tranche. While the fixed tranche is 
based on overall PAF performance, the variable tranche is linked to performance against selected 
PAF indicators (with performance in year n-1 determining disbursement in n+1).  
 The European Commission, in addition to its fixed tranche, operates two variable tranches, linked 
to specific PAF indicators: an annual performance tranche that is determined by the annual per-
formance assessment; and a performance tranche under the 6-year MDG-Contract scheme, 
where performance over the first three years of the arrangement determines disbursement in 
years 4 to 6.  
 The World Bank and the African Development Bank do not use a fixed tranche but both operate 
floating tranches which are disbursed once a set of selected PAF indicators (prior actions) is 
achieved.  
The share of the variable tranche in overall commitments also differs across Cooperating Partners: 
Norway and Sweden reserve 50 % of their commitments for their variable tranches, the UK only 13 %. 
The Netherlands, in 2009, would have been able to disburse an additional 30 % as incentive tranche. 
The EC, in turn, has reduced its performance tranche continuously from initially 91% to 25% in 2010. In 
2009, no variable tranche was foreseen by the EC. In 2007, the combined fixed tranches made up 84% 
of the overall PRBS commitments (Gerster / Chikwekwe 2007, 17).36 But not only do Cooperating 
Partners apply very different approaches in determining their PRBS disbursements; more importantly, 
the conditionality linking variable and floating tranches to indicators is very widely spread across the 
entire PAF.37 Prior to the PRBS inventory exercise conducted in 2010, there was evidently no clear 
understanding on the GRZ side (but not even within the PRBS-Group) of how exactly the individual 
Cooperating Partners linked their tranches to the PAF.” (Evaluation of budget support, 2010: p. 48-49). 
 Indicator 1.5.3: Improved student-teacher ratio 
The enrolment of children of the poorest households has improved enormously, but this is not the case 
with the distribution of resources for the education sector (schools, classrooms and teachers). Over the 
years, CPs have stressed the need to reduce existing disparities between urban and rural areas. Espe-
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cially the large disparities in pupil teacher ratios, with much higher pupil teacher ratios in poor and re-
mote rural areas than in wealthier urban areas, are a continuous concern. 
In 2006, a World Bank study concluded that teacher deployment was regressive. Schools with pupils 
from high-income parents had the most experienced teachers and significantly lower pupil teacher rati-
os. The study concluded that school funding was generally regressive, with 30% higher allocations to 
richer schools. In 2008, a study of IOB confirmed the large differences between urban and rural areas. 
Moreover, pupil teacher ratios were highest in the poorest districts. Most teachers prefer to work in ur-
ban areas, resulting in an enormous shortage of trained teachers in more remote areas. The lack of 
housing in rural areas is an obstacle to teacher recruitment and retention in rural areas (World Bank 
2006, p. 29). Recent field visits support the conclusion that the absence and low quality of teacher 
house and the difficult living conditions in rural areas have a negative impact on the retention of teach-
ers. Specific allowances do not provide sufficient compensation. Bonuses for teachers in remote rural 
areas do not provide sufficient compensation for the hardships and lack of housing these teachers have 
to face. 
One of the reasons, why the Ministry was not more successful in combating inequalities in pupil teacher 
ratios, is because enrolment grew faster in rural areas and poorer districts than in urban areas and 
wealthier districts. Between 2005 and 2009, basic school enrolment grew in rural areas with 18%. This 
growth was concentrated in community schools. The enrolment growth in urban areas was much lower 
(7%). Large numbers of new teachers were recruited and trained. The total number of teachers in-
creased by 65%, from 37,000 in 2000 to 61,000 in 2009. 
Table 1: Pupil teacher ratios by responsible agency and location (2005 and 2009) 
 2001 2005 2009 
 rural urban rural urban rural urban 
GRZ 58 37 66 44 56 39 
Grant-aided 43 28 60 31 62 41 
Community schools - - 58 54 73 59 
Private / church schools 28 21 39 21 39 18 
Total 57 35 64 41 58 38 
* Source: MoE/ EMIS; De KEMP 2010 calculations 
 
Extracts: 
“regular consultation among the Signatories is considered critical to continued engagement by the 
PRBS Group and effective implementation of the National Development Plan and subsequent reform 
strategies’ PRBS MoU, Part 5 : 
 
“The PRBS CPs should pursue a coherent portfolio approach to their assistance to Zambia. At present, 
PRBS tends to be an additional aid modality while CPs continue to provide ODA to GRZ through pro-
grammes and projects, on- and off-budget, on and off-treasury. Inconsistencies such as off-budget and 
off-treasury funding undermine the potential benefits of the PRBS and do not reduce transaction costs. 
The JASZ and the GRZ Aid Policy provide an agreed framework to improve the CPs portfolio coher-
ence. The GRZ and CPs should abstain from expanding the JARs in forthcoming years but rather in-
vest in strengthening domestic processes, whether ongoing or planned. Domestic institutions and pro-
cesses, such as the Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs), and the related annual poverty conference, have 
the advantage of being inclusive of all stakeholders. Strong domestic institutions and processes enable 
the PRBS machinery to be kept to a minimum.” (The PRBS Learning Assessment, 2007: page 11). 
 Indicator 1.5.4: Improved teachers` recruitment and training modalities 
The government and various stakeholders in the education sector have continued making efforts to 
enhance the quality of teacher’s recruitment and training modalities. In the quest to improve teachers 
recruitment; Nkrumah College of Education and Copperbelt Secondary Teachers College are being 
transformed into universities; additional infrastructure is being constructed at these colleges. At both 
institutions degree programmes have been developed and are being implemented. 
A new college of education is being established, to train teachers of science and mathematics. In the 
colleges of education, enrolment increased from 8,970 in 2007 to 9,235 in 2008.An Education Leader-
ship and Management Course for Head Teachers has been developed and commenced in 2009 at the 
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National In-Service Training College (NISTCOL). 
However, given that practically all the currently serving Head Teachers and Deputy Heads have had no 
school management training, in addition to the need to train new Heads and Deputies, including in-
service training, NISTCOL is inadequate for the size of problem to be addressed. Use could also be 
made of the Teacher Resource Centres (not to use the present Resource Centre Coordinators as train-
ers, but to use the Resource Centres as venues for specially developed, tailor made training pro-
grammes). 
A School Based Continuous Professional Development Master Plan has been developed. 
However, due to reduced funding to the Teacher Resource Centres, their levels of activity have been 
severely reduced. Given the importance of the Resource Centres for CPD activities, and of CPD activi-
ties to quality enhancement, the resource allocations to the Centres should be protected. 
Extracts: 
“In the three public universities enrolment has increased from 14,262 in 2007 to 15,447 in 2008 and 
17,026 in 2009. At the Copperbelt University and the University of Zambia, additional infrastructure has 
been constructed, such as a library and a unit to house the School of Business at CBU, and new hos-
tels at UNZA; existing infrastructure has been rehabilitated.  
At UNZA a public private partnership agreement has been entered into to develop infrastructure. An 
academic audit and a unit cost study for university education have been commissioned to facilitate de-
velopment of output based resource allocation criteria. 
With support from NUFFIC both the Copperbelt University and the University of Zambia are putting in 
place measures to improve the financial management of these institutions. 
Mulungushi University was established in 2008 and additional infrastructure is being constructed at the 
University.  
Including private universities, by the end of 2009 the number of universities was 14. Plans are ad-
vanced to establish a Higher Education Authority which will regulate, supervise and monitor standards 
of higher education.” National Implementation Framework , 2008-2010: 
 
“Oxford Policy Management, 2010: At the same time, in the education sector, for example, MoE officials 
and CP feel that the JASZ and the move towards PRBS have reduced transaction costs and have en-
hanced harmonisation and coordination in the sector. However, there also appears to be agreement 
amongst Cooperating Partners that the division of labour system has brought high costs for the lead 
donors (page 21).  
After the misappropriation of funds in the health sector, the PRBS group was able to respond almost 
uniformly signalling their unease about the corruption cases and as well as the overall slow pace of 
reforms. By temporally suspending PRBS disbursement and basket funding to the health sector and by 
jointly initiating a HLPD on the Underlying Principles as stipulated in the PRBS MoU, Cooperating Part-
ners were able to bring outstanding reforms back to the table. In the same vain (albeit arguably easier 
due to the smaller number of donors involved) Cooperating Partners dealt with a recent problems in the 
roads sector: In reaction to high unit rates for contractors and over-commitments by ZMK 1 trillion in 
2008, Cooperating Partners suspended disbursements and requested an audit by the Auditor General, 
covering financial, technical and procurement aspects. In his report, the Auditor General pointed to 
severe deficits in the procurement, linked to weak supervision by Road Development Agency (RDA). 
Cooperating Partners suspended disbursements of on-going funding and negotiated with GRZ a com-
mon Remedial Action Plan, focusing on the implementation of corrective measures to address the audit 
findings and guarantees that similar shortcomings are not repeated.” (Evaluation of budget support, 
2010: page 43). 
 
“The Ministry of Finance and National Planning is at the centre of managing aid relations in Zambia. It 
engages donors at various platforms both international and domestic to mobilize aid resources. It 
makes itself accountable to the wider GRZ, Parliament, civil society and the citizens at large over mat-
ters of mobilisation and use of aid and other resources. But the MoFNP has major human resources 
weaknesses which prevent it from carrying out these roles effectively. As an example, the restructuring 
of the ETC in recent years undermined its capacity to coordinate donor cooperation let alone systemati-
cally promote the implementation of the PD principles. Currently there are only four staff managing do-
nor relations. As stated earlier, there are 28 donors. The imbalance immediately conveys the extent to 
which the MoFNP is overstretched in effectively managing donor relations let alone the Paris Declara-
tion commitments’ (Evaluation of Implementation of Paris Declaration in Zambia, 2010: page 16). 
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“A high level of alignment, harmonisation and coordination has been achieved through the JASZ signed 
in April 2007, and the GRZ Aid Policy approved by cabinet in May 2007. The GRZ assigns an explicit 
priority to PRBS as the preferred aid modality. However, there is widespread acknowledgment that the 
project modality will continue for a long time, as the lack of implementation capacities cannot be over-
looked. In particular, the consensus on a division of labour and assigning lead donors for the sectors is 
noteworthy and important for the PRBS. It significantly clarifies and balances donor activities in relation 
to the sector advisory groups.” (Poverty Reduction Budget Support, Learning Assessment, 2007, page 
9). 
 Indicator 1.5.5: Development and roll out of improved curricula and examinations, support-
ed by appropriate teaching materials 
The Zambia FTI Assessment concluded that the Government’s National Implementation Framework 
2008-2010 constituted a sound and credible path to the achievement of the MDGs for education. At the 
same time, the education system does not reach all children and in an equitable manner. Children in 
rural areas tend to be more disadvantaged in terms of both access and quality. Gender disparities re-
main at the middle basic and upper basic level and completion rates at the upper basic level are too 
low. Moreover, girls have continued to drop out of the school system in significantly greater numbers 
than boys. Teacher management should be improved to tackle retention and absenteeism of teachers 
and the provision of qualified teachers. Teacher retention is especially a problem in rural areas 
(HLPD/PRBS). The IOB evaluation (2008) pointed to the improvement of school management as an 
important instrument to improve learning achievements. It will also help to reduce the absenteeism of 
pupils. It is also important to reduce the discrepancy between increments in enrolment at basic school 
level and post basic level (HLPD/PRBS). The FTI assessment points to the necessity to expand access 
to post-primary education and to improve the link with the world of work. 
However, pass rates are not a good indicator of the improvement of the quality of education. As a result 
of a lack of capacity at the upper basic level, Zambia is forced to restrict the number of pupils admitted 
to grade 8. Pass rates are therefore determined by the capacity at the upper basic level (grades 8 and 
9). The ‘selection’ (admission) of pupils is based on the available number of places and not on pupils’ 
scores. The development of average examination scores is therefore a better progress indicator. Figure 
4.4 shows the development of the average scores for English, mathematics, science and Zambian lan-
guages. The maximum score is 60. Between 2001 and 2009, average results did not improve, but dete-
riorated slightly. A number of districts, especially in Northern, Western, North-western, Luapula and 
Eastern Provinces have rather low results in comparison with other districts. 
According to De Kemp (2010), evaluation results show that the Ministry of Education succeeded in sig-
nificantly enhancing access to basic education after years of underinvestment by implementing devel-
opment plans and abolishing school fees in 2002. Enrolment in primary education has increased by 
more than 80% (from 1.6 million in 2000 to 2.9 million in 2009). Enrolment in basic education increased 
from 1.8 million to 3.4 million. Investments in teachers and teacher training, in schools and classrooms 
and in school facilities and books have been and are important instruments for reducing dropout and 
repetition and improving progression and completion rates (IOB, 2008). Completion rates at grade 7 
improved from 67% in 2000 to 92% in 2005. The gender gap has decreased and parity has almost 
been achieved at the basic education level. 
Figure 1: Development of examinations (grade 7) 2000-2009 
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   *Source: MoE / ECZ, 2010 
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JC 1.5:  GBS and other EU interventions have assisted in improving core indicators for primary 
education service delivery 
GBS and other EU interventions have assisted in improving core indicators for primary education ser-
vice delivery 
In the 1980s and 1990s, economic developments and a heavy debt burden had forced the Government 
to cut education budgets. As a result, the education sector became dilapidated. By the end of the mil-
lennium GRZ and cooperating Partners started to cooperate to revitalize the education sector, starting 
with the basic education subsector. In 2003, the sector cooperation was widened to the whole sector, 
although basic education remained the main area of interest. As a result of the sector cooperation and 
the resulting investments, as well as the introduction of free primary enrolment in basic education in-
creased with more than 60% between 2000 and 2005.  
With the introduction of GBS and the acceptance of the JASZ, several Cooperating Partners withdrew 
from the education sector. This did not have a negative impact on the budgeting of the sector. GRZ 
continued to allocate more money to the sector and basic education profited proportionally. Between 
2005 and 2009, real expenditure for basic education did grow more than 50%. Enrolment rates contin-
ued to improve, although it is very difficult to give precise figures. Gender disparities decreased and 
disappeared at the lower basic level. Evidence shows that especially the school attendance of children 
of the poorest households has improved. However, communities themselves were for a large part re-
sponsible for this increase through the creation of community schools. 
The sector faces several challenges, partly as a result of the high enrolment growth. Zambia’s spending 
on education is still low. The country spends 4.0% of its GDP on education against an average spend-
ing of 5.3% in comparator countries. The lack of resources contributes to the existing backlog in infra-
structure. Pupil teacher ratios remain too high, especially in poor rural areas. The distribution of teach-
ers over districts is regressive and has only slightly improved. This is partly the result of the relatively 
high enrolment growth in the poorest districts (and in rural areas). Disbursements to basic schools ap-
pear to be progressive, with the poorest districts getting relatively more money. These disbursements 
consist of school grants and resources for infrastructure and textbooks. Especially the resources for 
classroom construction seem to be progressive. At the same time, it must be noted that the budget per 
pupil is far too low to have an impact. The school grants are completely erratic and the average amount 
per pupil has decreased by 60% over the years. For poor rural areas, investments in classroom and the 
recruitment of new teachers are hardly enough to compensate for the increased enrolments. As a re-
sult, many children have to sit on the floor, without books and, as a result of the system of double shifts, 
school hours are too short. There are also serious inefficiencies in the sector, especially in the alloca-
tion of teachers. 
Partly as a result of a lack of resources, the quality of education remains low. The number of pupils 
completing primary education and upper basic education has increased enormously, but average re-
sults do not improve. It must be noted, however, that with the enormous enrolment growth the charac-
teristics of pupils have changed enormously. In 2010, many children in poor, remote rural areas go to 
school, while their parents haven’t had any education. The improvement of education in rural areas 
requires a more holistic approach. 
In 2007, the Ministry of Education (MoE) concluded the implementation of the Education Strategic Plan 
2003-2007. The EDF9 pool funding mechanism, supported through a €10m programme was concluded 
also in 2007. The EC also supported in 2007 the Education Management Information System (EMIS), in 
coordination with USAID. Considering the division of labour under the JASZ, the EC participation in 
sector dialogue was reduced from 2008, support being limited to short-term consultancies, through the 
Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF). In this regard, the Commission agreed to fund a consultancy – 
‘Review of the Decentralised Procurement of Text Books in Zambia’, with the MoE as the supervising 
agent. The tender and awarding of the contract was concluded by the Delegation in December 2008 
(indicator 1.5.1). 
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EQ2: To what extent have the EU interventions (GBS, SBSs and capacity de-
velopment programme) enabled a private sector led development? 
JC2.1:  Support to PEMFA enhanced predictability and transparency in public investment and ex-
penditure  
JC2.2:  Support to PEMFA enhanced fiscal discipline 
JC2.3:  Support to Private Sector Development (PSD) improved policies and regulatory framework in 
which the private sector operated 
JC2.4:  Capacity building initiatives supplied the qualified human resources needed by the private 
sector 
 
JC 2.1: Support to PEMFA enhanced predictability and transparency in public investment and 
expenditure 
 Indicator 2.1.1: Share of PFM performance indicators in PAF and as elements of the policy 
dialogue 
The general financial incentives of PRBS together with the policy dialogue on the Underlying Principles 
and around the PAF indicators acted as the relevant catalyst for PFM improvements while PEMFA was 
designed, under a basket fund associating 9 CPs (incl. the EU), as a capacity development programme 
covering almost all aspects of PFM and national planning. The PEFA assessments 2005, 2008 and 
2010 confirmed an improving trend for almost all indicators, at core PFM indicators.  
The PAFs for the years 2006 to 2008 included 5 PFM indicators, of which 4 were included in the re-
spective annual performance assessment. The 2009 PAF initially included 8 PFM indicators, of which 4 
were subsequently subsumed under the heading “oversight‘, leaving 4 core PFM indicators for the an-
nual reviews.  
The high priority given to PFM was driven right from the beginning of the reference period by the CPs in 
order to limit fiduciary risks attached to joining in basket funding and budget support approaches. This 
concern was shared by GRZ as far as it facilitated the access to external resources, and was expected 
to improve predictability and reduce transaction cost. The buy-in did not go much beyond this point, as 
shown by later weak ownership of most EU driven PEMFA components evidenced by a limited in-
volvement of senior staff in programme management. The shift of mindset of the GRZ dated back to the 
signature of the major GBS and SBS financing agreements, which coincided with the rise of copper 
export revenues. The lack of commitment of the government kept growing with the increasing marginal-
isation of ODA share in GRZ revenues and Zambian GDP. Lack of human resources, notably for 
MoFNP senior staff for macroeconomic and PFM matters may have reinforced the feeling, by CPs, of a 
weakening ownership.  
Already the core of policy dialogue, mainly at high level but also at sector level, the PFM issues came 
into harsh light at the end of the reference period with two scandals involving EU focal sectors: the 
health sector in 2008 and the road sector in 2009. The EU was at the forefront of strong renewal of the 
policy dialogue on PFM by suspending disbursements for Road Sector Policy Support Programme 
(SPSP)1 and requiring, with other CPs, a reassessment of the road sector programming documents.  
Data, figures, tables: 
Table 2 - Expenditure as a Proportion of Budget for each of the PEMFA Components (2005 to 2009) 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL 
  % % % % % 2005 to 2009 
  (compared (compared (compared (compared (compared (compared with 
 COMPONENT 
with annual 
budget) 
with annual 
budget) 
with annual 
budget) 
with annual 
budget) 
with annual 
budget) 
original budget) 
1 Commitment Control and FMS 38.2 50.3 74.3 22.7 24.4 258.3 
2 IFMIS Project Implementation 9.2 21.9 33.2 36.6 89.6 94.3 
3 Fiscal Policy and Economic Planning 8.2 44.2 136.2 32.0 59.8 482.0 
4 Budget Preparation and Execution 13.2 18.7 15.5 14.5 3.3 48.8 
5 Improved Debt Management 53.7 13.1 30.5 24.1 6.6 95.0 
6 Enhanced Internal Audit and Control 15.8 50.8 57.0 50.7 41.6 49.5 
7 Better External Finance & Co-ordination - 11.1 18.5 18.3 34.1 44.9 
8 Legal and Regulatory Framework 1.5 - 10.5 8.7 24.0 14.3 
9 Strengthened External Audit 0.3 31.0 63.3 49.1 46.7 92.0 
10 Enhancing Parliamentary Oversight 13.1 12.2 1.6 59.7 46.9 136.2 
11 Accounting Training and Regulations / ZICA 1.6 33.2 53.9 20.7 48.7 86.6 
12 Public Procurement Reforms 20.5 64.4 21.1 21.5 17.9 38.1 
13 Centralised Computer Services Department   1.9 1.3 -0.7 12.2 
14 PEMFA Secretariat 7.1 77.2 307.2 45.4 40.5 44.4 
 Total 11 34 42 36 61 73.5 
 
 Source: PEMFA final evaluation, 2011 
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Extracts: 
“Moreover, whilst an apparently justifiable charge of ‘micro-management’ was levelled at the CPs by the 
GRZ during the earlier phases of the reform, with apparent implications for the timeliness of approval 
for work-plans and with negative implications for working relations with the Government, the CPs ap-
pear to have failed to intervene at more strategic points when external influence would have been cru-
cial.” PEMFA final evaluation, p.vii 
“The original PEMFA budget of $72 million was dominated (in terms of budget allocation) by the IFMIS 
component, which had an original allocation of $26.9 million. There was a very high level of spending 
planned on the PEMFA Secretariat ($10.9 million). Planned spending on the external audit component 
($7.4 million) and the procurement reform component ($8.8 million) was also relatively high. It is notable 
that the planned spending on the fiscal policy and economic planning component ($0.5 million) and the 
budget preparation and execution component ($1.1 million) was relatively (and absolutely for a five year 
reform programme) very low, particularly given the ambition for reform in these areas at the start of 
PEMFA.” PEMFA final evaluation, p.viii 
“As a consequence, no formalised coordination and information exchange mechanisms with other TA 
activities have been established. (…) The root of this problem is that – beyond the before mentioned 
Code of Practice on Capacity Development (CPG 2008) that formulates 15 principles on how to provide 
TA – there is no coherent and harmonised approach to Capacity Development under which a formal-
ized coordination and dialogue process could be established. One way suggested by some interview 
partners to remedy this could be to develop a joint GRZ/Cooperating Partner Capacity Development 
Strategy and to establish a formalized dialogue and coordination framework in line with the SAG ar-
rangement in the sectors.” BS evaluation, draft final report, p.51 
“The PAFs for the years 2006 to 2008 included 5 PFM indicators, of which 4 were included in the re-
spective annual performance assessment. The 2009 PAF initially included 8 PFM indicators, of which 4 
were subsequently subsumed under the heading “oversight‘, leaving 4 ― core PFM indicators for the 
annual review. “BS evaluation, draft final report, p.61 
“The general financial incentives of PRBS together with the policy dialogue on the Underlying Principles 
and around the PAF indicators acted as the relevant catalyst for PFM improvements rather than flank-
ing capacity building in the PEMFA framework or PFM-specific conditionality attached to PAF. Some of 
the most relevant recent reform steps can however be – at least partly – attributed to the High Level 
Policy Dialogue initiated in the wake of the 2009 health scandal.” BS evaluation, draft final report, p.63 
“The MoFNP has emerged as the actor within GRZ having the strongest ownership for the dialogue 
process. The reason for this appropriation is related to the preference structure of the MoFNP. MoFNP 
perceives the policy dialogue as a means to strengthen its coordination function within the government 
and to reduce transaction costs vis-à-vis a situation, where it has to individually negotiate with a dis-
perse set of actors both, within the government itself and within the community of Cooperating Partners. 
At the same time, however, the capacity and the political strength of the ministry to fulfil its coordinating 
functions within the dialogue process has been limited (…) In particular, there is no well-equipped 
PRBS secretariat or similar entity that could effectively prepare, structure and follow-up on the policy 
dialogue. Beginning 2010, a Desk Officer has been assigned to each sector and line ministry to facili-
tate easier dialogue/ communication between Cooperating Partners and Government. (…) With regard 
to other central government agencies, ownership of the existing dialogue structures has been hetero-
geneous and the collaboration between MoFNP and sector ministries has been weak in the dialogue 
process. (…) Beyond a lack of the capacity in several ministries to fulfil their role in the complex dia-
logue structure, political interests played also against it. (…)This deficiency in the incentive structure to 
overcome deeply rooted collective action problems within the GRZ has been transferred into a weak 
division of labour across the SAGs and between the SAGs and the PRBS group.)” BS evaluation, draft 
final report, p.41 
“the instrument [BS] is still far from being the dominant mode of aid delivery. This has created a situa-
tion, where Cooperating Partners have not only to coordinate a complex and demanding instrument of 
budget support but also have to – individually – ensure that their traditional project or sector interests 
are made compatible with budget support – or vice versa. This situation of managing two different 
worlds of development aid delivery – one aiming at harmonisation and alignment, the other at individual 
visibility and project success – has increased the transaction cost of dialogue extensively.” BS evalua-
tion, draft final report, p.42 
“National Development Plan and Strategy - Difficult to link to the budget planning process: 
• No multi-year fiscal framework . 
• Used different sector classification to the budget 
• Analysis tended to be reflective, policy prescriptions and programme plans not suffi-
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cient developed. 
No process for updating and adapting strategies and plans to reflect changes in economic circum-
stances and the government priorities. 
FNDP quickly became outdated and less relevant in guiding government decision-making.” 
Public Expenditure Review Workshop, December 1-2, 2010; The Planning and Budget Process, A. Bird 
 Indicator 2.1.2: Degree of achievement of the expected results of the PFM strategic reform 
process, and particularly MTEF 
The 2010 PEMFA final evaluation assessed negatively the degree of achievement of the expected re-
sults on core PFM reform process: “In all of the twelve technical components, goals and objectives 
have either not been achieved at all or they have been delivered much later than programme design 
had envisaged. Where PEMFA has attempted directly to improve PFM processes, procedures and hu-
man resource capacities, in many cases this has not been achieved. In those components where there 
has been good progress in enhancement of PFM systems and capacities, the underlying improvements 
have often been achieved by complementary reform processes that have operated in parallel with (but 
independent from) PEMFA (with PEMFA supplying physical infrastructure, as noted above).” This con-
clusion is however balanced by progress made across the board by GRZ in PFM performance, as evi-
denced by PEFA assessments in 2005, 2008 and 2010. One of the issues revealed by the final evalua-
tion is that some of these reforms are suffering from design weaknesses that might lead to early future 
redesign and retraining requirements. This risk implies mainly on the most technical inputs pushed 
through by the EU (IFMIS in particular), whilst being a major part of the EU financial contribution 
(€26,9m over the initial €76m allocated to PEMFA), does not entail the overall reform process. IFMIS 
(Integrated Financial Management And Information System) was not yet operational by end 2011.  
The MTEF is of strategic importance in improving the strategic planning process and its implementa-
tion, i.e. service delivery and investment. The component 4 (Budget preparation and execution) of 
PEMFA was focused on strategic plans that link more closely to a dynamic and responsive national 
planning process; and the presentation of resource allocation information to the MoFNP and Parliament 
that is more strategic and, as a result, more transparent than the detail previously presented in budget 
documents. This reform was however already implemented before the start of PEMFA but the EU con-
tributed, as assessed by the final evaluation, to a number of achievements, particularly with regard to 
ensuring that new processes operated as planned, including: 
• Preparation and use of Green Papers; 
• Formulation of MTEFs; 
• Preparation of MTEF and Activity Based Budgeting (ABB) guidelines; 
• Preparation and use of Budget Framework Papers (BFPs); 
• Establishment of an inter-governmental fiscal architecture manual; 
• The training of Ministries, Provinces and Spending Agencies (MPSA) staff in operation of ABB. 
Component 4 under disbursement (from 3 to 19% of annual work plans) was due to overestimated tar-
gets which were shared by all components, but also the absence of implementation of some activities 
among the most demanding in terms of accountability and transparency: PERs and MTEF reviews. 
Number of issues need to be tackled still to bring a medium-term perspective to budget planning and 
improve the level of inputs of line ministries and their effective implementation of MTEF approach. 
The policy dialogue must be included in EU contribution to PFM reforms, was it on a regular basis (high 
level platform and SAGs) or, with more significant impacts, during the sector PFM crises at the end of 
the reference period (health sector in 2008 and road sector in 2009, both supported by EU under SBS 
approach). These crises amply evidenced that against PFM improvements brought with and by the 
MoFNP, they did not reached sector ministries which are responsible for most GRZ expenditures.  
 
In sum, PFM reforms, and particularly the implementation of MTEFs, were implemented by the GRZ 
with an EU significant contribution with PEMFA, even if design weaknesses, inappropriate procedures, 
some shortcomings on the provided long-term TAs did not ensured a leadership role to EU support. 
The three PEFA assessments conducted over the reference period (2005, 2008 and 2010) testify of a 
relatively steady improvement while sector PFM crises at the end of the reference period provided con-
tradictory evidences.  
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Data, figures, tables: 
 
 
  Source: BS evaluation, draft final report, p.62 
Extracts: 
“Over the PEMFA period, in fact, there appears to have been demonstrable improvement in key PFM 
areas, as measured by the high level PEFA indicator set, through assessments carried out in 2005 and 
2008. Moreover, to the extent that data has been made available to the PEMFA assessment team, 
analysis of Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) indicators in 2010 suggests that 
these gains have largely been consolidated in the later years of the PEMFA period. (…) Where physical 
infrastructure has been provided, however, this has either been delivered late, over budget, or with 
design flaws. In some cases, substantial amounts of time have been lost on implementing reforms that 
have been underdeveloped or only partially developed, with substantial potential opportunity costs in 
terms of future redesign and retraining requirements as well as for the extended period over which ex-
isting systems may remain sub-optimal in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. On the whole, PEMFA 
has either failed to deliver what it set out to achieve or has delivered late.” PEMFA final evaluation, 
2010, p.v-vi 
“Component 4 key issues. The major story of Component 4 is one of gains in transparency and process 
(carried out largely outside of direct PEMFA support) balanced by lost opportunity. Whilst achievements 
were made (mostly independent of PEMFA support and not by any means comprehensive with respect 
to plans), there was a missed opportunity to comprehensively analyse and specify reform requirements 
at the outset. This meant that those achievements that were made, could and should have resulted in: 
budgets that link more closely to strategic plans; strategic plans that link more closely to a dynamic and 
responsive national planning process; and the presentation of resource allocation information to the 
MoFNP and Parliament that is more strategic and, as a result, more transparent than the detail current-
ly presented in budget documents.  
Key issues are as follows: 
• Major reforms addressed under Component 4 pre-date the start of the PEMFA - introduction of the 
MTEF and the ABB and the revival of the NDP all occurred in the years just prior to the PEMFA. 
• This provided considerable scope to consolidate and improve upon these reforms in 2005. 
• Whilst the intervention logic appeared to be consistent with this (through one stream of work to con-
solidate the new reforms and another to improve reform design and implementation), the failure to 
specify a more optimal approach to design of this component meant that key reform opportunities were 
missed. 
Having noted this, a number of achievements were made, particularly with regard to ensuring that new 
processes operated as planned, including: 
• Preparation and use of Green Papers. 
• Formulation of MTEFs. 
• Preparation of MTEF and ABB guidelines. 
• Preparation and use of Budget Framework Papers (BFPs) . 
• Establishment of an inter-governmental fiscal architecture manual. 
• The training of MPSA staff in operation of ABB (with apparently full acceptance of this new process 
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throughout government, notwithstanding the additional work it entails). 
• In addition, a very simple but very powerful reform was introduced in the budget calendar, with the 
date for submission of the budget to Parliament being brought forward by three months (although this 
was a reform independent of PEMFA). 
But the further development of the above reform processes did not proceed as planned. In particular: 
• PERs and MTEF reviews were consistently scheduled in work plans but not carried out. 
• Whilst an MTEF review was carried out in 2008, its recommendations were weak and did not ad-
dress the most important reform issues. 
The huge under-spends in the Component 4 budget reflect in part some of the capacity building and 
other activities that were planned but not carried out in each year of the PEMFA (over the period 2005-
2009, annual spend reached a maximum of just 19% of budget in 2006 and fell to a minimum of 3% of 
budget in 2009).” .” PEMFA final evaluation, 2010, p.A11 
“Zambia’s MTEF Process 
• Comprehensive and unified Budget 
• Includes nearly all fiscal actions  
• Single budget process for capital and current spending 
• Two stage MTEF process, that reflects practice in many countries 
• Strategic phase leading to Green Paper 
• Medium-Term Macro-Fiscal Framework 
• Review of sector programmes and priorities (SAGs) 
• Resource ceilings for budget implementation 
• Budget formulation phase – ABB 
• MPSA Budget Framework Papers 
• ABB submissions 
• Consultations at key stages in process: 
• MTEF/Budget Cabinet Consultation Paper 
• Green Paper 
• Finalisation of draft Budget 
• Budget now approved by Parliament by beginning of FY. 
Issues 
• No formally agreed MTEF and budget planning calendar 
• MTEF and budget process starts late leafing insufficient time for analytical work 
• Little input from MPSAs during the strategic phase 
• Little guidance for sector reviews, SAGs not functioning effectively. 
• Outer year resource ceilings lack credibility and have failed to bring a medium-term perspective 
to MPSA budget planning 
• MPSAs continue to plan their budgets for a single year. 
• Procedures for capital investment management problematic 
• Project selection/appraisal procedures fail to exclude wasteful projects 
• Commitments for on-going capital investment projects not tracked by MoFNP or fully 
taken into account in setting resource ceilings.” 
Public Expenditure Review Workshop, December 1-2, 2010; The Planning and Budget Process, A. Bird 
“Notwithstanding remaining weaknesses Zambia‘s PFM performance has improved substantially since 
2005. To date, two performance assessments of Zambia‘s PFM system using the PEFA set of indica-
tors (PEFA 2005b) have been conducted. The first assessment in 2005 (GRZ 2005a) served as a first-
year evaluation of the PEMFA programme and baseline for future assessments. The second PEFA 
assessment conducted in 2008 measured progress against this baseline. It notes significant improve-
ments in various dimensions of PFM, in particular an improved basis for strategic budgeting, greater 
comprehensiveness of fiscal information (including systematic reporting of arrears), improvements in 
internal audit, and improved oversight (through better coverage and improved methodology for external 
audit, and the opening up of public access to the Public Accounts Committee hearings). “BS evaluation, 
draft final report, p.61-62 
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“Among the main factors restricting the effectiveness of BS-related TA inputs is the fact that – despite 
the joint PEMFA programme framework and the provision through country systems – the principles of 
ownership, alignment, and harmonisation are adhered to only to a limited extent. In particular with re-
spect to the PEMFA programme various interlocutors stressed that, while representing a comprehen-
sive programme with its large number of components and activities, the main rationale behind launch-
ing the programme was that it was conceived by Cooperating Partners as a pre-requisite for taking up 
the provision of budget support. (…) In particular, while MoFNP as a natural ally for most of the reforms 
supported by the PEMFA programme may actually exhibit sufficiently strong ownership at top man-
agement level, this is not necessarily true at all lower levels and in all parts of government. At the same 
time, some interview partners also argued that the programme design may have been too ambitious in 
terms of coverage to be effectively managed by MoFNP” BS evaluation, draft final report, p.50 
“The adoption of a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and the introduction of Activity Based 
Budgeting (ABB) with MPSA budgets broken down to programme and activity level were first consid-
ered in the late 1990s. ABB was piloted in 2000 and rolled out to all MPSAs by 2004, the MTEF was 
formally introduced in 2004.” BS evaluation, draft final report, p.64 
 “The Government officially launched the PEMFA in June 2005. PEMFA comprises reforms in all the 
main areas of public finance management from budget and planning to execution, procurement, report-
ing, audit and oversight. The benefits of each programme’s component are expected to be obtained 
with a moderated budget (USD74million for 5 years) completely financed by cooperating partners. 
PEMFA funding is essentially composed of bilateral or multilateral grants and only the contribution of 
the World Bank has been achieved through a non-rigid loan. The main contributors to the PEMFA 
budget are the UK (with USD21million) and the EDF9 (with USD20million). 
PEMFA is still a relatively young programme, and substantial progress still has to materialise (as expe-
rience in other developing countries shows, PFM reforms take time to take off). Since the official launch 
in June 2005, most progress has been made on the initial more administrative phases. Ironically, look-
ing back it appears that most reforms have taken place in the run-up to the creation and negotiation of 
the programme itself (2004 and early 2005). The main achievements include: introduction of an Activity-
Based Budget (ABB) in 2004, which led to a more effective framework for the translation of policy priori-
ties into the budget; preparation of a rolling MTEF, with a macro-economic and fiscal framework in line 
with PRGF-projections; introduction of quarterly cash allocation plans and cash-flow frameworks; adop-
tion of a new Finance Act, and drafting of new Financial Regulations and Procurement Act; computeri-
sation of the Financial Management System; more frequent and publicly available reporting on expendi-
ture, and timely delivery of audit reports to Parliament.” CSP 2008, p.23 
 Indicator 2.1.3: Evidence of improved coordination between the Ministry of Finance and the 
sector ministries in budget preparation, activity planning and budget implementation and 
monitoring 
This issue of improved coordination was mainly dealt by PEMFA components 3 “Policy, planning and 
budgeting” and 4 “Budget preparation and execution” (see I 2.1.2), with some overlaps. The major 
achievement of component 3, as seen through the 2010 final evaluation, is the development of a mac-
roeconomic database and macroeconomic model in the MoFNP (the ‘ZAMMOD’). As a result, the 
MoFNP now has the capacity to assess the economy-wide implications of various policy option scenar-
ios (e.g. changes in tax policy) and the likely poverty impact of various policy options. Some additional 
modelling was further added but to a large extent these do not target the main planning issue: the in-
volvement of the sector ministries, bringing realistic sector strategic analyses, reliable budgeting of cur-
rent expenditures and investments projects, and review of previous fiscal year budget implementation.  
Activity-Based Budgeting (ABB) was introduced in 2000, prior to EU support through PEMFA (2005) 
replacing previous line-item budgeting process. This approach utilises two tier classifications breaking 
down spending allocations by programme and activity, provides with outputs identified at programme 
level and included with targets in the budget estimates. ABB improved transparency of the budget (both 
for officials and Parliamentarians) and made it less easy to divert resources to other activities. A 2009 
assessment of the budget execution (Bird 2010) evidenced here again the lack of buy-in of sector min-
istries (introducing too many programmes/activity/outputs to be monitored and assessed) which stayed 
out of reach of the EU support and TA. The PFM crises at the end of the reference period came to con-
firm the design weakness of having focused all PEMFA components with the MoFNP. 
In sum, the EU was not in capacity to improve the coordination between the MoFNP and the sector 
ministries, even while supporting both through GBS/PEMFA and SBS (roads, health, both being EU 
focal sector under the EDF10), aligning on GRZ policy framework (again at central and sector levels), 
contributing to all ladders of the policy dialogue (high-level and SAGs), and mobilizing some 90% of the 
NIPs.  
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Extracts: 
“Whilst there has been improvements in the transparency of the budgeting process, there has been a 
lost opportunity to have budgets that link more closely to strategic plans and strategic plans that link 
more closely to a dynamic and responsive national planning process and the presentation of better 
resource allocation information to the Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MoFNP) and Parlia-
ment (Component 4).” PEMFA final evaluation, p.A3 
“Component 3 [Policy, planning and budgeting] successfully delivered a modelling capability in the 
MoFNP (although planning for this had originally envisaged a socio-economic modelling capability ). 
Whilst this represents one of the success areas of PEMFA, Component 3 failed to deliver in other key 
areas. Key issues are as follows.  
• There is overlap between Components 3 and 4.  
• There was a missed opportunity at the design stage of PEMFA with regard to these components to 
plan for reforms that would have strengthened and improved the relevance of the NDP, MTEF and 
ABB. 
• One of the success stories of the PEMFA has been the development of a macroeconomic database 
and macroeconomic model in the MoFNP (the ‘ZAMMOD’). 
• As a result, the MoFNP now has the capacity to assess the economy-wide implications of various 
policy option scenarios (e.g. changes in tax policy) and the likely poverty impact of various policy op-
tions (e.g. advancing the delivery of a Millennium Development Goal (MDG)). 
• Wide participation in ZAMMOD (including from the MoFNP, CSO, BoZ) will facilitate sustainability of 
the ZAMMOD, as will the development of a study module which has been made available to the Uni-
versity of Zambia. 
• Other key outputs were undelivered, however, including the planned strengthening of the Sector 
Advisory Groups (SAGs) to facilitate their monitoring of the PRSP and NDP. 
• Whilst the rationale behind the original intention to establish a socioeconomic model is unclear, the 
desire to establish a database of socio economic information for planning purposes is understanda-
ble. This was not achieved, however. 
• It should be noted that a Poverty Module was developed as one component of the ZAMMOD, which 
enables the modelling of some of the likely socio-economic effects of various policy scenarios. 
• Design of Component 3 was relatively weak. The goal was too broad to be achieved by the outputs 
and the outcomes specified and there was a missed opportunity at the design stage to properly ap-
praise the requirements to link the NDP and MTEF and the role of the MTEF in informing budget al-
locations.  
This resulted in overlap with Component 4 and a failure of both components to address some much 
needed additional reform issues with regard to the NDP, MTEF and ABB.” PEMFA final evaluation, 
p.A3 
“Integrated NDP/MTEF/Budget Calendar - Activity-Based Budgeting 
• ABB introduced in 2000 replacing previous line-item budgeting process 
• Utilises two tier classification breaking down spending allocations by programme and ac-
tivity 
• Outputs identified at programme level and included with targets in the budget estimates. 
• ABB seen as having: 
• Improved transparency of the budget (both officials and Parliamentarians) 
• Made it less easy to divert resources to other activities 
Issues 
• Risk of strategic focus and management of the budget is being undermined: 
• Excessive number of programs/activities. 
• Overly detailed breakdown of expenditures by economic item 
• Inconsistencies in the basis under which ABB has been applied in different ministries (Large 
variations in the number of programs). 
• Some major Economic items shown as programs and activities (personal emoluments, utility 
costs, capital projects) 
• Excessive number of outputs and indicators but output information not used in budget presen-
tation and monitoring.” 
Public Expenditure Review Workshop, December 1-2, 2010; The Planning and Budget Process, A. 
Bird 
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 Indicator 2.1.4: Evidences of improvements for procurement, reporting, audit and oversight 
Procurement was covered under PEMFA Component 12. The 2010 final evaluation assessed that the 
EU has delivered some improvements in legislation and procedures through PEMFA albeit with delays 
compared to the original planning: The Public Procurement Act (PPA) was enacted in August 2008 and 
operationalized through a statutory instrument in December 2008; the Zambia Public Procurement Au-
thority (ZPPA) was established by the Act and was (still) to be created at the end of the reference peri-
od. Public Procurement Regulations are being finalized. Capacity building is ongoing. Some PSUs have 
been certified.  
Despite this progress, a number of outstanding issues remains, including: 
• The development of Standard Bidding Documents and Procurement Guidelines; 
• Development of record management systems in the PSUs needs to be fast-tracked; 
• The procurement threshold has been increased for all the PSUs regardless of whether they 
have a functioning record management system; 
• Resources will need to be increased if ZPPA is to effectively carry out its new mandate. 
Whilst PEMFA Component 6 (Enhanced internal audit and control) substantially achieved in the deliv-
ery of logistical and infrastructure support (vehicles, furniture, software) and clearly defined training 
courses and manuals provided by consultants or institutions external to the Government, it only partially 
achieved in terms of their impact and quality, though the PEFA score for indicator PI-20 (‘effectiveness 
of internal controls for non-salary expenditure’) improved from ‘C’ to ‘C+’ and the PEFA score for indica-
tor PI-21 (‘effectiveness of internal audit’) improved from ‘D+’ to ‘C+’ over the period 2005 to 2008. 
The major issues identified by the final evaluation are the followings: 
 “The current audit role is very traditional and narrowly-focussed and there is a need for signifi-
cant modernisation (over time) through a shift to systems-based auditing as well as a need to 
keep pace with technical and operational progress (including computerisation). 
 Whilst the design and planned outcomes of Component 6 have focussed on activities to 
strengthen human resource and institutional capacities, there has been too much emphasis on 
technical training and provision of vehicles and equipment but not enough attention given to 
what was, in fact, the need for a strategic institutional reform agenda for the internal audit and 
control function. 
 Some interventions require significant shift in organisational culture, professional knowledge, 
skill sets, which are all medium to long term challenges that require an appropriate change 
management strategy mainstreamed within the GRZ. None of this has been present in this 
phase of PEMFA.” 
The Office of Auditor General (OAG) strategic role and capacity was supported by NORWAY, with the 
EU focusing its support on improving buildings, office spaces and equipment under PEMFA component 
10. The end of the reference period has seen clear improvements in external audit coverage, the quality 
of reporting and the development of specialist (Value for Money audit, etc.) audit reporting and skills. 
The best example is the 2009 Road audit and the commitment shown by the AG all over the process.  
In sum, after only 4 years of running related PEMFA components, significant improvements occurred 
for procurement, internal audits and OAG auditing with EU contribution but not under EU leadership. 
The most strategic lesson learned is that crises linked to external auditing, for a corrupted administra-
tive system, can be an accelerating factor for all aspects of PFM rather than the result of an overall 
development of capacities all across the board, as envisaged with PEMFA.  
Extracts: 
“Procurement has delivered some improvements in legislation and procedures albeit with delays com-
pared to the original planning (Component 12).” PEMFA final evaluation, p.A2 
“Despite slow progress in reform of the public procurement system (attributable to lack of capacity as 
well as the long turnaround time to enact legislation) and some related scheduling difficulties, tangible 
outcomes are now beginning to manifest themselves. One of the deliverables that is critical but that 
does not seem to have received attention in the early part of the programme has been the development 
and implementation of record management systems in the Procurement Supply Units (PSUs) and the 
training associated with this. A transparent, accountable and efficient public procurement system, in 
order to improve expenditure management, will not be realized if record management in the PSUs is not 
in place. Key issues are as follows: 
• The Public Procurement Act (PPA) was enacted in August 2008 and operationalised through a 
statutory instrument in December 2008 (i.e. 4 years into the PEMFA procurement reforms). 
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• A Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA) was established by the Act and is beginning to 
take its place in the regulatory and advisory space. ZPPA has shifted its focus from operational is-
sues to an oversight function.  
• Some PSUs have been certified (though not to the extent initially targeted). 
• The review of the second and final draft of the Public Procurement Regulations has been finalized 
(a partial achievement against the relevant output). 
• Capacity building is ongoing and is expected to continue into the future given the current level of 
capacity constraints related to procurement in the public sector. 
Despite this slow, though promising progress, a number of outstanding issues remains, including: 
• The development of Standard Bidding Documents and Procurement Guidelines remains outstand-
ing. 
• Development of record management systems in the PSUs needs to be fast-tracked. 
• The procurement threshold has been increased for all the PSUs regardless of whether they have a 
functioning record management system. 
• Resources will need to be increased if ZPPA is to effectively carry out its new mandate. 
There has been an improvement in the high level PEFA indicator for procurement (PI-19) from a D+ 
score in the 2005 baseline assessment to a C+ score in the 2008 assessment. Information presented to 
the evaluation team suggest that this should now be moved to a score of ‘B’, following the passing into 
law of the Public Procurement Act No. 12 of 2008 which makes provision for a procurement complaints 
mechanism. Public expenditure management and financial accountability do appear to have been 
strengthened through improvements in legislation and procedure for public procurement, albeit with 
delays compared with the original planning for Component 12.” PEMFA final evaluation, p.A15 
“Whilst the impact of PEMFA support on audit and control cannot be fully and objectively evaluated, the 
evaluation conclusion is that these aspects have not been achieved. Key issues are as follows: 
• The current audit role is very traditional and narrowly-focussed and there is a need for significant 
modernisation (over time) through a shift to systems-based auditing as well as a need to keep pace 
with technical and operational progress (including computerisation). 
• Whilst the design and planned outcomes of Component 6 have focussed on activities to strengthen 
human resource and institutional capacities, there has been too much emphasis on technical training 
and provision of vehicles and equipment but not enough attention given to what was, in fact, the need 
for a strategic institutional reform agenda for the internal audit and control function. 
• Some interventions require significant shift in organisational culture, professional knowledge, skill 
sets, which are all medium to long term challenges that require an appropriate change management 
strategy mainstreamed within the GRZ. None of this has been present in this phase of PEMFA. 
• Planned progress has only been partially achieved in any case, with huge year-on-year budget un-
der-spends. 
Whilst Component 6 substantially achieved in the delivery of logistical and infrastructure support (vehi-
cles, furniture, software) and clearly defined training courses and manuals provided by consultants or 
institutions external to the Government, it only partially achieved in terms of their impact and quality. 
(…) there have been some improvements, with the PEFA score for indicator PI-20 (‘effectiveness of 
internal controls for non-salary expenditure’) improving from ‘C’ to ‘C+’ and the PEFA score for indicator 
PI-21 (‘effectiveness of internal audit’) improving from ‘D+’ to ‘C+’ over the period 2005 to 2008.” PEM-
FA final evaluation, p.A16 
“Key issues are as follows: 
• PEMFA provided for five new provincial offices for the OAG, to replace previous inadequate facilities. 
• PEMFA also extended the OAG headquarter building in Lusaka. 
• Motor vehicles and significant other furniture and equipment were also provided. 
• By the end of December 2009, office construction and logistic supplies were delivered, albeit with 
procurement and construction-related slippages. 
• Whilst new office facilities (and logistical support) are vital to improve working conditions, they are of 
limited use in and of themselves without capacity building of staff, development of the audit method-
ology, continued organisational restructuring and PFM legislative changes – none of which was pro-
vided for through PEMFA. 
• Having noted this, the PEMFA measures were designed to complement the reforms being undertak-
en with bi-lateral support and have achieved what they set out to do in this regard (albeit with slip-
pages). 
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Whilst the period 2005-2009 has seen clear improvements in external audit coverage, the quality of 
reporting and the development of specialist (Value for Money audit, etc.) audit reporting and skills, in-
terestingly enough this coincided with a shift in the overall PEFA score for indicator PI-26 from ‘B+’ (at 
the 2005 evaluation) to ‘B’ (at the 2008 evaluation).” PEMFA final evaluation, p.A18 
“Yet, as the 2008 PEFA assessment confirmed, external budget oversight has been strengthened sig-
nificantly in the past years, too. (…) With regard to external budget oversight further improvements are 
necessary. In particular, even though the effectiveness of the Auditor General‘s Office improved signifi-
cantly, important challenges with regard to follow-up of audit findings remain” BS evaluation, draft final 
report, p.62-63 
 
JC 2.1:  Support to PEMFA enhanced predictability and transparency in public investment and 
expenditure 
The PEMFA reforms represent one of the three pillars of the Public Sector Reform Programme (PSRP). 
The objective of PEMFA is to contribute to the efforts of the Government in improving efficiency, effec-
tiveness and accountability in the management and utilisation of public financial resources at both cen-
tral and sub-national levels in order to improve public expenditure management and to strengthen finan-
cial accountability overall. With regard to budget support, positive results of the programme would im-
pact on Cooperating Partners confidence in using GRZs own country and PFM systems. The Pro-
gramme is supported by the signatories to the PEMFA MoU, which includes all nine PRBS donors: 
Norway, The Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Denmark, United Kingdom, European 
Commission, World Bank (IDA), United Nations, AfD) and the Government of the United States of 
America. GRZ is also providing counterpart funding to meet recurrent costs.  
The PEMFA Programme was initially a five year programme (2005-2009) with 13 components, namely: 
(1) Commitment Control System (CCS) and Financial Management System (FMS); (2) IFMIS (Integrat-
ed Financial Management System) implementation; (3) Improved Fiscal Policy and Economic Planning; 
(4) Reformed Budget Preparation and Budget Execution; (5) Improved Debt Management; (6) Improved 
Internal Audit; (7) Better External Finance and Coordination; (8) Legal and Regulatory Framework; (9) 
Strengthened External Audit; (10) Enhancing Parliamentary Oversight; (11) Accountancy Training and 
Regulation; (12) Public Procurement Reform; and (13) Centralized Computer Services Department. The 
contribution to the budget for the programme for the five year period by co-operating partners amounts 
to USD 72.2m.  
PFM was a main focus of EU high level policy dialogue with almost all GBS PAF indicators related to 
core PFM or extended aspects of PFM (oversight). The high priority given to PFM was driven right from 
the beginning of the reference by the CPs in order to limit fiduciary risks attached to joining in basket 
funding and budget support approaches. This concern was shared by GRZ as far as it facilitated the 
access to external resources, improve predictability and reduce transaction cost. The buy-in did not go 
much beyond this point, as shown by later weak ownership of most EU driven PEMFA components 
evidenced by a limited involvement of senior staff in programme management. Another indication of the 
strategic weight of PFM in policy dialogue is the relatively rare regularity of PEFA assessments after 
2005, with three exercises in five years (2005, 2008, 2010). PFM overflowed at the end of the reference 
period all EU policy dialogue platforms with two scandals, one for each of the EU focal sectors (I-2.1.1). 
PFM reforms, and particularly the implementation of MTEFs, were implemented by the GRZ with an EU 
significant contribution with PEMFA, even if impeded by design weaknesses, inappropriate procedures, 
some shortcomings on long-term TAs. PEMFA did not ensured a leadership role to EU support but con-
tributed to improve, though in a piecemeal way, the reliability of the MTEF and its underlying analytical 
tools (ZAMMOD, under Component 3). Major achievements under MTEF preparation and use were 
familiarizing MoFNP with Green Papers, Budget Framework Papers, preparation of MTEF and ABB 
guidelines. Those inputs were supported by the establishment of an inter-governmental fiscal architec-
ture manual and training of MPSA staff in operation of ABB. The related PEMFA Component (4) was 
subject to under disbursement (from 3 to 19% of annual work plans) due to overestimated targets which 
were shared by all components, but also the absence of implementation of some activities among the 
most demanding in terms of accountability: PERs and MTEF reviews. The three PEFA assessments 
conducted over the reference period (2005, 2008 and 2010) testify of a relatively steady improvement 
while sector PFM crises at the end of the reference period provided the exact opposite evidence (I-
2.1.2). 
The issue of improved coordination between planning and budgeting that was mainly dealt by PEMFA 
components 3 “Policy, planning and budgeting” and 4 “Budget preparation and execution” (see I 2.1.2), 
improved the tools available to the MoFNP but to a large extent failed to include sector ministries in the 
process. The integration of line ministries was either not considered in designing the component or re-
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sisted by the ministries themselves (or both, more realistically). PEMFA was therefore not in a position 
to contribute to alleviate the main planning/budgeting issue: the involvement of the sector ministries, 
bringing realistic sector strategic analyses, reliable budgeting of current expenditures and investments 
projects, and review of previous fiscal year budget implementation. The PFM crises at the end of the 
reference period came to confirm the design weakness of having focused all PEMFA components with 
the MoFNP. In sum, the EU was not in capacity to improve the coordination between the MoFNP and 
the sector ministries, even while supporting both through GBS/PEMFA and SBS (roads, health, both 
being EU focal sector under the EDF10), aligning on GRZ policy framework (again at central and sector 
levels), contributing to all ladders of the policy dialogue (high-level and SAGs), and mobilizing some 
90% of the NIPs (I-2.1.3). 
More tangible results were contributed by the EU for procurement and audits (internal and external) 
within PEMFA programme. The legal and institutional framework for public procurement was entirely 
revised, though late enough in the reference period not to be able to assess its effective implementa-
tion. Extensive efforts were made under EU patronage to produce further regulations and guidelines 
and provide trainings. Here again, the MoFNP achievements were impeded by line ministries’ PSUs 
which benefitted, whatsoever or not having been certified, of increased procurement thresholds.  
Internal audit capacity was supported by the EU by office space improvement and equipment, as well as 
training courses without bringing about noticeable change in the traditional way the staff undertake its 
function. External auditing by the OAG, though supported by the EU in a similar way, also benefited of a 
support of Norway on its strategic approach. The end of the reference period has seen clear improve-
ments in external audit coverage, the quality of reporting and the development of specialist (Value for 
Money audit, etc.) audit reporting and skills. The best example is the 2009 Road audit and the commit-
ment shown by the AG all over the process.  
 
The most strategic lesson learned is that the external audit, for a corrupted administrative system, can 
be an accelerating factor for all others aspects of PFM rather than the result of an overall development 
of capacities all across the board, as envisaged by EU and the 8 other CPs involved with PEMFA.  
 
JC 2.2: Support to PEMFA enhanced fiscal discipline 
 Indicator 2.2.1: Evolution of the fiscal deficit 
(see I 2.1.2) 
Extracts: 
“Considerable progress has been made in implementing public financial management reforms. After 
consultation with stakeholders, the government has altered its budget cycle to ensure parliamentary 
approval of the budget in advance of the fiscal year. This is expected to improve budget execution and 
the legislature‘s participation in the budgeting process. In addition, the government is expected to intro-
duce a planning and budgeting act in 2010 in order to clearly define the budgeting process and key 
deliverables by the government as part of the budget (structural benchmark for end-June 2010). 
The government is in the advanced stages of finalizing its implementation strategy for the establishment 
of a Treasury Single Account (TSA). A draft strategy was approved in early 2009 and various modalities 
of implementation have now been addressed. The implementation will commence with trial runs at the 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning, followed by a full pilot in early 2010, with other Ministries, 
Provinces, and Spending Agencies (MPSAs) being added to the pilot in due course. The full introduction 
of the Treasury Single Account will be phased, commencing in 2010 when six MPSAs will adopt the 
TSA (structural benchmark for end-December 2010), and all MPSAs expected to use the TSA subse-
quently. 
The implementation of the integrated financial management information system (IFMIS) will gather sig-
nificant momentum in 2010, with the first full pilot commencing in January 2010. Comprising of thirteen 
technology modules, the IFMIS project will create substantial efficiencies across government institu-
tions, providing for greater financial information flows and improved accountability and control. The first 
pilot site will be the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, which will operate all thirteen modules 
starting in January 2010. Over the course of the year, additional MPSAs will be included, with a full 
rollout expected by end-2011”. IMF Article IV, 2010, p.38 
 Indicator 2.2.2: Evolution of domestic and external debt 
The goal for PEMFA’s Component 5 has been to ‘manage Zambia’s debt both domestic and external to 
sustainable levels and effectively manage government investments’ which it sought to achieve through 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 34 - 
eight broad outcomes, including:  
 domestic debt portfolio costs and risk reduced;  
 increased clarity of roles and responsibilities;  
 improved efficiency and effectiveness of debt management through reorganisation of the In-
vestment and Debt Management (IDM) Department;  
 strengthened institutional capacity;  
 improved legal and regulatory framework;  
 strengthened human capacity in debt management;  
 strengthened asset management and  
 improved availability and quality of debt data.  
The volume of external debt (foreign debt has substantially reduced from an all-time high of US$7.0 
billion pre-HIPC completion point to just over US$1.0 billion) in particular has been reduced over the 
PEMFA period but this achievement cannot be related to improved systems, procedures and capacities.  
Domestic arrears declined from K622.3 billion in December 2002 to K155 billion on December 31 2009, 
with post-2002 domestic arrears declining from K509.3 million in 2005 to K218.9 million by December 
2009. This progress again has largely been made independent of changes that have occurred in PEM-
FA Component 5. 
Whilst there has been useful and important progress in some key outcome areas, progress against all 
outcomes has either been delayed or not achieved at all: the outcome ‘improved legal and regulatory 
framework’ remains at draft level; the strengthening of asset management in the IDM Department is still 
awaiting a law on SOEs, and the re-organisation of the IDM Department into front, middle and back 
offices (functional line) remains unachieved. 
In terms of PEFA scores related to this component, dimension (i) of indicator PI-17 (‘quality of debt data 
recording and reporting’) remained unchanged at ‘C’ between 2005 and 2008 (and is assessed at ‘C’ for 
2009 too), whilst dimension (iii) (‘systems for contracting loans and issuance of guarantees’) improved 
from ‘C’ to ‘B’ between 2005 and 2008 (and is assessed at ‘B’ for 2009).  
Extracts: 
“The outcome areas in respect of Zambia’s debt management have delivered sub optimal results with 
all outcomes being delayed or not achieved at all. In particular there are key legislative gaps: a law on 
state-owned enterprises (SoE’s) needs to be prepared; the Draft Debt Law must be completed, ap-
proved and enacted; and a government policy is required on SoE’s (Component 5).” PEMFA final eval-
uation, p.A3 
“The goal for Component 5 has been to ‘manage Zambia’s debt both domestic and external to sustain-
able levels and effectively manage government investments’ which it sought to achieve through eight 
broad outcomes, including: domestic debt portfolio costs and risk reduced; increased clarity of roles and 
responsibilities; improved efficiency and effectiveness of debt management through reorganisation of 
the Investment and Debt Management (IDM) Department; strengthened institutional capacity; improved 
legal and regulatory framework; strengthened human capacity in debt management; strengthened asset 
management and improved availability and quality of debt data. Whilst the volume of external debt in 
particular has been reduced over the PEMFA period, achievements in terms of improved systems, pro-
cedures and capacities were less successful than the design for Component 5 had originally envisaged. 
Key issues are as follows: 
• Foreign debt has substantially reduced from an all-time high of US$7.0 billion pre-HIPC completion 
point to just over US$1.0 billion. 
• Domestic arrears declined from K622.3 billion in December 2002 to K155 billion on December 31 
2009, with post-2002 domestic arrears declining from K509.3 million in 2005 to K218.9 million by De-
cember 2009. 
• This progress has largely been made independent of changes that have occurred in Component 5. 
• Whilst there has been useful and important progress in some key outcome areas, progress against 
all outcomes has either been delayed or not achieved at all. 
• The outcome ‘improved legal and regulatory framework’ remains unachieved. As a step toward the 
modernisation of the legal framework, a draft law on debt has been developed by the Ministry of Fi-
nance and National Planning. This draft law seeks to bring together all pieces of legislation relating to 
the contracting and management of public debt 
• The strengthening of asset management in the IDM Department was to be achieved through the 
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development of a government policy as well as enactment of a law on SOEs. This remains unachieved. 
• The re-organisation of the IDM Department into front, middle and back offices (functional line) re-
mains unachieved. This output was first earmarked for delivery in December 2005. 
In terms of PEFA scores related to this component, dimension (i) of indicator PI-17 (‘quality of debt data 
recording and reporting’) remained unchanged at ‘C’ between 2005 and 2008 (and is assessed at ‘C’ for 
2009 based on information presented to the evaluation team), whilst dimension (iii) (‘systems for con-
tracting loans and issuance of guarantees’) improved from ‘C’ to ‘B’ between 2005 and 2008 (and is 
assessed at ‘B’ for 2009 based on information presented to the evaluation team) . Whilst some 
strengthening of public expenditure management and financial accountability can be attributed to the 
work of this component, the gains are below those that could and should have been achieved.” PEMFA 
final evaluation, p.A14 
 Indicator 2.2.3: Evolution of the inflation rate 
This indicator does not relate to any PEMFA programme’s component. It therefore cannot be expected 
the EU to have had any influence on it.  
 
JC 2.2:  Support to PEMFA enhanced fiscal discipline 
Fiscal discipline was only very indirectly addressed by PEMFA which targeted systems and procedures, 
and was more a matter related to GBS and high level policy dialogue (see EQ1). 
However limited, the EU contribution to improving fiscal discipline through PEMFA was achieved by 
supporting value for money in the planning process, the macro-economic modelling for foreseeing fiscal 
resources potential and evaluating alternative policies (ZAMMOD), and the MTEF for managing public 
expenditures (JC 2.1). The dedicated PEMFA component improved the external and internal debt man-
agement capacity (I-2.2.2). The final evaluation of the programme assessed that “PEMFA has had very 
modest influence at best on strengthening public expenditure management and financial accountability 
to date”, which applies as well on revenues and debt management. 
 
JC 2.3: Support to PSD improved the policies and regulatory framework in which the private 
sector operates 
 Indicator 2.3.1: Degree of improvement of the comprehensiveness of the policy and regula-
tory framework 
The EU implemented during the reference period several projects that covered private sector develop-
ment (PSD) from its various instruments (EDFs, ProInvest, European Investment Bank (EIB), Sugar 
accompanying measures, Sysmin and probably export related instruments such as Everything But Arms 
(EBA), FLEX, etc.). Its involvement dated back to the EDF8 (with an Export Development programme 
phase I, €5.9m), and rolled on continually up to the end of the reference period. Against this longstand-
ing involvement, ending with the Capacity Building Private Sector Development (CBPSD) programme, 
and the strategic importance of supporting Zambia ensuring a smooth economic transition, the EU did 
not issued a comprehensive framework for its support to PSD in CSPs.  
The basic programmatic document the 2004 GRZ Private Sector Development Reform Programme with 
the aim of accelerating private-sector-led economic growth. A PSD Action Plan was developed, group-
ing actions under six main reform areas:  
 Policy Environment and Institutions;  
 Trade Expansion;  
 Infrastructure;  
 Citizens' Empowerment;  
 Business Facilitation and Economic Diversification; and  
 Laws and Regulation.  
The Action Plan was funded by several CPs, the EU focusing on the meso level i.e. on the policies and 
regulatory framework in which the private sector operates through its EDF9 Capacity Building for Private 
Sector Development project under the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and Industry (MCTI). The EDF9 
project was implementation from 2006 to 2009. Through this programme, as well as its other interven-
tions during the reference period, the EU did not intended to impact on the policy and regulatory frame-
work enabling PSD.  
For the Dept. of Information and Planning the CBPSD impact was assessed by the final evaluation as 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 36 - 
near to nil due to lack of interest, which strongly limits EU contribution to improving the comprehensive-
ness of the policy and regulatory framework.  
Independently from EU support but probably with contributions in high level policy dialogue platforms, 
the initial framework of the PSD reform programme was complemented by the FNDP (2006-2010), and 
then the SNDP.  
Extracts: 
“The Capacity Building Private Sector Development (CBPSD) Programme planned to support the Minis-
try in a number of ways, such as: 
 Specialist training in formulating and implementing trade remedies in Zambia to level the play-
ing field for locally produced and imported goods. 
 Training of trade negotiators from the public and private sector to enable them to more effec-
tively contribute to regional and multilateral trade negotiations. 
 Supporting the Department of Foreign Trade's work in Trade in Services through the funding of 
research expertise and training. 
 Assessing the economic potential of rural districts with a view to formulating a rural economic 
development policy. 
 Enhancing and re-launching the MCTI website and providing training in website management. 
 Supporting the participation of Ministry officers at major events such as Trade Facilitation con-
ference in Cape Town and an Aid for Trade Dialogue in Paris. 
 Encouraging and supporting greater dialogue between the Ministry, other public sector organi-
sations and the private sector. 
The purpose of this CBPSD Programme was also to reduce policy-induced and supply-side constraints: 
(a) Measures to address policy-induced constraints: 
 Improve the investment climate 
 Develop and maintain a coherent trade strategy 
 Improve the implementation of WTO, Cotonou and regional trade agreements 
 Strengthen institutions processes and consultation mechanisms 
 Enhance policy coordination 
 Improve trade information 
 Strengthen trade support institutions. 
(b) Measures to address supply-side constraints: 
 Facilitate export production 
 Trade and investment facilitation and support services 
 Market access.” CBPSD final evaluation, 2011, p.13 
 
“CBPSD effectiveness – Main findings 
 Main challenge faced by the CBPSD was the lack of management capacity within the MCTI 
 Benefits gained by the interventions were positive and enabled the beneficiaries to achieve 
some of the expected results 
 Through the different activities of the CBPSD Programme, the effect on MCTI's capacity to de-
liver services more effectively and efficiently is not really positive 
 Statutory Bodies benefited a lot from CBPSD in terms of equipment, trainings, study tours and 
technical assistance 
 Contributory grant scheme for private sector business associations aimed at enhancing their 
service delivery to members produced good results 
 For the trade and economic-related civil society organisations, the objectives were to fund activ-
ities that would raise public awareness of the contribution of the private sector to economic 
growth.” CBPSD final evaluation, 2011, p.13 
“CBPSD Impact – Main findings 
 Impact at MCTI was very low except for Foreign Trade Dept. due to lack of absorption capacity, 
competences and lack of interest/commitment to the project 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report  
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
  
Page - 37 - 
 Much higher impact at the level of Statutory Bodies such as Zambian Bureau of Standards 
(ZABS), ZWMA and CCPC
3
 
 Limited impact at ZDA. The organisation should have benefited from support for its restructuring 
but refused this assistance. In addition, they wanted support for activities which their own inter-
nal budget should have covered 
 There was significant and positive impact for most Private Sector Intermediate Organisations.” 
CBPSD final evaluation, 2011, p.28 
 
“CPs’ support to Zambia’s private sector development will focus on improving productivity, market effi-
ciency and the overall business climate. The dualistic character of Zambia’s economy will continue to 
require a differentiated approach. For informal, rural-based small- to medium-enterprises the focus of 
support will be on market accessibility, financial inclusion and skills. For medium and larger-sized enter-
prises, there will be focus on competitiveness, productivity, innovation and job creation. CPs will contin-
ue to support GRZ’s Private Sector Development Reform Programme to reduce the costs of doing busi-
ness and create an enabling business environment. Further, in their respective programmes, CPs will 
work with all relevant stakeholders to create an environment conducive for all businesses in Zambia to 
improve the overall economic competitiveness.” JASZ II EU Proposals, 2011 
“In October 2002, the Government adopted the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) for the 
period 2002-2005 incorporating and expanding the scope of its first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. 
The TNDP encompassed all the areas in the PRSP and includes other areas such as the Judiciary, Law 
and Order, and Defence and Security. The two companion documents PRSP/TNDP captured the core 
elements of the Government's poverty reduction strategy. (…) 
The FNDP 2006-2010 structural reform agenda will focus on (i) improving the business and investment 
climate (Private Sector Development Programme); (ii) providing for the delivery of basic services (Public 
Service Reform Programme); (iii) strengthening expenditure and financial accountability systems (Public 
Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Programme); and (iv) developing the financial 
system (Financial Sector Development Programme). Reforms in most of these areas have already 
started and will be accelerated. On the financing side, the FNDP total estimated cost stands at ZMK63.2 
trillion, to be financed from domestic funding (ZMK48.3 trillion) and cooperating partners (ZMK12.1 tril-
lion), with a residual gap of over ZMK2.7 trillion. (…) 
The implementation of the FNDP could also be affected by generally weak public-service capacities, 
including in the area of budget planning and execution. Efficient implementation of reforms under the 
Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability programme and capacity-building efforts, 
linked in particular to the Public Service Reform programme, are imperative to address such constraints. 
Besides, the intended FNDP growth targets will also require continued implementation of prudent fiscal 
and monetary policies so as to further enhance macro-economic stability. The reduction of inflation to 
single-digit levels (achieved in December 2006) will be a key target of the Plan. The necessary addi-
tional domestic revenue presupposes the adoption of tax reforms (tax policy, tax administration and 
mining fiscal regime). Another FNDP target is the reduction of domestic debt to sustainable levels (be-
low 10 per cent of GDP).” CSP 2008, pp.20-21 
 
“In 2004, the Government embarked on a Private Sector Development (PSD) Reform Programme with 
the aim of accelerating private-sector-led economic growth. A PSD Action Plan was developed, group-
ing actions under six main reform areas: Policy Environment and Institutions; Trade Expansion; Infra-
structure; Citizens' Empowerment; Business Facilitation and Economic Diversification; and Laws and 
Regulation. The Plan sets out no fewer than 85 reform actions. In December 2005, a MoU was signed 
between the Government and donors supporting this programme. The cost of implementing the reforms 
amounts to USD 20million for the period 2006-2011. Some donors (Sweden, Finland, DFID and the 
Netherlands) will pool their funds using a joint financing mechanism, while others will channel their sup-
port for capacity building and technical assistance to Ministries, private sector organisations and public-
private partnerships through the traditional project approach. The latter includes the EC through its 
EDF9 Capacity Building for Private Sector Development project under the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, 
and Industry (MCTI). The EDF9 project implementation started in 2006 (to 2009) and is focused on the 
meso level i.e. on the policies and regulatory framework in which the private sector operates, after con-
sidering recommendations from the evaluations of the previous EDF8 project in this sector (including 
the multicountry evaluation, December 2005). The project is based in the Department of Domestic 
Trade within the MCTI and will provide support to the Department of Trade and Department of Industry 
                                               
3
  Zambian Weight and Measure Agency (ZWMA) ; Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) 
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in charge of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Support will also be provided to statutory bodies such 
as the Export Board of Zambia, Zambia Investment Centre, Zambia Bureau of Standards, and Zambia 
Competition Commission. Civil Society and Private Sector intermediary organisations will benefit 
through two specific grant facilities.” CSP 2008, p.24 
 
“Support to the private sector will be complemented through the activities of CDE (Centre for the Devel-
opment of Enterprise). Currently CDE is supporting five individual enterprises in Zambia, mainly in the 
sectors of agriculture and gemstones, with a total contribution of about EUR 60,000 to finance start-up 
assistance and technical studies. This amount represents only 7% of the support provided by CDE to 
the Southern Africa countries. Therefore emphasis will be placed on increasing awareness among pri-
vate sector actors regarding the possibilities offered by CDE, including the Pro€invest facility also man-
aged by CDE. 
As of May 2006, the EIB’s active portfolio (not reimbursed) in Zambia included 34 loan and three equity 
operations for a total amount of €428m including the Commission’s special loans of EUR 143m and 
EUR 16.5m under the Small Scale Mining facility stemming from the SYSMIN programme with the 
Commission. From this a total of EUR 90m was signed under the Investment Facility, composed of two 
major loans (EUR 34m for Kansanshi and EUR 48m for Mopani) in the copper sector and one loan 
(EUR 7.6m) in the power sector (ZESCO). The remaining active portfolio (see Annex 13) was signed 
under the various Lomé conventions and was financed from risk capital.” CSP 2008; p.27 
“Other more horizontal actions to improve the environment for private initiatives, under the Private Sec-
tor Development (PSD) programme and in coordination with other cooperating partners (Netherlands, 
World Bank and USAID), will be supported under the 8-EDF9 existing funding and complemented, if 
necessary, with EDF10 resources linked to EPA implementation.” CSP 2008, p.30 
 Indicator 2.3.2: Degree of improvement of the functioning of the Export Board of Zambia, 
the Zambia Investment Centre, the Zambia Bureau of Standards, and the Competition 
Commission 
The degree of improvement of the Export Board of Zambia, the Zambia Investment Centre, the Zambia 
Bureau of Standards, and the Competition Commission by the CBPSD was assessed by the 2011 final 
evaluation of the programme.  
The EU support was particularly effective in improving the Zambia Bureau of Standards (ZABS) capaci-
ty and achievements during the reference period, gaining weight and autonomy. Similar benefits were 
achieved with Zambia Weights and Measures Agency (ZWMA), though more at the end of the refer-
ence period. The support to the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) brought 
new guidelines. 
The major shortcomings were faced with the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA, ex-Export develop-
ment Board), which is the major player for enabling PSD and the main beneficiary of the EU project: 2 
TAs for 3 years and one for a year; trainings for trade, investment promotion, negotiation skills, and 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E); equipment; export promotion missions; study tours and 6 workshops 
on investments, sources of finance, donor support funding and awareness creation. 
Extracts: 
“CCPC - The revision of the Competition Law helped to consolidate CCPC’s (former ZCC) position. The 
Consumer Protection Legal Framework was developed and this had a positive impact on the Govern-
ment and Zambia’s citizens. The previous law was full of “don’ts” and the Guidelines brought a frame-
work of “do’s”.  
ZABS - The highest impact can be found at ZABS as their efficiency has improved drastically. They 
have procured the necessary equipment and have acquired the knowledge on how to use it. Their facili-
ties have been improved and they have a Quality Insurance under way. Staff has also grown adequate-
ly. The role of the TA Pieter de La Court was critical to the good results obtained. However, further 
training will be needed for the use of equipment (only used at an average of 30%). ZABS has learned a 
lot in terms of management of projects and are now promoting their activities. They were the biggest 
recipient of the CBPSD programme.  
ZWMA - As the TA was shared with ZABS, the impact could be felt near the end of the project only 
when he was 100% dedicated to ZWMA. Main other contribution of the project were vehicles, trainings, 
study visits abroad (South Africa), computers & equipment, etc. The impact within the organisation of 
ZWMA is that procedures have been institutionalised with an acceleration of effectiveness and the TA 
automated the IT system. They are also linked to other programmes which will in turn provide new im-
pact. ZWMA is intervening now in the trade sector namely in factories, mines, and farms and want to 
expand their knowledge in new additional fields. They are also in liaison with other metrology institu-
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tions in Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana and Malawi. The major impact was that capacity building contribut-
ed to increase inspections and verifications by over 65% allowing for better income. 
ZDA - The impact at ZDA was limited although expectations were high. ZDA has still not digested its 
own merger of different organisations. The organisation itself should have benefited from support for its 
restructuring but it seems that it denied this assistance. In addition they tried to obtain support for activi-
ties which their own internal budget should have covered. ZDA benefited from three TAs services. (Two 
for 3 years and one for a year). They received quite some support in capacity building for trade, invest-
ment promotion, negotiation skills, and M&E. In addition, support was provided for IT equipment, export 
promotion missions, study tours and benefited from 6 workshops on investments, sources of finance, 
donor support funding and awareness creation. The project improved skills at ZDA and increased its 
visibility and “moved its status of baby to young adult” as was quoted to the evaluators by one Director.” 
CBPSD final evaluation, 2011, p.30 
 Indicator 2.3.3: Extent of improvement of the coordination between central agencies in 
charge of supporting the private sector initiatives 
Central agencies (ZDA, ZWMA, ZBS) being statutory bodies of the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and 
Industry (MCTI), the improvement of their coordination depends largely on reinforced capacity and 
commitment of the said ministry. The CBPSD final evaluation assessed that the project has “a limited 
impact at the Ministry due to lack of absorption capacity, competences and lack of interest/commitment 
to the project”. Under those circumstances, improvements were at best limited. 
Extracts: 
“MCTI - There was a limited impact at the Ministry due to lack of absorption capacity, competences and 
lack of interest/commitment to the project. This was mainly due to previous management at the Minis-
try. With the arrival of the new PS changes were put in motion to improve things. Unfortunately, the 
non-extension of the project caused a final blow to these changes. However, with some additional sup-
port to these changes, mid-term impact could be achieved. 
The most positive impact could be found at the Dept. of Foreign Trade thanks to the successive Direc-
tors’ flexibility and adaptability. The capacity of Foreign Trade staff was enhanced through trainings, 
studies and attendance to foreign events such as OECD meetings. The challenge remains as there is a 
need to continue enhancing capacity of stakeholders of MCTI.  
At the Domestic Trade Dept. expectations were rather high. Capacity was built in terms of trainings, 
workshops, seminars, field visits, improved computer and procurement skills. For the Dept. of Infor-
mation and Planning the impact was near to nil due to lack of interest. 
For the Dept. of Industry the main impact for capacity building seems to have been in negotiation and 
procurement skills as well as in monitoring and evaluation improvement (for the M&E unit). For the in-
dustrial development unit the impact was little as the contribution of the Rural Industrialisation Strategy 
was only partially delivered. (Part 1) It is still being used today. The lack of interest of the former Direc-
tor did not help either.” CBPSD final evaluation, 2011, p.29 
 
JC 2.3:  Support to PSD improved the policies and regulatory framework in which the private 
sector operates 
 
The EU implemented during the reference period several projects that covered private sector develop-
ment (PSD) from its various instruments (EDFs, ProInvest, EIB, Sugar accompanying measures, Sys-
min and probably export related instruments such as EBA, FLEX, etc.). Its involvement dated back to 
EDF8 (with an Export Development programme, €5.9m), and rolled on continually up to the end of the 
reference period. Against this longstanding involvement, ending with the Capacity Building Private Sec-
tor Development (CBPSD) programme, and the strategic importance of supporting Zambia ensuring a 
smooth economic transition, the EU did not issued a comprehensive framework for its support in CSPs. 
Independently from EU support but probably with contributions in high level policy dialogue platforms, 
the initial framework of the PSD reform programme was complemented by the FNDP (2006-2010), and 
then the SNDP. (I-2.3.1) 
The EU CBPSD programme started in 2005, and ended in 2009. Beneficiaries of the TA were mainly 
the MCTI and its departments, as well as its Statutory Bodies such as ZABS (Zambia Bureau of Stand-
ards), ZWMA (Zambia Weight and Measures Agency), ZDA (Zambia Development Agency) and CCPC 
(Competition and Consumer Protection Commission). The project also catered to the Private Sector 
Intermediary Organisations (PSIOs) and Civil Society Intermediary Organisations. The main objective of 
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CBPSD Programme was to enhance the conducive environment for private sector driven economic 
activity (investments, production, foreign and domestic trade) in terms of (i) regulatory framework (poli-
cies and regulations), and (ii) availability and quality of and access to business support services. This 
induces that the major player for reaching expected outcomes was the ZDA which provides incentives 
and opportunities to the private sector.  
ZDA was the one among the statutory bodies which benefitted of the more intensive support from EU 
(TAs, equipment, trainings, workshops, etc.). It is also the one which achieved less in take-in, limiting 
drastically the impact potential of EU project on PSD. (I-2.3.2) 
This shortcoming was reinforced by the lack of interest of MCTI senior staff for the project. Whilst an 
intensive support was granted to the Foreign Trade, Domestic Trade, and the Industry departments 
(trainings, workshops, equipment, study tours,…), the CBPSD final evaluation did not identified re-
newed coordination or improved service delivery. (I-2.3.3)  
 
JC 2.4: Capacity building initiatives supplied the qualified human resources needed by the pri-
vate sector 
 Indicator 2.4.1: Number of qualified workers entering annually the job market 
None of the EU interventions were expected to have an effect on vocational training or higher educa-
tion.  
 Indicator 2.4.2: Capacity of vocational training centres and technical/commercial post-
graduate trainings courses 
None of the EU interventions were expected to have an effect on vocational training or higher educa-
tion.  
 Indicator 2.4.3: Regional ranking of the quality of the teaching in Zambia’s training centres 
None of the EU interventions were expected to have an effect on vocational training or higher educa-
tion.  
 Indicator 2.4.4: Degree of building of skills of rural population to enable better understand-
ing of agriculture markets 
None of the EU interventions were expected to have an effect on vocational training or higher educa-
tion.  
 
JC 2.4:  Capacity building initiatives supplied the qualified human resources needed by the pri-
vate sector 
The originally considered involvement of the EU in enhancing the private sector workforce skills and 
qualification did not materialize. The several projects focused on PSD and economic transition (overall, 
and for sugar) did not contributed at this level, targeting either macro-economic mechanisms, the regu-
latory framework, or support to a given business.  
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EQ3: To what extent have the EU interventions contributed to improve in a sus-
tainable manner the institutional framework of transport infrastructure man-
agement and transport operations regulation? 
 
JC3.1:  The transport sector policy and programming framework have improved in line with EU per-
formance assessment framework 
JC3.2:  The financing framework for transport infrastructure maintenance and expansion is viable 
and sustainable, in line with EU performance assessment framework 
JC3.3:  Institutional performance of transport sector management has improved at all administrative 
levels 
JC3.4:  Transport sector agencies improved in a sustainable way the quality of their human re-
sources 
JC3.5:  EU has contributed to set donor coordination mechanisms in place in support to policy dia-
logue 
 
JC 3.1: The transport sector policy and programming framework have improved in line with EU 
performance assessment framework 
 Indicator 3.1.1: Policy and programming documents cover major shortcomings of transport 
sector with related realistic action plans 
The policy and strategy framework of the transport sector comprises the Transport Policy Document 
approved by Cabinet in May 2002, followed by the submission to the Donors of a Letter of Road Sector 
Policy signed by the Minister of Finance and National Planning in December 2003. The policy frame-
work was consistent with the PRSP. The Fifth NDP (2006-2010) did not renew the transport policy 
framework. The Sixth NDP (2011) reinforces former generic orientations (such as for land transport: to 
coordinate and strengthen transport infrastructure development; to maintain and rehabilitate road 
transport infrastructure; to maintain rehabilitate and upgrade rail transport infrastructure) and plan for a 
Transport and Communications Master Plan. The output targets set by the SNDP are hardly realistic, all 
the more in light of ROADSIP II achievements and financial constraints.  
The 2002 transport policy document covers all modes of transport and considers as a long-term goal an 
integrated transport system. As it stands, the road section is well developed and the other far less. The 
EU performance assessment framework, being rightly result and output oriented, does not cover as 
such the policy and planning framework.  
Road sector 
The GRZ (MCT) issued in 2003 a Road Sector Policy letter (to the WB) to provide a framework for the 
implementation of a bankable ROADSIP. This policy letter presents a perfect state-of-the-art of the 
transport policy framework supported by CPs, particularly the WB/EU supported Road Maintenance 
Initiative, of this time. It was thus appealing for external funding in the form of basket funding or budget 
support.  
The Transport Policy Document established a comprehensive institutional framework for the road sec-
tor which foresees the establishment of the RF, RA and a road safety agency. Another significant land-
mark of this policy statement is the role of the private sector and conversely the focus of the govern-
ment on creating an enabling environment and investing in infrastructures. The policy framework was 
translated only for the road sector in an investment programme: the Road Sector Investment Pro-
gramme (ROADSIP), a ten-year programme (1997 to 2007) with an original budget estimate of US$860 
million.  
The first phase of ROADSIP ended in December 2003 (after only 6 years), replaced by ROADSIP II 
(2003-2013) due to the revision of the core road network which increased from 12,204 to 40,113 km. 
The 2002 transport policy statement was not updated or replaced by a more comprehensive policy or 
strategic framework during the reference period. Overall, the document does not provide the needed 
guidelines for balancing modes of transport comparative advantages, allowing a strong prevalence of 
road transport and thus higher transport costs. This situation led the CPs to integrate the request of a 
Transport Master Plan in their policy dialogue with GRZ (ex. EU JASZ II proposal), without effect.  
The ROADSIP II is a comprehensive document analysing in detail the road sector issues and spelling 
out the GRZ options stated in the policy letter. The overall objectives of the ROADSIP II are: 
• Rehabilitation/periodic and routine maintenance of the core road network of 40,113km through var ious 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 42 - 
funding agencies; 
• Improve road condition for Trunk, Main, District, Primary feeder roads, Tourist roads and selected 
Urban roads through full and accessibility improvements as per “need” and priorities; 
• Institutional strengthening of the construction industry through appropriate approaches; 
• create employment opportunities through appropriate road interventions; 
• improve road safety as per Road Safety Action Plan; 
• improve environmental management by building capacity; 
• improve rural transport mobility through road improvements; 
• improve management of community roads through the Road Development Agency and; 
• address poverty and HIV/AIDS country-wide through PRSP and National Policy on HIV/AIDS 
EDF8 contributed to ROADSIP with the implementation of two road projects: the Monze-Zimba Road 
(rehabilitation of a 205-km section in the middle of the trunk road between Lusaka and Livingstone) and 
the Kabwe–Kapiri Mposhi and Chisamba Roads project (rehabilitation of a 62 km section in the trunk 
road between Lusaka and the Copperbelt, and a 21 km section of road into the agricultural area of 
Chisamba).  
The purpose of the road SPSP EDF9 was to contribute to the establishment of a safe, reliable and sus-
tainable core road network with an improved provision of basic access for social services and food se-
curity achieved by the end of ROADSIP II (Road Sector Investment Plan). The main expected results 
were: (i) the elimination of backlog of periodic maintenance in all priority and essential roads by the end 
of ROADSIP II, together with increased capacity in the management of road maintenance and improved 
management of the road fund revenues in the National Road Fund Agency (NRFA) and (ii) the direct 
and significant improvement in accessibility and increased capacity of Road Development Agency 
(RDA) at provincial level and of District Councils (Road Authorities), to plan and manage their road net-
works. Zambia has been the forerunner of sector budget support in the road transport sector in the 
framework of EDF9. Implementation of the SPSP EDF9 started at the end of 2005 and accompanied 
the sector reform progress mainly taking off in 2005 (based on Public Road Acts in 2002) with regard to 
the establishment, operation and functioning of three autonomous Road Agencies, the Road Develop-
ment Agency (RDA) for the management of the entire public road network, the National Road Fund 
Agency (NRFA) for financing the sub-sector and the Road Traffic and Safety Agency (RTSA). The 
SPSP1 did not assess formally the realism and comprehensiveness of the transport policy, as not 7-key 
areas assessment was required in 2005.  
In the road sector, the realism of the ROADSIP II investment and maintenance programming was ques-
tioned relatively rapidly, considering the limited resources, the bias in favour of the paved network, the 
rising construction costs and the low absorption capacity of the road management system (institutional 
bottlenecks with RDA and insufficient capacity of the private contractors, for which the issues of con-
struction standards arose). This cautious stand notably of CPs was first confirmed by the ROADSIP II 
(2009) Mid-Term Review which questioned the programme’s realism along with its affordability and 
sustainability, and then much more strongly by the Road Audit conducted by the Office of the Auditor 
General.  
The IIT report noted that to bring the entire Core Road Network (CRN) to a maintainable condition, over 
2,000 km of (mainly urban) paved and nearly 23,000 km of unpaved roads would require rehabilitation. 
On the basis of recent contract prices, this would cost in the order of USD 2.6 billion, of which a sub-
stantial amount is for the rehabilitation of urban paved roads. With total road funding of USD 243.5 mil-
lion in 2010, this is clearly unrealistic and was so right from 2008 even with CPs – and EU- financial 
support.  
Civil aviation 
The aviation sector policy stated in 2002 is focused on the following issues: (a) pursuing legal and insti-
tutional reforms aimed at revamping the industry to meet the challenges of a liberalised environment; 
(b) promoting civil aviation in accordance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation; (c) ensur-
ing compliance with regional and international agreements; (d) encourage, training and professional 
development of human resources in the aviation industry; and (e) attracting both national and interna-
tional carriers to stimulate tourism and trade. During the reference period, the EU did not support direct-
ly the MCT in improving the aviation sub-sector policy framework – neither the institutional framework, 
which stayed unchanged whilst policy commitments. This concern was raised under EDF10 program-
ming, backed by a formulation study finalized in June 2010. 
Rail Sector 
The rail sector policy framework is set by the 2002 transport policy document and was not renewed 
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during the reference period. The orientations set were sound: concessionning and prioritizing railway 
tracks maintenance, even if the lack of analysis of the comparative advantages of the truck industry re 
ponderous goods casts a serious doubt on their realism.  
Inland waterways 
The situation is similar as far as planning documents are concerned than for the railways. The sub-
sector itself is underdeveloped and bears far less weight in Zambia in passengers and goods transport 
than other modes.  
 
In sum, the policy framework was set at the brink of the reference period, with the support of CPs (but 
not specifically EU). The Transport Policy Document provides a broad framework for sector program-
ming, insufficiently developed at strategy level to ensure consistency in sub-sector policies and realism 
in investment programming. This missing link allowed an overdeveloped and over-engineered road 
programming to emerge with the financial support of CPs, and particularly the EU. The financial gap 
became too apparent at the end of the reference period, and called for a throughout revision of the 
ROADSIP, under the close scrutiny of CPs (EU being the lead partner in this sector).  
The other modes of transport strategic frameworks and programming were left aside by CPs, unless the 
EU support to Lusaka and Livingstone airports rehabilitation, and late in the reference period, the civil 
aviation support project.  
The unbalance between modes of transport, and particularly between the rise of road transport against 
the decline of rail transport, renewed the interest of the EU and GRZ for an integrated approach of the 
transport sector. A Transport and communication master plan is anticipated under the SNDP, to be 
financed by AFDB (after EU has declined).  
Data, figures, tables: 
 
Extracts: 
“With the RoadSIP II targets for unpaved and urban roads well off track and with much donor funding 
still suspended, GRZ commissioned a consultancy in 2011 to assess the situation and revise the pro-
gramme. The report noted that to bring the entire CRN to a maintainable condition, over 2,000 km of 
(mainly urban) paved and nearly 23,000 km of unpaved roads would require rehabilitation (I.T.Transport 
Ltd 2011). Table 11.5 shows that, on the basis of recent contract prices, this would cost in the order of 
USD 2.6 billion, of which a substantial amount is for the rehabilitation of urban paved roads . With total 
road funding of USD 243.5 million in 2010, this is clearly unrealistic. In revising RoadSIP II it is neces-
sary to consider both the financial prospects and the economics of rehabilitating the CRN.  
Table 11.5 Cost of Rehabilitating CRN in Poor Condition 
  Km Cost/km, USD  Cost, USD million 
TMD paved  66 1,000,000  65.9 
Urban paved  1,949  750,000 1,461.9 
TMD unpaved  8,917  75,000  668.8 
Urban unpaved  1,393  30,000  41.8 
Primary feeder unpaved 12,613  30,000  378.4
4
 
Total 24,938  2,616.8 
                                               
4
  In practice, feeder roads would be improved incrementally through spot improvements over a number of years using a 
network approach rather than fully rehabilitated link by link as assumed here. 
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Source: (I.T.Transport Ltd 2011) and consultants’ estimates. TMD stands for Trunk, Main and District roads. 
Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, pp.15-16 
“It has been estimated that some USD 2.6 billion is needed to achieve the RoadSIP II target of restoring 
the entire CRN to a maintainable condition, while an additional USD 130 million a year would be need-
ed to maintain it.(…) The fundamental problem is that Zambia is too poor and sparsely populated to 
maintain the entire 40,000 km Core Road Network to desired standards, let alone the other 26,000 km 
of feeder, park and community roads. Apart from some urban roads and the trunk roads connecting 
Lusaka and the Copperbelt to Chirundu / Livingstone / Kazungulu / Nakonde, few roads carry (or have 
the prospect of carrying) sufficient traffic to economically justify being paved or maintained in a ‘good’ 
condition. ” Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.21, p.27 
 
“The priority for CPs will be to support GRZ to take ownership of the sector strategy, to review the 
Transport Policy of 2002 and to establish a National Transport Master Plan. The National Transport 
Master Plan is expected to prioritise regional transport links in support of efforts to improve the coun-
try’s competiveness in regional and international markets as well as access to the local markets for 
domestic producers. For the road sector the Road Sector Investment Programme – ROADSIP II (2004-
2013) will be revised and CP-funded projects will be selected from these prioritised project lists, with a 
focus on the main rural linkages and feeder roads that are included in the core road network. For the 
civil aviation sector CPs will support GRZ to restructure the sector to be compliant with International 
Standards and good practices and hence contribute to reducing the cost of doing business. CPs will 
also in the medium- and long-term work with GRZ to overcome sector-specific public finance manage-
ment weaknesses related to budget commitment and execution control, and cost-inefficiencies arising 
from contractual and financial management practices.” JASZ II, EU proposals, 2011, p.12 
 
“In support to the Government measures, the EU funded the secondment to the Road Development 
Agency of engineering and financial management experts. The implementation of immediate corrective 
actions eventually made it possible for donors' financial re-engagement in the sector. However, in the 
absence of progress on the revision of the ROADSIP II policy framework, EDF Sector Budget Support 
could not be disbursed in 2010 which resulted in Zambia losing out €23.95 million (4th & 5th variable 
tranches floating from 2009 - €8.5 million & €3.15 million - and release of the 1st fixed tranche floating 
from 2009 - €12.3 million).” JAR 2010, p.9 
 
“Based on the mid-term review conclusions, it is obvious that the roads sector strategy needs an entire 
revision in view of what can realistically be achieved under a constrained sector financial framework, In 
consequence, the need for an entire review of the ROADSIP II is indispensable in view of ensuring that 
the sector programme fulfils its key requirements of realism, affordability and sustainability. Particularly, 
the definition of a sustainable Core Road Network length in view of economic but also poverty and rural 
service delivery aspects are considered as the major challenges the sector is presently facing.” AAP 
2010, AF SPSP2, p.2 
 
“Sector policy and strategy are well developed through the ROADSIP and transport strategy that are 
aligned with the FNDP. New agencies are in place and as the new institutional framework matures, 
efficiency will increase. An update of ROADSIP is required and this is expected under a current study.” 
SPSP1 Mid-Term Review (MTR), 2008, p.3 
 
“Improvement of the road sector was identified in Zambia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
in 2002 as the single most important means to address and combat poverty. A core road network of 
40,113 km has been identified as being the minimum road network needed to be effective in combating 
poverty through improved accessibility, connectivity and job creation. Out of the core road network, 
7,250 km are unpaved and 32,863 km are paved roads. The density of the core road network is 0.053 
in km/square and 0,029 in km/capita. The percentage of international and domestic passenger and 
freight services carried by road is above 80%, which has also resulted in increased pressure on the 
roads.” CSP 2008, p.14 
 
“Strategic road network management and programming is guided through the Road Sector Investment 
Programme (ROADSIP), in its second phase running from 2004 to 2013, with a programmed 10 years' 
budget of USD1.6 billion.” CSP 2008, p.14 
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“The Kabwe-Kapiri-Mposhi roads (…) project constituted an important step forward in consolidation of 
the innovative policies and approaches begun in 2002.” ROM Report 2006 
 
“With the aim of having a safe, efficient, developed and sustainable private sector driven industry, the 
Transport Aviation Sector Policy of 2002 focuses on the following: (a) pursuing legal and institutional 
reforms aimed at revamping the industry to meet the challenges of a liberalised environment; (b) pro-
moting civil aviation in accordance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation ("Chicago Con-
vention"); (c) ensuring compliance with regional and international agreements; (d) encourage, training 
and professional development of human resources in the aviation industry; and (e) attracting both na-
tional and international carriers to stimulate tourism and trade. The Civil Aviation Act (Chapter 444 of 
the Laws of Zambia, promulgated in 1995 at the level of parliament) gives effect to the Chicago Con-
vention and is intended to provide for the control, regulation and orderly development of aviation within 
Zambia. The Government of Zambia has started the process of reviewing this act in 2009 under the 
umbrella of an inter-ministerial committee of officials.” AAP 2010, AFs, p.11 
 Indicator 3.1.2: Improvements in the enabling environment for road, rail and aviation 
transport management 
Road sector 
Against the reform implemented in the road infrastructure management system, the 2009 Road Audit 
demonstrated that the relatively newly (created in 2002, operational in 2006) formed RDA, whilst 
strongly supported by TAs, and particularly EU’s, was out of control with major PFM (overcommitments) 
and contract/supervision issues. Those issues are coming on the top of a strong bias in favour of paved 
network extension and rehabilitation, which is leaving unpaved core network and rural road disintegrat-
ing.  
The establishment of the NRFA as a proxy of a 2
nd
 generation road fund was far more convincing by 
increasing the resources available to the road maintenance, mainly through fuel levy and, to a far lesser 
extent, other road user charges (ORUCs). The NRFA, with the support of the EU, obtained from the 
Tax administration and the Budget to be remitted in full of its share on taxes levied on diesel and gaso-
line. However, road maintenance funding is not ringfenced and allocation of the budget is not constraint 
by any minimum percentage to be dedicated to road maintenance.  
The contribution of the Road Traffic and Safety Agency (RTSA) to establishing an enabling environment 
was limited as it become operational only at the end of the reference period. All actions taken till then 
are focused on road safety, and transport industry economic regulation is not even considered (unless 
indirectly through overload control).  
Even considering the above, provided that the corrective measures agreed with CPs in 2011 will be 
implemented, the enabling environment of road transport infrastructure environment improved during 
the reference period.  
Rail sector 
The concessionning of Zambia Railways Limited (ZRL), to Railway System of Zambia was a major de-
velopment in this sub-sector during the reference period, supported by CPs. The capacity of the MTC, 
in charge of rail transport, did not increase in the required proportion to ensure a proper contract man-
agement. 
Civil aviation 
The enabling environment did not incur major reform during the reference period. The institutional set-
ting was left unchanged and its insufficient consistency with OACI requirements was highlighted by the 
2009 review mission.  
 
In sum, major institutional achievements were reached during the reference period, and as many new 
challenges arose. The road sector institutional framework envisaged by the FNDP, subject to EU and 
other CPs’ policy dialogue for years, came into force in 2003-04 while the declining railways were con-
cessionned at the same period. Both are far more potentially conducive environment for transport man-
agement. The civil aviation and the inland waterways sub-sectors did not benefit of a similar renewal 
with major drawbacks emerging in their time as the blacklisting of Zambian airlines by the EU in 2009.  
Extracts: “The progress reports, compiled by the National Road Fund Agency, break down the function-
al responsibilities and reporting by Executing Agency as follows:  
1. Road Development Agency (RDA) for civil works for road maintenance, upgrading and rehabilitation 
of trunk, main and district roads, including engineering and technical services such as design, axle load 
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control, etc.; 
2. Department of Infrastructure and Support Services (DISS) in Ministry of Local Government and 
Home Affairs (MLGH) was formerly responsible for civil works for road maintenance, upgrading and 
rehabilitation of feeder and urban roads, including engineering and technical services. Primary respon-
sibility for these functions have generally been transferred to RDA but RDA has in turn appointed local 
authorities, falling under MLGH, to execute/supervise the work; 
3. Ministry of Communications and Transport (MCT) for implementation of institutional reforms in the 
road sector, including monitoring and evaluation. MCT is also charged with overall project oversight; 
4. HIV/AIDS Coordinator (in MCT) for implementation of the HIV/AIDS project component; 
5. National Council for Construction (NCC) for the promotion of local construction industry; 
6. Environmental Management Unit (EMU) in RDA for the implementation of environmental manage-
ment and capacity building within the road sector and that environmental and social impact assess-
ments are undertaken for road projects; 
7. Road Transport and Safety Agency (RTSA) for improvement of road safety, implementation of the 
Traffic Safety Action Plan, as well as road traffic management, including licensing of motor vehicles and 
operators; 
8. RAMP (Rural Access and Mobility Program) Coordinator (in MLGH) for the promotion of rural acces-
sibility and mobility through improvement of rural infrastructure and promotion of intermediate means of 
transport (IMT).” RODSIP II MTR, Assessment, p.24 
 
“Apart from meeting the required sector funding needs, the other key challenges for the sector are (ii) 
the urgent need to increase the low absorption capacity experienced over the past under which the 
road asset value has declined and (ii) the development and maintaining of institutional capacity for the 
efficient, equitable and financially sustainable management of the public road infrastructure at central 
and particularly regional level (rural road network).” AAP 2008, p.3 
 
“The Zambian railway network consists of Zambia Railways Limited (ZRL), which was concessioned to 
Railway System of Zambia, and the Tanzania-Zambia Railway system (TAZARA). It is important to 
integrate the two separate rail systems in order to increase speed and reliability. ZRL has a total single 
track of 1,266 km running from the border with Zimbabwe at Livingstone to the border with DRC, with 
branch lines to the Copperbelt, and has granted a concession to Railways Systems of Zambia (RSZ) for 
20 years at USD1.5 million per annum. ZRL is committed to rehabilitating the existing network and roll-
ing stock: once completed, the average speed will increase by 67 per cent to 70-80 km/hour. TAZARA, 
owned jointly by both Governments, is 1,700 km and runs from Dar-es-Salaam to Kapiri-Mposhi where 
it connects to the ZRL system.” CSP 2008, p.15 
 
“the Delegation continued to experience frustrating relations with certain line ministries when develop-
ing new programmes or when addressing difficult issues notably in the health and road sectors (with 
misappropriation / mismanagement of funds brought to the surface). A positive development however 
was the good collaboration with the Office of the Auditor General in the case of road sec-tor audits 
which will form the basis for corrective action plans by the GRZ in 2010.” EAMR 2010/1, p.3 
 
“Zambian railways’ low traffic densities are well below the viability threshold of at least 2 million tons 
per kilometer for railways of this kind, making it difficult to capture the revenues needed to maintain 
assets. Also, performance for the RSZ is mixed, while TAZARA performance data is largely unavaila-
ble. Low traffic volumes complicate the financial viability of any concession arrangement. In the case of 
the RSZ, the lack of a clear regulatory framework or administrative capacity to supervise the contract 
has made it difficult for the government to provide clear oversight.” AICD country report 2011, p.11 
 
“Concerning sector performance monitoring, the present central statistical system providing data to 
monitor the sector is weak. Limited data for road sector monitoring are provided by the three road 
agencies Road Development Agency (RDA), National Road Fund Agency (NRFA) and the Road Traffic 
and Safety Agency (RTSA) as well as the National Construction Council. There is no aggregation of 
transport sector performance data at the Ministry of Transport and Communication (MCT) in response 
to its mandate. The Mid Term Review of ROADSIP II is to develop a revised M&E framework for the 
road sector including input, output and outcome indicators.” SPSP2 Action fiche. 
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 Indicator 3.1.3: Improvement of GRZ capacity in infrastructure maintenance planning 
Road sector 
The EU supported only the road sector for improving the infrastructure maintenance planning, which 
was one of the main objectives of SPSP1, and all the more so of SPSP2. 
NRFA and RDA were supported by EU funded TAs (7 long-term full-time and 2 short-term experts), 
trainings, purchase of equipment and an annual road condition survey.  
The original TA team was composed by 5 long-term full-time and 2 short-term experts: 
- Planning - Team Leader (RDA) – 3 years 
- Implementation (RDA) – 2 years 
- Highway Management System (HMS) Specialist (RDA) – 2 years 
- Social/Poverty Specialist (RDA) – 3 years 
- Financial Specialist (NRFA) – 3 years 
- HMS System and Software Specialist (RDA) – 4 man/months 
- RMMS Specialist (RDA) – 29 man/months 
To which were added (addendum) to care of the rural road component: 
- Coordinator Rural Road Programme (based in Central Province) – 31.5 months 
- Rural Road Programme (based in North-Western Province) – 31.5 months” 
This TA mobilisation is probably among the heaviest support among EU-funded SSA transport SPSPs. 
Maintenance planning was directly supported by 2 out of the 7 LT TAs, and was using the road condi-
tion surveys and most of the equipment purchased. Some complementary support was provided by the 
WB. 
As far as it can be traced down in the documentation at this time, the EU support contributed success-
fully to create a road data management system, including a calibrated HDM-4 model. This allows an 
annual programme of works, prioritized by their economic internal rate of return. As far as SPSP1 was a 
targeted budget support, and other CPs funds were also targeted to specific road links, this program-
ming exercise was only intended to rationalizing the use of GRZ resources allocated to the mainte-
nance and rehabilitation of the Core Road Network (CRN).  
The Road audit 2009, the Road programme revision 2011 and Raballand 2011 demonstrated that the 
HDM’s results were often overruled by other considerations such as inter alia political pressure for 
paved roads and regional balance in maintenance expenditures). 
Railways 
The railways lines’ planning does not bear the same complexity than the road network in a landlocked 
and sparsely populated country as Zambia. The main issue of economic and financial significance is to 
link mines to ports and to improve the travel time, thus mainly railway tracks condition. Used to be of 60 
Km/h, the average operational speed for trains is of 15 km/h due to the maintenance backlog.  
The EU did not support the improvement of the infrastructure maintenance planning in this sub-sector 
but promoted a more balanced and regulated competition with road transport services, notably by push-
ing for a more comprehensive policy framework. The SNDP has adopted this view and is committed to 
elaborate a Transport and Communication Master Plan. 
Civil aviation 
The EU did not support the NACL planning capacity as such during the reference period. Airports bene-
fited from rehabilitation and runaway extension during the reference period, notably with an EU support 
(EDF8 and 9) to Livingstone (tourism development) and Lusaka (main international gateway) airports. 
The modernisation and improvement projects were framed under an Airports Development Plan for the 
years 2000-2005 elaborated in 2000 by NACL. They had included mainly upgrades in the physical se-
curity of the aerodromes, modernisation of the check-in areas and electronic ticketing capability, com-
pliance with the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the International Air Transport Association 
regulations.  
In EDF10, EU interventions are expected to scale up and improve Zambia's compliance capability with 
international aviation standard in aviation safety, security and economic oversight civil aviation, includ-
ing inter alia airports’ maintenance planning.  
In sum, the EU contributed directly in road network maintenance planning, both CRN and rural roads, 
directly with TA, surveys and equipment, and indirectly within policy dialogue platforms. Based on GRZ 
commitments, the road management system was installed with RDA, staff trained, updated data pro-
vided for deigning annual work programmes. The various audits and reviews undertaken from 2009, 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 48 - 
thus 3 years after RDA became operational, identified major deviations between implemented mainte-
nance and rehabilitation projects and the basic principles of HDM (for ex. Paving road with less than 
300 vehicles/day, and even less than 150). The main issue appeared to be that data entered in the 
system is not reliable. The EU contributed to solve this issue by funding road surveys and traffic counts. 
The EU did not support maintenance planning in other transport sub-sectors but will come to this in its 
on-going EDF10 civil aviation project. 
Extracts: 
“As a result, Zambia had the highest proportion of ‘over – engineered’ roads (paved roads with less 
than 300 vehicles per day) in a survey of 21 African countries (Gwilliam et al. 2008:37). In other words, 
much funding of the road sector has been wasted because the vehicle operating cost savings from 
paving cannot outweigh the extra construction costs, even in the long term. The proportion of over-
engineered roads will increase further as a result of the new upgrading projects contracted since 2010.” 
Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.20 
 
“The enabling legislation for three new autonomous road sector agencies was enacted in December 
2002: 1. The National Road Fund Act, 2002 – creating the National Road Fund Agency (NRFA) under 
the Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MOFNP) and the National Road Fund. 2. The Public 
Roads Act, 2002 – creating the Road Development Agency (RDA) under the Ministry of Works and 
Supply (MWS), providing for the care, maintenance and construction of public roads, and regulating 
maximum weights on roads. 3. The Road Traffic Act, 2002 - creating the Road Transport and Safety 
Agency (RTSA) under the Ministry of Communications and Transport (MCT), providing for a system of 
road safety and traffic management, licensing of drivers and motor vehicles, registration of motor vehi-
cles and trailers, promotion of road safety, regulation of road transport between Zambia and other coun-
tries, and implementation of SADC and COMESA protocols. Each of the agencies reports to the Com-
mittee of Ministers of the Road Maintenance Initiative. The Boards of the agencies were inaugurated in 
December 2004. The NRFA assumed the responsibilities of the National Roads Board. NRFA’s first 
year of operations was 2005. The NRFA’s main objectives for 2006 are to ensure that all new staff 
members are in place, common basket funding is implemented, the National Road Fund is broadened 
by including road user charges other than the fuel levy and that there is a transparent and effective 
system put in place for collection, receipting, banking and monitoring all road user funds. The RDA is 
responsible for all public roads, having assumed the functions of the Roads Department of the MWS 
and the Department of Infrastructure Support Services of the Ministry of Local Government and Hous-
ing. The RTSA assumed all the functions of the former National Road Safety Council (NRSC) and the 
Road Traffic Commission (RSC). All roads are in fact being brought under the Ministry of Works and 
Supply and managed through the RDA. There is one integrated programme for roads. The Ministry of 
Communications and Transport (MCT) has responsibility for overall policy formulation and monitoring of 
the transport sector. It oversees a number of corporate bodies and institutions on behalf of the GRZ.” 
CSP 2008, annexe.  
 
“Performance of the ROADSIP II programme has also fallen behind schedule (see Annex 12), but the 
establishment of the NRFA, RDA and RTSA was only achieved in 2006 With this condition achieved, 
overall management capacity in the sector will be significantly improved.” CSP 2008, p.23 
 
“The results from SPSP II, through its increased leverage for consultation with the Government of Zam-
bia under the sector dialogue, besides easing the financial strains of GRZ, would be influencing the 
sector in a positive way by providing support to the achievements of the above objectives of ROADSIP 
II. This will be done through a strengthened policy dialogue, particularly for rural roads, supporting al-
locative efficiency in utilising resources, encouraging sounder budgeting and improvement of the regu-
latory framework, building capacity of institutions at central/local level and promoting private sector 
through training to contractors” AAP 2008, p.4 
 
“There is evidence of overinvestment in Zambia’s main road network. (….) analysis suggests that 65 
per cent of the main road network does not have the traffic levels that warrant paving.” AICD country 
report 2010  
 
“Based on the above cited Aviation Act, aviation activities are assigned to the Minister for Communica-
tion and Transport (MCT). The Executive entity for this legislation is the Department of Civil Aviation 
(DCA2), defined as a statutory body under the MCT, which is also recognised by the International 
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Community for having responsibility for safety and security oversight. In practice, there are several in-
tervening entities in civil aviation (…) The DCA has limited authority to directly manage several issues 
affecting the aviation industry in Zambia. Ideally the DCA should have direct regulatory oversight over 
operators or service providers directly involved with aviation.” AAP 2010, AFs, p.12 
 
“The original TA team was composed by 5 long-term full-time and 2 short-term experts: 
- TA I Planning - Team Leader (RDA) – 3 years 
- TA II Implementation (RDA) – 2 years 
- TA III Highway Management System (HMS) Specialist (RDA) – 2 years 
- TA IV Social/Poverty Specialist (RDA) – 3 years 
- TA V Financial Specialist (NRFA) – 3 years 
- HMS System and Software Specialist (RDA) – 4 man/months 
- RMMS Specialist (RDA) – 29 man/months 
+ addendum for:  
- TA VI Coordinator Rural Road Programme (based in Central Province) – 31.5 months 
- TA VII Rural Road Programme (based in North-Western Province) – 31.5 months” End Term Review 
(ETR) TORs 2009.  
“In 2000, NACL created an Airports Development Plan for the years 2000-2005. As of 2006, NACL had 
completed several improvements at the three major airports, estimated at a $70 million, as a part of the 
company’s Development Plan. These investments corresponded to about 100% of the planned im-
provements for Livingston, approximately 75% of the planned improvements for Lusaka and approxi-
mately 25% of the planned improvements for Ndola.” USTDA, 2008 
 
JC 3.1:  The transport sector policy and programming framework have improved in line with EU 
performance assessment framework 
The EU contributed to strengthen significantly the policy and programming framework only for the road 
sub-sector, based on its SPSP 1. For the civil aviation, the support was mainly under project approach, 
rehabilitating Livingston airport and extending Lusaka airport runaway. The maintenance planning will 
be covered under EDF10 support to civil aviation compliance, such after the reference period. The EU 
did not supported the rail sub-sector unless within its sector policy dialogue. Inland waterways were 
supported by renovating Kazungula pontoons. The EU advocated however successfully for an integrat-
ed strategy eventually adopted by the SNDP; a transport and Communication Master Plan will be elab-
orate soon. and  
The Transport policy was finalized by the Ministry of Transport in 2002, covering all transport modes but 
only the road sector deserved a detailed programme with the ROADSIP (the first version preceding the 
Transport policy, which translated the same principles). The ROADSIP II (2003-2013) was elaborated 
to cater with an extension from 12,204 to 40,113 km of the Core Road Network (CRN).  
The road policy framework was fully consistent with the expectations of the CPs, particularly aligned 
with the Road Management Initiative pushed for by the WB (and adopted by the EU). It was, consider-
ing the relatively recent end of the socialist regime in Zambia, a potential success story for liberalizing 
the road management. The GRZ adopted most recent WB approaches, notably the maintenance per-
formance based contracts, not yet disseminated nowadays in many other SSA countries. The new road 
agencies (NRFA, RDA) were jointly supported by CPs, with notably a heavy EU involvement in tech-
nical assistance (7 long-term TAs), equipment and road condition surveys. Both agencies became rela-
tively quickly operational (created in 2002, staffed and equipped in 2006). (I-3.1.1) 
The RDA is in charge of road construction and maintenance planning, design, procurement, contract 
management, and supervision. The EU supported in this regard the establishment of a road mainte-
nance data management system, geared around Highway Development and Management System 
(HDM4) for prioritizing on the economic rate of return the annual maintenance work programmes. The 
system was operationalized successfully.  
From 2007 onwards, successive EU audits and reviews warned that the rational process in place was 
not prevalent in GRZ budget allocations to the road sector and identification of road projects. Brought to 
the sector policy dialogue platform, this issue did not deserved attention or corrective measures from 
the MWS/RDA. The road audit undertaken in 2009 (with EU financial support) by the Auditor General 
confirmed previous results, further highlighted on the planning issue by the 2011 revision of ROADSIP 
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II, which assessed that 65% of the CRN is over-engineered. (I-3.1.2) 
 
JC 3.2: The financing framework for transport infrastructures maintenance and expansion is 
viable and sustainable in line with EU performance assessment framework 
 Indicator 3.2.1: Existence of a mid-term expenditure framework (MTEF) and timely budget 
execution for the transport sector 
There is no sector MTEF for the transport sector. The ministry of Finance has a rolling MTEF identifying 
the annual sectors envelop, but it is not disaggregated at sector level. The transport sector does not 
have a visibility on its mid-term resources.  
For the road sub-sector, by its very nature of ten-years programme, the ROADSIP cannot be consid-
ered as a MTEF. At this stage, NRFA/RDA annual work programmes (AWP) do not compare to MTEFs 
too. 
Data, figures, tables: 
Road Funding, 1996 – 2010 (USD million) 
  GRZ Projects Fuel Levy ORUCs Domestic Sub-total External Total 
1996 13.4 8.8  22.1 7.9 30.0 
1997 14.3 10.3  24.6 11.5 36.1 
1998 27.0 12.4  39.4 4.3 43.7 
1999 21.6 8.5  30.0 6.7 36.7 
2000 19.9 7.3  27.2 37.0 64.1 
2001 12.4 9.3  21.8  53.3 75.0 
2002 9.9 10.6  20.5  67.6 88.1 
2003 11.6 8.3  19.9  62.4 82.3 
2004 4.9 24.1  29.0  47.1 76.1 
2005 5.6 39.2  44.9  52.6 97.4 
2006 19.8 55.7  4.9 80.3  79.4 159.8 
2007 33.8 56.2  5.2 95.2  59.6 154.8 
2008 26.0 51.2 45.1 122.2  91.4 213.6 
2009 59.3 61.9 45.1 166.3  40.0 206.3 
2010 100.8 68.7 45.5 215.0 28.3 243.5 
Sources: Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.14 
 
ROADSIP II MTR – Financial achievements 
 
Extracts: 
“Significant progress on restoring the network only got going from 2000 when donor funding scaled up 
substantially, reaching USD 91.4 million in 2008. The programme was mainly donor funded between 
2000 and 2005. However, following a striking jump in GRZ project funding, the programme has again 
been mainly domestically funded since 2006. Other Road User Charges (ORUCs), which have been 
credited to the Road Fund since RTSA took over responsibility for their collection in 2007, have also 
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become a significant source of funding – USD 45.5 million in 2010. Total road funding increased from 
USD 30.0 million in 1996 to USD 243.5 million in 2010. The domestic share of road funding accelerated 
sharply from 2009, reaching 88% in 2010. This is due to two main developments. Firstly, GRZ funding 
through the budget for specific road projects increased from USD 26.0 million in 2008 to USD 59.3 Mil-
lion and USD 100.8 million in 2009 and 2010 respectively. Secondly, much donor funding for RoadSIP 
II was suspended in 2009 following the discovery that RDA had signed contracts committing itself to 
expenditure of more than double the USD 180 million approved in the 2008 GRZ Budget. “ Raballand & 
Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, pp.13-14 
“The MTEF is a fundamental instrument to integrate FNDP strategic objectives into the annual budget. 
The Ministry of Finance & National Planning established a 2008 – 2010 MTEF, whose main objectives 
are: 
- realign resources to capital investment programmes. 
- Maintain macro-economic stability through 
. inflation control (single digit level) 
. external sector : foreign currency, Kwacha value. 
. accelerate growth 
- Promotion of private sector development. 
The transport sector (of which around 90% for roads) averages about 10% of total planned expenditure 
over the 3 year MTEF period as shown in the table below. 
 
The ROADSIP 2008 Annual Work Plan shown below corresponds reasonably closely to the 
MTEF and it can be seen that external sources will supply over half the total.” SPSP MTR 2008, p.16 
 
“In 2008, RDA signed 316 road contracts to be financed from local resources. The total value of the 316 
contracts was US$ 299 million or nearly three times as much as presented in the Road Sector Annual 
Work Plan for 2008. US$253 million remained to be paid by January 1st, 2009 which represents the 
total of local resources for 2009, 2010 and half of 2011. Only US$41 million of contracts had yet to be 
activated (any payments made) by January 1st, 2009.” ROADSIP II MTR, Final ppt  
 Indicator 3.2.2: Existence and updating of databases for transport infrastructure mainte-
nance strategies and prioritisation procedures 
The SPSP1 budget (from Rider n°2) allocate €5.55m to TA (to RDA and NRFA), road condition Surveys 
and equipment (Vehicles, data processing hard- and software, HMS setup, data update, system 
maintenance for an amount of €1.7m). Approximately half of this was dedicated to setting and updating 
road management system.  
The feedbacks on the data management are not convergent. The system is running and HDM4 is able 
to provide an annual prioritisation of maintenance works. Besides this, the 2009 MTR quoted number of 
issues left (dynamic segmentation of the shape files and matching condition data), casting doubts on 
road condition data reliability and suggesting a more decentralized organisation. The EU is funded a 
road condition survey in 2009. Traffic counts are outdated, the last one dating back to mid-2000s. The 
SPSP2 Action fiche quotes that a continuation of TA is required for highway management and institu-
tional capacity building to be provided to new local road authorities.  
As said in 3.1.2, another issue is the discrepancy between prioritisation on economic grounds, and con-
struction or rehabilitation projects funded by GRZ, their traffic characteristics and the standards applied. 
In other transport sub-sectors, the EU did not support data management and prioritisation procedures. 
 
In sum, the EU contributed heavily to setting a road management system with RDA, as a strategic tool 
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for rationalizing the programming process and ensuring value for money of GRZ road sector resources’ 
allocation. HDM4 was installed, the road condition data collected, the equipment purchased, the staff 
trained, and technical issues solved, even if with delays. The RDA’s staff is able to run the system and 
produce results but the lack of updated data and road condition and traffic does not allow to achieve 
credible results.  
Extracts: 
“Although the Road Sector Policy states that expenditure priorities will be established on the basis of 
economic criteria (Republic of Zambia 2003:11), the reality is different. There is no tradition of basing 
investment decisions on economic appraisal in Zambia. (…) Computer software such as HDM-IV has 
been developed to enable governments, road agencies and donors to prioritise projects and mainte-
nance expenditure on the basis of objective data and economic criteria – i.e. as required by the Road 
Sector Policy. However, the resulting priorities often conflict with political priorities – such as the Zambi-
an pressure to pave. (…) Although RDA operates HDM-IV, it has little impact on decision making
5
 . (…) 
A World Bank study refers to ‘the widely accepted minimum traffic threshold of 300 vehicles per day to 
make paving of roads economically viable’ Gwilliam et al. (2008:36). A study using country data ex-
tracted from trucking surveys in HDM-IV demonstrated that high service levels are not economically 
viable for roads with less than 150 loaded trucks per day (Teravaninthorn and Raballand 2008). In 
Zambia this threshold is probably only achieved on the trunk / main network, mainly between Chirundu 
and Solwezi and possibly Kazungula / Livingstone and Lusaka. “ Raballand & Whitworth, Transport 
Policy, 2011, pp.17-18 
 
“Given the political attraction of paving roads in Zambia, it is not surprising that their dubious economics 
is largely ignored. Instead projects are justified on such grounds as: (a) traffic will increase substantially 
after the road is opened; (b) upgrading is needed for national integration; (c) there will be important 
social and developmental benefits which are not captured by conventional economic analysis; and (d) 
the road will open up new trade (e.g. with Angola). While there can be some validity to such arguments, 
they are rarely backed up with evidence – they are simply asserted. (…) Zambia’s geography com-
pounds such pressures. Because of its size the people of, say, Western Province see little benefit from 
road improvements in Eastern Province (and vice versa). This creates political pressure for regional 
‘equity’ in the allocation of resources. This can be a particular problem for road maintenance funding. 
While technical and economic considerations would focus funds on those roads and regions with the 
heaviest traffic, because this is seen as inequitable, NRFA has been pressurized into distributing 
maintenance funding evenly across the country. When maintenance funding is inadequate to begin 
with, this can result in resources being spread too thinly to have much impact.” Raballand & Whitworth, 
Transport Policy, 2011, p.21 
 
“Institutional capacity development is needed in all aspects of rural roads management, accounting & 
procurement and the development of systems and procedures for the newly established but not yet 
operational local road authorities. At central level, a continuation of capacity building is needed in the 
fields of highway & road asset management and its systems, procedures development, procurement & 
internal quality control and sector monitoring/evaluation.” SPSP2 Action Fiche 
 
“A lot of work needs to be done in developing highway management systems at RDA. The vast territory 
of Zambia makes a centralised approach very difficult and the MRT recommends a modular approach 
at provincial and LRA level apart from the paved trunk roads.” SPSP1 MTR, p.2 
 
“Road condition surveys have been carried out in 2006 and 2007 and a number of logistic and organi-
sational problems were encountered by the surveyors during the exercise. The survey was conducted 
on 18,700km of the core road network of some 40,000 km. The report from the survey team does not in 
fact provide the information on the condition of the roads as surveyed. This information is available to 
the RDA management through the TA team. The cleaning and analysis of the data for 2007 is still being 
done. It appears that the process and technology used to collect and make the data available is over 
complicated for the data outcome required. Although the data needs to be capable of input into sophis-
ticated planning programmes such as dTIMS and/or HDM the time effort and expense being used to 
decide whether any section of road is in good fair or poor condition seems to be unwarranted. There 
are a number of technical problems still to be sorted out. Dynamic segmentation of the shape files and 
                                               
5
  ‘Economic analyses are usually carried out for large projects but this is often in a perfunctory way and if the results show 
that the investment is not justified, this is often ignored’ (I.T.Transport Ltd. 2011). 
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matching condition data is still outstanding. This is required if mapping of the results is to be achieved 
and for any reasonably coherent network planning process. The Management of RDA together with the 
TA are currently considering these issues.” SPSP1 MTR, p.21 
 
“These surveys may provide good baseline data for comparison in subsequent years but routine annual 
condition surveys will require local capacity and a more extensive survey (whole network) to be useful 
for monitoring the network condition for ROADSIP and for the EU SPSP programme.” SPSP1 MTR, 
p.27 
 Indicator 3.2.3: % of maintenance needs met 
Two indicators define the targets for enhancing road financing: (i) annually available funding from GRZ 
($26.01m in 2010), and (ii) annually available funding from fuel levy ($31.8m in 2010).  
Revenue levels arising from the fuel levy (15% of the wholesale price of petrol and diesel) and other 
road user charges meet the criteria of being ring-fenced and show a satisfactory trend of being 100% 
remitted to the road sector for the use of road maintenance and development. However, funding levels 
were not sufficient to cover the entire routine and periodic maintenance needs of the Core Road Net-
work during most of the reference period. The ROADSIP II Addendum; July 2011, provides an updated 
assessment: “Roadwork costs have risen significantly in recent years. Consequently, the estimated cost 
of routine and periodic maintenance of the CRN in 2011 prices is approximately USD 240 million per 
year. The total internally generated income to the Road Fund (RF) was about USD 220 million in 2010 
and is budgeted to reach USD 320 million in 2011. Of these totals, about USD 110 million is from Road 
User Charges”, out of which fuel levy’s proceeds account for USD 67 million.  
Though the performance indicators of the SPSP1 are exceeded, there is still, against a fuel levy rate 
and a diesel price that are among the highest in Southern Africa (leading the trucking companies to fill 
their tanks abroad), a gap of some 54% for GRZ to come to a balance for meeting routine and periodic 
maintenance needs on internal NRFA resources. This situation questions the rationale of fixed targets 
for financial indicators conditioning the release of SBS variable tranches with sector’s economics char-
acterized by strong inflationary tensions.  
Tolls are envisaged to be created on busiest roads, as well as direct tax on the trucking industry as 
complementary revenues. Yet the decision should proceed from an integrated (multimodal) transport 
policy framework that is still missing. 
The most worrying issue is not about maintenance financing in itself but rather the balance between 
internal resources dedicated to maintenance and the ones allocated to network extension, particularly 
paved network. RDA’s 2011 Work Plan foresees the start of upgrading or rehabilitating of 900 km of 
existing roads to fully engineered paved roads, in addition to 700 km of such projects which were 
signed earlier and continue into 2011 and beyond. This represents an increase in the length of the 
paved network (6,600 km excluding urban roads) by nearly a quarter under ROADSIP, which will further 
maintenance financing in 3-4 years considering work supervision issues.  
Data, figures, tables: 
Estimated Average Maintenance Cost for the Core Road Network: Routine and Periodic Maintenance, USD 
million per year 
Road Type Paved Unpaved Total 
Trunk 36.9 1.2 28.1 
Main 18.8 13.5 32.3 
District 8.5 66.3 74.8 
Urban 42.3 25.1 67.4 
Primary Feeder  27.2 27.2 
Total 106.5 133.3 239.8 
Source: I.T.Transport Ltd (2011): Table A1-6. 
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Source: ROADSIP II, Addendum 2, July 2011 
 
Extracts: 
“Given GRZ’s poor record of funding for road maintenance, adoption of a fuel levy was made a condi-
tion for donor support of RoadSIP. Initially in 1994 the levy was set at about 1 US cent per litre for petrol 
and diesel, increasing to about 4.5 cents in 1996. Since then, part of the excise duty on petrol and die-
sel (up to a maximum rate of 15% of the wholesale price) collected by the Zambia Revenue Authority 
(ZRA) has been designated as Fuel Levy. It is paid into the GRZ consolidated fund (‘Control 99’) along 
with all other ZRA revenue, but is earmarked for routine road maintenance. The Budget Office then 
transfers funds to the National Road Fund Agency, although the amounts transferred do not necessarily 
match revenues. While they have increased substantially in recent years, reaching USD 68.7 million in 
2010 (Table 11.4), Levy proceeds are not based on - and have never been nearly sufficient to meet - 
Zambia’s road maintenance requirements. Being ad valorem, they fluctuate with world fuel prices. They 
are also subject to political decisions, such as the reduction in diesel excise duty from 30% (15% for 
Fuel Levy) to 7% in 2008 in order to reduce pump prices. As of April 2010 Fuel Levy was equivalent to 
8.8 and 11.3 US cents per litre for diesel and petrol respectively, among the highest rates in the region 
(Gwilliam et al. 2008:17). Total fuel taxes (customs duty, excise duty and VAT) were equivalent to 23.0 
and 39.1 US cents per litre respectively. While data is not available, it is widely acknowledged that in-
ternational trucks largely avoid Zambian fuel taxes by filling their fuel tanks before entering and after 
leaving Zambia. As illustrated in Appendix 9.1, diesel prices are significantly higher in Zambia than in 
neighbouring countries, mainly because of inefficiencies in the pipeline and refinery. Reducing diesel 
prices through liberalising fuel imports would reduce the incentive to purchase diesel outside Zambia 
and should lead to increased Fuel Levy collections. “ Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, 
pp.13-14 
 
“Far from switching budgeted funding to maintenance, the 2011 GRZ Budget substantially increased 
domestic funding for projects to USD 215 million. While budget outturns are usually below the original 
provisions (particularly for capital investment), this is nevertheless a dramatic increase. It reflects a 
number of new projects to extend the paved network. RDA’s 2011 Work Plan foresees the start of up-
grading or rehabilitating of 900 km of existing roads to fully engineered paved roads, in addition to 700 
km of such projects which were signed earlier and continue into 2011 and beyond. This represents an 
increase in the length of the paved network (6,600 km excluding urban roads) by nearly a quarter 
(I.T.Transport Ltd 2011).” Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.18 
 
 “Using recent actual contract prices and costs, the RoadSIP II revision exercise estimated the average 
annual cost of maintaining the CRN - assuming that the entire network was brought to a maintainable 
condition. For the unpaved and urban networks this was, of course, largely hypothetical. The annual 
cost of maintaining the paved and unpaved networks is estimated at USD 106.5 million and USD 133.3 
million respectively in 2011 prices (Table 11.6). In principle, maintenance expenditure should be fully 
financed from the Fuel Levy and ORUCs. However, despite recent increases, their combined value was 
still only equivalent to USD 112 million in 2010 (Table 11.4). This is barely sufficient to maintain the 
paved network; there are negligible funds left over for the unpaved network.” Raballand & Whitworth, 
Transport Policy, 2011, p.16 
 
“However, GRZ direct funding in Table 11.4 is for specific upgrading projects and switching it to 
maintenance looks problematic. While GRZ stated policy as set out in the Road Sector Policy priori-
tises maintenance expenditure, there has been a growing divergence between policy and practice in 
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recent years. For as long as donors were providing most of the finance for RoadSIP II, they were 
able to ensure that funds were allocated in line with the Road Sector Policy / economic priorities. 
This meant prioritizing roads carrying the most traffic (i.e. trunk and main roads) for rehabilitation 
and resulted, as noted above, in most of the paved network being restored to good or fair condition. 
GRZ fiscal space started increasing significantly from 20076 and the road sector has been one of 
the prime beneficiaries; domestic funding in Table 11.4 increased from 0.46% to 1.33% of GDP7 be-
tween 2003 and 2010. With the paved network largely fixed by 2006, under RoadSIP II these addi-
tional resources should have been used to start rehabilitating those parts of the unpaved and urban 
networks with relatively heavy traffic – and then to maintain them. However, contrary to the Road 
Sector Policy, most of the additional GRZ road funding since 2007 has been used to extend the 
paved network. ” Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.16 
 
“NRFA indicated that, by the end of 2007, the road sector was able to meet without difficulty the re-
quirement that 40% of total road expenditures incurred in routine and periodic maintenance be financed 
from domestic sources; in fact this percentage exceeded 60% in 2007. Since that time however, it has 
been necessary to reduce the percentage of the fuel excise dedicated to the NRF because of escalat-
ing fuel costs and general budget shortfalls. (…) Apparently the issue in passing the fuel levy directly 
from the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) to the Road Fund has been resolved and, by the end of 
2007, the Ministry of Finance was transferring all of the proceeds of the fuel levy collections to the Road 
Fund, although still through the Treasury. At the end of 2007, road user charges did not yet cover fully 
the routine and periodic maintenance needs of the road network, there was a gap of about 1/3, i.e. the 
revenues were only about 2/3 of the needed expenditures. In financial terms this means a financial gap 
of about Kwacha 230 billion (US$64 million at the then current exchange). Much of this gap could be 
covered by increasing the annual licensing fee for trucks heavier than 15 tons from K350,000 at present 
to K1.5 million (US$450 equivalent), or by more than 4 times, as proposed by two recent road user 
charge studies (Alan Kenniard and SWEROAD/AFRICON) to cover the road maintenance expenditure 
that these heavy vehicles are causing to the Zambian road network. A recent effort to get this increase 
passed was, however, stymied by the strong resistance from Zambian transport/trucking associations.” 
ROADSIP II MTR, Assessment, pp.30-31 
 
“The establishment of a second-generation road fund in the country resulted in a stable allocation of 
resources to the sector. Zambia is one of the few countries in the region with a road sector budget in 
excess of what is needed to maintain the main road network, and adequate to address the rehabilitation 
backlog (figure 4). During the early 2000s, Zambia spent 3 per cent of GDP on the roads 
sector on average—a relatively high allocation.” AICD country report, 2011, p.13 
 
“Financing of the sector has improved recently and current budget levels are sufficient to make modest 
progress. However, actual disbursement is below budget and if this continues the backlog of mainte-
nance will continue to increase. If the Government can increase funding by around $90m per annum 
then it should be possible to remove the backlog assuming capacity issues are concurrently ad-
dressed.” SPSP1 MTR, p.2 
 
“The fuel levy is set as a percentage of the wholesale price of petrol and diesel (presently 15%) which 
has given increased revenue to the NRF as the wholesale price of fuel has gone up in recent years. 
Income stemming form the fuel levy shows thus a satisfactory trend over the last years. The released 
amounts are in excess of the programmed amount in the ROADSIP II financing plan. 100% of the col-
lected fuel levy is transferred to the Road Fund. (…) Annual Work Plans for the Core Road Network 
have proven to be overambitious and thus unrealistic. The total real income arising from the different 
sources against the planned disbursements is insufficient to preserve the road asset of particular un-
paved roads (maintenance and rehabilitation). The income from the fuel levy can presently cater for 
100% of routine and some 40% of the periodic maintenance needs. Under ROADSIP II and its AWPs, 
focus has been given to date to the paved core road network of 7,250 km. While performance on the 
paved road network is satisfactory, the unpaved road network of particularly feeder and district roads 
has been neglected so far.” CSP 2008, annexe 
 
                                               
6
  This was due to the combined effect of improved fiscal management, HIPC / MDRI debt relief, increasing mining tax and 
GDP growth (Whitworth 2011).  
7
  Rapid economic growth meant that real GDP was 60% larger at end 2010 than at the start of 2003. 
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“The NRFA has proved to be a success and with limited staff resources in the beginning has raised the 
profile of road maintenance and brought most of the trunk roads under routine maintenance. The NRFA 
has been hampered by under-remittance of the fuel levy to the Road Fund. Since the end of 2002 re-
mittances have improved with a substantial increase in fuel levy remittances in the year 2004 and the 
full and timely remittance of the fuel levy to the Road Fund in 2005.” SPSP1 Rider 1, p.5 
 
JC 3.2:  The financing framework for transport infrastructures maintenance and expansion is 
viable and sustainable, in line with EU performance assessment framework 
The targets set initially for road financing indicators were exceeded for GRZ contribution and well as 
fuel levy collection and direct remittances to the NRFA. This contributed to the release of the first three 
variable tranches of EU SPSP1 but, given steady rise in construction prices (cost increases, limited 
competition among major contractors, mismanagement within RDA) only 46% of routine and periodic 
maintenance needs are met annually through user charge collection, and 92% including GRZ budget 
allocations (including inter alia EU financial inputs under SPSP).  
Given the macroeconomics context, the high level of the fuel levy, the weak political position of GRZ 
against the trucking industry, and the prospects of further construction price rise, the financing frame-
work for CRN maintenance is not viable and even less sustainable. (I-3.2.3) The situation might lead to 
the loss of the colossal capital investment made during the reference period on paved trunk roads, all 
the more so if EU’s SBS would ceased in relation to weak corrective measures of RDA mismanage-
ment revealed by the OAG’s 2009 Road Audit. The GRZ, with CPs and particularly EU support, started 
at the very end of the reference period a throughout analysis of alternatives, the most convincing being 
to drastically reduce the CRN length. By the end of 2011, the EU was yet not in a position to resume its 
support.  
Besides the resources available for road maintenance, the value for money of road sector budget is 
another important shortcoming faced by the EU. The EU supported heavily (7 fulltime long-term TAs, 
equipment, surveys worth €5.5m) the setting of a reliable and updated road management system, cen-
tred on HDM4’s use for rationalising annual work programmes. Though the system is running, there are 
quite some doubts on the consistency between HDM4 results and the works programme implemented 
by the RDA, as demonstrated by the 2009 Road Audit. The level of service applied to most rehabilita-
tion projects (paving) even for road with less than 150 vehicles a day, does not make much sense with 
the basic principles of economic rate of return supposedly in-built in HDM4 parameters. (I-3.2.2) 
The overall financial prospects framework for the transport sector was not established. A global MTEF 
is maintained by the Ministry of Finance (supported by EU PEMFA project) but was not disaggregated 
at sector level due to resistance from the MSW. The ROADSIP II cannot be considered in any way as 
an equivalent tool for providing reliable visibility on the road sub-sector financial framework, being sub-
ject to annual budget arbitrations. (I-3.2.1) 
 
JC 3.3: Institutional performance of transport sector management has improved at all adminis-
trative levels 
 Indicator 3.3.1: Existence of appropriate standards and guidelines for competitive pro-
curement of works and services (including maintenance) and contract management 
The EU SPSP1 provided TA to RDA and NRFA (€2.8m) to support notably defining appropriate stand-
ards, procedures and guidelines for road maintenance management, particularly contract management. 
Capacity building supported: 
 Periodic Maintenance of Trunk, Main and District Roads: (a) RDA in the use of the Highway 
Management System (HMS), (b) RDA in the planning, budgeting, implementation and evalua-
tion of road maintenance projects, and (c) NRFA in the management of effective disbursement, 
monitoring and auditing of road sector funds. 
 Rehabilitation of Unpaved Rural Roads at provincial/district level: Enhance the efficiency of the 
road authorities in provinces/districts such that: (a) the relevant RDA Regional Road Engineers' 
offices are able to successfully manage (i) road maintenance needs planning and program-
ming; (ii) road rehabilitation planning, design, and supervision; and financial planning for annual 
works programmes; (b) the future Road Authority's engineering staff (District Council) is able to 
successfully manage: (i) road prioritisation; (ii) road development for economic growth and 
poverty reduction; (iii) road maintenance needs planning and programming; and (iv) contract 
preparation and procurement. 
The TA mission started in 2006 and therefore was able to provide (3-years positions) the intended 
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technical input to RDA (mainly) and NRFA alike before the end of the reference period. The AG’s Road 
Audit in 2009 and further detailed procurement, financial and technical audits assessed a very insuffi-
cient level of RDA’s take-in, and therefore indirectly the limited effectiveness of this heavy TA mission.  
Taken from Raballand 2011 (p.26), other disturbing findings than the 2008 over-commitment were: “On 
procurement, these included: 
- Lack of drawings and condition surveys. 
- Poor quality contract documents.  
- Lack of transparency in the selection of RDA bid evaluation committees. 
- A tendency of RDA tender boards to ignore bid evaluation committees’ recommendations, con-
trary to procurement rules. 
- Engineer’s estimates were not used when conducting evaluations, making it difficult to ascertain 
the reasonableness of bids. 
- Lack of contract negotiation meetings. 
On financial and technical aspects, the audits highlighted: 
- Contracts were sometimes running without supervision. 
- Poor contract administration leading to delays and additional costs. 
- Poor quality works were observed on most of the contracts reviewed 
- Non submission of performance bonds meant contractors were not penalized for non perfor-
mance.  
- Delays in payments to contractors and consultants resulting in interest charges and standing 
time. 
- Irregular instructions were given to contractors, such as payment to RDA staff and servicing of 
RDA vehicles. 
- Inadequate progress reports. 
- Decisions on contract price variations were not always justified by the contractor. 
- Where RDA supervised contracts, supervision funds were paid through the contractor - raising 
issues of objectivity.” 
 
The EU support to NRFA brought far more positive results as financial and technical audits did not 
brought any case of mismanagement while the resources managed under the road fund increased sig-
nificantly.  
 
The EU did not support the other transport sub-sectors in these matters.  
 
In sum, appropriate standards and guidelines for competitive procurement of works and services (in-
cluding maintenance) and contract management were drawn with EU support but they were not in use 
within RDA almost at any stage of the road maintenance and rehabilitation projects. This led to signifi-
cant economic and financial losses and a low value for money of the EU contribution. The EU support 
to NRFA helped in turn to control financial flows and allowed to establish the expected reliability in user 
charges collection and management. 
Extracts: 
“Nevertheless, an investigation of RDA by the Auditor General (following RDA’s over-commitment of its 
2008 budget) in 2009 showed that unit costs are substantially higher than they need be. Detailed pro-
curement, financial and technical audits revealed widespread inefficiency in RDA management of road 
contracts and produced other disturbing findings.” Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.25 
 
“Sufficiently efficient oversight seems to be missing for the various executing agencies charged with 
implementing the ROADSIP II program. At the time road sector programs were established in mid 
1990s in Zambia (prior to ROADSIP I) NRFA (and its predecessor NRB) was charged with oversight 
functions vis-à-vis RDA. This was a model advocated by the World Bank at that time. It is not a worka-
ble model that one executing agency oversees the activities of another one, It is bound to create conflict 
and overlapping functions, as has actually appeared to have happened in this case. Oversight and reg-
ulatory control needs to be exercised by a Ministry. In this case the situation is complicated as RDA 
reports to Ministry of Works and Supply and NRFA to the Ministries of Finance and Transport. (…) Up 
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to and including 2007, capacity to execute was another problem, which was not been solved on the 
spot by new institutional set-up: it may have in fact exacerbated the situation for a period. While RDA 
has definitely demonstrated capacity in 2008, in prior years it seems to have lacked the capacity to 
execute the required program. This is clear from the very fact that surplus funding accumulated in the 
NRF, while disbursements and physical accomplishments lagged behind the tempo targeted in the 
Bankable Document; in fact a surplus accumulated even though the NRFA revenue lagged behind the 
ROADSIP targets.” ROADSIP II MTR, Assessment, pp.31-32 
 
“The report of the PAC and its recommendations were submitted to the Bank and other CPs in August 
2010. The report made specific recommendations for disciplinary measures but its overall recommen-
dations are: (i) more involvement by RDA Board members in the award of contracts; (ii) improvement of 
the unpleasant relationship between RDA and NRFA; (iii) harmonisation of the Public Finance Act and 
the Public Procurement Act; (iv) strengthening of the National Construction Council (NCC); (v) more 
power for the Zambia Public Procurement Authority; and (vi) more decentralisation of RDA operations. 
The recommendations specific to RDA are: (i) introduction of a framework for contract management; (ii) 
strengthening of the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit; and (iii) better management of consultants. The 
next immediate action from government is the submission to the Bank and other CPs, of the preferred 
course of actions in view of the PAC report. (…) The Bank carried out an in-depth financial review and 
an independent procurement review both of which had pointed out weaknesses revealed by the gov-
ernment’s audit report. The key preliminary findings of the independent procurement review were flaws 
in the management of procurement documentation while the in-depth financial review suggests the 
existence of ineligible expenditures. (…) Bank supervision will be intensified and will especially focus on 
the activities that are critical to the project’s success particularly in the contract award process, timely 
payment to contractors and consultants, and adherence to implementation schedules.” WB RRMP 2010 
restructuring, p.5 
 
“the sector has been overshadowed by the results of a comprehensive financial, technical and pro-
curement audit under the Office of the Auditor General following Cooperating Partners' serious concern 
on sector specific Public Finance Management (PFM) issues raised during the April 2009 Joint Donor 
Forum. This development led to the majority of Cooperating Partners putting on hold funding for new 
road projects including the release of the Sector Policy Support Programme tranches I and II (sector 
budget support). The audit findings in summary reveal (i) mismanagement of resources and disregard 
of Annual Work Plans, (ii) irregularities in procurement, (iii) sub-standard execution of road works, (iv) 
unsubstantiated payments to contractors and (v) the non-observation of Regulations and Acts govern-
ing the sector.” AAP 2010, AF SPSP2, p.3 
 
“We have noted several problems that have resulted in cases of sub-standard value for money: Spread-
ing too little money over too many kilometers of road, stemming in part from a lack of hard and fast 
national standards and lack of capacity in construction cost estimating; Project preparation and bidding 
documents; Quality of workmanship by contractors and lack of adequate enforcement of standards by 
supervisors; Reluctance to accept variations to the scope of construction contracts that are required to 
avoid waste; A multitude of low value contracts and a lack of capacity to supervise so many contracts. ” 
ROADSIP II MTR, final ppt 
 
“Initiatives are also under way to strengthen the private sector’s contractual capacity (through the Na-
tional Council for Construction).” CSP 2008, p.23 
 
“EC Procurement Audit - A comprehensive technical audit was carried out in mid 2007. For procure-
ment the auditor re-evaluated a selection of tenders (5 contracts) and compared their marks with those 
of the evaluation report. The key findings of the procurement audit were that: 
 Insufficient bidders 
 Short evaluation and tender period 
 Poor Tender Documents 
 Inconsistency in applying eligibility criteria 
 Committee appeared to make strategic decisions and then manipulated results to fit 
 Identical bids for different packages achieved significantly different scores 
 Identical CVs included for the same position in more than 1 bid received different scores for each 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report  
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
  
Page - 59 - 
 Scores given to similar academic qualifications varied considerably 
 Computational errors. 
EC Civil Works Audit - This was done on 6 contracts concurrently with the procurement audit in mid 
2007. The key findings were: 
 Insufficient preparation was carried out for design, materials and hydrology 
 Works started on a number of contracts several months before the supervising engineer was on site. 
 Most of the roads were not visited by either RDA or contractors prior to tender resulting in problems 
defining the scope of rehabilitation. 
 Quality of works was generally acceptable.” SPSP1 MTR 2008, pp.30-31 
 Indicator 3.3.2: Reduced scope and improved efficiency of force account operations in road 
maintenance 
Right from the beginning of the reference period, GRZ excluded to recourse to force account operations 
in the thrust of liberalisation and transition from the socialist economy. All maintenance works are un-
dertaken by private contractors, supported by the National Council for Construction (NCC). This ap-
proach was enshrined in the Transport policy document in 2002: “encourage and promote increased 
private sector participation in the provision management and maintenance transport infrastructure and 
services”. 
The interests of the local construction industry are represented by the National Council for Construction 
(NCC). 
The efficiency of road maintenance operations stayed unquestioned for many years, South African and 
Chinese contractors reinforcing the absorption capacity of the nascent national construction industry 
(mainly hired for routine maintenance of unpaved roads). With the (temporary) departure of the South 
Africans from the Zambian market, in view of the 2010 World Cup preparation, the absorption capacity 
fell steadily (to 50-60%) at the end of the reference period and the monopoly of the 4 Chinese compa-
nies drove to price rises.  
Bidding maintenance works for the Core Road Network (CNR) and supervising the 170 contract (repre-
senting 2% of total ROADSIP budget) spread over the country exceeded RDA capacity. The quality of 
works done is weak, implying a higher than expected future frequency of the maintenance operations.  
Performance contracts were already considered for road maintenance in 2002 transport policy paper 
and in 2003 road sector policy letter, GRZ being far in advance in this matter compared to most of other 
SSA countries. The first generation OPRC, based on WB principles, appeared to be in vivo laborato-
ries, leading to contractual re-negotiations and contract models improvements.  
The GRZ has re-established at the end of the reference period mechanised Force Account (FA) capa-
bility for the specific purpose of revitalizing non-CRN feeder roads in rural areas, coming to a more bal-
ance approach of private sector development.  
 
In sum, the GRZ tried to apply in full the principles of the EU-supported RMI at the beginning of the 
reference period. All construction, maintenance and rehabilitation works were procured with the private 
sector (mainly foreign, unless for low qualified routine maintenance tasks). The RDA acknowledged 
significant issues with the quality of works, delays in implementation and construction price rises before 
2009 but the construction industry was still seen as a levelled playing field. After the departure of the 
South African contractors in 2009, the oligopolistic nature of this market became apparent, with a cartel 
of 4 contractors (Chinese) driving up the prices.  
RDA’s inefficiency in managing contracts and supervising works brought its lot to issues faced with 
maintaining the CRN and providing low value for money for internal resources as CPs’ alike. Consider-
ing the low absorption capacity (approx. 50%) demonstrated by the private sector for the CRN, the GRZ 
decided at the end of the reference period to create force account brigades to caters to maintenance 
needs of the rural roads. 
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Data, figures, tables: 
 
“7% contracts represent 74% of the total value, 52% of the contracts represent only 2% of the total val-
ue.” ROADSIP II MTR 
Extracts: 
“Development of domestic construction industry and promotion of labour based work methods has been 
a long-standing objective in Zambia, preceding implementation of ROADSIP I even. However, not much 
has been achieved in this area for a variety of reasons, which mainly relate to training, financing and 
creating an enabling environment within the contracting industry. The National Construction Council, 
NCC, has been charged with development of the domestic construction industry, but has not been as 
effective as envisaged at the time of preparation of ROADSIP II. Specific to NCC, this agency engaged 
a consultant to prepare a strategic plan, utilizing part of a US$500,000 IDA allocation to NCC. NCC 
rejected the report submitted by said consultant and recommended that the study be re-awarded on a 
sole source basis. This recommendation was rejected and eventually, at the time of the Consultant’s 
data gathering, another consultant had been selected to carry out the work of preparing a strategic plan 
for NCC. (…) The registration of contractors by NCC seems to be well documented. We have been 
provided with a list of 349 entries listing contracting firms by grade, category, type of work and province. 
There are only a handful of Grade 1 road building contractors registered.” ROADSIP II MTR 2008, As-
sessment, p.32 
 
“The packaging of the performance based contracts into very large value units has acted against the 
inclusion of small to medium scale local contractors. All of the OPRC work has been awarded to either 
international (foreign) contractors or the few largest National Zambian contractors. This has foiled plans 
by NCC to develop the local contracting industry to take over most of the work on the maintenance of 
roads in the country and provided much needed local employment through employment intensive 
methods of working. NCC does not get any direct support from the SPSP but is funded by other con-
tributors to the ROADSIP II sector programme. The capacity building of the local contracting and con-
sulting industry needs to be strengthened if ROADSIP II is to achieve its objectives.” SPSP1 MTR 2008, 
p.17 
 
“The appointment of staff to the reformed institutions has been carried out through a competitive appli-
cation and selection system that was designed to select the best qualified candidate. The remuneration 
packages being offered attracted candidates from both the public and private sectors for the posts. 
Often the private sector candidates were selected from consulting companies. This means that the re-
sulting staff of the new institutions is very strong, being a combination of staff from public and private 
backgrounds. This has had the unexpected effect of reducing the capacity of many of the local private 
sector consulting companies who have lost a number of highly qualified staff to the posts offered by the 
new institutions.” SPSP1 MTR 2008, p.22 
 
“Procuring the services of small-scale contractors has proven very tedious; the results obtained by 
small-scale contracting have been mixed at best, and the requirement to terminate contracts and re-
place contractors has been a major problem. ROADSIP II is a big programme and a huge amount of 
resources, not available in Zambia, or most other countries for that matter, would be necessary to get 
the programme done while also directly managing and supervising a large number of small-scale con-
tractors. Certain types or models of contracting have been problematical; for example - the initial OPRC 
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contracts have had to be modified following initial floating of tenders. The Government of the Republic 
of Zambia has taken a major step to re-establish force account capability in the road sector to handle 
primarily rural roads that are not part of the CRN.” ROADSIP II MTR 2008, p.3 
 
“Despite a slow start in 2008, largely due to the blacklisting by GRZ of more than 40 road sector con-
struction companies (…)” ROADSIP II MTR, final ppt 
 
 “The sector absorption capacity to implement Annual Work Plans is limited and shows on average a 
rate of 50-60% absorption only. Lack of competition can be noted in the sector over the last years, 
which has mainly arisen from a withdrawal of South African contractors from the Zambian market, in 
view of the 2010 International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA) World Cup preparation and its 
enormous infrastructure challenges. This has led to a monopoly of some 4 contractors in Zambia, dom-
inated by Chinese companies, with consequently high costs of doing road works plaguing the sector.” 
AAP 2010, AF SPSP2, p.2 
 
“The results from SPSP II, through its increased leverage for consultation with the Government of Zam-
bia under the sector dialogue, besides easing the financial strains of GRZ, would be (…) promoting 
private sector through training to contractors” AAP 2008, p.4 
 Indicator 3.3.3: Improvements in enforcing traffic regulations (including axle load, safety, 
environmental legal framework and transport industry regulatory framework) 
Road sub-sector 
The only issue tackled during the reference period as regards road traffic regulations in the axle load 
control, included in ROADSIP II to protect the road network and increase the life time of the rehabilitat-
ed links. The target was not the transport industry as such but the road network.  
The Axle load control programme was launched in 2004 by Norway with an amount of €3m and a con-
tribution of the EU of €2.5m. The agreement provides a framework for an institutional cooperation be-
tween the Road Development Agency (RDA) and the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA). 
The final evaluation of the programme in 2009 was very positive. The review found that the technical 
assistance from NPRA was an essential input to the ALCP. 
The EU contributes through SPSP1 to reinforce the environment legal framework and its implementa-
tion by the RDA. Environment Impact assessment studies are done for major projects. They stay how-
ever formal, and mitigation action plans implemented by contractors is not supervised by RDA.  
 
Civil Aviation 
Air traffic regulations were not into the scope of 8 and EDF9 interventions, only focused on airports 
rehabilitation (Livingstone) and extension (Lusaka). Following the EU ban on Zambian airlines in reac-
tion the OACI 2009 review, the EC extended its EDF10 support to contributing to the compliance with 
international regulations sought by GRZ. This project not being yet started, it can asserted that during 
the reference period, the EU major contribution to air traffic regulation was the ban imposed, which was 
a major incentive for GRZ to reconsider the time line of a much needed institutional reform.  
The EU did not intervene on these matters with the other transport sub-sectors. 
 
In sum, the only concrete EU contribution to promoting better organisation and balanced market regula-
tion in Zambia was limited to controlling successfully truck overloading, as financial contributor to a 
project implemented by Norway. 
Extracts: 
““NACL is responsible for the provision of Zambia’s National Air Traffic Service, Aeronautical Infor-
mation Service and Aeronautical Telecommunications Service. Air Operators: There are two main do-
mestic airlines doing schedule services – Proflight and Zambezi airlines and several internationals (…). 
Freight operators include Cargolux, MK Cargo and Southern Aviation. (…) Approximately 50% of all 
Aviation activity in Zambia is accounted for by the Private Sector. Ground Handling: This service is pro-
vided at Lusaka by three competing entities: National Airport Cooperation Limited (the airport operator), 
National Aids Committee (NAC) 2000 Ltd. and Zega Grounding Services. Regulation of Ground Han-
dling Services is done by DCA, though there are currently no written regulations.” Formulation study, 
June 2010, pp.13-14 
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“The Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) remains responsible for all regulatory aspects of civil aviation. 
However, due to its civil service structure involving constrained administrative procedures, poor sala-
ries, poor working environment and few incentives, the DCA has difficulties in recruiting and retaining 
qualified personnel with international qualifications. As a result of that situation, it also has difficulties in 
retaining specialists who are capable of efficiently planning, inspecting and regulating the diverse oper-
ations of the Zambian civil aviation industry. Responding to these circumstances, the 2002 Transport 
Policy of the MCT identifies the need to pursue legal and institutional reforms to provide for an efficient 
regulatory framework to ensure compliance in the industry that will contribute to the overall develop-
ment of the air transport and the economy. Transforming DCA to an autonomous Civil Aviation Authori-
ty would achieve international and national policy objectives. (…) NACL is materially noncompliant with 
ICAO due to the lack of effective regulatory oversight, further compromised through out-dated legisla-
tion. New model legislation, good reference materials and an effective regulator would enable NACL to 
regain focus on providing an airport and air traffic service compliant and in uniformity with international 
standards. (…) The issue of restructuring the DCA into an autonomous Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
has been the subject of studies, arriving at the conclusion that the DCA should be restructured into an 
autonomous CAA. The enactment and implementation of a replacement Civil Aviation Law, modelled 
on ICAO standards and other related is regarded as necessary for the sustainability of the project. In 
this context, the GRZ has already established an interministerial committee of officials to review the 
aviation acts to enable the creation of an autonomous CAA and to facilitate an institutional reform pro-
cess.” Formulation study, June 2010, p.20 
 
 “It was planned that all 8 vehicle weigh stations are rehabilitated and staffed by the end of 2006. At 
January 2008 this was not the case and only two had been improved. Nevertheless considerable pro-
gress has been made in axle load control particularly in terms of legislation and management and over-
loading is now decreasing. Axle load regulations were published in 2007. The two newly refurbished 
weigh stations, Kapiri Mposhi and Kazungula have the latest satellite computer systems that automati-
cally transmit axle loading data to head office thus making malpractice much more difficult. Weigh sta-
tion staff have the powers to detain overloaded trucks and fine vehicles $2,000 for failing to stop. The 
TA was originally supported by Norway, but EC budget support is now used to continue the pro-
gramme. It is clear that this TA has been very effective in developing the strategic axle load control 
policies and systems and has very good relations with counterpart staff. Plans are being developed to 
further commercialise this area in terms of private management of weigh stations and the unit is ex-
pected to make a profit through overloading fines and abnormal load permits (income expected to be 
$2.5m/y). A draft 3-year plan 2008-2010 has been prepared giving plans for further legal initiatives, 
weigh bridges, anti corruption measures, management information system, commercialisation, project 
monitoring and administration.” SPSP1 MTR 2008, p.20 
 
“To continue the support to the aviation sector (rehabilitation of the two international airports Lusaka 
and Livingstone and a comprehensive Master Plan Study, under the 8th and EDF9), the EDF10 will 
focus on regulatory and operational know-how, technology transfer in the domain of air safety, security 
and traffic management. (…) Concerning the aviation sector, project support could be possible in form 
of TA services shall be given in response to aviation safety and regulatory issues.” CSP 2008, p.31 
 
“The Government of Zambia had in 2009 an International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Universal 
Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) follow-up audit. One of the main safety concerns is the 
issuance of certificate of airworthiness, particularly to Zambian operators undertaking international 
flight. This finding resulted in the EU banning of Zambian registered aircraft into EU airspace in July 
20093. With this ban and the world crisis, operators have reported a decline in traffic by 25% in 2009. 
(…) Thus, the major problem the project is intended to address is the non-compliances of Zambia's civil 
aviation safety and security oversight system with international standards. The main causes of this 
problem are: (i) inflexibility of the existing system and inability to enforce ICAOs' Standards and Rec-
ommended Practices (SARPs); (ii) no training fully integrated and ICAO compliant; (iii) out-dated legis-
lation and lack of individual accountability; (iv) lack of independent aeronautical accident and incident 
investigation; (v) inadequate system for AVSEC regulation and operation; and (vi) ineffective economic 
regulation.” AAP 2010, AFs, p.12 
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JC 3.3: Institutional performance of transport sector management has improved at all adminis-
trative levels 
During the period under review, the EU support to institutional performance was only granted to the 
road sub-sector, and more specifically to road infrastructure management with the SPSP1. As said, the 
RDA and the NRFA benefited from a strong team of long-term TAs during three years. If the take-in by 
the NRFA in commendable, this did not applied to RDA, although it took the major part of EU technical 
assistance. The AG’s 2009 Road Audit and subsequent detailed technical, financial and institutional 
reviews evidenced a very low level of performance in works design, contract management, and work 
supervision, against an higher than expected (10%) administrative cost ratio. (I-3.3.1) 
The private sector participation was a major landmark of the 2002 transport policy document, providing 
a concrete translation of the transition toward a liberalized market economy. The recourse of force ac-
count was thus not considered, even if the national private sector at the beginning of the reference pe-
riod was at best embryonic. Promoting and developing the national construction industry capacity was 
rightly a major component of ROADSIPP and thus of the EU support. This was initially planned with the 
National Council for Construction (NCC) which was expected to provide trainings and technical advices 
to its members. Its contribution ended by being limited, far below the national industry’s needs and pro-
spects, based on what seems ex-post of some sort of misunderstanding. The road market was taken 
over by foreign contractors (South-Africans, Chinese) for major construction and rehabilitation projects, 
as well as performance-based contracts that require large financial basis. The local contractors were 
mainly hired for routine maintenance works. The quality of works became quickly a concern, as price 
rises and delays. The absorption capacity stayed far beyond expectations, roughly 50% of annual work 
programmes for CRN only at the end of the period under review. The GRZ is even establishing force 
account units for the rural roads maintenance. (I-3.3.2) 
The EU did not considered until recently for the civil aviation under the EDF10 to support reforming 
transport regulations.  
 
JC 3.4: Transport sector agencies improved in a sustainable way the quality of their human 
resources 
 Indicator 3.4.1: Number, themes and type of trainings for transport-related agencies’ staff 
At this stage, the number, themes and type of trainings are not documented. The SPSP1 MTR analyses 
the attendance to trainings provided to RDA and NRFA staff that are relevant in number with improving 
significantly the capacity of these agencies. The trainings were complementary to long and short term 
TAs. In sum, the EU provided the new road agencies with the required technical support to improve the 
quality of their human resources.  
Extracts: 
“During the period from 2006 to end of 2007 some 189 RDA staff attended various training courses at 
an overall cost of Kw 537million. An assessment of individual and organisational training needs is cur-
rently underway in the organisation to determine the training plan for the next 3 year period. RDA now 
has a complement of staff in Lusaka and the provinces totalling 352. 
NRFA has a similar plan to train its smaller complement of staff and has designed a training programme 
for each year with overall goals and targets. During 2007 NRFA has trained 106 staff members at an 
overall cost of Kw 674 million with courses as far afield as GIMPA in Ghana and University of Birming-
ham in UK.” SPSP1 MTR 2008, p.20 
 Indicator 3.4.2: Level of consistency between filled positions and qualifications 
Staff appointment for both road agencies was carried out through a competitive process, monitored by 
CPs. It can therefore be assessed that qualifications fitted filled positions, as far as national human 
resources allow.  
Extracts: 
“The appointment of staff to the reformed institutions has been carried out through a competitive appli-
cation and selection system that was designed to select the best qualified candidate.” SPSP1 MTR 
2008, p.22 
“The progress made in implementing institutional reforms with regard to the Agencies may be summa-
rised as follows: 
1. The three agencies NRFA, RDA and RTSA have been established with their own Boards since 
December 2004, comprising private and public sector representatives. The Boards were established 
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within the time frame of the RRMP Credit Agreement (DCA). 
2. The CEO for the RDA was appointed in December 2005; the CEO for NRFA at the end of 
March 2006; and for RTSA at the end of April 2006. 
3. Senior management staff members for NRFA were in place by July 2006 and operational staff 
by end of 2006. For RDA (including an Environmental, Social Impact/Poverty and HIV/AIDS Unit) and 
RTSA management and operational staff were in place by the end of 2007. 
4. Agency regulations for all the three agencies were completed by end of December 2006.  
5. RTSA (…) much needs to be done to further strengthen its operational capability, which may 
include awarding concessions for a number of activities, which can best be undertaken by the private 
sector.  
6. The Consultant has identified, as key issues to be resolved, the work distribution and staff as-
signments between NRFA and RDA, and further streamlining of RDA’s operations, to achieve maxi-
mum efficiency and to avoid duplication of work. The National Road Fund and Road Acts, passed on 
Dec 31, 2002, establish clear institutional responsibilities within the road sector.” ROADSIP II MTR, 
Assessment, pp.29-30 
“Staffing of the sector agencies was initially delayed but has satisfactorily progressed concerning re-
cruitment of 1st, 2nd and 3rd tier management staff in 2006. Performance of agencies is expected to 
further improve with full staff capacity in 2007. The management capacity of particular the RDA for the 
management of the road programme will have to be closely monitored in 2007” CSP 2008, annexe 
 Indicator 3.4.3: % of turnover among management personnel 
Turn-over not an issue for road agencies human resources management. The staffing of RDA and 
NRFA was stable before the 2009 Road Audit. Since then the Boards were renewed and senior staff 
replaced. 
 Indicator 3.4.4: Level of salary in transport sector agencies compared with similar positions 
in the private sector 
The remuneration packages being offered attracted candidates from both the public and private sectors 
for the posts. Often the private sector candidates were selected from consulting companies. This 
means that the resulting staff of the new institutions is very strong, being a combination of staff from 
public and private backgrounds.(SPSP1 MTR 2008, p.22) 
 
JC 3.4:  Transport sector agencies improved in a sustainable way the quality of their human 
resources 
The two major road agencies (RDA and NRFA) were established in 2004 and were fully staffed in 2007, 
as per the targets of the EU performance assessment framework. The recruitment process was com-
petitive (I-3.4.2) and monitored by the EU, allowing, with attractive remuneration packages (I-3.4.4), a 
strong staff with a balance combination of public and private backgrounds. The staff benefitted of train-
ings and long-term TAs (I-3.4.1). Turn-over is not mentioned as an issue (I-3.4.3). The root causes of 
the mismanagement in RDA evidenced by the 2009 AG’s Audit are elsewhere.  
JC 3.5: EU has contributed to set donors coordination mechanisms in place in support to poli-
cy dialogue 
 Indicator 3.5.1: Existence of a specific DPs coordination group established for the 
transport sector, chaired by the GRZ 
The overall policy dialogue architecture was established formally by the JASZ I, consisting of Sector 
Advisory Groups (SAGs) and a High-level platform. The EU, as lead donor, took a pro-active role in 
strengthening the transport SAG after a period of weakness for this forum.  
The scope of the SAG had been too wide, especially in contrast to the the almost exclusive focus of 
CPs on the road sector. The lack of GRZ ownership shown in leading the CPs coordination led to post-
poned meetings, limited attendance and turnover of participants. In a way, Joint Donors Mission aide-
memoires seem to be a better platform for exchange among donors than face-to-face meetings, thus 
losing the main interest (ownership through formalized constructive policy dialogue) expected from EU 
SPSP 
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Data, figures, tables: 
 
From JASZ MoU 2011, p.16 
Extracts: 
“There is consensus among observers that the dialogue at sector level has not been working well. 
SAGs have not been significantly involved in reviewing sector outcomes and performance. Contribu-
tions from SAGs for the preparation of the annual reviews have been limited. In theory, the SAG meet-
ings are held three times a year, but in practice take only place once or twice (JASZ evaluation). There 
is a constant change of participants, which, together with the absence of key personnel, erodes the 
substance of the discussions. Reports are often circulated months after they take place, and key back-
ground papers before the meetings come late or not at all (OPM 2010).27 Consequently, many tech-
nical issues related to the assessment of sector performance could not be clarified prior to the PRBS 
review. As a result of this phenomenon, the SAGs as well as the annual joint SAG conference have not 
functioned properly in building a link between specific sector issues and the core mechanisms of the 
budget support dialogue.” BS Evaluation, draft final report, p.65 
 
“Both project and sector budget support modalities are an integral part of the EU’s sector dialogue as 
lead donor in Zambia in support of ROADSIP II. The steering of the SPSP is mainly embedded in quar-
terly ROADSIP II committee meetings between CPs and key stakeholders of the sector in view of re-
ducing transactions costs.” SPSP1 ETR TOR, p.5 
 
“The 3 well established major fora in the sector for the GRZ/cooperating partners dialogue are the (i) 
ROADSIP II steering committee meetings on a quarterly basis, (2) bi-annual Joint Donor Forum at poli-
cy level and operational level between CPs and the committee of Permanent Secretaries of the Road 
Management Initiative (RMI) and (3) Sector Advisory Group (SAG) meetings to monitor the implemen-
tation of the FNDP at sector level under the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ). AAP 2008, 
p.5 
 
 Indicator 3.5.2: Progress towards the adoption of a common approach of division of labour 
for interfacing with GRZ at central as well at local levels 
The first formalized attempt to establish a clear division of labour was the JASZ I. At sector level, the 
DOL is not very detailed (identifying lead, active, silent, etc. partners) and it is difficult at this stage to 
assess the practical benefits from this structure. However, it is worth noting that under EU leadership, 
coordination was particularly effective: Joint donors’ missions and forum were periodically organized 
and established apparently excellent working relationship among sector’s CPs 
If at all the interface established by the EU at local levels was limited, unless probably with the rural 
road component. 
Extracts: 
“1. Transport - The GO-DOL still identifies the EU as one of the co-lead in the sector; but co-leads 
identified are different with the AfDB and Japan replacing the WB and Denmark. In a recent meeting at 
the Ministry of Transport and Communication, it appeared that GRZ is already considering the AfDB as 
the next lead within the Troika. This has not yet been discussed in the CP Group. Interesting to see 
France as new entry (most likely AFD). To discuss in CP group. 
Policy 
Dialogue 
 CPG and ST - CPG Troika monthly Meetings
Annual High Level Policy Dialogue Meeting (HLPD)
 National Poverty Conference and SAG Workshop
 PRBS Annual Review 
 Sector Advisory Groups
 Sector Reviews
 Reviews of large sector programmes
 Public Finance Management Group 
 Public Sector Managem. Steering Committee
 Mutual Accountability Group
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EU response to the Government-Oriented DOL for JASZ II, March 2011.  
“The Bank is supporting the road transport sector in Zambia through a three-phased, ten year Adapta-
ble Program Loan (APL) for which the overarching goal is to stimulate economic growth, and contribute 
to poverty reduction through investments in road infrastructure and institutional policy reforms. The first 
phase of the APL (RRMP I) in the amount of US$50.0 million was approved on March 9, 2004, became 
effective on June 15, 2004 and is scheduled to close on June 30, 2012. A US$25.0 million additional 
financing was provided under RRMP I mainly for rehabilitation of flood damage to river crossings and 
bridges. The second phase of the APL (RRMP II) in the amount of US$75.0 million was approved on 
October 16, 2009, became effective on March 30, 2010 and is scheduled to close on June 30, 2014. 
The third phase of the APL is yet to be prepared. There are no other agencies co-financing AF2 but in 
the context of the APL, the Bank is part of a group of about eight CPs supporting Zambia’s second 
Road Sector Investment Programme (ROADSIP II) in parallel. During the preparation of RRMP I, it was 
estimated that the full cost of the project would be US$380.86 million made up of US$179.08 million 
from domestic sources and US$201.78 from external sources (including the US$50.0 million IDA cred-
it). (…) CPs have continued to autonomously support ROADSIP II with a high level of coordination 
among themselves and their contributions are regularly reported in the National Road Fund Agency’s 
(NRFA’s) quarterly reports.” WB, RMMP restructuring 2010, p.1 
 Indicator 3.5.3: Absence of gaps or duplications in donors’ support 
An increasing number of CPs joined the momentum created by the EU and no example of gaps or du-
plication could be identified in the available documentation. The level of CPs’ satisfaction on “the quality 
of management arrngments for sector coordination” increased significantly compared to pre-JASZ peri-
od (2007). 
Data, figures, tables: 
How you would rate the quality of management arrangements for sector coordination currently, and in 
2007 before the JAS? 
 
From JASZ 2007-2010 evaluation, 2011, P.99 
 CP proposal GO-DOL for SNDP 
 JASZ CPs Non-JASZ CPs 
Lead 
 
EU, WB AfDB, EU, Japan - 
Active AfDB, DK, Japan WB, Norway Nordic Development 
Fund, BADEA, 
Kuwait Fund, OPEC 
Fund, China 
Background/Silent 
 
Germany, Norway - - 
Phasing Out 
 
 - - 
New Entry 
 
 France Saudi Fund, South 
Africa (DBSA) 
Sub-Total 7 6 7 
Total 
 
 13 
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Extracts: 
“The EU is the only active Cooperating Partner in the air transport sector in Zambia.” AAP 2010, AFs, 
p.14 
 
JC 3.5:  EU has contributed to set donors coordination mechanisms in place in support to poli-
cy dialogue 
The EU has made a very significant contribution to setting-up CPs coordination structures in the road 
sector; firstly by ensuring an effective leadership within the DOL sector framework, and secondly by 
supporting the improvement of GRZ reporting as the most relevant basis for policy dialogue. 
The overall policy dialogue architecture was established formally by the JASZ I, consisting of Sector 
Advisory Groups (SAGs) and a High-level platform. The EU, as lead donor, took a pro-active role in 
strengthening the transport SAG after a period of weakness for this forum. The scope of the SAG had 
been too wide, especially in contrast to the almost exclusive focus of CPs on the road sector. The lack 
of GRZ ownership led to postponed meetings, limited attendance and turnover of participants. In a way, 
Joint Donors Mission aide-memoires seem to be a better platform for exchange among donors than 
face-to-face meetings, thus losing the main interest (ownership through formalized constructive policy 
dialogue) expected from EU SPSP (I-5.3.1).  
The first formalized attempt to establish a clear division of labour was the JASZ I. At sector level, the 
DOL is not very detailed (identifying lead, active, silent, etc. partners) and it is difficult at this stage to 
assess the practical benefits from this structure. However, it is worth noting that under EU leadership, 
coordination was particularly effective: Joint donors’ missions and forum were periodically organized 
and established apparently excellent working relationship among sector’s CPs (I-5.3.2). 
An increasing number of CPs joined the momentum created by the EU and no example of gaps or du-
plication could be identified in the available documentation. The level of CPs’ satisfaction on “the quality 
of management arrangements for sector coordination” increased significantly compared to pre-JASZ 
period (I-5.3.3). 
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EQ4: To what extent have EU interventions in the transport sector contributed 
to improve the economic accessibility: locally (to marketing and inputs for ag-
riculture products) and at country level (to external markets)? 
JC 4.1: The maintenance of road, and rail networks and airports has improved in line with EU 
performance assessment framework 
 Indicator 4.1.1: Conditions of road sections ensuring network connectivity between regions 
and between food deficit/surplus areas, and with external markets 
Zambia has a classified and non-classified road network of roughly 67,000 km. ROADSIP II defines a 
Core Road Network of some 40,000 km which is given priority for maintenance and other interventions 
as it is recognised as being essential for the socio-economic development of the country. The Core 
Road Network includes some 7,200 km of paved and 32,800 km of unpaved roads. The Core Road 
Network comprises Trunk, Main, District, Urban and Primary Feeder Roads. 
The CRN condition has indeed a strong weight in the performance assessment framework allowing EU 
SPSP1 variable tranches release. 5 indicators over the tenth relate directly to road (paved and un-
paved) length maintained or rehabilitated, thus 50% of the variable tranches. The incentive is therefore 
quite strong for RDA to implement its work programmes, and thus to bring the CRN to be maintainable. 
It should be noticed that road condition as such were not selected as indicators, as it was in other EU 
SPSP (ex. Ethiopia).  
The CRN road condition targets were set in the ROASIP II to 63.5% in good condition for the paved 
network, and 38.5% for the unpaved one. The 2008 SPSP MTR evidenced already that the impact of 
the ROADSIP on road condition was lagging behind expectations with only 27% and 6% of roads in 
good condition for respectively the paved and unpaved network. The unpaved roads were themselves 
left aside in implementing the work programmes.  
A part of those poor results were attributed to the poor quality of the works for paved roads, with even 
newly rehabilitated ones above the usual ceiling of an IRI of 3, which in turn was attributed to unskilled 
operators and poor supervision. Rather than tightening supervision and increasing work quality, the 
RDA adjusted the classification criteria (IRI ceiling) which permitted to dramatically improve its 
achievements, as it can be seen below: 
 
Depending on the adoption or not of the new IRI ceilings, the RDA exceeded or was far below its initial 
targets at the end of the reference period (2009) for paved roads in good condition. The effect is not as 
strong for the unpaved network which definitely achieved 1/3
rd
 of its targets.  
Whatever those contractual issues within SPSP management and the financial sustainability of the 
programme itself, the implementation of the ROADSIP II and individual EU road projects (improved 
significantly the paved CRN, with between 94 to 99% of the said roads in good or fair condition. This 
implies that connectivity among Zambia main cities, agricultural surplus/deficit areas and with external 
markets has improved. The poor performance for unpaved roads of the CRN (7 or 10% in good condi-
tion) implies in turn that accessibility of the paved network for secondary cities was kept unchanged.  
Railways 
RSZ has committed itself to invest 60 million USD in the coming 20 years, the duration of the conces-
sion, of which 40 million USD in the first 5 years (rehabilitation of the existing network and the rolling 
stock). However, only $15m are specified in the agreement and reports evoke a $50m investment up to 
the end of the reference period. 
 
In sum, connectivity improved significantly for main cities and along regional corridors with one side EU 
financial inputs (€90m) for road maintenance and rehabilitation through SBS to ROADSIP, and on the 
other side some 100 km of individual road projects (Kabwe-Kapiri-Mposhi and Chisamba Roads, 62 km; 
Zimba-Livingstone, 48 km). The value-for-money of the works undertaken under SPSP1 funding was 
poor, due to several shortcomings in RDA management of NRFA resources.  
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Data, figures, tables: 
Road Network 
Road type Responsible 
agency 
Estimated  
Network (km) 
CRN Paved 
(km) 
CRN Unpaved  
(km) 
CRN Total 
(km) 
Trunk RDA 3,116 3,024 92 3,116 
Main RDA 3,701 2,205 1,496 3,701 
District RDA 13,707 1,362 12,345 13,707 
Urban RDA 5,597 2,812 2,785 5,597 
Primary feeder RDA 15,311  14,333 14,333 
Secondary feeder MLGH 10,060    
Tertiary feeder MLGH 4,424    
Park roads ZAWA 6,607    
Community roads MLGH 5,000    
Total  67,523 9,403 31,051 40,454 
  
Source: RDA 
Road network condition vs targets (2008) (paved/unpaved) 
 
 PAVED 
 CRN TARGET TMD SURVEYED CRN ASSESSED 
GOOD 63.5% 33% 27% 
FAIR 26% 61% 56% 
POOR 10.5% 6% 17% 
    
 UNPAVED 
 CRN TARGET TMD SURVEYED CRN ASSESSED 
GOOD 38.5% 8% 6% 
FAIR 24.5% 9% 7% 
POOR 37% 83% 87% 
  
Source: ROADSIP II MTR 
 
ROADSIP II, Addendum 2, 2011 
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Extracts: 
 “(…) substantial resources have been spent on rehabilitating the road network since 1996. Initially the 
main source of funds was the GRZ budget, through both direct funding of rehabilitation projects and the 
Fuel Levy. Levy proceeds were in the range USD 7-15 million annually through 2003, but have in-
creased substantially since 2004 – reaching USD 68.7 million in 2010. Significant progress on restoring 
the network only got going from 2000 when donor funding scaled up substantially, reaching USD 91.4 
million in 2008. “ Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.13 
 
“One of the main objectives of RoadSIP II was to bring the CRN into a ‘maintainable condition’ by 2013, 
i.e. once rehabilitation was carried out, only routine and periodic maintenance would be required to 
maintain the network in ‘good’ or ‘fair’ condition. Initially, priority was given to roads carrying the most 
traffic, i.e. trunk and main roads. As a result, the proportion of the paved network in ‘poor’ condition was 
reduced from 21% in 2004 to 6% in 2009. (RDA 2009a:9-11). Using the revised criteria adopted in 2008 
(see below), the poor proportion was just 1%. By contrast, the proportion of the unpaved network in 
poor condition increased from 74% in 2004 to 79% in 2009 (using the original criteria). The proportion 
of urban roads (excluded from the above figures) in poor condition was 69% for paved and 50% for 
unpaved in 2009 (RDA 2009a, revised criteria). So whereas good progress has been made on the 
paved network, unpaved and urban roads have continued to deteriorate. The substantial increase in 
road funding in recent years was only sufficient to restore the paved network.” Raballand & Whitworth, 
Transport Policy, 2011, p.15 
 
“Zambia has a significant trade facilitation agenda to improve the flow of goods along the north-south 
corridor. Zambia’s strategic location on the north-south corridor makes it an important transit country for 
goods traveling to and from Central Africa and the Port of Durban. The Chirundu border post in the 
south between Zambia and Zimbabwe has been the cause of notorious delays of transit traffic and has 
contributed to keeping transit speeds along the corridor at a pace of not much more than 10 km per 
hour. The government began to address this issue only recently and will open southern Africa’s first 
one-stop border post at Chirundu to help improve the situation.” AICD country report 2011, p.10 
 
“The rehabilitation of the Great East Road [162.8 km of road rehabilitation for four sections] is part of a 
multi-national and multi-modal corridor approach which has been developed within a dialogue led by 
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the Government of Zambia under ROADSIP II. The Great East Road in Zambia is part of the Nacala 
regional corridor going from Lusaka in Zambia to Nacala port in Mozambique through Malawi. The 
Great East Road also feeds the North-South regional corridor.” AAP 2010, AFs, p.4 
 
“The quality of asphalt pavement surfaces (rideability) is generally quite poor. This is primarily a reflec-
tion of allowing unqualified operators and supervisors to execute the work. It is extremely disappointing 
to expend funds, which are not expected to be available again for the particular section of road for 
many years, only to end up with an undulating surface, ugly longitudinal joints, bumpy transverse joints 
and the potential for the ponding of rainwater on the surface. (…) There seems to be an unacceptably 
high rate of premature asphalt concrete pavement failures. From discussion with persons involved in 
the projects or familiar with their development and by physical site inspections, the Consultant is satis-
fied that the following factors have contributed: specification of inadequate asphalt bound layer thick-
ness to allow even for practical lay-down inaccuracies and/or to prevent attrition in underlying layers; 
inappropriate selection of materials and mixes; poor workmanship; and inadequate inspection and 
checking. (…) Design/design review problems (resulting in delays, additional costs, with potential for 
the need to renegotiate competitively bid jobs at the outset and divided liability) appear to be a perenni-
al plague effecting major rehabilitation projects “ ROADSIP II MTR 2008, Assessment, p. 41 
 
“The Kabwe-Kapiri Mposhi road tranche is extremely relevant to national policy since it restored the 
integrity and use-ability of the North-South main arterial network. The project had immense social and 
economic implications and fits fully into the development priorities of the Government of Zambia (GRZ) 
and of the European Union (EU).” ROM report 2006 
 
“The EDF9 infrastructure programme was increased by including the funding of the Zimba – Livingstone 
road project. This road remains the only section of the entire corridor connecting Zambia with Tanzania 
at Nakonde and with Zimbabwe at Victoria Falls which is still in poor condition. (…) The creation of a 
National Corridors Committee at Permanent Secretary level is a recent development reflecting the in-
creasing importance of developing alternative import/export routes for Zambia.” CSP 2008, pp.22-23 
 
“Zambia’s overall air traffic doubled between 2001 and 2007. By the standards of its neighbours, Zam-
bia is handling a relatively high volume of such traffic, at 1.46 million seats per year. Its domestic air 
transport sector remains modest and is a fraction of that found in Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania. 
This may reflect the fact that the most economically significant cities are relatively close together and 
well connected by road and rail. Even as overall traffic has increased, connectivity (measured by the 
number of city pairs served) has declined from 35 to 25 in recent years, typical across Africa over this 
period. Lusaka has relatively good intra-African connectivity compared to many other capitals in the 
region. But the aging aircraft fleet in Zambia presents another challenge, and its renewal is slower than 
in neighbouring countries.” AICD country report 2011, p.11 
 
“RSZ has committed itself to invest 60 million USD in the coming 20 years, the duration of the conces-
sion, of which 40 million USD in the first 5 years. This money will mainly be spent in rehabilitation of the 
existing network and the rolling stock. RSZ is paying 1.5 million USD concession fee per year. Integra-
tion of both railway systems is priority to guarantee fast and reliable international railway transport. 
There are plans to link the TAZARA railway line with Mpulungu Port at Lake Tanganyika and with Ma-
lawi/Mozambique.” TTF Audit, 2004, pp.22-23 
 
“During the FNDP period, the state of railway infrastructure continued to be poor with the only major 
progress being the completion of the Chipata-Mchinji Railway line. As a result of low investment, the 
railway line network continued to deteriorate to the extent that the average locomotive speed reduced 
from 60km/h to 15km/h. Consequently, the targeted volume of cargo and passengers transported could 
not be met and this put more pressure on the road network. The linking of Chipata/Mchinji Rail line to 
TAZARA will therefore, improve connectivity to the railway network to the Port of Nacala in Mozam-
bique. During the FNDP period, out of an approximated 1,700 km of canals and inland waterways, ap-
proximately 700 km underwent routine maintenance and rehabilitation, while one dredging equipment 
was rehabilitated and two were procured.” SNDP 2011, pp.57-58 
 Indicator 4.1.2: Condition of rail infrastructure and rolling stock 
The rail infrastructure was suffering from a significant maintenance backlog at the beginning of the ref-
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erence period, due to years of financial losses of the publicly owned railways companies. Though not 
documented, the rolling stock and particularly the locomotives were in a state of disarray by lack of 
maintenance and renewal. This situation prevented the EU to support the rail sub-sector. 
The GRZ signed a 20-years concession agreement with a South-African company to operate Zambian 
Railways (renamed Railway Systems of Zambia, RSZ) but kept the other railways company TAZARA 
as a joint (with Tanzania) as a parastatal. 
The concessionaire committed to invest $30m in rehabilitating the tracks and the rolling stocks. The 
GRZ did not extended the rail network during the period under review, though a 37 km link from Chipata 
to the Malawi rail network, which connects to the Mozambican port of Nacala, was commissioned in 
2010 at a cost of some USD 10 million. 
At the end of the reference period, serious concerns remain on the part of the mines: 
 over RSZ’s capacity limitations (insufficient locomotives and wagons);  
 reliability (outdated infrastructure and poor maintenance);  
 transit times (average of 30 days to Durban; Average transit times in 2005/06 to Durban were 
estimated at 21 days by rail and 7-9 days by road. Times to Dar es Salaam were 18 days and 
8.5 days respectively),  
 uncompetitive rates relative to road rates (particularly for Durban);  
 poor security of rail shipments; and  
 weak coordination between RSZ, TAZARA, and Spoornet 
 
In sum, the condition of rail infrastructure and rolling stock did not improved significantly during the ref-
erence period in this sub-sector not supported by the EU. 
Extracts: 
“Not surprisingly, by the turn of the century both railways had accumulated substantial financial losses 
and maintenance backlogs. To try and address the situation, in February 2003 GRZ signed a twenty 
year concession agreement with NLPI Ltd of South Africa to operate Zambian Railways, which was 
renamed Railway Systems of Zambia (RSZ). The concessionaire relieved GRZ of responsibility for 
financial losses and committed to invest USD 30 million. While freight traffic increased from 265,000 
tonnes in 2004 to 754,000 tonnes in 2010, this was far below expectations in the NLPI Ltd financial 
proposal and a fraction of traffic volumes in the 1970s. Much of the increase came from copper concen-
trate exports, which increased from 8,331 tonnes in 2004 to 238,109 tonnes in 2008 before falling back 
to 114,200 tonnes in 2010 (Table 11.2). RSZ withdrew completely from inter-mine traffic, which had 
traditionally been important, because it could no longer compete with trucks. 
A stakeholders’ meeting in January 2010 chaired by the Ministry of Communications and Transport 
revealed serious concerns on the part of the mines over RSZ’s capacity limitations (insufficient locomo-
tives and wagons); reliability (outdated infrastructure and poor maintenance); transit times (average of 
30 days to Durban; Average transit times in 2005/06 to Durban were estimated at 21 days by rail and 7-
9 days by road. Times to Dar es Salaam were 18 days and 8.5 days respectively), uncompetitive rates 
relative to road rates (particularly for Durban); poor security of rail shipments; and weak coordination 
between RSZ, TAZARA, and Spoornet. 
The situation at TAZARA, which is jointly owned by the Zambian and Tanzanian Governments and still 
operated as a parastatal, appears to be worse than at RSZ. Despite a rebound in 2009/10, freight vol-
umes have fallen precipitously (Table 11.2) to a point where the operational viability of the system is in 
doubt. While financial data is not publicly available, TAZARA is believed to be in financial crisis and 
largely dependent on (tied) grants from China. ‘TAZARA requires an investment of USD 208.999 million 
to sustain its operations’ (TAZARA 2010:19). With annual turnover averaging just USD 37 million be-
tween 2007/08 and 2009/10, there is little prospect of recapitalisation on this scale. To avert collapse 
the two governments approached the Chinese Government – which financed and built the railway - 
about the possibility of concessioning TAZARA to a consortium of Chinese enterprises (TAZARA 
2010:6). The outcome is not known. TAZARA’s fundamental problem is that, even if it were well capital-
ized and managed, the rationale for its existence largely disappeared once sanctions against Rhodesia 
/ Zimbabwe were lifted and the border re-opened. With Zambia Railways / RSZ itself having substantial 
surplus capacity, it is doubtful whether there is sufficient traffic for one railway, let alone two.” Raballand 
& Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.7 
“GRZ has emphasized the need to revive RSZ and TAZARA and reverse the switch from rail to road 
transport for some time. However, the only significant investment so far is the 37 km link from Chipata 
to the Malawi rail network, which connects to the Mozambican port of Nacala, which was commissioned 
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in 2010 at a cost of some USD 10 million. The Sixth National Development Plan includes plans not only 
to recapitalize TAZARA, but also to build a number of completely new rail lines; these include connect-
ing TAZARA both to the Nacala system and to Lake Tanganyika, and extending the RSZ system from 
Chingola to Solwezi (to serve the new Kansanshi and Lumwana mines), from Livingstone to Kazungula, 
and from Kafue to Lion’s Den in Zimbabwe (Republic of Zambia 2011)”. Raballand & Whitworth, 
Transport Policy, 2011, p.10 
 Indicator 4.1.3: Condition of international airports 
The EU intervention for rehabilitating Livingstone airport (EDF8) and extending the Lusaka airport run-
away (EDF9) improved significantly their capacity to support the development of air traffic. The Living-
stone airport was intended to help develop tourism and contributed to achieve this goal, against tech-
nical and contractual issues with the contractor. The extension of Lusaka airport runaway allowed effec-
tively international companies to link the capital with higher capacity aircrafts. 
Extracts: 
“The severe underperformance of the contractor [Lusaka airport], due to inadequate human resources 
and dilapidated equipment, resulted in low quality of work, repetitive breaches of safety norms and poor 
management of employee welfare. The underperformance has provoked delays in work programme 
which provoke additional supervision costs and inconvenience costs to NACL.” ROM report 2006, p.2 
 
“Zambia has four international airports at Lusaka, Livingstone, Ndola and Mfuwe and several domestic 
airports. The four airports are managed by the National Airports Corporation Limited (NACL), a parasta-
tal company established in 1989 and their total traffic of passengers was 1,180,000 for 2008. Interna-
tional traffic represents over 80% of total traffic. The 188 domestic airports under Government control 
are managed by the DCA. The largest domestic aerodromes are: Solwezi, Chipata, Kasama and Kasa-
ba Bay. At present, there are two main domestic airlines on scheduled services – "Proflight" and "Zam-
bezi Airlines" and several internationals ones. Three main freight operators are active. Zambia, as a 
tourist destination, has a significant number of charter operators. There are currently 35 registered air-
craft operators in Zambia.” AAP 2010, AFs, p.12 
 
“Zambia has four main international airports owned and operated by NACL at Lusaka, Livingstone, 
Ndola and Mfuwe. There are 182 domestic aerodromes, most are owned and operated by the GRZ. 
The total traffic for the four international airports in thousands was: 845, 1085 and 1180 for 2006, 2007 
and 2008 respectively. International traffic represents over 80% of total traffic at the four international 
airports. Traffic increased substantially between 2006 and 2007, at average of 20% per annum and 
dropped to 12% between 2007/2008. With the ban of Zambian airlines, operators report decline in traf-
fic.” Formulation study 2010, pp.13-14 
 
JC 4.1:  The maintenance of road, and rail networks and airports has improved in line with EU 
performance assessment framework 
For the two transport sub-sectors supported by EU during the reference period, the condition of the 
infrastructure improved significantly. The percentage of paved trunk roads and regional corridors of the 
CRN in good and fair condition increased from 79% to 94%, in a way at the cost of an almost un-
changed condition for the unpaved network (I-4.1.1). Livingstone and Lusaka (2 of the 4 main Zambia 
airports) airports’ capacity were adjusted to the traffic requirements and the GRZ pro-growth policy. 
Improvements were achieved against poor performance of the contractors (I-4.1.3). The railway sub-
sector was left aside by EU support and, even with the concessionning of the more economically worth 
of the two parastatal companies, did not improved to the extent to face the trucking industry competition 
(I-4.1.2). 
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JC 4.2: The extension of infrastructure networks has improved Zambia’s connectivity 
 Indicator 4.2.1: Increased road density in rural areas (measure of improved rural access) 
and between regions and between food surplus/deficit areas 
Rural accessibility, as a % of rural population within 2 km from all-season road is 16.8% at the end of 
the reference period (AICD country report 2011).  
The most noticeable initiative under ROADSIP is the Rural Accessibility and Mobility Programme 
(RAMP) launched in 2006 and implemented through the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. 
The main aim of RAMP is to contribute to poverty reduction through facilitation of enhanced mobility 
and access to socio-economic goods and services for rural communities. Among the initiatives that 
have been adopted within the RAMP project are Community Transport Infrastructure (CTI) and Inter-
mediate Means of Transport (IMTs). Under the Community Transport Infrastructure initiative the minis-
try has undertaken to rehabilitate and maintain community transport infrastructure in selected pilot dis-
tricts, including the construction of footbridges/culvets and the opening up of new foot paths and cycle 
or ox-cart trails in rural areas. Through the IMTs initiatives, the RAMP programme has helped with the 
provision of transportation means which are applicable to a rural setup, these include: cattle, donkeys, 
bicycles and trailers, motor cycles, tricycles, barrows and canoes. 
Data, figures, tables: 
GIS rural accessibility (% of rural pop within 2 km from all-season road): 16.8% (AICD country report 
2011 
 
Extracts: 
“Primary Feeder Roads constitute 46% of the CRN unpaved network, of which 88% (over 12,000 km) 
were in poor condition in 2009. The cost of rehabilitating this network is estimated at USD 378 million in 
2011 prices. Even if funds were available, it would be hard to justify such a large investment since mo-
torised traffic levels on these roads are very low - typically less than 20 vehicles per day (I.T.Transport 
Ltd. 2011).” Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.24 
 
“There is a continuum of integration into markets for most households in Africa. Although a road may be 
impassable for cars, a motorcyclist can dismount and walk around the trouble spot in the road and then 
continue his trip. Most rural populations are connected to markets somehow; connectivity is not either 
zero or one. Transport connectivity is only one component of rural development, and not necessarily 
the most important. This may explain why investments in rural roads have rarely had the anticipated 
impact on poverty reduction, as found in a recent study of Cameroon, Burkina Faso and Uganda (Ra-
balland et al. 2010a). While no such evaluation has been conducted in Zambia, the results would prob-
ably be worse since Zambia is less densely populated than Cameroon and Uganda (implying less traf-
fic). Road upgrading is not the only answer to connectivity problems in rural areas. From a transport 
service provider perspective, purchases from small farmers cannot increase significantly without load 
consolidation and agglomeration at the local level. Load consolidation decreases the need for a road 
accessible by truck to every farm, and increases value-added for farmers. Roads for trucks should only 
be extended to where local agglomeration occurs (small towns or large collection points). With larger 
volumes to transport and more rotations (because of more rapid turnover and better road conditions), 
increased competition between transport operators may emerge - helping to reduce transport prices.” 
Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.24 
 
“Rural Accessibility and Mobility Programme (RAMP) with Ministry of Local Government and Housing 
(MLGH). The RAMP Coordinator, who was appointed in 2006, has prepared a revised ROADSIP II 
Logical Framework Matrix indicating the programme for the next two years, as well as a Work Plan and 
Budget, covering the remaining years of ROADSIP II. RAMP had slow start during the first five years of 
ROADSIP II. The annual budget during the past two years has been about Kwacha 2 billion (about $0.5 
m) sourced from GRZ grants. The Bankable Document for ROADSIP II envisaged a $108.5 m RAMP 
program, subsequently scaled down to $53.8 m, but still ten times larger than the actual expenditures to 
date.” ROADSIP II MTR 2008, Assessment, p.34 
 
“36 feeder roads of a total of 1,319 km of have been identified and included in the programme. The 
roads link: 92 basic schools, 9 secondary schools, 39 health centers, 1 hospital, 10 storage depots and 
13 markets. It is very likely that improved access to these facilities have resulted in more pupils attend-
ing school regularly, more patients visiting health facilities and more visitors to markets. Total produc-
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tion value in 2005 in the catchment area of the roads was estimated at around US$ 12 million and the 
anticipated production increase due to road works is estimated at 27%. This should directly result in 
higher household incomes, more employment and thus alleviating poverty. The estimated savings on 
vehicle operating costs per year on 1,300 km of rehabilitated rural roads would be around Euro 
650,000; this should result in lower transportation costs and in lower prices of agricultural input and 
consuming goods. Higher farm gate prices for agricultural produce is also to be expected. All the above 
figures originate in the Feasibility Study for Feeder Roads, 2005; however it should be noted that in-
creases in construction costs of 30-40% (in the local currency) is likely to reduce the number kilometres 
of roads that will be rehabilitated.” SPSP1 MTR 2008, p.35 
 
“There is evidence of overinvestment in Zambia’s main road network. About three-quarters of the pri-
mary and secondary road network is paved, one of the highest ratios among Africa’s low-income coun-
tries. Traffic density on Zambia’s paved roads is comparatively low—at 736 vehicles per day it is about 
half of the average for resource-rich countries. Indeed, analysis suggests that 65 per cent of the main 
road network does not have the traffic levels that warrant paving (meaning fewer than 300 vehicles use 
it per day). The rural road networks appear to be neglected. Zambia’s rural road accessibility is poor 
compared to it peers. While 70 per cent of Zambians depend on agriculture for their livelihood, only 17 
per cent of this population lives within 2 km of an all-season road—about half the African average. The 
condition of the existing rural networks is exceptionally poor, with only 21 per cent in good or fair condi-
tion, compared with around 60 per cent in the relevant peer groups. There may thus be a case for shift-
ing attention and resources to the rural networks in the future.” AICD country report 2010, p.9 
 
“The density of the core road network is 0.053 in km/square and 0,029 in km/capita. (…) While sector 
performance on the paved core road network is satisfactory, the unpaved strategic road network is still 
in a generally poor condition without all-weather access, adversely affecting basic access for the rural 
poor.” CSP 2008, p.14 
 Indicator 4.2.2: Increased number of road and rail links to external markets, particularly 
neighbouring countries 
Most EU road interventions focused on improving the regional corridors through rehabilitation under 
SPSP1 and reconstruction through individual projects (some 100 km). The length rehabilitated under 
SPSP1 does not appear in the available documentation and will have to be identified with RDA. 
The EU did not support the maintenance or the extension of the rail link with Zambia’s neighbouring 
countries (and no such investment occurred during the reference period).  
Data, figures, tables: 
 
 
Source: Gaël Raballand, The Impact of Regional Liberalisation and Harmonisation in Road Transport 
Services: A Focus on Zambia and Lessons for Landlocked Countries, 2008 
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 Indicator 4.2.3: Number of regular air lines and frequency 
No data available.  
Extracts: 
“Air freight rates are extremely high at USD1.55 -1.60 kg for vegetables and USD1.70 for flower exports 
during the high season (October-April). There has been a noticeable increase in commuter and air 
charter operations, which has resulted in development of tourism activities particularly in the Living-
stone area.” CSP 2008, p.15 
 
JC 4.2:  The extension of infrastructure networks has improved Zambia’s connectivity 
The period under review acknowledged a significant increase in Zambia’s connectivity with external 
markets, and particularly ports with improvements of the road condition along regional corridors. Links 
between main cities and between those and regional corridors benefited as well from EU support 
through SPSP1 and individual rehabilitation projects. The EU contributed mainly to physical connectivity 
rather than transport facilitation, which was evidenced during the reference period as being more far-
reaching in terms of impact on transport price. (I-4.2.2) 
The rehabilitation of Livingstone and the extension of Lusaka runaway with EU support contributed also 
to improve Zambia connectivity, here again mainly with international demand for transport (tourism and 
affairs respectively). (I-4.2.3) 
The rural areas accessibility was far less improved, with most efforts of the road sub-sector budget 
allocated to the paved CRN. (I-4.2.1) 
 
JC 4.3: Access to rural areas and external markets has improved 
 Indicator 4.3.1: Average time between main cities and Lusaka reduced by more than 25% 
Specific data not available to inform this indicator at this stage. The decrease in travel time on the main-
tained and rehabilitated sections of the CRN is clear and widely recognized.  
Extracts: 
“Traffic volume data is also in short supply and is not collected during the contract period on the roads 
being worked. There are traffic counts and surveys being carried out for specific road projects but the 
old 60 fixed point traffic survey does not appear to be producing reliable data. The Consultants carrying 
out the road condition survey are also collecting traffic data but this is hidden in the black box that is 
presently HMS and not easily available for the RDA M&E unit to analyse. Poverty impact data is equally 
difficult to come by although a number of baseline surveys that have produced vast amounts of data. 
So far there have been no follow up impact surveys to collect and analyse the differences generated by 
any of the works programmes. Charts the consumer prices indicators stipulated in the EC agreement is 
shown in Annex T5 This shows that prices in general are rising faster in Lusaka than in rural areas, and 
that prices for food in Lusaka are catching up with prices in the rest of the country. How much of this 
change can be attributed to the road programme and what it means in terms of the effectiveness of the 
programme is beyond the scope of this review to determine.” SPSP1 MTR 2008, p.29 
 Indicator 4.3.2: Average time between border crossings and Lusaka reduced by more than 
25% 
The indicator is not readily available from the documentation. The concentration of rehabilitation works 
and maintenance operation on paved road of the CRN and particularly on the regional corridors implies 
that travel time to the border post decreased by more than 25%.  
Considering the analysis of the impact of the various factors reducing transport cost (see below JC 4), 
the time required to clear road freight at border-crossing must be including under this indicator. The 
analysis will be done on Chirundu border crossing where a WB project created on of the first one-stop 
clearance (Dec. 2009, thus at the end of the reference period), with a SSATP contribution for setting a 
corridor observatory. There are plans to construct similar one-stop posts at the main border crossings 
with Tanzania, Malawi and Botswana. In 2007, on average, it took 39 hours for a truck to transit north-
bound through Chirundu and 14 hours southbound. This compared with 34 hours and 11 hours respec-
tively for Beitbridge.  
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report  
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
  
Page - 77 - 
Data, figures, tables: 
 
 
Extracts: 
“Goods being transported along the North South Corridor spend up to one third of total transport time at 
border crossings (Curtis 2009). In 2008 it took an average of 39 hours for a truck to transit northbound 
and 14 hours southbound through Chirundu, the main crossing between Zambia and Zimbabwe (and 
34 hours and 11 hours respectively for Beitbridge). Delays mainly affect the clearance of consolidated 
loads, i.e. loads that have multiple consignors or consignees. On average, it took over 60 hours to clear 
a northbound consolidated load (there were virtually no southbound consolidated loads) in Chirundu. 
Single entry break-bulk loads (which are loaded on to a flat deck trailer and then tarped) took around 40 
hours to clear, both northbound and southbound. The main source of northbound delays was the Zam-
bia Revenue Authority, which took an average of 17.4 hours to process a truck and its documents (Cur-
tis 2009). 
“If Zambian international transport prices are to be significantly reduced, it is essential that clearance 
procedures are simplified and border-crossing time reduced. This was the motivation for opening a one-
stop border post at Chirundu in December 2009. The idea is that customs and immigration procedures 
are only completed once, instead of being repeated on both sides of the border. However, it is too early 
to assess the impact on reducing border delays; international experience demonstrates that building 
such facilities is easier than implementing institutional reforms.” Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Poli-
cy, 2011, pp.4-5 
 
“On average, it took 39 hours for a truck to transit northbound through Chirundu and 14 hours south-
bound. This compared with 34 hours and 11 hours respectively for Beitbridge. The RFA Vehicle Cost 
Schedule for April 2008, gives the standing cost for a secondhand truck and flat deck semitrailer com-
bination as US$265 per day, the equivalent standing cost for a modern truck and tanker interlink com-
bination is US$524 per day. Estimating that 75 per cent of the trucks transiting Chirundu are 
secondhand and noting that on average 225 trucks transit the border in a day, the daily cost for trucks 
standing at the border is the US$84656 (225 x .75 x 323 + 225 x .25 x 536). This equates to US$31 
million per annum.”SSATP The Chirundu Border Post, Detailed Monitoring of Transit Times, September 
2009 
 Indicator 4.3.3: Average time between the regional economic capitals and the nearest sec-
ondary town 
The little data available confirms a decrease in average travel time and costs. 
Extracts: 
“The baseline studies were completed before the rehabilitation works, however indications from an ini-
tial follow-up on the baseline studies suggest that traffic volumes have increased, travel time has been 
reduced and the cost of transportation gone down on the roads, where rehabilitation has been complet-
ed. The following examples are quoted in Western Province, on the 185 km from Kaoma to Lukulu: (i) 
trucks of more than 10 tons did not travel to Lukulu and were being off-loaded in Kaoma, this has 
changed; (ii) it used to take 7 hours to cover the 185 km from Luklu to Kaoma, the travel time has now 
been reduced to 5 hours; (iii) passenger fares between the two town has been reduced from Kz 85,000 
to Kz 60,000.” SPSP1 MTR 2008, p.35 
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 Indicator 4.3.4: Improvements in transport facilitation, particularly border-crossings and 
swift access to ports 
However the main travel time issue for goods road transport is customs clearance, particularly for con-
solidated loads in Chirundu: on average it took 60 hours for a consolidated load and 40 hours for break-
bulk loads. The main source of northbound delays was the Zambia Revenue Authority, which took an 
average of 17.4 hours to process a truck and its documents. The opening a one-stop border post at 
Chirundu in December 2009 with WB (and SSATP) support improved the situation.  
The goods transported by rail are even more penalized than the trucking operations. A rail freight jour-
ney of 3,000 km from Kolwezi on the DRC border to the port of Durban takes 38 days to complete—9 
days of travel time and 29 days associated with customs clearance and loading and interchange. 
Freight moves no more than 4 km per hour on average, and the aggregate costs of delays along the 
corridor have been estimated at $120 million per year. Access from one rail system to another is re-
stricted for technical reasons or connecting rail operators simply do not have the necessary traction 
capacity to service existing traffic. Poor traffic planning causes undue delays, and operators are not 
incentivized to provide reliable interconnection services. (AICD 2011) 
Extracts: 
“The lack of reciprocal access rights delays rail transit through Zambia and along the entire north-south 
corridor. A rail freight journey of 3,000 km from Kolwezi on the DRC border to the port of Durban takes 
38 days to complete—9 days of travel time and 29 days associated with customs clearance and loading 
and interchange. Freight moves no more than 4 km per hour on average, and the aggregate costs of 
delays along the corridor have been estimated at $120 million per year. The Zambian rail network con-
tributes to these delays. Access from one rail system to another is restricted for technical reasons or 
connecting rail operators simply do not have the necessary traction capacity to service existing traffic. 
Poor traffic planning causes undue delays, and operators are not incentivized to provide reliable inter-
connection services. Reducing these delays requires revision of the contractual relationships and ac-
cess rights linking these railways to ensure transparency and fairness in reciprocal track access rights.” 
AICD country report 2011, p.11 
 
JC 4.3:  Access to rural areas and external markets has improved 
Though considered under the SPSP1, improvement of the primary feeder roads was not fully taken into 
account if RDA’s work programmes, which gave a priority to the paved network and the pave the gravel 
trunk road needing rehabilitation (I-4.3.1). The condition of the unpaved roads of the CRN stayed al-
most unchanged during the reference period, and the TA support provided by the EU specifically to 
rural road network (2 long-term TAs) did not contribute significantly to set-up a dedicated decentralized 
maintenance system. The GRZ decision to create new force account units to carry-on maintenance and 
rehabilitation of the rural roads is a new factor. According to field mission finding, these units obey to 
the general rule of growing inefficiency and overstaffing. 
The accessibility to the road freight of the external markets improved steadily with the EU contribution. 
Most rehabilitation and maintenance works under the SPSP1 were focused on the regional corridors, 
reducing travel time up to the border. They were complemented by road works implemented through 
EU project approach (I-4.3.3). However, surveys with truck operators identified that the border-crossing 
were the main factor for delays (up to 60 hours in Chirundu for a consolidated load). The opening of a 
one-stop post in Chirundu with WB support paved the way for further reduction of travel time to or from 
ports (I-4.3.4).  
The rail freight is still even more penalized than the road freight by differences in standards between 
networks, insufficient coordination, lack of traction capacity, etc. reinforcing the comparative ad-
vantages of the road freight. 
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JC 4.4: Passenger and goods transport has improved 
 Indicator 4.4.1: Average vehicle operating costs on trunk roads and regional corridors for 
passengers and freight 
The documentation does not provide with a rigorous analysis of Volatile organic compounds (VOC) 
decrease implied by the EU support to the ROADSIP. The rehabilitation and maintenance operations, 
particularly on paved roads, mechanically decrease VOCs, as mentioned by the 2008 SPSP1 MTR. In 
the Zambian context, with newly paved roads with an IRI exceeding already 3 (due to the poor quality of 
the works), the VOCs decrease along the years will be far less significant than planned, as a conse-
quence of weak supervision and contractual. As far as EU projects are concerned a recent audit of the 
EU Court of Auditors assessed that works were carried out according to specifications. 
Data, figures, tables: 
 
Source: G. Raballand, The Impact of Regional Liberalisation and Harmonisation in Road Transport 
Services: A Focus on Zambia and Lessons for Landlocked Countries, 2008 
 
Extracts: 
“The baseline studies were completed before the rehabilitation works, however indications from an ini-
tial follow-up on the baseline studies suggest that traffic volumes have increased, travel time has been 
reduced and the cost of transportation gone down on the roads, where rehabilitation has been complet-
ed. The following examples are quoted in Western Province, on the 185 km from Kaoma to Lukulu: (i) 
trucks of more than 10 tons did not travel to Lukulu and were being off-loaded in Kaoma, this has 
changed; (ii) it used to take 7 hours to cover the 185 km from Luklu to Kaoma, the travel time has now 
been reduced to 5 hours; (iii) passenger fares between the two town has been reduced from Kz 85,000 
to Kz 60,000.” SPSP1 MTR 2008, p.35 
 
“Until the copper mines were privatized in the late 1990s nearly all Zambian copper was exported by 
rail, much of it in concentrate form. Both the mines and the railways were government owned and 
transport competition was discouraged; the road network was in such poor condition that road transport 
was not an option anyway. Today most copper is exported by road. The decline in rail traffic began long 
before privatisation. Total traffic carried by Zambian Railways fell from more than 6 million tonnes in 
1975 to below 1.5 million tonnes in 1998 and 265,000 tonnes in 2004. While TAZARA’s design capacity 
was some 5 million tonnes per year, freight traffic peaked at 1.2 million tonnes in 1986, averaged about 
600,000 tonnes during the 2000s (TAZARA 2010) and dropped to just 383,000 tonnes in 2008/09. (…) 
Following privatisation of the mines, the railways lost their monopoly over copper traffic. However, they 
were slow to adjust to the changing market and competition from the trucking industry. Managers, many 
of whom were political appointees, were reluctant to reduce staffing in response to falling revenues 
because GRZ regarded the railways as an important source of employment; so labour costs came to 
consume about 60% of revenues. (…) Copper production rebounded strongly – reaching 852,000 
tonnes in 2010 - following privatisation and the worldwide copper boom. However, there was little re-
bound in rail traffic for a number of reasons. ” Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.6 
 Indicator 4.4.2: Cuts in road vehicle operating costs and reduced time for improved roads 
were consistent in extent and duration with initial plans 
The ROADSIP does not specify extent and duration of VOCs’ cuts. Poor civil work quality implies in turn 
that expectable extent and duration of standard rehabilitation of paved roads and paving of former 
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gravel roads will not be met.  
 Indicator 4.4.3: Cuts in railways exploitation costs 
No data available.  
 Indicator 4.4.4: Decrease in airports tax and fares 
This indicator is not relevant. EU interventions increased security and extended the range of aircrafts 
able to land in Livingstone and Lusaka, without direct link to the level of airport taxes and fares. Exploi-
tation costs decreases are more a major civil aviation concern. Passenger numbers in Livingstone (41 
international passengers in 1990, 3544 in 1997 and some 150,000 in 2005) illustrate that the improved 
passenger processing capacity and ground handling capability contributed to change the area a pole of 
tourism development - an international tourist destination. Airport tax is affordable to passengers (25 
USD for international flights; 10 USD for internal flights). 
Extracts: 
“The results are an improved taxiway in Lusaka Airport and improved passenger processing capacity 
and ground handling capability at Livingstone Airport, which should be achieved by straightforward re-
habilitation and extension works and supply tenders to upgrade equipment. International and internal 
travellers benefit directly from the improvements made to the airports. Passenger numbers in Living-
stone (41 international passengers in 1990, 3544 in 1997 and 150,000 predicted in 2005) illustrate that 
the project is addressing a genuine need, fuelled by the diversification of the Zambian economy. (…) 
Since 2001 Livingstone has become a pole of tourism development - an international tourist destination. 
Investments in hotels, game reserve management, shopping malls are observed. The multiplier effects 
of tourism are manifest on the local economy – restaurants, shops, food and beverage industry, ar-
ticrafts and curios. The project, strictly an infrastructure project, cannot affect the wider conditions, 
which influence tourism in Zambia. However, the airport staff, like people in Zambia in general, are 
friendly and polite, immigration procedures are straightforward, the airports are clean and well run, all of 
which make visitors feel welcome the moment they step off the plane. (…) The NACL is well managed 
as a private company established under the Limited Companies Act, of which the government is 100% 
shareholder. The financial performance of NACL will continue to strengthen if current trends on pas-
senger numbers are maintained. Airport tax is affordable to passengers (25 USD for international 
flights; 10 USD for internal flights). Livingstone Airport employees are properly trained to handle the 
equipment provided by the project.” ROM report 2006 
 
JC 4.4:  Passenger and freight transport has improved 
The EU interventions in the transport sector improved significantly road and air transport.  
The SPSP1 financial inputs targeted on maintenance and rehabilitation, as well as individual rehabilita-
tion projects, almost all delivered in the last years of the reference period due to procedural delays and 
contractual issues with contractors, reduced mechanically the VOCs and the travel time between main 
cities and from those towards neighbouring countries and ports (Dar es Salam, Durban). The poor qual-
ity of the works undertaking under the management and supervision of the RDA, which represents the 
most of EU resources, implies that not only value for money of the investments was lower than expect-
able but that the economic benefits for road transport will be lower and will last far less than otherwise. 
The losses are not analysed in the available documentation. (I-4.4.1, 4.4.2) 
The EU contribution to adjusting Lusaka and Livingstone airports to the increasing demand of mobility 
and the growth potential of the deserved areas improved the passengers and, to a far lesser extent, 
freight transport mainly with countries in the region and the tourist international market. The main cities 
are too close to bear a large development of national lines. In this sub-sector, the EU intervention con-
tributed to improve security and adjusted runaway capacity rather than exploitation costs. (I-4.4.4) 
The railway sub-sector was not encompassed in EU strategic response for the transport sector. Condi-
tions improved following the concessionning of RZ but far from increasing significantly its competitive 
position vs the trucking industry (time-wise and price-wise, not considering its flexibility and security). (I-
4.4.3) 
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JC 4.5: Transport operator’s benefits from EU road interventions were passed on to customers 
 Indicator 4.5.1: Price flexibility for roads, railways and airlines transport 
Transport price flexibility that could be expected from decrease in transport cost was analysed recently 
(Teravaninthorn and Raballand 2008) using the truck operators survey (in Southern Africa, incl. Zam-
bia). This analysis confirmed that the decrease in VOCs due to the rehabilitation of a road link from fair 
to good is of 3 to 5% and induces a decrease in price of 2 to 3%, the difference being kept by transport 
companies. The EU contribution to CRN maintenance and rehabilitation induced a decrease in freight 
price of this magnitude.  
The study covered other measures able to bring down transport cost: 
Measures Decrease in 
transport costs 
Decrease in 
transport prices
8
 
Rehabilitation of road from fair to good -3/5% -2/3% 
20% reduction in border-crossing time -3/4% -10/15%
9
 
20% reduction in fuel price -10% -5/7% 
20% reduction in informal road payments -1% +/- 0% 
The reduction of border-crossing time has the most noticeable impact on price (up to 15% for a reduc-
tion of 20% in customs clearance), followed by reduction in fuel price (for which severe inefficiencies are 
noticeable). These data question value for money of a too strong target on road condition and value an 
integrated approach, notably through sector policy dialogue (with the association of the Ministry of fi-
nance for customs and fuel prices issues). 
 
No data available at this stage for airlines prices on national lines and for railways.  
Data, figures, tables: 
Zambia International and Regional Trade - Estimated Freight Transport Flows 2005/2006 (million tonnes pa) 
 
Source: Raballand et al. (2008). POL is Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants. Nominal (Nom.) means a very 
insignificant volume (a couple of trucks a day). 
 
Extracts: 
 “Using simulations with vehicle operating cost data from Zambian operators along the North South Cor-
ridor; it was found that the two most important determinants of transport prices in Southern Africa are 
                                               
8
  Decreases in transport costs and prices differ since some cost savings are retained by truck operators.  
9
  The reduction in border-crossing time enables increased vehicle turnarounds (and revenues) which, with strong competition 
along this corridor, leads to significant reductions in transport prices. 
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border-crossing time and fuel costs (Teravaninthorn and Raballand 2008). Table 11.1 shows that while 
upgrading the condition of a corridor road from ‘fair’ to ‘good’ is expected to decrease transport prices 
by 2-3%, 20% reductions in border crossing time and fuel prices can generate much larger reductions.” 
Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.3 
 
“It is widely assumed that, by reducing vehicle operating costs for trucks, road investments make 
transport more affordable for farmers and road users. However, farmers may still not be able to afford to 
use a truck if they only have a small agricultural surplus to market. Moreover, as noted above, vehicle 
operating cost savings may not be passed on to users through lower tariffs if trucks face no competi-
tion10. Road infrastructure has an impact on service delivery through two main channels. The first - 
which is less significant than usually thought11 - is the impact on vehicle operating costs: roads in bad 
condition increase trucks’ fuel consumption and maintenance costs. The second impact - more critical, 
but often neglected - is on timeliness and supply chain reliability: poor road quality can (occasionally) 
cause breakdowns and service interruptions. “ Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.23 
 
 “The high diesel prices in February 2010 illustrated in Appendix 9.1 are largely attributable to Zambia’s 
highly inefficient fuel importation arrangements. Instead of importing finished products by road or rail like 
most landlocked countries, Zambia imports crude oil through a pipeline from Dar es Salaam which is 
then processed at the Indeni refinery before being distributed throughout the country. Inefficiencies at all 
stages in the chain (purchasing crude, pipeline, refinery and distribution) mean that Zambia has sub-
stantially higher fuel costs than necessary.” Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.5 
 
“Currently, some 1,300 to 1,500 large trucks registered in Zambia operate nationally and regionally. 
Zambian truck operators can be classified into the following categories, subject to the trucks they oper-
ate:  
1. Small trucks, two axles, used for local distribution and deliveries (less than 3.5 tonnes) and which do 
not require an operating permit. These trucks are operated mainly by businesses rather than by 
transport companies. 
2. Medium sized rigid trucks, two axles, and smaller articulated trucks with up to four axles (from 3.5 
tonnes to 20 tonnes). Many of these trucks are also owned and operated by businesses (construction 
companies, manufacturing companies, wholesalers and retailers) and used mainly for distribution and 
deliveries, but they also serve the agricultural sector, carrying tobacco, sugar to processing plants and 
warehouses. These trucks are generally not used for cross-border regional transportation because of 
the higher cost of operating per ton of freight carried. This category of companies would be the most 
affected if the rule on cabotage is lifted because this would allow foreign trucking companies to carry out 
local direct deliveries on a discounted price or tariff basis while waiting for back hauls. 
3. Large Articulated Trucks, five to eight axles (up to 56 tonnes) operated by small and medium sized 
Zambian trucking companies, carrying mainly bulk goods within Zambia (copper metal, copper concen-
trate, cement, coal, sugar, grain and smaller numbers of containerized goods). This forms the core of 
the Zambian trucking sector, driven by the current 2006 high demand for transport services from the 
mining and agricultural sectors. There are many Zambian trucking companies which operate in this cat-
egory, transporting bulk goods to and from inland ports such as Ndola, Lusaka, Livingstone, Kapiri, 
transshipped to or from rail, as part of a multi-modal transport system. The demand for road haulage 
within Zambia is set to increase with the planned increased copper production. 
4. Large Articulated Trucks, six to eight axles (48 tonnes to 56 tonnes), operated by the large Zambian 
trucking companies on regional routes and cross-border freight services. This is mainly confined to the 
large operators generally owning between 15 and more than 200 trucks.” Raballand, 2008, p.10 
 Indicator 4.5.2: Transport price flexibility for various categories of freight and for passen-
gers 
Data not available.  
Extracts: 
“It is widely assumed by the public, politicians and donors alike that road investments reduce poverty by 
cutting vehicle operating costs, which in turn lead to lower transport prices, higher farm incomes, and 
increased investment and employment, as well as improved service delivery. In reality, only the first link 
                                               
10
  At low traffic volumes there is no possibility of competition between truck operators. 
11
  See Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2008). 
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in the chain - between road investment and reduction of vehicle operating costs - can be taken for 
granted and is relatively automatic. Whether operating cost savings get translated into lower transport 
prices depends on the degree of competition in the trucking industry, which depends in turn mainly on 
formal / informal rules in the industry and on traded volumes. In an uncompetitive environment with low 
traded volumes reducing vehicle operating costs is unlikely to lead to corresponding reductions in 
transport prices. The volumes of agricultural produce traded in rural areas of Africa are generally low by 
international standards – particularly in sparsely populated Zambia – making it unlikely that cost savings 
will be passed on. “ Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.20 
 Indicator 4.5.3: Existence of a level playing field among transport operators 
The Zambian trucking industry, though comprising still 15.4% of parastatals, is competitive, with prices 
among the lower in SSA, aligned with EU long distance average (see below). The percentage of inter-
national and domestic passenger and freight services carried by road being above 80%, the potential 
for the economy and the reduction of poverty of VOCs measures is very high. .  
Comparison of Transport Prices in selected Countries and Routes, 2006/2007 
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Source: Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2008). 
 
In June 2006 road transport prices in Zambia fluctuated between 1.35 and 1.65 USD per km for a truck 
with an average payload of 33.9 tonnes, depending on the backhaul rate, which is probably the ena-
bling factor why competitiveness was achieved in Zambia against most African countries: consumer 
goods imports from ports to cities and copper exports from mines to ports allow a profitable activities.  
Other factors might have help, such as fuelling outside Zambia and limited capacity and commercial 
speed of the rail transport to increase profitability. Competition in a levelled playing field implies price 
flexibility. 
Extracts: 
“The percentage of international and domestic passenger and freight services carried by road is above 
80%. The percentage of statal, parastatal and private services is 84.6 % for private and 15.4 % for par-
astatal.” CSP 2008, annex. 
 
“Zambia’s landlocked status is widely regarded as a major impediment to trade and economic growth. 
However, it is offset somewhat by the fact that international road transport prices to and from Zambia 
are among the lowest along international corridors in Africa. In June 2006 road transport prices in Zam-
bia fluctuated between 1.35 and 1.65 USD per km for a truck with an average payload of 33.9 tonnes, 
depending on the backhaul rate. This translated into a transport tariff between 3.7 to 5.6 US cents per 
tonne kilometer (tkm), which is comparable to South African rates (Raballand et al. 2008) . A different 
source, based on systematic trucking surveys, confirmed that Zambia benefits from some of the lowest 
transport rates (along the Copperbelt - Durban corridor) among African landlocked countries (Tera-
vaninthorn and Raballand 2008). These low rates reflect the highly competitive trucking industry that 
has developed between South Africa and Zambia since the collapse of apartheid in 1991. The lifting of 
economic sanctions led to a boom in South African exports (and investment) throughout Southern Afri-
ca, mostly transported by road. In contrast to its neighbours, from which trucks usually return empty, the 
revival of Zambian copper exports has meant that trucks are able to carry loads in both directions – 
significantly reducing transport prices.” Raballand & Whitworth, Transport Policy, 2011, p.2 
 
“The South Africa Road Freight Association reports total operating costs for a seven axle interlink, typi-
cally used on the Zambia – South Africa route, to be 9.80 ZAR per km. This is comparable with Zambi-
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an operators; tariffs being from 9 ZAR to 11 ZAR per km for a truck with an average payload of 33.9 
tonnes” Raballand 2008, p.12 
 Indicator 4.5.4: Percentage of the road transport cost due to illegal check-points and other 
road racketing 
Illegal checkpoints do not exist anymore in Zambia, at least along the main roads, including transit cor-
ridors. 
 
JC 4.5: Transport operator’s benefits from EU road interventions were passed on to customers 
The basic fact is that the Zambian trucking industry is competitive, with segmented markets, several 
operators and deregulated transport prices (I-4.5.3). Conditions for enabling a levelled playing field are 
in place (but not all, particularly regulations on cabotage by South African operators are restrictive). 
Transport prices on international operations are aligned on South African standards, and national 
freight prices are higher to take into account higher fuel price in Zambia (I-4.5.1). There are therefore 
not apparent market distortions in price setting.  
The illegal checkpoints tolls does ot exist anymore in Zambia (I-4.5.4) Waiting time at border-crossings 
and fuel price are the main factors for fixing transport price on long-distance haulage. 
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EQ5: To what extent EU interventions in the health sector contributed to im-
prove the health status of the population, in particular regarding fight against 
HIV? 
JC 5.1.  EU support contributed to increase service utilisation and intervention coverage 
JC 5.2. EU support contributed to enhanced service availability & quality related to infrastructure, 
equipment and drugs 
JC 5.3.  EU support contributed to enhanced service availability & quality related to health care work-
ers 
JC 5.4.  EU support contributed to increased affordability of health care 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION for all JCs 
 
Data, figures, tables: 
Between high expectations and rea i       e a  a io  o  b   e  s   or  i  Zambia      -       
     esis re or      o ie  e  em          r  Fa s     E    e a   ei erer    E         c a  er   
Budget support and sector cooperation.  
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Between high expectations and reality: An evaluation of budget support in Zambia (2005-2010): 
Health case study (Amsterdam Institute of International Development, (jan 2011) : chapter 2 
health sectors indicators.  
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Figure 2 .1 Public expenditure on health in Zam bia, 1 9 95 - 20 0 8
Source: WHO, 2010-b
The total health expenditure (THE) in Zambia amounted to 6.0% of GDP in 2008, which was down
from 7.0% of GDP in 2005, but up from 5.7% in 2000 (WHO, 2010-b). The evolution of THE as a
share of GDP can be seen in figure 2.1 above and its underlying data can be found in Annex II, table
6. In 2008 61.8% of the THE were government’s discretionary funds. This amounted to 15.2% of its
total government expenditures through which it has successfully lived up to its pledge to spend at
least 15% of its budget on health (GRZ, 2005, p. 18). 32.1% of THE came from external sources
which are part of government’s share. Not included in the government’s share is the 38.2% gained
from private expenditures made by the Zambian people. In 2000, 51.3% of THE came from the
Zambian government (17.8% of THE came from external sources that year) and 48.7% of THE came
from private sources. Out-of-pocket private expenditure, one of the three components of private
expenditure, made up 74.5% of private expenditure and 28.5% of THE in 2008 (WHO, 2010-b).
Per capita THE (at average exchange rate) was US$57 in 2007, up from US$18 in 2000 (WHO,
2010-a, p. 137). Per capita THE adjusted for power purchasing parity was $81 in 2008 and $79 in
2007, up from $50 in 2000. Per capita government expenditure on health (PPP) was $50 in 2008, $46
in 2007 and $26 in 2000. Furthermore, per capita government expenditures on health were estimated
to be US$33 in 2007 and US$42 in 2008. The WHO estimated that a country such as Zambia needs a
per capita expenditure on health of US$33 for it to deliver its Basic Health Care Package’ (GRZ, 2005,
p. 18). These estimates mean that Zambia performs well regarding its level of health spending.
During the period 1996 to 2002 Zambia’s total spending on health fluctuated within a range of
$18-26 (at market exchange rates) but increased to $34 in 2004. This was attributable mainly to an
increasing share of donor funding (Goldsbrough and Cheelo, 2007, p. 3). Disease-specific vertical
funds are the main driver behind the increase, of which PEPFAR (US President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief) is the most notable contributor (ibid., p. 4). The sharp rise in health spending in dollar
terms has also been caused by appreciation of the Kwacha (ibid., p. 29). Figure 2.2 shows the per
capita THE (PPP) and the per capita Zambian government’s share (PPP) on health.
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Figure 2 .2 Per capita THE and governm ent share, PPP average exchange rate,
1 9 9 5 -2 0 08
Source: WHO, 2010-b
Health expenditure in Zambia is increasingly being devoted to administration. Disaggregating health
accounting data into health service provision and administration reveals the increasing
bureaucratization of health services. Since 2001, the percentage of MoH health expenditures going to
service provision has decreased, while the percentage going to administration has risen sharply.
Expenditures on administration have jumped from 14.8% of THE in 2001 to 30.8% of THE in 2004. By
2004, dministrative exp nditures ac ounted for 37.6% of total MoH expenditures. Among
dministrative costs, general administration at MoH consistently xpanded since 2001, rising from
63.4% to 93.6% of total administration in 2004. The creation of two separate entities (MoH and
CBoH) during this period largely accounts for this administrative intensity (Picazo and Zhao, 2009, p.
26, 27). The fragmentation of financing and service delivery following these reforms appears to have
increased administrative costs. Administrative costs of donor-supported vertical projects incurred 50
percent of total administrative costs in the sector (ibid., p. 26).Thus, about a third of all health
expenditure in Zambia is being used for activities not directly related to health service provision and
the demands attached to donor funding are compounding this problem. The GRZ’s share of total
spending has been going down, but its discretion over health sector resources has been increasing due
largely to donor support (Picazo and Zhao, 2009, p. 19). This subject is addressed below.
2 .5 Cooperat ing Partners in Zam bian Health Sector
External donors, called cooperating partners (CP) in Zambia, have come to play an increasingly
important role in the Zambian health sector. Since the late 1990’s their share in THE has risen sharply
till about 2005, after which it settled, to rise again slightly in 2008 (see figure 2.3 below). External
resources have increased 4-fold in real terms between 1995 and 2008. In that same period
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government and private expenditure on health increased by a factor of only 1.5 (WHO, 2010-b). The
contribution of external funds to total health expenditure as a percentage is shown in figure 2.5. Here
one can see that in 2005 when external funds slacked its share of THE decreased sharply.
Figure 2 .3 External resources for health in Zam bia as percentage of total health
Expenditure
Source: WHO, 2010-b
2 .6 Pr ivate Expenditure
Another interesting d velopment in health funding has been the rise of out-of-pocket expenditure as
part of THE. Also the increasing share of non-profit institutions as part of the private expenditure is
worth noting. As a share of THE private expenditure on health was the same in 2008 as it was in
1995. In nominal terms though, private expenditure has grown considerably over the years (see figure
2.4 below). Figure 2.5 also shows a sharp increase of non-profit institutions’ share in private
expenditure. These institutions, like NGO’s for instance, have seen a 5-fold increase in real terms,
whereas out-of-pocket’s increase was only 1.3 times in the period 1995-2008, also in real terms.
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National Health priorities, MOH, National Strategic Health Plan (2006-2010) 
Group (SAG) meetings and monthly CPs-MoH Policy meetings review progress, approve plans and 
monitor policy progress. Then there are technical working groups on HRs, M&E, procurement, income 
and expenditure, and several areas of public health concern. The adoption of a JASZ (see 2.2.(3) above) 
has further streamlined the workings of the health SWAp. A troika of lead donors is currently composed 
of WHO, DFID and Sweden. 
3. DESCRIPTION 
3.1. Objectives 
This Sector Policy Support Programme (SPSP) will contribute to the overall goal of the NHSP 2006-
2011: "To further improve health service delivery in order to significantly contribute to the attainment of 
the health Millennium Development Goals and national health priorities". Therefore, the purpose of the 
SPSP is to significantly contribute to the expansion of integrated public health services in the drive to 
attain the MDGs as planned in the Zambian National Development Plan (FNDP) 2006-2010, and as 
detailed in the health sector strategic plans.  
3.2. Expected results and main activities 
The S ctor Pl n Support Programme shares the riorities stated in the NHSP 2006-2011; the expected 
results of the S SP, aligned to these same plans, include public health outcomes as well as systems 
strengthening in crucial areas such as HR, M&E, planning/budgeting and procurement, all through the 
meta-outcome of alignment and harmonisation of external support with continued consultative sector 
dialogue among stakeholders. The priorities of the NHSP 2006-2011 are: 
A. Human Resource Crisis 
1. Human Resources: To provide a well motivated, committed and skilled professional workforce who 
will deliver cost effective quality health care services as close to the family as 
possible. 
B. Public Health Priorities 
2. Integrated Child Health and 
Nutrition: 
To reduce Under-5 MR by 20%, from the current level of 168 per 1,000 live 
births to 134 by 2011, and significantly improve nutrition. 
3. Integrated Reproductive Health: To increase access to integrated reproductive health and family planning 
services that reduce the Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) by one quarter, from 
729 per 100,000 live births to 547 by 2011.   
4. HIV/AIDS, STIs and Blood Safet y:  To halt and begin to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS and STIs by increasing 
access to quality HIV/AIDS, STI and blood safety interventions. 
4. Tuberculosis (TB): To halt and begin to reduce t he spread of TB through effective interventions. 
5. Malaria: To halt and reduce the incidence of malaria by 75% and mortality due to 
malaria in children under five by 20%. 
6. Epidemics Control and Public Health 
Surveillance 
To significantly improve public health surveillance and control of epidemics, so 
as to reduce morbidity and mortality associated with epidemics.   
7. Environmental Health and Food 
Safety: 
To promote and improve hygiene and universal access to safe and adequate 
water, food safety and acceptable sanitation, with the aim of reducing the 
incidence of water and food borne diseases. 
C Support Systems Priorities 
9. Essential Drugs and Medical 
Supplies: 
To ensure availability of adequate, quality, efficacious, safe and affordable 
essential drugs and medical supplies at all levels, through effective 
procurement management and cooperation with pharmaceutical companies. 
10. Infrastructure and Equipment: 
(Infrastructure, Medical Equipment, 
Laboratory Support and Medical 
Imaging) 
To significantly improve on the availability, distribution and condition of essential 
infrastructure and equipment so as to improve equity of access to essential 
health services. 
11. Systems Strengthening: 
(M&E, HMIS, FAMS, Procurement 
and R&D)  
To strengthen existing operational systems, financing mechanisms and 
governance arrangements for efficient and effective delivery of he alth services. 
12. Health Systems Governance: 
(Governance and Health Care 
Financing) 
To provide a comprehensive policy and legal framework and systems for 
effective coordination, implementation and monitoring of health services. 
 
The EC will participate with other cooperating partners in the sector policy dialogue, the monitoring of 
the implementation of the NHSP 2006-2011 and the sector performance assessment. In this context, the 
EC will also continuously assess eligibility for sector budget support and monitor progress towards the 
 
 
Mid term review FNDP (2006-2010) - Chapter 7: Health  
Note : some of these data are contradicting with those presented in the previous table (immunisation and utilisation rates) 
 
 
JC 5.1: EU support contributed to increase Service Utilisation and Intervention Coverage 
The data presented in the tables below have been mainly collected from the Health Management In-
formation System (HMIS) Health Statistical bulletins. 
 Indicator 5.1.1: Increased utilisation of rural health facilities for curative consultation 
The utilisation rate of Primary Health Care facilities is the third key Performance Indicators (HEA3) fol-
lowed in both FNDP and Budget Support performance Assessment Framework and belongs to the in-
formation routinely followed by the Heath Management information System (HMIS) as summarized in 
©2009, FNDP Mid-term Review 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 89 
managem nt has led t  cle rly established structures and processes that are generally consistent 
with the International Health Practices and agenda. 
 
Table 7.4: Existing health facilities 
 
 
 
Facility Type 
Number of Health 
Facilities by Ownership Total no. of Facilities 
 
GRZ Private Mission 
No. 
Required 
Total 
Level 3 Hospitals 5 0 0 5  
Level 2 Hospitals 13 5 3 21 9 
Level 1 Hospitals 41 4 29 74 72 
Health Centres  1136 75 83 1,294 1,385 
Heath Posts 161 8 2 171 3000 
Total (All) 1,354 92 117 1,563 4,466 
Source: MoH, Annual Health Statistical Bull tin-2007 
 
Some of the achievements during the review period include the following: 
(a) Compilation of the Health Sector Performance Monitoring Framework and the 
development of the Performance Assessment tools, which will allow the MOH 
to closely monitor the implementation of the various interventions.  
(b) “Roll-out” of the new Health Management Information System to capture 
health i dicators as measured by st dards of var ous stakeho ders.  
(c) Formulation of the 2008-2010 Health Facility Infrastructure Development Plan 
to ease allocation of resources and prioritization of capital projects in under-
served areas.  
(d) Establishment of Health facilities (infrastructure) data bank to serve as a 
source of information for the formulation of development and pr curement 
lans for capital/infrastructure programmes.  
(e) Formulation of infrastructure standards and guidelines as a basis for 
implementation of programmes. 
(f) Approval of Infrastructure Maintenance Policy; 
(g) Increased allocations to capital investment programmes; 
(h) Increased percentage of distric s providing complete HMIS quarterly reports 
from 90 percent in 2005 to 91 percent in 2007 against the 2010 target of 100 
percent. 
 
7.5 Assessme t of KPIs 
7.5.1 Overview 
Five Key Performance Indicators were identified to measure sector performance. During the 
period under review, performance of selected FNDP health indicators was generally positive. 
However, varied trends have been recorded for the different programmes. Table 7.5 shows key 
achievements for various KPIs in the h alth sector: 
 
Table 7.5 KPIs Health Sector 
 
Key Performance Indicators 
Baseline 
value 
2005 
Target 
2006 
Actual 
2006 
Target 
2007 
 
Actual 
2007 
Target 
Value 
2010 
Percentage of deliveries assisted by 
midwives, nurse, doctors or clinical officers 
43 45 43 43.4 47 60 
Percentage of fully immunised children 
under one year of age in 20 worst 
performing districts 
50 65 82 70 85 70 
Malaria case fatality rate among children 
below 5 years (Fatality Rate per 1,000 
admissions) 
24/1000 - 35/1000 22/1000 41/1000 15/1,000 
Utilisation rate of PHC facilities 0.48 0.5 1.2 1.3 1.3 0.8 
Percentage of MOH releases to District 
level 
55 57 62 13 14 13 
Source: FNDP, 2006, Page 375 and MOH Annual Reports 2006, 2007. *Malaria Case Fatality Rate per 1,000 admissions 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report  
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
  
Page - 89 - 
the table below. 
The Health centre per capita attendance improved continuously since 2001, peaked in 2007 before 
stabilizing on a lower trend around 1 contact per person and per year. This trend can be noticed for 
both age tranches (under and over 5) and is even more significant in the hospitals’ in-patient admis-
sions.  
It appears that the improvement in the frequentation of public healthcare facilities have slowed the pace 
after a substantial increase in 2006 which followed the government’s decision of providing free health 
services in rural areas. And the new patients captured by this decision remained with the public system 
of health care.  
Further analysis
12
 indicates however that the efforts for capturing additional patients after 2006 were not 
successful, as if the additional clients had been either excluded from the health care system
13
 or at-
tracted by alternative offers in health care.  
Table 2: service utilisation during the period under review 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1.1 Increased utilisation 
of rural health facilities for 
curative consultation 
Key Performance Indica-
tor & Indicator HSA-3 in 
PAF BS 2008-2010 
0,42 0,77 0,73 0,86 0,76  
 
0,86 1,22 1,1 0,99 1,11 
Under 5 na 1,88 2,04 1,93 2,56 2,24 2,01 2,42 
Over 5 0,3 0,48 0,6 0,9 0,83 0,73 0,88 
total Hospital (level 1-3) 
in-patient admission 
         
501.495  
 
493.859  
 
509.158  
 na   
445.943  
 
399.744  
 
359.159  
 (a) (a) (a) (a) (a)+(b) (a)+(b) (a)+(b) (b) (b) (b) (b) 
Sources: (a) FNDP (2006-2010) table 17.2 and National Health Strategic Plan (table 4) (b) Annual Health Statistical Bulletin 2006-2010 
In sum, if the first part of the noticed trend can be attributed to the combined inputs from Government, 
health staff and DPs in the health sector, the apparent downward trend indicates that the efforts (in 
terms of tarification for example) were not sufficient to sustain the population’s commitment in favour of 
the public health sector.  
Data, sources, and extracts:  
As a result of investment in the sector, the coverage of basic services such as immunisation, antenatal 
care and supervised deliveries has slightly improved. The abolition of user fees in rural (in 2006) and 
periurban areas (in 2007) contributed to higher utilisation rates of Primary Health Care (PHC) facili-
ties.112 (112 For 2009, the data suggest a decrease. According to the PRBS review for 2009, this is 
the result of the Induced outputs, outcome and impact prolonged strike in 2009, which discouraged 
clients from a ending these facilities (p. 16).) The data also show that more and more women give birth 
in health facilities, although the reduction in births at home appears to be (relatively) higher in urban 
areas than in rural areas (see Chapter 10 as well). Information about the educational.(Evaluation of BS 
Zambia synthesis (2011) p.164). 
Part of this improvement can be explained by beer access to health facilities (because there were more 
facilities). The abolition of fees in 2006 also resulted in this huge increase in the use of these facilities. 
In 2001, only 29% of mothers took their children for treatment to the health facility, but in 2007 this had 
risen to 53%. Diarrhoea is slightly more common among poorer households, although the differences 
are small and decreasing. (Between high expectations and reality: An evaluation of budget support in 
Zambia (2011) p.166) 
The utilisation rate of PHCs has increased considerably, from 0.48 in the base year to 0.6 in 2006 
(against a target of 0.5). This is because of the introduction of two specific policy interventions, specifi-
cally the removal of user fees and the distribution of free ARVs. (EC JAR 2006 p.11)  
 Indicator 5.1.2: Increased antenatal care coverage (at least one visit and at least four visits) 
The indicators followed by the Health Management Information System (HMIS) in Zambia for approach-
ing the quality of antenatal care are the followings: 
                                               
12
  Refer to developments in JC4 EC support contributed to icreased affordability of health care. 
13
  Refer to Indicators 5.1.2. et 5.1.3 related to maternal health 
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 Antenatal coverage as a percentage of expected deliveries  
 Average number antenatal visits: the initial norm of 12 in Zambia was readjusted in order to 
better match with WHO recommendation of 4 antenatal visits.  
If almost all pregnant women accessed to a first antenatal visit (97% in 2004, 98% in 2008), the aver-
age number of antenatal visits has been for the whole period, below WHO recommendation. Further 
concern is related to the average number of antenatal visits, which has been declining since 2002. This 
trend must be analysed while taking into account that alternative treatment schemes for Prevention of 
VIH transmission from mother to child might have diverted the concerned mothers from the traditional 
antenatal visits.  
But the risk of failing to identify pregnancies at risk has been increasing over the period, a warning sig-
nal to be correlated to the increase in maternal mortality between 1996 (649/100.000)
14
 and 2002 
(729/100.000) and its difficult decrease since then as indicated in the results of 2007 (591/100.000) far 
from a OMD target of 162/100.000 for 2015. 
Table 3: antenatal care during the period under review 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
- First Antenatal coverage (%) of expected deliveries 90 88 90 95 97 93 92 92 98 88 85 
- Average antenatal visits (times) 3,6 2,6 3,4 3,3 3,1 3 2,9 2,8 2,6 2,6 2,6 
 
(a) (a) (a) (a) (a)+(b) (a)+(b) (a)+(b) (b) (b) (b) (b) 
Sources: (a) FNDP (2006-2010) table 17.2 and National Health Strategic Plan (table 4) (b) Annual Health Statistical Bulletin 2006-2010 
In sum, it seems that the global coverage of antenatal care is still important but the decreasing number 
of antenatal visits since 2002 cannot be overlooked, and the country is not likely to reach goals set in 
OMD-5  
Data, sources, and extracts:  
Extracts: 
The maternal mortality rate can be converted to a maternal mortality ratio and expressed per 100,000 
live births by dividing the rate by the general fertility rate of 0.198, which prevailed during the same pe-
riod. Thus, the obstetrical risk of pregnancy and childbearing is emphasized. Using this 
survey methods are generally used to estimate maternal mortality in developing countries: the indirect 
sisterhood method (Graham et al., 1989) and a direct variant of the sisterhood method (Rutenberg and 
Sullivan, 1991). In this report, the direct estimation procedure is applied. 
Mortality rates expressed per 1,000 procedures, the maternal mortality ratio during the seven-year peri-
od preceding the 2007 Zambian Democratic Health Survey (ZDHS) is estimated as 591 maternal 
deaths per 100,000 live births. (CSO Zambia 2007 Demographic and Health survey) 
 
“The Maternal Mortality Rate increased from 649 per 100,000 live births in 1996 to 729 in 2002 (which 
is one of the highest in the world) despite high antenatal attendance, currently estimated at 80 per cent 
for urban and 68 per cent for rural areas. It is estimated that approximately 50 per cent of maternal mor-
tality is directly attributed to postpartum haemorrhage, sepsis, obstructed labour, abortion and eclamp-
sia. Indirect causes of maternal mortality include malaria, anaemia and HIV/AIDS related conditions. 
Other contributing factors include delays in accessing health care at community and health centre lev-
els. (Zambia Fifth National Development Plan FNDP (2006-2010), page 150) 
 Indicator 5.1.3: Increased proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel 
The rate of institutional deliveries is the second key Performance Indicator (HEA2) followed in both 
FNDP and Budget Support performance Assessment Framework and belongs to the information rou-
tinely followed by the Heath Management information System (HMIS) as summarized in the table below. 
In complementarity to the indicator followed in the PAF the following table gives elements on the institu-
tional deliveries (i.e. assisted by midwives, nurses, doctors or Clinical officers) as well as on supervised 
deliveries, which include those assisted by trained Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs).  
The HMIS data indicate marginal progress on institutional deliveries, and in supervised deliveries as 
well, indicating that pregnant women still do prefer to deliver at home with not necessarily the appropri-
ate assistance: women appear to be still reluctant to leave their needing families at home in order to 
                                               
14
  and 390/100.000 in 1990 according to WB MDG tables presented with the next indicator 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report  
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
  
Page - 91 - 
deliver in an appropriate health facility, which difficult to be reached because of poor communication 
facilities and inadequate transport.  
That justifies the Government attempt to accelerate the reduction of maternal, neonatal and child mor-
bidity and mortality
15
 in Zambia, which has been eligible to UN IHP+ initiative in terms of maternal mor-
tality
16
.  
Table 4: births attended by skilled personnel 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1.3 Increased proportion of Institutional deliveries (%) 
Key Performance Indicator & Indicator HSA-1 in PAF 
BS 2008-2010 
39 44 49 55 43 43 43 45 45 44 44 
Deliveries with TBAs (%) 
Key Performance Indicator & Indicator HSA-1 in PAF 
BS 2008-2010 
na na na na 18 19 18 17 15 23 13 
1.3 Increased proportion of supervised deliveries 
(Insitutional+TBAs)(%) 
Key Performance Indicator & Indicator HSA-1 in PAF 
BS 2008-2010 
na na na na 61 62 61 62 60 67 57 
 
(a) (a) (a) (a) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) 
 
Sources: (a) FNDP (2006-2010) table 17.2 and National Health Strategic Plan (table 4) (b) Annual Health Statistical Bulletin 2006-2010 
Data, sources, extracts:  
Data, figures, tables: 
  1990 1995 2000 2009 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health 
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19) .. .. 152 133 
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) 51 47 47 47 
Maternal mortality ratio (modelled estimate, per 100,000 live births) 390 490 600 470 
Pregnant women receiving prenatal care (%) 92 96 93 94 
(WB- statistics MDG 2009) 
Extracts: 
The UN Agencies are committed to providing global level and country level support towards the attain-
ment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The agencies are also committed to the promotion 
of harmonisation and better coordination of aid, in line with the principles of the Paris declarations on aid 
effectiveness and related initiatives, and are signatories to the Global IHP Compact, which aims at scal-
ing up support and greater harmonisation and coordination of aid to achieve the health related MDGs. 
In the spirit of the IHP+ and having considered the commitments expressed by the Government, in the 
2009 Addendum to the MOU, the UN Agencies operating in the Zambian health sector hereby make a 
commitment to provide support to Zambia on the basis of the IHP principles, particularly the following: 
• The UN agencies endorse and commit to comply with the IHP Compact document. In this re-
spect, within the framework of Delivering as One UN initiative, the UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA and 
UNAIDS commit to adhere to the principles of one country sector strategy/plan, one budget, 
and one Monitoring and Evaluation system. 
• In the context of Delivering as One UN in Zambia, UN agencies will undertake joint interven-
tions and activities in identified areas, in order to ensure more coherent, effective and efficient 
support to national partners. 
(UN Agencies Commitment of Intent - IHP – December 2008) 
Although on average 92 per cent of all pregnant women received some kind of antenatal care during the 
period 2000 to 2005, only an average of 38.5 per cent delivered in health facilities (institutional deliver-
ies) during the same period. However, the number of supervised deliveries (a combination of deliveries 
by both institutional and trained traditional birth attendants) increased from 39 per cent in 2000 to 62 per 
cent in 2005. The national antenatal coverage also rose from 90 per cent in 2000 to 93 per cent in 
2005.” (Zambia Fifth National Development Plan FNDP (2006-2010), page 150) 
                                               
15
  Concept Note to European Commission, Accelerating Progress Towards Maternal, Neonatal and Child Morbidity and 
Mortality Reduction in Zambia, June 2011 
16
  UN 2008 Commitment quoted below 
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 Indicator 5.1.4: Increased proportion of 1 year-old children immunized against measles, 
diphtheria and hepatitis B 
The immunisation rate in the 20 worst performing districts is the first key Performance Indicators (HEA1) 
followed in both FNDP and Budget Support performance Assessment Framework but does not belong 
to the information routinely followed by the Heath Management information System (HMIS). Rather 
HMIS follows the countywide rate of children under one year of age who have completed the recom-
mended series of immunisation as summarized in the table below. 
However if we consider a longer reference period, Children immunisation ratio is not as good as in the 
90ies and specific MDGs data series over the last 20 years indicate a downward trend between 1990 
and 2009  
Table 5: Immunisation rate over the period under review 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1.4 Increased proportion of 1 year-old 
children fully immunized  
76 86 76 74 80 82 87 85 90 94 94 
 
(a) (a) (a) (a) (a)+(b) (a)+(b) (a)+(b) (b) (b) (b) (b) 
Sources: (a) FNDP (2006-2010) table 17.2 and National Health Strategic Plan (table 4) (b) Annual Health Statistical Bulletin 2006-2010 
In sum: The HMIS data show encouraging upward trend, which might indicate a sustained good perfor-
mance of the system over the period under review. But a rather declining performance over the last 20 
years, backs the joint GoZ and donors specific interest on Immunisation rate in the 20 worst performing 
districts, which is however not routinely followed.  
Data, sources, and extracts:  
Data, figures, tables: 
  1990 1995 2000 2009 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality 
Immunisation, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months) 90 86 85 85 
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 108 105 99 86 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 179 176 166 141 
(WB- statistics MDG 2009) 
Extracts: 
 “Progress towards the MDGs - In the initial stage, the progress in indicators on health fell behind the 
planned level, but improvement has since occurred. The period 2002 - 2004 has witnessed an im-
provement in some health – related MDG indicators such as Target Five (Reduce Child Mortality). Alt-
hough still relatively high, the under-five mortality rate (U5MR) has decreased considerably, from 162 
per 1000 live births in 2000 to 131 per 1000 live births in 2004. The prevalence of underweight children 
went from 23.3% in 2001 to 18% in 2004; the under-five mortality rate per 1000 live births declined. 
However, it is improbable that the goal of reducing child mortality to 63 per 1000 live births by 2015 will 
be achieved unless significant efforts are made to reduce the current constraints facing the health sec-
tor, especially inadequate child health services, high prevalence of malaria and limited coverage of 
PMTCT (prevention of mother to child prevention) programmes”. (Zambia EC-CLE (2006), p.73) 
 Indicator 5.1.5: Increased utilisation rate of modern contraceptive means 
As recall WB 2009 MDG statistics, Globally contraceptive prevalence with modern contraceptive means 
improved notably over the evaluation period from 22% of women ages 15-49 in 2000 to 41% in 2009. In 
its routine statistics, HMIS follows rather the utilisation rate of modern contraceptive means (per 1000), 
which indicates an upward trend as well at least between 2000 and 2006. 
But WB MDG data indicate that the unmet need for contraception did not decrease simultaneously at 
the same pace. And as the HMIS indicator has not beet updated since 2006, the most recent trend on 
contraception is still unclear.  
Table 6: Utilisation of modern contraceptive means 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
New family planning acceptors (per 1000) 85 101 111 123 127 138,3 140,9 na na na na 
 
(a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (b) (b)         
Sources: (a) FNDP (2006-2010) table 17.2 and National Health Strategic Plan (table 4) (b) Annual Health Statistical Bulletin 2006-2010
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Data, sources, and extracts:  
Data, figures, tables: 
  1990 1995 2000 2009 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health 
Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49) 15 26 22 41 
Unmet need for contraception (% of married women ages 15-49) 31 27 13 27 
(WB- statistics MDG 2009) 
 Indicator 5.1.6: Improved care for Malaria especially among children under 5  
Over the last decades the trend for Malaria prevalence has been steadily increasing from 121 per 1000 
in 1976 to a peak of 425 per 1000 reached in 2003.  
The Government answer detailed in its 2006–2010 National Malaria Strategic Plan, a renewed version 
of the one covering the period 2000–2005, aimed to cut malaria incidence by 75% and significantly re-
duce malaria-related mortality by 2010 mainly through insecticide-treated mosquito nets, indoor residual 
spraying and prompt, effective antimalarial treatment, especially to vulnerable groups of the population, 
such as children and pregnant women. These efforts could be scaled up with the donors’ support, 
among which large disease specific funds, such as the Roll Back malaria initiative or the Global Fund 
against HIV/Aids tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). In 2009 5,6 Million bed nets had been distributed 
among households whereas only 300,000 were available throughout the country in 2000
17
. 
Even though Malaria’s incidence almost halved since then (246 per 1000 in 2009), it still represented 
the first cause of visit to health facilities in 2009 and its incidence increased again in 2010: a trend ex-
plained by HMIS by (among others) a high refusal rate of indoor spraying in some houses.
18
 
But the curative response improved and death related do Malaria were divided by almost 2,5 between 
2000 and 2009
19
. Malaria burden remains however particularly heavy for children under 5 years old, for 
which incidence is four times higher than for the age group 5 years and above.
20
 And fatality case for 
Children under 5 increased again between 2009 and 2010
21
 from 26 per 1000 admission in health insti-
tution with diagnosed malaria to 36 in 2010. 
Table 7: Incidence of Malaria over the evaluation period 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
- Malaria incidence per 1000  316   388 425 383   412 358 252 246 330 
- Malaria incidence among children under five             1106 940 641 620 897 
- Malaria case fatality rate per 1000 admissions         43 49 40 40 39 26 34 
 
(a) (a) (a) (a) (a)+(b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) 
Sources : (a) FNDP (2006-2010) table 17.2 and National Health Strategic Plan (table 4) (b) Annual Health Statistical Bulletin 2006-2010 
In sum, Despite Malaria’s increased burden especially among the younger, Government’s response, 
supported by the important commitment of donors helped decreasing the fatality rate in hospital for chil-
dren affected with Malaria. An indication of an improved efficient curative response of the Zambian 
health facilities, which has to be sustained as indicate the relatively bad figures, reported in 2010. 
Data, sources, and extracts:  
Extracts: 
Bed nets were an important part of the National Malaria Control Plan and the Ministry’s National Malaria 
Strategic Plan. While these bed nets were funded by the Global Fund and the World Bank (and several 
other smaller donors), the Ministry of Health and the National Malaria Control Centre handled the distri-
bution. Between 2003 and 2008, the government and its partners distributed some 5.9 million bed nets, 
especially in rural and previously poorly served areas (Chizema-Kawesha et al., 2010, 481). The cam-
paign had a significant impact. In 2001, only 28% of the households reported having at least one bed 
                                               
17
  further details in the table 9.1 extracted from 2011 BS evaluation in the Background information of this chapter. 
18
  National Health Statistical Bulletin 2010 
19
  further details in the table 9.2 extracted from 2011 BS evaluation in the Background information of this chapter 
20
  KPI followed in FNDP monitoring. Refer to table 7.5 extracted from FNDP Mid-term review in the Background information of 
this chapter 
21
  HMIS 2010 Health statistical bulletin. 
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net. By 2007, this percentage had improved to 71%. The concerted effort has led to a reduced number 
of cases of malaria and improved the survival rates of those infected. Progress has also been made 
towards achieving a more equitable availability and use of malaria interventions (see next chapt.er). The 
large scale-up in disease control efforts has contributed significantly to overall improved child survival. 
Elbers et al. (2011) concluded that the increased use of bed nets saved the lives of about 18,000 chil-
dren. ). (Between high expectations and reality: An evaluation of budget support in Zambia (2011) p.166 
“Malaria and respiratory infections remain obstacles. They are the main cause of death, and there has 
been no improvement over the past years. The most common cause of death is fever/malaria (23 per 
cent) followed by cough/cold/chest infections (11 per cent) and TB (11 per cent). Although the Govern-
ment has increased its spending on poverty related programmes, the Health Sector suffers from limited 
absorptive capacity at district level and from an increasing brain drain.” (Zambia EC-CLE (2006), p.73) 
The Roll Back Malaria (RBM) initiative allowed to improve malaria control: change in the malaria treat-
ment policy to Artemisinin combination therapy (ACT) as the standard for care countrywide to address 
the emergence of Chloroquine-resistant strains; decentralized programming leading to capacity devel-
opment at district level; introduction of Intermittent Presumptive Treatment (IPT) for pregnant women; 
in- door residual spraying (IRS) in selected districts; improvements in methods of diagnosis for malaria; 
promotion of the use of Insecticide Treated Nets (ITN); staff training; improvements in data and infor-
mation capturing and management; strengthened public/private partnerships in malaria control; and 
increased resource mobilisation efforts.(National Health Strategic Plan 7.5.1 Malaria Situation Analysis) 
“Malaria is a major public health problem in Zambia. It is the leading cause of morbidity and mortality, 
accounting for 45% of all hospitalisations and outpatient attendances and 50% of cases among children 
under-five years of age (HMIS 2004). The National Malaria Control Centre (NMCC) estimates that ma-
laria is responsible for nearly 4.3 million clinical cases and over 50,000 deaths per year, including up to 
20% of maternal mortality. The National Health Strategic Plan of 2001-2005 set the target to reduce 
malaria incidence rate to 300 per 1,000 populations by the year 2005. However, this target is yet to be 
achieved, as malaria incidence in 2004 was 383 per 1,000 populations. Over the past three decades, 
malaria incidence rates in Zambia tripled, from 121 per 1,000 populations in 1976 to 383 in 2004. Statis-
tics also indicate that over the past three years, the national malaria incidence rate has been fluctuating, 
increasing from 388 in 2002 to 425 in 2003 and then dropping to 383 in 2004. In 2004, the malaria case 
fatality rate (in hospitals only) remained high at 43 per 1,000 admissions for children under the age of 
five years, 65 for the over five and 33 as overall for all age groups. Factors which have contributed to 
this increase in malaria incidences include the spread of drug resistance, reduced vector control efforts, 
and decreased access to health care, HIV and high poverty levels.” (National Health Strategic Plan 
7.5.1 Malaria Situation Analysis, pages 35-36) 
 
“Malaria remains a major public health problem in Zambia, accounting for nearly 40 per cent of all out-
patient attendances and 50 per cent of cases among children under-five years of age. It is estimated 
that malaria is responsible for nearly 4 million clinical cases and 50,000 deaths per year, including up to 
20 per cent of maternal mortality. Malaria incidence rates in Zambia tripled over the three decades, from 
121/1,000 in 1976 to 396/1,000 in 2003 due predominantly to Chloroquine resistance; reduced vector 
control; limited access to quality care and poor clinical care management; HIV and AIDS; and poverty. 
The Government is implementing the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) programme. The main components of 
the programme include a change in the malaria treatment policy to address the emergence of Chloro-
quine-resistant strains; indoor residual spraying; improvements in methods of diagnosis for malaria; 
promotion of the use of insecticide treated nets (ITNs); and staff training.” (Zambia Fifth National Devel-
opment Plan FNDP (2006-2010): 17.2.3 Malaria, page 149) 
 Indicator 5.1.7: Increased proportion of HIV infected patients under antiretroviral drugs 
Five indicators intend to deal in this EQ with HIV and AIDs related issue
22
: in the first one 5.1.7 In-
creased proportion of HIV infected patients under antiretroviral drugs, the purpose is to address the 
quantitative coverage of the ART treatment, whereas the others will tend to address more qualitative 
issues related to improved care of needing patients. 
                                               
22
  5.1.7 Increased proportion of HIV infected patients under antiretroviral drugs, the purpose is to adress the coverage of the 
ART treatement after undedlining some background elements, whereas the developments on indicators 5.2.2 Increased % 
of health facilities with a minimum package of PCMTCT) (Prevention of HIV transmission from mother to child) services and 
5.2.4 Increased availability of drugs (HIV tests and ARV treatments) in the rural heath facilities will be more focussed on the 
«input side of the HIV-AIDS related service deliveries. Indicator 5.3.3 Increased health facilities meeting the technical 
requirements for diagnosis and first intention treatment of HIV/AIDS will shortly be going about the testing and counselling 
activities by health staff and Indicator 5.4.3 Increased proportion of population among vulnerable groups (especially HIV 
infected patients) benefiting from care from the health facilities will develope the thematics of affordabillity. 
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A short answer to this indicator will be given after some background summary. 
Background 
When HIV was first reported to the Ministry of Health by a team of medical experts in the mid 1980s, a 
national surveillance committee was set up and the first AIDS case in Zambia was diagnosed in 1984. 
The national response was formulated in an emergency Short-Term Plan developed in 1987 to en-
sure safe blood and blood product supplies in all provincial and central referral hospitals successfully 
implemented with EC support: 33 blood-screening centres were established all over the country, 
strengthened by a National Blood Transfusion Service. Two reference laboratories were established at 
the University Teaching Hospital and Tropical Diseases Research Centre and a state of the art virology 
laboratory was constructed. 
In December 2002, the National HIV/AIDS/STI/TB Council (NAC) was established to coordinate the 
national multisectoral response, composed of representatives from government, nongovernmental or-
ganisations, representative of mass media, youth and the private sector, religious and traditional lead-
ers with the participation of multilateral and bilateral agencies.  
Prominent among the initiatives taken by the Government to fight against HIV/AIDs pandemic Voluntary 
Counselling and Testing (VCT) and Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT) programmes 
were introduced as early as 2000. In 2002, the Government introduced provision of anti-retroviral ther-
apy (ART) in public health institutions. Since 2003, the national policy provides that free and universal 
access to anti-retroviral therapy, has to be offered to target population, a scheme further expanded in 
2005 to include all related services.  
But the spread of HIV / AIDS throughout the population in the late 1990s was far worse than the expec-
tations as HIV prevalence among adults picked up to 16%: in 2004 over one million adults and 200,000 
children were infected, whereas the Central Statistics Office (CSO) had projected a rise in the number 
of HIV / AIDS infected persons in the population (including Children) from 293,600 in 1990 to 877,000 in 
2000 and 914,700 in 2005 with a drop to 881,100 expected by 2010.  
In September 2004, Zambia declared thus HIV/AIDS a national emergency. And after the implementa-
tion of two medium-term plans, the National HIV/AIDS Policy adopted in 2005, strengthened a coordi-
nated national response with the combined efforts of Government and DPs within in the Global Health 
initiative (GHI) which led to a rapid increase in donors funding though large global, bilateral, and private 
philanthropic HIV/AIDS-specific initiatives, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS and the US Govern-
ment and the Presidential Expanded Programme for AIDS Response (PEPFAR) and the World Bank 
Multi Country AIDS Programme (MAP) 
23
.  
The fight against HIV&AIDS in Zambia focuses on four main intervention areas
24
: 
• Prevention of transmission of HIV: This includes diagnosis and treatment of Sexually Transmitted 
Infections (STIs), Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT)
25
 for HIV, condom use, behaviour change, 
Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT)
26
, Post-Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP), and blood 
safety and universal precautions; 
• Treatment: This includes the provision of free Anti-Retroviral Treatment (ART) to eligible HIV&AIDS 
patients and treatment of opportunistic infections. During the year under review, focus was on scaling 
up of ART throughout the country, with special emphasis on Paediatric ART; 
• Care and support: This strategy includes care and support for the chronically ill, and support for or-
phans and vulnerable children; and 
• Systems strengthening: Aimed at strengthening systems relevant to the fight against HIV&AIDS, in-
cluding the policy, legal and regulatory framework, support systems, human resources and capacity 
building, infrastructure and equipment; and provision of drugs, test kits and other essential medical 
supplies.  
Answer to indicator 
The current indicator is mainly related the second aspect of this strategy. The number of centres provid-
ing ART increased rapidly from 53 in 2003 to 84 in 2004 and coverage of Anti-Retroviral Therapy (ART) 
among patients in need of ART substantially increased from 4000 in 2003 to almost 345000 in 2010 as 
described in the table below.  
 
                                               
23
  Issues related to financing of total HIV/AID expenditure and the specific commitments from US Goverment PEPFAR and 
Global fund will be further detailed with indicator 5.2.2  
24
  ZHDR 2007: Enhancing household capacity to respond to HIV and AIDS 
25
  further detailed with indicator 5.3.3 
26
  further detailed with indicator 5.2.2 
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Table 8: ART treatments coverage during the period under review 
Indicators 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1.7 Increased number of people with advanced of HIV infected 
patients (in need of ART) under antiretroviral drugs. 
4000   39351 80030 156299 219576 283863 344407 
 
(a)   (a) (a) (b) (b) (b) (b) 
Sources : (a) MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009 (b) Annual Health Statistical Bulletin 2006-2010.  
Refer to table 13.in the datas sources mentioned below for slightly different figures (source NHA 2003-2006) 
In sum, the HIV/AIDS pandemic tends at last to slow the pace and the availability of treatments im-
proved significantly as well as the proportion of HIV infected persons in need of ART and under treat-
ment. This is however mainly the fact of the big disease-specific donors funds. As a contributor to the 
Global Fund, EC certainly contributed to an improved availability of ART Treatment. But EC specific 
contribution was particularly significant in supporting a safer blood transfusion system throughout the 
country.  
Data, sources, and extracts:  
 
Data, figures, tables: 
 
Source : UNDP 2007 HDR Zambia Map 3.1 
Mid term review FNDP (2006-2010)- Chapter 13: HIV and AIDS 
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Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006 (March 2009) 
 
Extracts: 
As early as 1987, the government launched an emergency plan on safe blood supply. All district, pro-
vincial and central referral hospitals have blood transfusion facilities. All blood products used here are 
required to be screened for HIV (WHO, 2005-b). In December 2002, the National HIV/AIDS/STI/TB 
Council (NAC) was established to coordinate the national multisectoral response. The NAC is made up 
of representatives from government, nongovernmental organisations, mass media, youth and the pri-
vate sector, as well as religious and traditional leaders, and integrates the participation of multilateral 
and bilateral agencies. The National HIV/AIDS/STI/TB Intervention Strategic Plan 2002–2005 was de-
veloped with the following priority interventions: promoting behaviour change, reducing mother-to-child 
transmission, ensuring safe blood transfusion, providing care, treatment and support to people living 
and affected by HIV/AIDS, improving care and support for orphans and vulnerable children and 
strengthening multisectoral coordination of interventions (WHO, 2005-b). (Budget Support evaluation 
health case study (2011) p.40) 
 
“The prevalence rate of HIV and AIDS reduced from 16.9 per cent to 14.3 per cent. Females were more 
likely to be HIV positive (16.1 per cent) than males (12.3 per cent). Urban areas had higher prevalence 
(20 per cent) than rural areas (10 per cent). An estimated 10 per cent of HIV transmission from parent 
to child occurs during pregnancy, birth or breastfeeding, yet with effective treatment and follow- up, 
paediatric HIV could be virtually eliminated. (…) The treatment coverage of ART increased significantly 
with 283,863 people in 2009 receiving treatment that allows them to live longer and healthier lives. Sig-
nificant progress has therefore been made in access to treatment, blood safety and injection safety. (…) 
During the SNDP period, concerted effort will be targeted at the six key drivers of new infections which 
are 1) high rates of multiple concurrent sexual partners, 2) low and inconsistent condom use, 3) low 
rates of male circumcision, 4) mobility, 5) vulnerable groups with high risk behaviours, and 6) Mother To 
Child Transmission (MTCT). ” (Sixth National Development Plan SNDP (2011-2015) final draft (Jan 
2011), page 28) 
 
According to the MoH and National Aids Council (2007), the number of adults and children with ad-
vanced HIV infection receiving antiretroviral therapy increased from approximately 4000 in 2003 to 
39,351 in 2005 and 80,030 in 2006. The rapid increase in the number of people on ART between 2003 
and 2005 could be attributed mainly to the introduction of free ART services by government in 2003. 
However, the number of persons receiving ART lies below the national targets. For instance the nation-
al set target was 90,000 for 2006. The scaling-up of free ART was continued in 2006, resulting in a 
©2009, FNDP Mid-term Review 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 123 
13.3.2 Coordinating provision of Information  
During the period under review, the sector commenced the implementation of the third of the 
‘Three one’ principles of One Country level Monitoring and Evaluation System. As part of this 
principle, a well constructed, harmonized and costed M&E Plan was used to support promotion 
of harmonized systems. Particularly, NAC intensified its efforts in collaboration with 
cooperating partners to generate the needed evidence to scale-up the national response. This 
involved convening and facilitating different groups of stakeholders at both national and 
decentralised levels to contribute to the generation of strategic information, analysis and 
dissemination. Thus, the sector has been able to monitor its performance against universal 
access to prevention, treatment and mitigation services as shown in Figure 13.2. A National 
AIDS Spending Assessment (NASA) was eloped to track actual HIV and AIDS expenditures of 
all partners towards the national response.  
 
Figure 13.2: Progress towards universal access by 2010, (2005 and 2007) 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
KNOWLEDGE
HCT
PMTCT
ART
Zambia
2005 achievement 2007 achievement 2010 targets
 
 
13.4 Performance against KPI  
The KPIs for which comprehensive data was available to measure performance on an annual 
basis are shown in table 14.1. 
 
Table 13.1: Performance against KPIs - HIV and AIDS 
 
Indicator 
Baseline  
(2005) 
2006 2007 2008 2010 
Target 
 
Assessm
ent Target Actual Target Actual  Target Actual 
Number of clients 
tested for HIV at 
VCT and receiving 
the test results 
150,000 200,000 234,430 500,000 843,722  1,050,000 1,050,000 Met 
Number of HIV+ 
pregnant women 
receiving a complete 
course of ARV 
prophylaxis 
  25,578 35,000 35,314  50,741 45,000 Not Met 
Number of persons 
with advanced HIV 
infection on ART 
30,112  81,030 140,000 149,199  197,129 206,000  Met 
Number of 
workplaces, 
including line 
ministries, with 
developed 
workplace policies 
and programmes for 
HIV and AIDS  
68 39 39 39 109   49,94311  Met 
                                               
11 Public sector workers   
©2009, FNDP Mid-term Review 
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Amount of funds 
spent on HIV and 
Aids in the past 12 
months (US$ 
million)) 
-- -- --  231.9  358 362.4 Met 
 
The assessment of KIPs brought out the following noteworthy developments during the review 
period: 
 
(a) The number of HIV infected pregnant women who received antiretroviral 
drugs to reduce mother to child transmission increased from 25,578  in 2006 to 
35,314 in 2007 and 45,000 in 2008.  
(b) The number of adults and children with advanced HIV infection receiving 
antiretroviral therapy increased from 81,030 in 2006 to 206,000 by September 
2008, representing an increase of 60.6 percent.   
(c) Paediatric ART uptake increased significantly.  Of the 29,100 and 40,000 
estimated infants and children under 15 years in need of ART, 13.7 percent 
and 33 percent were on ART at the end of 2006 and the end of 2008, 
respectively.   
(d) VCT sites increased from 500 in 2005 to over 1,102 in 2008.  PMTCT sites 
increased from 251 sites in 2005 to 936 in 2008. The number of ART service 
centres for both private and public sectors increased from 107 in 2005 to 355 
in 2008. All the 72 districts continue to provide ART services.  
(e) Support groups for PLWHA as well as treatment support groups for both TB 
patients and PLWHA programmes were scaled up in order to improve the 
quality of life of PLWHA through the encouragement of positive living, good 
nutrition, and prevention of opportunistic infections and avoiding high-risk 
behaviour.   
(f) Within the public sector, 40 line ministries and public work places finalized 
their HIV and AIDS policies of which 17 disseminated their policies.  
(g) The number of OVCs that benefited from mitigating services increased to 
43,287. In terms of participation by gender, about fifty percent that benefited 
from the educational support were girls. 
 
According to anecdotal evidence from interviews, the achievements catalogued above  
translated into decreasing levels of morbidity and mortality among the population. In addition, 
the quality of life of people living with HIV has improved and subsequently led to reduced 
absenteeism as evidenced in a number of lime ministries. There is also a noticeable reduction in 
stigma and discrimination in the workplace as evidenced by the willingness of people to access 
food supplements at workplaces. Similarly, data obtained from the company directories by 
NAC in 2008 indicate that the number of companies with written HIV and AIDS workplace 
policies increased to 101 in 2008 from 56 in 2007. HIV and AIDS work place programme 
activities have also been scaled up (Figure 14.3).  
 
Key efforts on Civil Society Organisations (CSO) coordination was focused primarily on 
identification and capacity support to key self-co-ordinating structures such as the National 
Youth Development Council and the Zambia Agency for People with Disabilities. Others were 
the Network of Zambian People Living with HIV and AIDS. In addition, the National AIDS 
Council (NAC) consolidated its efforts to ensure that emphasis was put on CSO’s institutional 
capacity building through direct technical and mentorship, especially in relation to strategic and 
operational planning and monitoring and evaluation; others include skills on facilitation, 
secretariat support, resource mobilization, review and documentation and mobilization of 
specialized technical assistance. NAC also supported the development of a directory of CSOs 
involved in HIV and AIDS interventions and greater involvement of CSOs at the decentralized 
level within the framework of a capacity development approach in 2008.  
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significant increase in the number of centres providing both ARVs for PMTCT and ART nationwide. The 
centres increased from 62 in 2005 to 146 in 2006 and 320 at the end of 2007. Moreover, the total num-
ber of HIV infected pregnant women on PMTCT increased from 14,071 in 2005 to 25,578 in 2006 and 
by the end of 2007 the number had increased further to 35,314. Based on an estimated need of 86,232 
for 2006, the percentage of HIV positive pregnant women who received ARVs was 29.7%, while in 
2007 this proportion to 39.1% based on an estimated need of 90,252 (MoH, 2007). (MoH Zambia Na-
tional Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009) 
 
“Access to Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) and Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission 
(PMTCT) services has continued to increase with 400 and 270 sites respectively offering these ser-
vices. However, only 25 per cent of HIV positive mothers are receiving a complete course of anti-
retroviral (ARV) prevention and 39 per cent of infants born to HIV positive mothers are infected. 100 per 
cent of transfused blood units are routinely screened for HIV. (Zambia Fifth National Development Plan 
FNDP (2006-2010): 32 HIV and AIDS, page 268) 
“The number of centres providing ART increased from 2 in 2003 to 84 in 2005. As a result of all these 
efforts, the level of ART awareness improved significantly leading to an increase in the number of eligi-
ble patients accessing ART from 4,000 patients in 2003 to about 32,144 by August 2005. The national 
target has been to have 100,000 eligible HIV patients on ART by end of 2005 (50% of each year’s de-
mand)”. (MoH National Health Strategic Plan (2006-2010) -7.3 HIV/Aids & STI situation analysis, page 
32) 
“According to the 2001/2002 Zambia Demographic and Health Survey (ZDHS), HIV prevalence in the 
general population was estimated at 16 per cent of the population aged 15 to 49. The infection rate was 
higher among women, at 18 per cent, than men at 13 per cent. The place of residence is also closely 
associated with HIV levels and the rate was twice as high in urban areas as in rural areas (23 per cent 
and 11 per cent, respectively). Provinces with levels above the national average include Lusaka (22 per 
cent), Copperbelt (20 per cent), and Southern (18 per cent). Approximately 39.5 per cent of babies born 
to HIV positive mothers are infected with the virus. Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) and Pre-
vention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT) programmes were introduced in 2000.” (Zambia Fifth 
National Development Plan FNDP (2006-2010) :17.2.4 HIV/AIDS, STIs and Tuberculosis, page 150) 
 
“Tuberculosis (TB), on the other hand, is one of the major non-pneumonia respiratory infections in 
Zambia. TB notification rate increased from 105 per 100,000 populations in 1985 to 545 per 100,000 
populations in 2002 mainly due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It is estimated that 70 per cent of patients 
with TB are HIV positive. The peak age group for TB is 20 to 35 years and the annual risk of infection in 
Zambia is estimated to be around 2.5 per cent. In recent years, cure rates have improved from 58 per 
cent in 2001 to 64 per cent in 2004. Similarly, the treatment success rate improved from 74 per cent in 
2003 to 77 per cent in 2004. These improvements were largely attributed to the successful implementa-
tion of a number of interventions such as the Directly Observed Treatment Short-course (DOTS) and 
improved supply of TB drugs.” (Zambia Fifth National Development Plan FNDP (2006-2010):17.2.4 
HIV/AIDS, STIs and Tuberculosis, page 150) 
 
JC 5.1:  EU support contributed to increase Service Utilisation and Intervention Coverage 
The indicators under this judgement criterion attempt to collect elements for assessing the specific im-
pact of the EC support on health in terms of increased service utilisation and intervention coverage. 
Between both 2001 and 2007 ZHDS some health related MDG indicators substantially improved. The 
Under-Five Mortality rate reduced from 168 per 1,000 live births in 2002 to 119 per 1,000 live births in 
2007, exceeding the 2010 target of 134 per 1000 live births. And recent updates indicate a sustained 
improvement of infant mortality (86 in 2009 against 99 in 2000). 
Spread of Malaria slightly reduced from 373 per 1,000 persons in 2002 to 358 per 1000 population in 
2007 and HIV prevalence rate finally dropped in 2007 to 14 per cent for adults aged between 15-49 
years, from 16 per cent observed in 2001/2002. Updated trends
27
 indicate a decreased incidence of 
tuberculosis as well as well as a sustained decreased incidence of malaria (I-5.1.6). 
These results are directly correlated to the upward trend depicted in the HMIS health bulletins, related 
for instance to improved service utilisation and intervention coverage (I-5.1.1) improved children im-
                                               
27
  WHO estimates. Direct comparison of ZHDS survey (119 in 2007) has to be made carefully according to methodological 
differences. Further details summarized in the table 9.2 extracted from 2011 BS evaluation in the Background information of 
this chapter. 
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munisation (I-5.1.4) improved family planning (I-5.1.5), improved malaria treatment (I-5.1.6) and im-
proved antiretroviral therapy coverage (I-5.1.7).  
This can be attributed to the combined of EU and other DPs financial and technical support to the deliv-
ery of public health services, which allowed for appropriate and timely budgetary disbursements to the 
districts (running budget and drugs). A conclusion shared with the 2011 BS evaluation:  
“ Budget increases between 2005 and 2010 showed that budget support contributed to im-
proved service delivery and to improved urban and rural health facilities, medical staff and drug 
supplies. These supplies were also used more efficiently, as evidenced by the improved use of 
health centres and primary health facilities, institutional deliveries and improved immunisation. 
The efforts of GRZ and cooperating partners produced positive results, which reduced the 
number of tuberculosis patients and, more recently, those with malaria and underweight chil-
dren. There was also significant improvement in indicators such as infant mortality, child mortal-
ity and maternal mortality, although results in these indicators are still off-track. The impact 
analysis did identify a positive effect on child mortality, maternal death, malaria and diarrhoea.” 
 
In addition, the EU allocated an amount of 0.4 M€ to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) for 
the performance in 2006 of the Zambia Demographic and Health Survey, which is the reference docu-
ment for the MDG progress reports
28.  
EC support allowed strengthening Government information systems through the assessment of the 
Health Management Information System (HMIS) and the implementation of the related action plan 
through the institutional support from BS, for an amount of €3.3 million. Finally the sustained EC contri-
bution within the PAF monitoring could allow for timely release of updated information 
 
Nevertheless, serious challenges still remain.  
 The Maternal Mortality ratio decreased from 649 per 100,000 leaving birth in 2002 to 499 
deaths per 100,000 live births in 2007 and 470/100,000 in 2009, far above MDG target of 
162/100,000 set for 2015. A trend confirmed with the indicators on improved antenatal care 
coverage (I-5.1.2) and increased births attended by skilled personal (I-5.1.3) that indicate a 
persisting reluctance for pregnant women to deliver in health centres. This sustains the threat 
on maternal health and backs the UN the IHP/+ initiative
29
.  
 As documented by the Amsterdam Institute for International Development quality of global pro-
vision of service delivery shall not be overlooked, especially for maternal health care, as super-
vised deliveries as well as stock of antibiotics strongly impact negatively maternal fatality cas-
es
30
. 
 
JC 5.2: EU support contributed to enhanced service availability & quality related to infrastruc-
ture, equipment and drugs 
 Indicator 5.2.1: Increased proportion of functional health facilities for minimum package 
activities at first and second level (in terms of an available trained human resources, 
equipment and tracer drugs and reactive for diagnosis) 
According to the National Health policy, first level health facilities are composed in rural areas of health 
posts intended to service a population of 3500 people within a radius of 5 km, as well as rural Health 
Centres, within a catchment area of 29 Km radius or a population of 10,000. Second level health facili-
ties are composed with referral hospitals able to provide medical, surgical, obstetric and diagnostic ser-
vices to a population catchment comprised between 80,000 and 200,000 people (from 200,000 to 
800,000 for 2
nd
 lever referral hospitals). In large and sparsely populated rural areas such in Zambia, 
meeting agreed standards in terms of accessibility of health infrastructure requires huge financial needs. 
In 2005 less than 50 per cent of the rural population was estimated to live within the agreed standard of 
5 kilometres of the nearest health facility. 
Based on a service availability mapping study carried out in 2004, a capital investment plan was devel-
oped followed by an operational plan launched in August 2008. As a result the total number of Public 
health facilities increased by 42% between 2002 and 2009 with significant improvement of the availabil-
ity of health facilities between 2008 and 2009. Total number of functional hospital increased from 97 in 
                                               
28
  Unfortunately the 2011 MDG draft progress report 2011 does not refer to more recent sources than those established by the 
2007 HDS 
29
  Zambia belongs to the 26 less performing countries in terms of Maternal health 
30
  the full quotation is presented with indicator 5.4.3 
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2002 to 112 in 2009 (+15%) whereas the total number of health centres increased from 1210 in 2002 to 
1495 in 2009 (24%) a trend pushed by the efforts placed on urban health centres that almost doubled 
during the period (+84%) But the most substantial effort was placed on health posts, which number was 
multiplied by 5 between 2002 and 2007 and further doubled between 2007 and 2009. In addition the 
number of rural health centres which had remained stable between 2002 and 2005 increased by less 
than almost 9% between 2005 and 2009
31
 as summarized in the table below. However, according to 
2008 WB public expenditure review
32
 it cannot be taken for granted that all those facilities are fully func-
tional and that all the needs from the Rural health Centres for instance have been fully met.  
Another effort was placed in a Flying Doctors Service, a mobile health unit provided by around one hun-
dred staff throughout Zambia, which assists with emergency outreach services such as Mobile Eye Clin-
ic Services, Mobile Counselling and Testing (CT) Services or Mobile ART Services. But this service 
operating with a very old fleet needs a large capital investment for sustaining its activities. 
 
Table 9: Health infrastructures over the evaluation period 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total number of health facilities               1563 1564 2272 1881 
Private (no level 3 hospital)                 92 267   
Mission (no level 3 hospital)                 117 124   
GRZ health facilities     1327         1394 1355 1881 1881 
third level hospitals (no private, no mission)     
97 
        5 6 6 6 
Second level hospitals             21 21 21 21 
first level hospitals             74 72 84 84 
Urban Health Centres     237     237   
1294 
265 436 436 
Rural health centres     973     973   1029 1059 1059 
Health posts     20         107 171 275 275 
 
    (a)         (b) ('c) ('c) ('c) 
Sources : (a) FNDP (2006-2010) table 17.2 and National Health Strategic Plan (table 4) (b) Annual Health Statistical Bulletin 2006-2010 
This notable investment policy was supported by the resources managed by the Government, which 
supported almost 60% of total health expenditure between 1995 and 2008.  
As early as 1993, the Ministry of Health (MoH) and cooperating partners had developed a sector-wide 
approach (SWAp) and attempted to pool donors support into a basket fund. This joint donors commit-
ment impacted first negatively on the domestic contribution from the Government, which fell from 41% in 
2001 to 20% of total health expenditure in 2005. But during this second part of the evaluation period, 
Government allocated a higher domestic budget to support its commitment for health and GRZ expendi-
ture on health increased by 64% (at constant prices) between 2005 and 2008, with a further increase to 
88% in 2010. Concomitantly, the share of the Ministry of Health in the total budget increased from 4.7% 
in 2004 to 9% in 2005 and 11.8% in 2009. 
External resources strongly supported this capital investment policy as well and financed from 11.5% of 
total health expenditure in 1995 (15% in 2001) up to 42.5% of total health expenditure in 2005 and 32,1 
in 2008
33
. But the main increase in external aid during this period was largely financed by significant 
flows of vertical funds, specifically allocated for fighting against HIV/Aids malaria
34
.  
Both developments continue to give an unclear picture of actual external programmes and Government 
(domestic and pooled founds) financial commitment over the period. This was further exacerbated with 
the 2009 crisis related to the misappropriation of funds that finally led to suspension of BS related in-
stalment until Joint governance Action Plan would be fully implemented
35
. 
 
 
                                               
31
  According to the draft SNDP even more health infrastructure have been under construction. But the real figure of the 
operational ones has still to be confirmed. 
32
  Figures detailed below 
33
  Refer to figures 2.2 and 2.3 in the background from Health Case study of 2011 BS evaluation in the background information 
of this chapter. 
34
  Refer to nex indicator as well 
35
  Joint governance Action plan for Government and cooperating partners (june 2009-March 2010) final version 1rst July 2009 
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Table 10: Contribution to Health budget (partial data) 
In ZMK 2.006 2.007 2.008 2009** 2.010 
MoH Budget           
Total authorized provi-
sion (expenditure) 
  1.272.263.213.104 1.627.882.791.430 1.365.700.000.000 1.514.039.617.884 
Total releases* (from 
GoZ revenues) 
605.430.000.000 722.880.000.000 1.083.130.000.000 1.242.350.000.000 1.522.990.000.000 
Actual Resources       NA   
 among which Global 
fund  
0   0 27.200.000.000 874.705.840 
 among which SWAP  0   160.880.000.000 39.920.000.000 0 
Among which EU 
support 
    15.000.000.000 78.360.000.000 0 
Among which donors 
capital grants 
      na na 
Actual expenditure   928.671.430.396 1.211.762.730.029   1.453.519.552.732 
Source MoF financial report for the year ended Dec 31st (2007-2010) 
*source EUDEL, **/# 2009 budget address; **/## OAG 2009 report 
In sum, notable investments have been provided by the Government for easing the constraint of the 
geographic accessibility which in turn raised two additional constraints related to functionality of opened 
health centres as well as those related to staff allocations, addressed with the next Judgement criterion 
(JC5.3) 
Data, sources, extracts: 
 
Data, figures, tables: 
WB Health Public expenditure review (2008) 
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National Health Strategic Plan (2006-2010) 
 
 
Government of the Republic of Zambia 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH National Health Strategic Plan 2006 - 2010
 
November 2005 
 
“ equity of access to cost-effective, quality healthcare ”
 
8
 
3 BACKGROUND  
 
3.1 Sector Organisation and Management 
 
3.1.1 Organisation of the H ealth Sector 
  
The main feature of the organisational and institutional restructuring implemented under the health 
sector reform programme was the decentralisation of health service delivery, through devolution 
of key management responsibilities and resources to district level.  In this respect, two parallel, but 
complimentary organizational structures were introduced, namely,  popular structures for public 
involvement and participation in the decision-making process,  and the technical and management 
structures, designed to ensure that health services are implemented and managed in a manner that 
is technically sound and conform with best practices.  The popular structures created in this 
process included: the Central Board of Health (CBoH) board, at national level; Hospital 
Management Boards (HMBs), at hospital level; District Health Boards (DHBs), at district level; 
and the Neighbourhood Health Committees and Health Centre Committees, at community level.  
On the other hand, the technical structures established included: the management teams at MOH 
and CBoH, at national level; Hospital Management Teams (HMTs), at hospital level; and District 
Health Management Teams (DHMTs), at district level.  Further, the Provincial Medical Offices 
were reconstituted into Provincial Health Offices.   
 
However, the Government has since made a decision to abolish CBoH, together with the hospital 
and district health management boards.  Following this decision, the health sector is undergoing a 
comprehensive restructuring process through which the functions of MOH and CBoH will be 
merged and the management and control of all public health facilities and services will directly 
fall under MOH, through the Provincial Health Offices.  In order to ensure continued popular 
public participation in the management of health services, the hospital and district management 
boards will be replaced by advisory councils.    The challenge for MOH will be to manage the 
transformation process in a planned and coordinated manner, with minimal disruptions to the 
existing systems and operations.   
 
3.1.2  H ealthcare Providers 
 
The main providers of health care services in Zambia include:  public health facilities under MOH; 
facilities under the Ministry of Defence, including clinics and one hospital in Lusaka; clinics under 
the Ministry of Home Affairs; Mine hospitals and clinics; Mission hospitals and clinics, which are 
coordinated by the Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ); Private hospitals and clinics; 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs); and traditional healers.  For historical reasons, each of 
these categories of healthcare providers has concentrated in different parts of urban and rural 
Zambia.  The total number of health facilities including Government, mission and private facilities 
are as summarized in Table 3, below. 
 
Table 3:  Summary of Existing H ealth Facilities in Zambia 
Type/Level GRZ M ission Private Total
Hospitals 53 27 17 97
Health Centres 1,052 61 97 1,210
Health Posts 19 0 1 20
Total 1,124 88 115 1,327
Source:  CBoH , Health I nstitutions in Zambia:  A L isting of H ealth Facilities According to Levels and Locations,2002 
 
 
Extracts: 
An important element of the plans is the development and implementation of the Basic Health Care 
Package to improve the health of Zambians, especially those living in remote and poor areas. One 
health post should ideally cater for 500 households in rural areas and 1000 households in the urban 
areas, or it should be established within a five-kilometre radius in sparsely populated areas (Saasa, 
2010a, 10). The Fifth National Development Plan’s (FNDP) target over the 2006–2010 period was to 
build 3000 health posts. Up to now, this core element of Zambia’s National Health Strategic Plan for 
2006–2010 has not been fully implemented yet at all levels of service delivery in the country. During the 
FNDP period, the sector began constructing a total of 27 hospitals, eight of which were completed by 
the end of 2010 (SNDP). In addition, the construction of 231 health posts had commenced and a num-
ber of health centres were rehabilitated and expanded. The number of staff in the posts increased from 
24,400 in 2008, to 27,520 in December 2009.( evaluation of BS Zambia synthesis (2011) p.164) 
“During the FNDP period, the sector commenced the construction of a total of 27 hospitals as well as 
231 health posts. Various health centres were also rehabilitated and expanded countrywide. Of the 27 
hospitals commenced, a total of 8 were scheduled to be completed by end 2010 and these were Kapiri-
Mposhi, Chadiza, Mumbwa, Mufumbwe, Kaputa, Lumwana, Kaoma and Lusaka General Hospital. A 
total of 19 would remain under construction during the SNDP period and these include Chama, Samfya, 
Shangombo, Lufwanyama, Chiengi, Mpulungu and Nakonde. Others are Serenje, Isoka, Choma, Ma-
saiti, Namwala, Luangwa, Lundazi, Mongu, Milenge, Mwense, Chavuma and Mkushi. 
Besides physical health infrastructure, mobile health services were also provided through the Zambia 
Flying Doctors Service, Mobile Eye Clinic Services, Mobile Counselling and Testing (CT) Services, Mo-
bile ART Services and Routine Outreach Services. Provision of Mobile Health Services made it possible 
to reach communities in hard-to-reach areas and where physical health infrastructure is absent or insuf-
ficient.” (Zambia Fifth National Development Plan FNDP (2006-2010), page 84) 
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“• Health Posts: Intended to cater for populations of 500 households (3,500 people) in rural areas 
and 1,000 households (7,000 people) in the urban areas, or to be established within 5Km radius for 
sparsely populated areas. The target is to have 3,000 health posts but currently only 20 have been 
commissioned;  
• Health Centres: These facilities include Urban Health Centres, which are intended to serve a 
catchment population of 30,000 to 50,000 people, and Rural Health Centres, servicing a catchment area 
of 29 Km radius or population of 10,000. The target is 1,385 but currently there are a total of 1,210 
health centres (973 Rural, 237 Urban);  
• 1st Level Referral Hospitals: These are found in most of the 72 districts and are intended to 
serve a population of between 80,000 and 200,000 with medical, surgical, obstetric and diagnostic ser-
vices, including all clinical services to support health centre referrals. Currently, there are 74 1st Level 
Referral Hospitals;  
• General Hospitals: These are 2nd level hospitals at provincial level and are intended to cater for 
a catchment area of 200,000 to 800,000 people, with services in internal medicine, general surgery, 
paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology, dental, psychiatry and intensive care services. These hospitals 
are also intended to act as referral centres for the 1st level institutions, including the provision of tech-
nical back up and training functions. Currently there are 19-second level hospitals. Two provinces, 
namely Southern and Copperbelt, have 5 and 3 second level Hospitals respectively. There is need to 
rationalize the distribution of these facilities through right-sizing; and  
• Central Hospitals: These are for catchment populations of 800,000 and above, and have sub- 
specialisations in internal medicine, surgery, paediatrics, obstetrics, gynaecology, intensive care, psy-
chiatry, training and research. These hospitals also act as referral centres for 2nd level hospitals. Cur-
rently there are 5 such facilities in the country, of which 3 are in the Copperbelt Province. Again there is 
need to rationalize the distribution of these facilities.” (National Health Strategic Plan 2006-2010 (Nov 
2005), page 9) 
 
“With respect to infrastructure development, there are challenges related to distribution of health facili-
ties and the state of existing infrastructure. It has been estimated that less than 50 per cent of the rural 
population live within 5 kilometres of the nearest health facility compared to over 90 per cent for the 
urban population. This has the effect of limiting access to the much needed health services. On the 
other hand, the deterioration of health facilities has reached a stage where urgent repairs and replace-
ments are required for the health system to function effectively. Various issues have contributed to this 
state of affairs, including inadequate financial resources; emphasis on an expansion of the network ra-
ther than on the rehabilitation of existing facilities; lack of a preventive maintenance policy (and guide-
lines); and lack of skilled staff for preventive and corrective maintenance. Analysis of the Joint Invest-
ment Plan 2001 to 2005 clearly shows that there is inadequate investment going to infrastructure. In 
order to provide information that would feed into the development of a prioritized capital plan, the Gov-
ernment commissioned a health facility census in 2004. Information generated from the census will be 
used to develop infrastructure development plans.” (Zambia Fifth National Development Plan FNDP 
(2006-2010): 17.2.9 Other Main Challenges, page 152) 
 
 Indicator 5.2.2: Increased % of health facilities with a minimum package of PCMTCT (Pre-
vention of HIV transmission from mother to child) services 
Consistent with the effort of scaling up the number of infrastructures able to propose access to ARVs to 
eligible HIV/AIDS infected patients
36
, a sustained effort was provided for prevention of Mother to Child 
Transmission (PMTCT) and related services were multiplied by five within two years (2005-2007). Even 
though still below the target
37
, the number of positive pregnant women receiving a complete course of 
ARV sharply increased accordingly, but the updated information was not available in more recent statis-
tical bulletins.  
This large-scale care policy involving costly treatments could be predominantly implemented through a 
large financial commitment. This was initially supported by the public sector, which in 2002 financed 
47% of the total HIV/AIDS expenditures against 44% being financed by the private sector. But with the 
increased DPs involvement in the Global HIV and Aids initiative (GHI) and especially substantial USAID 
PEPFAR and Global Fund commitments, donors contribution accounted for 60% in 2005 and 74% in 
                                               
36
  Refer to indicator 5.1.7 
37
  Refer to the table in the introduction of the chapter for this EQ. 
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2005 and 2006 of total HIV/AIDS health expenditures. Today, 70% to 80% of ART provision in Zambia 
is directly or indirectly, being supported by external donors
38
: whereas Global fund disbursements oscil-
lated (between 10 and 25% of the total HIV health expenditure) according to the shape of different 
rounds, the proportion of USAID PEPFAR expenditure in total HIV/AIDS health expenditure increased 
steadily from 26% in 2003 to about 37% in 2005-2006.  
According to the National Health Accounts 2003-2006 (2009), Government ranked then the third largest 
financing source of HIV/AIDS health expenditures with 10% of HIV/AIDS related total expenditure
39
.  
Despite punctual notable involvement of private companies such as mines related industries (Konkola 
copper sources, Chilanga cement,...) banks (BoZ, Barclay’s, Z Nat. Commercial...)
40
 (...), the contribu-
tion of private employers remained negligible at an average of 2% throughout the study period: this lack 
of commitment is not proportional with the economic dramatic impact of HIV/AIDS among private firms 
in Zambia, whereas an increased commitment for prevention and early treatment would be on the con-
trary much more cost effective
41.  
As a contributor to the Global fund and actor of the Country Coordination Mechanism the EC certainly 
contributed to the noticed results. However It is less obvious to detail what should directly be attributed 
to EC Sectorial BS.  
Table 11: PMTCT services over the evaluation period 
Indicators   2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
number of sites providing PMTCT (partial data from public and private facilities)   251     936  na  na 
Percentage of HIV positive pregnant women receiving a complete course of ARV 
from facilities providing PMTCT services (including with provision of mobile ser-
vices) 
    28,80% 39,10% 53,20%     
Number of health facilities providing ART services   na na 305 419 373 454 
Sources :MoH Annual Health statistical Bulletin year       2008 2008 2010 2010 
 
Data, sources, extracts: 
Data, figures, tables: 
 
                                               
38
  BS evaluation health case study (2011) .Full quotation in the extracts below 
39
  Refer to the comprehensive table (“table 29”) on HIV/Aids health care financing among the selected data, figures and tables 
presented below. 
40
  Detailed in the extracts below from ZHDR 2007: Enhancing household capacity to respond to HIV and AIDS 
41
  detailed in MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009 quoted below 
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Table 29 Distr ibution of Total H I V /AI DS H ealth Expenditures, 2003,  2005-2006  
  2003 2005 2006 
H I V /AI DS H ealth Expenditures      
Total HIV/AIDS expenditure (ZK) 244, 372,  757,597, 658,085 
Total HIV/AIDS Health Expenditures (K  Mn) 235, 349.6    648,099.0 576,838.0  
Total HIV/AIDS Health Expenditures (US$) 
49,620,408              
145,183,459.88  
              
161,217,981  
HIV/AIDS Health Expenditure As % of Total Health Expenditure 
18 
32 26 
HI/AIDS Health Expenditure as % of GDP 
1.2% 
2.0% 1.5% 
HIV/AIDS Health Expenditure per capita  (US$) 
 
4.6 12.7 13.7 
Household Out-of-pocket spending per PLWHA (US$) 
 
24.1 22.7 
Sources of H I V /AI DS H ealth Expenditures 
 
    
Ministry of Finance 
9.8% 
7.7% 9.5% 
Employers - 2.0% 2.6% 
Household  19.7 16.0% 13.9% 
Global Fund 4.9 23.2% 9.2% 
USAID 26 27.6% 36.7% 
All Rest of the World 39.2 23.5% 28.1% 
Financing agents of H I V /AI DS health Expenditures 
 
    
Ministry of Health 
18.2% 
27.3% 23.0% 
National Aids Council 
4.4% 
4.8% 3.8% 
Other Ministries & Other Govt Agencies 
3.3% 
1.4% 1.2% 
Private Insurance 
 
0.2% 0.4% 
Household Out Pocket 
19.7% 
15.9% 13.8% 
Non-Governmental Organization 
5% 
14.2% 15.6% 
Private Firms and Corporations 
1.6% 
1.9% 2.3% 
All Donors  
48 
34.2% 39.9% 
USAID 
26% 
27.6% 36.7% 
Recipients of H I V /AI DS H ealth Expenditures (Providers of 
H I V /AI DS H ealth services) 
 
    
Public providers 
17% 
9.8% 11.4% 
Public Hospitals 
15% 
6.4% 7.3% 
Public health centres 
2% 
3.3% 4.1% 
Private providers 
10% 
13.8% 10.6% 
Private Hospitals 
9% 
12.8% 7.7% 
Private health centres/clinics 
0.3% 
1.0% 2.9% 
Providers of prevention and public health services 
41 
40.8% 40.1% 
Providers of General Administration for HIV/AIDS 
7% 
8.2% 10.3% 
Other providers 
16% 
27.4% 27.6% 
Use of H I V /AI DS H ealth Expenditures (Functions) 
 
    
Services of curative care 
32 
42.6% 43.4% 
Inpatient curative services 
9 
13.8% 10.5% 
Outpatient curative services 
24 
28.8% 32.9% 
Services of long-term nursing care 
0.2 
3.9% 0.2% 
Ancillary services to health care 
0% 
0.0% 0.5% 
Medical goods dispensed to outpatients 
13 
3.5% 4.1% 
Prevention and public health services 
41 
40.8% 40.1% 
Health administration and health insurance 7% 8.2% 10.3% 
 Capital formation 1% 1.1% 1.4% 
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Extracts: 
The Global HIV/AIDS initiatives (GHI) provided resources to this end. They included actual financial 
resources to purchase the antiretroviral, support for upgrading clinics and hospitals as well as a variety 
of technical support functions (Hanefeld, 2009, p. 5). About 70% to 80% of ART provision in Zambia is, 
directly or indirectly, being supported by external donors (Hanefeld, 2009, p. 8).( BS evaluation health 
case study p.40 (2011)) 
The main recipients of GF resources are MoH, Other Ministries and NGOs. MoH remained the major 
recipient accounting for 88% and 51% in 2003 and 2005 respectively. However its share declined to a 
mere 9% in 2006. As already alluded, the drop in GF financing to MoH was due to a break in disburse-
ment of funds to the Ministry (Table 11). The data also revealed that over the study period, local NGOs’ 
share in GF was increasing whilst that of MoH was decreasing. The share of local NGOs in GF re-
sources increased from 2 % in 2003 to 45 % in 2005 and sharply rose to 83 % in 2006. However, like 
other GF recipients, the disbursement of funds to Local NGOS also declined in absolute terms from 
ZMK 125 billion in 2005 to ZMK73 billion in 2006. The share of other ministries in GF funds increased 
from 3% in 2005 to 8% in 2006 despite also exhibiting a declining trend in absolute terms from K9 bil-
lion in 2005 to K 7 billion in 2006. (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009) 
Donors were the major sources of HIV/AIDS health expenditures in Zambia during the study period. 
They accounted for 60% in 2005 and 74% in 2005 and 2006 of total HIV/AIDS health expenditures. 
Donor increases in HIV/AIDS health expenditures is mainly attributed to USAID PEPFAR and Global 
Fund. The proportion of USAID PEPFAR expenditure in total HIV/AIDS health expenditure increased 
from 26% in 2003 to 27.6 % in 2005 and 36.8% in 2006 while that of the Global Fund oscillated from 
4.9% in 2003 to 23% in 2005 and 9.2% in 20069. As a proportion of total donors HIV/AIDS health ex-
penditures, the USAID PEPFAR expenditures represented 37% and about 50% in 2005 and 2006 re-
spectively. The Rest of the World (excluding USAID and Global Fund) came second at 23.5% and 28% 
of total HIV/AIDS health expenditures in 2005 and 2006 respectively while Global Fund came third at 
23.2% in 2005 and falling to a 9.2% in 2006. (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 
2009) 
Government was the third largest source of financing HIV/AIDS health expenditures estimated at 9.8% 
in 2003 but dropped to 7.7% in 2005 before increasing to 9.6% in 2006. This low contribution by gov-
ernment for HIV/AIDS could be attributed to limited resources available from general government reve-
nue and the possible re-allocation of the same limited resources to other health programmes and ser-
vices after realizing that there were disbursements for most of ARVs by donors in particular PEPFAR 
and Global Fund. Employers were the last major source of HIV/AIDS expenditures accounting 2% and 
2.6% of total HIV/AIDS health expenditures in 2005 and 2006 respectively (…) 
The contribution of private employers remained negligible at an average of 2% throughout the study 
period. This contribution is very low considering the fact that private firms and corporations are hardest 
hit by HIV/AIDS in Zambia. The epidemic disrupts their productivity and hence the productivity of the 
overall economy. Therefore increased expenditures by private employers on HIV/AIDS programmes 
has the potential to maintain high levels of productivity in their firms as empirical evidence shows. For 
instance a study by Eholie et al. (2003) found that a private electricity company which offered ARV 
drugs to employees saved 4-5 times the cost of the staff time due to a decrease in HIV/AIDS-related 
absenteeism, fewer hospitalisations, a decline in new AIDS cases, and reduced mortality. As such, 
firms and corporation’s need to increase their spending on HIV/AIDS treatment, prevention and care 
and support so that absenteeism and staff attrition due to HIV/AIDS at the workplace is reduced and 
productivity is improved. (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009) 
In 2002, the public sector was the major financing agent of HIV/AIDS health funds accounting 47% of 
the total HIV/AIDS expenditures seconded by the private sector at 44% of the total HIV/AIDS health 
expenditures (MOH 2004). However, this situation changed drastically in 2003, 2005 and 2006. Table 
30 below shows that donors have remained the largest financing agents of HIV/AIDS resources be-
tween 2003 and 2006. (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009) 
The scaling-up of free ART was continued in 2006, resulting in a significant increase in the number of 
centres providing both ARVs for PMTCT and ART nationwide. The centres increased from 62 in 2005 
to 146 in 2006 and 320 at the end of 2007. Moreover, the total number of HIV infected pregnant women 
on PMTCT increased from 14,071 in 2005 to 25,578 in 2006 and by the end of 2007 the number had 
increased further to 35,314. Based on an estimated need of 86,232 for 2006, the percentage of HIV 
positive pregnant women who received ARVs was 29.7%, while in 2007 this proportion to 39.1% based 
on an estimated need of 90,252 (MoH, 2007). (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, 
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March 2009) 
The contribution of private employers remained negligible at an average of 2% throughout the study 
period. This contribution is very low considering the fact that private firms and corporations are hardest 
hit by HIV/AIDS in Zambia. The epidemic disrupts their productivity and hence the productivity of the 
overall economy. Therefore increased expenditures by private employers on HIV/AIDS programmes 
has the potential to maintain high levels of productivity in their firms as empirical evidence shows. For 
instance a study by Eholie et al. (2003) found that a private electricity company which offered ARV 
drugs to employees saved 4-5 times the cost of the staff time due to a decrease in HIV/AIDS-related 
absenteeism, fewer hospitalisations, a decline in new AIDS cases, and reduced mortality. As such, 
firms and corporation’s need to increase their spending on HIV/AIDS treatment, prevention and care 
and support so that absenteeism and staff attrition due to HIV/AIDS at the workplace is reduced and 
productivity is improved. (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009) 
Private companies and public institutions have also been major players in responding to the challenges 
of HIV and AIDS. In relation to the private sector, several companies have been very instrumental in 
responding to the epidemic. They have developed workplace programmes for HIV and AIDS in the 
interest of their employees and family members. For example, Chloride Batteries, Barclays Bank, Bank 
of Zambia, Chilanga Cement, Zambia National Commercial Bank and Konkola Copper Source (ZHDR 
2007: Enhancing household capacity to respond to HIV and AIDS) 
Mines have developed programmes aimed at sensitizing members of staff on HIV and encouraging 
them to undergo voluntary counselling and testing (VCT). 
Chloride Batteries, with about 42 employees, has a workplace policy that encourages HIV positive em-
ployees to go for monthly CD-4 count paid for by the company. However these initiatives do not target 
or benefit the households. They benefit individual employees of the company. 
On the other hand, the policies and workplace programmes for Assets Holding Company - Mining Mu-
nicipal Services and Phoenix Contractor target not only the employees, but also communities where 
these employees reside. As a result house- hold members have not only benefited but have been lead-
ers in responding to the social ramifications of HIV and AIDS, such as the support to OVCs. (ZHDR 
2007: Enhancing household capacity to respond to HIV and AIDS) 
“For the Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT) plus programme, an average of 5,000 
women were being counselled each month. The main challenges in integrated reproductive health in-
clude shortage of appropriately trained staff; socio- cultural factors leading to delays in seeking health 
care; poor transport and communication systems resulting in delays in reaching facilities; poor quality of 
ante-natal care; inadequate appropriate infrastructure and equipment; and inadequacy of drugs and 
other essentials.” (Zambia Fifth National Development Plan FNDP (2006-2010): 17.2.5 Integrated Re-
productive Health, page 150) 
“Within the National HIV/AIDS, TB and STI Policy and Strategic Framework, the health sector has been 
implementing several interventions. The Counselling Testing and Care (CTC) programme was 
strengthened and expanded to 420 centres countrywide. Similarly, the Prevention of Mother to Child 
Transmission (PMTCT) programme was strengthened and expanded to 220 centres. CTC is the entry 
point for PMTCT. In 2004, over 80, 000 women were tested at these centres and 95% of those who 
tested HIV positive were put on Nevirapine. According to the available statistics, in 2004, at least 12% 
of the expected number of pregnant women in the country was tested for HIV through the PMTCT pro-
gramme. HIV prevalence at PMTCT sites is estimated at 23%, which is higher than the 19% prevalence 
recorded at sentinel surveillance sites. Anti-Retroviral Therapy (ART) activities were also scaled up. In 
this respect, a total of 700 medical personnel were trained in the administration of ART and manage-
ment of opportunistic infections. (MoH National Health Strategic Plan.” (2006-2010) -7.3 HIV/Aids & STI 
situation analysis, page 32) 
 
 Indicator 5.2.3: Decreased shortage in essential drugs in health facilities 
Zambia took in the early 2000 a comprehensive set of measures for improving the availability of essen-
tial drugs as well as reinforcing the quality of drugs used in the country. With the Adoption in 1999 of 
the National Drug policy based on the requirements of the Basic Health Care package, the target of an 
availability of essential drugs of 85% was set in among the priorities of the National Health Strategic 
Plan.  
USAID supported to process of improving the regulatory and logistical framework through the Rational 
Pharmaceutical Management (RPM+) project for the period 2000 to 2005. 
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The review of the Food and Drug Act started in 2003 under the auspices of a Drug Policy Steering 
Committee (NDP-SC) aimed at reinforcing the quality control of medicines including donations, whereas 
a Pharmacovigilance Unit (NPVU) was initiated under the Pharmaceutical Regulatory Authority (PRA) 
which also produced guidelines on donation of drugs and medical supplies. 
The improvement of the management of drugs supply chain was given to Zambian Logistics Manage-
ment Information System (LMIS) with the development of a first three-year procurement plan for the 
period 2005 to 2007 and the support of the “Essential Drugs” and “Tracer Drugs” lists. 
However the target of an availability of 85% for the essential drugs was hardly met, as indicate the fig-
ures from the table below: the global availability peaked to 75% in 2008 (86% in hospitals but 74% in 
health centres) but could not be sustained on the longer run. Availability of essential drugs stepped 
back again with the sharp decline in 2006 of the budget allocated for drugs in 2006 with decreased 
allocations of approx.15% from both MOH and Basket Fund Budget: Simultaneously, the performance 
in health centres reduced to 70% in 2007 and 69% in 2008, whereas in hospitals the percentage of 
drug availability reduced from to 84% in 2007 and 77% in 2008.  
For rapidly improving the availability of essential drugs in rural areas, the distribution of drug kits that 
had started in the late 90ies was strengthened with substantial results after 2004, but with issues in the 
sustainability of the obtained results. Drug kits opened per 1,000 patients rose from 0.73 in 2000 to 0.93 
in 2004, 0.98 in 2006 with a slight decrease in 0.75 in 2007 and 0.97 in 2008 : the main shortage re-
mained for instance on contraceptive, malarial treatments, Cotrimoxazole Amoxicillin with vital implica-
tion on the population. 
In order to better understand the roots of shortages, a pilot survey took place in 2009 with two alterna-
tive distribution systems involving the same actors, namely MSL, and selected districts stores, health 
centres and health posts, which concluded that the proposed alternative (with packaging individualized 
by Health centre directly at MSL) would be more cost effective.  
But this implies additional financing which have not been mobilized up to now, donors trying to promote 
actions deriving from the lessons learned. But the principle of an Improved availability of essential med-
icines, in public and private sectors is being considered as one component of the EC Health Sector 
Policy Support Programme
42
 .  
Table 12: shortage in essential drugs in health centres and hospitals 
 
Indicators :  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
- Health centre months in stock (%) 76 74 74 70 69 na na 
- Hospital months in stock (%) 82 82 86 84 77 na na 
- Summary of percentage of months in stock (%) 76 74 75 71 69 na na 
Sources : Annual Health Statistical Bulletin year:  2006 2006 2006 2007 2008     
In sum, Drugs were included in the thematic for EC support and CSP NIP for 2001-2007 already advo-
cated for the reactivation of a drugs supply fund. But the expected improvements appeared to be erratic 
on the period, with their possible integration in the upcoming EC Health Sector Policy Support Pro-
gramme. 
Extracts 
 Survey on Zambia MOH Essential Drugs Logistics System 2009 
  
                                               
42 
 EC AEDES HERA Consortium Health Sector Policy Support Programme Identification Studies – Zambia draft 
report ,June 2011  
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Extracts: 
Medical staff had to work with an acute lack of drugs and medical supplies. The drug delivery system 
was neither effective nor efficient, and the distribution was not in accordance with needs (Leiderer et al., 
2010, 83). Districts have received drugs either in the form of pre-packaged health center kits or bulk 
supplies of essential drugs. Districts en received large quantities of drugs that were not needed, while 
at the same time they lacked other essential drugs. Moreover, the health facilities and DHMT staff 
lacked adequate facilities. There has been a lack of coordination at all levels, vertical in terms of the 
relationship between the DHMTs and the ministry, and horizontal at the ministry and district levels (Lei-
derer et al, 2010, 84). (Evaluation BS synthesis report (2011) p165) 
 
“The percentages of months for which drugs were in stock in health centres reduced from 74% in 2006 
to 70% in 2007 and then 69% in 2008. Similarly, in hospitals, the percentage of drug availability re-
duced from 86% in 2006 to 84% in 2007 and 77% in 2008. Insufficient funds experienced in 2008, 
compounded by weakness in the management system in drugs and supplies which resulted in the expi-
ry of drugs may explain the reduction in drugs availability.” (MoH Annual Health statistical bulletin 2008, 
(Oct. 2009): Drugs availability at health centres and hospitals, page xiv) 
 
The visible improvement in drug availability could be reversed with the surprisingly sharp decline in the 
drug budget for FY06. Since the early 2000s, the drug budget has been increasing, and this has result-
ed in a positive impact on drug availability as drug kits opened per 1,000 population rose steadily since 
2002 (Figure 45). Thus, it is surprising that for FY06, the MOH + Basket Fund Budget slashed drug 
allocations by as much as 15 per- cent, with the districts bearing the brunt of the reduced allocations by 
as much as 34 per- cent. These budget reductions come at a time when health facilities are still smart-
ing from very visible drug shortages as will be documented in this section. (WB Health public expendi-
ture review, 2008) 
“It is therefore critical that essential drugs and medical supplies are always in stock at any given health 
facility. In this respect, in 1999, the Ministry developed and adopted a National Drug Policy (NDP), 
which is based on the requirements of the Basic Health Care Package (BHCP)D. The vision of the NDP 
is to provide equity of access for all Zambians to good quality, safe and efficacious medicines, which 
are affordable and rationally used as close to the family as possible. The 2001-2005 National Health 
Strategic Plan projected the availability of essential drugs at 85% by the year 2005. (…) Over the past 4 
years the bulk supply of essential drugs and medical supplies was erratic, with more than 50% of es-
sential drugs out of stock. However, the availability of rural health center kits was fairly steady. Health 
Centre stocks, on average, improved from 73% in 2002 t0 76% in 2004. (…) A number of activities 
were undertaken in the area of essential drugs and medical supplies, which included: 
• A three year procurement plan for the period from 2005 to 2007 was developed;  
• The “Essential Drugs” list were developed, intended to help in the monitoring of stocks and 
 management of procurement for critical drugs and supplies;  
• In order to facilitate enforcement of the quality assurance legislation, in 2003 the National 
 Drug Policy Steering Committee (NDP-SC) carried out a review of the Food and Drug Act and labora-
tory to establish their capacity to effectively enforce quality control on medicines. The review identified a 
number of weaknesses and the Government is yet to implement the recommendations; In order to im-
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 
Paracet amol 500mg t abs 
Mebendazole 100mg tabs 
Benzathine Benzylpenicillin  
Met ronidazole 200mg tabs 
Amoxycilin 125mg/ 5ml susp 
A/ L 120/ 20mg tabs 4* 6  
RDTs 
Oralcon- F tablets 
Condoms,  lubricat ed 
Depo  
Cot rimoxazole 
M&E 
Baseline 
Stock Out s 
 Baseline (N=416) vs M&E (N=274) 
January vs December 2009  
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prove on the quality of donated drugs and medical supplies, in 2004 the Pharmacy and Poisons Board, 
in collaboration with various stakeholders, produced Guidelines on Donation of Drugs and Medical 
Supplies. However, the same have not yet been disseminated and applied.  
• Process for establishment of a Zambian Logistics Management Information System (LMIS) 
continued with the establishment of the Zambian tracer drugs/medical supplies list;  
• Under the newly established Pharmaceutical Regulatory Authority (PRA) structure, activities to 
operationalize/establish the Pharmacovigilance Unit (NPVU) have been initiated. The Unit will be re-
sponsible for introducing the concept of Pharmacovigilance in Zambia, including training and training in 
Adverse Drug Reaction/Events (ADR/Es) detection and its reporting systems.” (MoH National Health 
Strategic Plan (2006-2010) – 8.1. Essential Drugs and Medical Supplies, page 49) 
Zambia also requires approximately US $10 million for the procurement of the Coartem drug for malaria 
treatment and US $8 million for vaccines and injection supplies.” (MoH National Health Strategic Plan 
(2006-2010) – 8.1. Essential Drugs and Medical Supplies, page 24) 
20 MEUR (8,3% of the Indicative Work Program) Health (including HIV/AIDS)-10 MEUR 
Support to the health sector aims at strengthening the delivery of basic health services in the framework 
of the National Health Strategic Plan (NHSP). It will contribute to basket funds of GRZ and donors’ re-
sources, provided that the safeguards are in place and maintained. The current district health basket 
should also cover the provincial level and be expanded to include other items than support to non-
salary recurrent costs, while the Drug Supply Fund should be re-activated and operationalized. The 
fight against HIV/AIDS will be intensified through the provision of basic health care. (CSP NIP 2001-
2007 Annex 3) 
 Indicator 5.2.4: Increased availability of drugs (HIV tests and ARV treatments) in the rural 
health facilities 
According to 2008 Global fund evaluation of health facilities, the reported functionality of health infra-
structure providing Anti-retroviral treatments was not optimal, even in the high disease burden districts, 
as only 57% had adequate staff and 9% had sufficient equipment and supplies. A severe judgement 
partly mitigated by HMIS data which indicate that 8% of the health facilities experienced ARV drug 
stock out in the previous 12 months (stock-out of at least one ARV drug in a facility) in 2008, 2009 and 
2010.  
The drivers behind the issue of sustainable drugs availability result from an adequate the drugs supply 
chain and proper financing. Whereas questions remain on how to strengthen the supply chain
43
 the 
issue drugs financing is crucial as well, especially for ART procurement: With the policy of free Anti-
Retroviral (ARVs), Zambia requires about US $25 million per annum to sustain the 39,000 patients on 
ARVs. If Anti-Retroviral Therapy is scaled up to cater for 100,000 eligible patients, approximately US 
$60 million will be required for procurement of anti retroviral whereas both Government and cooperating 
partners could hardly finance the forth
44
. This raises the issue of sustainability of the ART financing 
particularly when Global Fund’s Round 11 is being delayed. 
Table 13 ARV drug stock out (2008-2010) 
Indicators 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
4.1 percentage of health facilities that experienced ARV drug 
stock out in the last 12 months (stock-out of at least one ARV 
drug in a facility) 
              8 8 8 
Source : 2010 Health Statistical Bulletin               2010 2010 2010 
 
Extracts: 
Three global HIV/AIDS initiatives have contributed the largest direct external funding to scaling up 
HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care in Zambia since the introduction of, initially domestically fund-
ed, ART in 2002: the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM), and the World Bank Multi Country AIDS Programme (MAP) 
(GHIN, 2008, p. 7). The MoH initiated pilot, public sector ART programs at the country’s 2 largest hospi-
tals. These programs filled to capacity almost immediately, which made evident to Zambian decision 
makers that the sheer magnitude of the nation’s AIDS epidemic would far outstrip not only the number 
of available physicians but also the ability of the existing hospital system to cope. (BS evaluation health 
                                               
43
  Indicator 5.2.3 
44
  2011 BS evaluation, health case study. Refer to the full quotation among the extracts below 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report  
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
  
Page - 111 - 
case study p.40) 
Zambia’s room to manoeuvre in reaction to these findings is very limited since it has little influence on 
policy formation regarding the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This is because the country relies so heavily on the 
GHI resources for its national treatment programmes. National treatment targets for Zambia are devel-
oped based on discussions with the GHI’s and are led by their own targets and priorities. This demon-
strates close coordination, but also how the country’s national policy process regarding ART has been 
shaped by GHI’s’ (Hanefeld, 2010, p. 97) (BS evaluation health case study p.40) 
“In the high disease burden districts 27 per cent had adequate infrastructure, 57 per cent had adequate 
staff, 21 per cent had guidelines and 9 per cent had sufficient equipment and supplies. In the medium 
disease burden districts all the facilities providing ART districts had no infrastructure, while in the low 
disease burden facilities had no guidelines and equipment. Among the high disease burden districts, 
Sesheke had the highest proportion of health facilities with adequate infrastructure while all the facilities 
in Katete reported to have adequate staff and guidelines. Among the low disease burden districts, facili-
ties in Mpulungu only reported to have adequate staff the other elements were not available. “(CSO 
Global fund evaluation health facilities 2008, page 26). 
“Due to limited experience with the operational use of antiretroviral drugs in developing country settings, 
a draft national framework for HIV drug resistance (HDR) monitoring was developed. This is to ensure 
that measures are taken not only to guarantee the quality, safety and efficacy of the products, but also 
to ensure proper monitoring of ARV drug resistance. This will fall under the NPVU.  Shortages and 
inappropriate clinical usage of drugs and medical supplies still remains a major problem. Efforts need to 
be enhanced in the dissemination and enforcement of compliance with recognized/recommended 
treatment guidelines and prescriptions. Zambia Fifth National Development Plan FNDP (2006-2010) 
Drugs and supplies: Zambia requires approximately US $38.5 million for procurement of essential drugs 
but less than half of this is available annually from both Government and cooperating partners. With the 
policy of free Anti-Retroviral (ARVs), Zambia requires about US $25 million per annum to sustain the 
39,000 patients on ARVs. If Anti-Retroviral Therapy is scaled up to cater for 100,000 eligible patients, 
approximately US $60 million will be required for procurement of anti retroviral drugs. (MoH National 
Health Strategic Plan (2006-2010) – 8.1. Essential Drugs and Medical Supplies, page 24) 
 
JC 5.2:  EU support contributed to enhanced service availability & quality related to infra-
structure, equipment and drugs 
The indicators under this judgement criterion attempt to collect elements for assessing the spe-
cific impact of the EC support on health in terms of enhanced service availability & quality relat-
ed to infrastructure, equipment and drugs. 
Enhanced service availability related to infrastructure, equipment and drugs depends on a sustained 
Government commitment towards a comprehensive strategy consistent with sustained financial releas-
es.  
The sector-wide approach (SWAp) developed as early as 1993 by the Ministry of Health (MoH) and 
cooperating partners attempted to pool donors support into a basket fund. With the approval of a Na-
tional Health Strategic Plan IV (NHSP) for 2006–2010 aligned to the FNDP, Zambia expressed its inten-
tion to gradually transform the funds going into district baskets into a general health sector basket. EC’s 
pushed significantly in the finalisation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on PRBS signed in 
April 2005, in line with the national medium-term framework to manage the Cooperating Partners’ de-
velopment cooperation with GRZ in alignment with the FNDP formulated in the Joint Assistance Strate-
gy for Zambia (JASZ). 
During the first period of the evaluation period, this joint donors commitment was negatively correlated 
to the domestic contribution from the Government, which fell from 41% in 2001 to 20% of total health 
expenditure in 2005. But, the sustained political dialogue finally led to a substantial increase in the Gov-
ernment’s financial commitments during the second part of the evaluation period, which were multiplied 
by 2,5 in real terms between 2006 and 2010 and increased by 64% (at constant prices) between 2005 
and 2008, with a further increase to 88% in 2010. This raised concomitantly, the share of the Ministry of 
Health in the total budget from 4,7% in 2004 to 9% in 2005 and 11.8% in 2009. 
External resources strongly supported thus these capital investments in both terms of policy dialogue as 
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well as financial commitments, which financed from 11,5% of total health expenditure in 1995 (15% in 
2001) up to 42,5% of total health expenditure in 2005 and 32,1 in 2008
45
. But the main increase in ex-
ternal aid during this period was largely financed by significant flows of vertical funds specifically allo-
cated for fighting against HIV/Aids malaria and prominently aimed at providing ART treatments. 
Globally the government efforts yielded notable outcomes in terms of service availability (I-5.2.1) and for 
prevention/treatments services related to HIV/AIDS infection (I-5.2.2). But reservations remain about 
their level of functionality, especially among rural health facilities. Substantial efforts have been placed 
on the effective availability of essential (I-5.2.3), and ART drugs (I-5.2.4) with mixed results, especially 
for essential drugs which logistics and proper financing need to be substantially improved.  
 
The aspects of enhanced service quality related to infrastructure, equipment and drugs are more 
difficult to assess. 
Government failed in improving budget transparency with changing presentations in the budgetary doc-
uments and financial reports, and there are still important gaps in reporting donors overall commitments. 
A large portion of donor support remained off budget and the anticipated move towards sector budget 
support was mainly supported by DFID, the Dutch cooperation and EU only. 
This was further exacerbated with the 2009 crisis related to the misappropriation of funds that finally led 
to a discontinuation of Donors support until a Joint Governance Action Plan would be fully implement-
ed
46
. Release of subsequent tranches of funds was conditional to the achievement of triggers actions to 
be completed by subsequent Sector Advisory Groups meetings. Despite all of them should have been 
performed by SAG one 2010, the disbursements resumed partially up to now. In 2010 Ministry of Fi-
nance and National Planning (MoFNP) could thus not be in a position to include DPs support into the 
budget, which involved a huge reduction in the total budget for 2010 and the reduction of health’s share 
in the total budget allocation from 11.9% in 2009 to 8.2% in 2010. But this was partially compensated by 
increasing domestic allocation to the health budget which share increased from 6% in 2005 to 9% in 
2009 and 10% in 2010. Even if government continues to fall short of the Abuja Commitment of 15%, it 
announced that it would increase resources for health to 11.5% in 2011 and 14.3% in 2015 which com-
pares favourably with neighbouring countries commitments. 
Among its non-financial inputs, the EC support to the finalisation of the MoU has to be underlined, even 
though it did not lead to the expected increased additional ‘in-budget’ support from the donors. The 
2009 crisis ruined these efforts but the joint donors response gave a clear incentive to the Government 
for an improved quality in the overall management of the health sector: and even though late upon 
schedule, the joint Governance action plan is being implemented. 
 
JC 5.3: EU support contributed to enhanced service availability & quality related to health care 
workers 
 Indicator 5.3.1: Increased quantity of qualified health care workers including qualified spe-
cialists in dentistry, pharmacy, environmental health etc.  
Background 
In 1992, the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) entered into a paradigm shift related to the 
organisation of activities in the public sector formalized in the National Health Services Act: whereas the 
Ministry of health was in charge of the policy formulation and regulation part of the public health activi-
ties, a Central Board of Health (CBoH) was established in order to run the overall technical manage-
ment of the health sector. With the repeal of the National Health Services Act decided in 2005, the 
CBoH was finally dissolved in 2006. 
Just after the dissolution of Central Board of Health in 2005, the Ministry of Health approved a new es-
tablishment, while Government was debating on overall wage bill sustainability. This new establishment, 
consistent however with WHO recommendations, substantially increased the number of needed posts 
from the initial 23,000 to about 50,000.  
At that time (2005) the total number of heath staff was 23176 and with the new establishment the health 
sector reported operating at 50 per cent of the established needs, officialising an acute staff attrition, 
with nearly 45 per cent of the rural health centres run by unqualified health workers. The physician to 
population ratio represented 1 to 10,000 in 1975, it was 1 to 17,500 thirty years later, after even reach-
ing 1: 19,000 in 2006, far below WHO recommendation of one physician for 5,000 habitants. According 
to the current revised establishment of 39,588 health staff, there are still currently 9,063 nurses missing, 
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  Refer to figures 2.2 and 2.3 in the background from Health Case study of 2011 BS evaluation in the background information 
of this chapter. 
46
  Joint governance Action plan for Government and cooperating partners (june 2009-March 2010) final version 1rst July 2009 
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2,465 clinical officers and 2,929 midwives.  
This situation resulted from a combination of factors ranking from poor and un-attractive conditions of 
service (especially in remote rural areas) challenged by more attractive local, regional or international 
job offers, to the increased workload related to burden from AIDS pandemic among the Health staff and 
the patients. The situation is severe to an extent that it challenges the country’s ability to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals related to maternal health and to fight against priority diseases. 
 
In order to address the issue of retaining qualified health workers in remote rural areas, MoH started in 
2003 to develop the Zambian Health Worker Retention Scheme, a three years commitment that allowed 
MoH to allocate ZMK 32 billion in addition to the normal personal emolument. In a context marked by 
the debate on the wage sustainability, the MoH could be exempted from the public sector employment 
freeze. This was implemented with the initial support of the Netherland for the period 2003-2006, fol-
lowed by an EU sector budget support implemented in 2007-2008 in support to the programme for re-
tention of human resources for health sector, in line with the EU Strategy for Action on the Crisis in Hu-
man Resources for Health in Developing countries approved in December 2005
47
. This €10m
48
 sectorial 
budget support programme for retention of human resources in health intended to provide a well moti-
vated, committed and skilled professional workforce who will deliver cost effective quality health care 
services as close to the family as possible, enabled the MoH to major achievements, such as the ex-
pansion of the rural retention scheme, staff integration onto payroll of the MoH, development and im-
plementation of the National Training Operational Plan, and significant steps in filling the new estab-
lishment with person-to-post matching based on the new job descriptions
49
. 
Answer to the indicator 
The Human resources for Health strategic plan (2006-2010) aimed at ensuring an adequate and equita-
ble distribution of appropriately motivated, skilled and equitably distributed health workers providing 
quality services. This allowed incorporating the corresponding financing needs in the country’s macro-
framework and corresponding MTEF. The recruitments and incentive introduced to retain certain cate-
gories of health workers especially in rural areas, contributed to a slight improvement of the doctors per 
population.  
The number of medical doctors doubled between 2006 and 2010 (from 574 to 1076 respectively), the 
number of midwives slightly increased (from 2,240 to 2,745) and the number of nurses increased from 
6,496 to 7,795 (+20%). In terms of density the figures obtained with the updated population from the last 
census indicate a substantial improvement in the density of medical doctors (1:21019 in 2006, 1:12125 
in 2010), and slight improvements in the density of midwives (1:5,386 in 2006 , 1:4,753 in 2010) and 
nurses (1:1,857 in 2006, 1:1674 in 2010)
50
. However this is still not sufficient to solve the issue of staff 
shortages, as stressed as well in the 2011 evaluation report of Paris declaration, which mentions very 
high rates of staff vacancies, staff turnover and a heavy reliance on expatriates and volunteers in health 
facilities
51
.  
This plan is being updated with EC support focusing on the objective of improvements in (i) training of 
health workers, (ii) equitable distribution of health workers with appropriate skills mix, and in (iii) the 
performance of health workers with adequate HR planning and management. 
 
Table 14: Health Staffing levels over the period under review 
Indicators 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Medical Doctors (excl doctors with adm positions) 646 574 721 795 836 911 
Clinical Officer 1.161 1.212 1.213 1.161 1.424 1.535 
lecturer and Tutors   157 163       
Mid-Wives 2.273 2.240 2.255 2.400 2.471 2.671 
Nurses 6.096 6.496 6.534 6.691 7.461 7.669 
Other medical personnel (Medical licenciates, laboratory, 
Environmental, Radiology Physiology, Biomedical etc.) 
2.117 2.581 2.334 4.587 2.488 2.703 
                                               
47
  Refer to 2006 JAR in the extracts below 
48
  8,571,450 EUR disbursed, the remaining being decommitted 
49
  JAR 2009. 
50
  refer to the tables presented with the next indicator. 
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  Country Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia Phase II, Feb 2011 
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Pharmacists 24 37 na 90 317 371 
Support staff 11.003           
Nutritionists 65       120 139 
Radiologists 3           
Dental surgeons 14       246 257 
Laboratory technologists 100           
Other paramedics  320           
Total health cadres   13.297 13.220 15.724 15.363 16.256 
Total clinical personnel   13.297         
Total number of health staff 23.176     24.051     
Sources :MoH Annual Health statistical Bulletin year 2006 2006 2007*  2008 ('c) ('c) 
pm population of Zambia   
 
12.064.686  
  
 
12.477.836  
 
12.819.472  
 
13.046.508  
* public and Management Establishment Commission 
In sum, EU’s support as a response to the identified issue of acute staff attrition, addressed by Govern-
ment with a coherent strategy, was consistent with GBS support as well
52
. Its substantial financial com-
mitment impacted positively on the implementation of the Health Worker Retention Scheme as well as 
the HR development plan which is currently being updated.  
Data, sources, extracts: 
Progress reports mention the difficulty of reducing the maternal mortality rate because of shortage of 
midwives and a poorly working referral system caused by poor communication facilities and inadequate 
transport (Between high expectations and reality: An evaluation of budget support in Zambia (2009) 
p.166.) 
Data, figures, tables: 
WB The Zambian Health Workforce as Depicted in the Public Expenditure Tracking and Quality of Ser-
vice Delivery Survey, Picazo (2008) p.7: 
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 87 
(e) Equipping of all districts with diagnostic facilities brought the total to 156 
facilities in the country.  
(f) DOTs activities covered remained at 100 percent of the population during the 
review period. 
(g) Percentage of TB patients tested for HIV increased from 22 percent in 2006 to 
47 percent in 2007. 
(h) TB Incidence Rate per 100,000 reduced from 3.2 percent in 2005 to 1.8 
percent in 2007. 
(i) Percentage of TB Cure Rate increased from 74 percent in 2005 to 77 percent in 
2007 against the 2010 target of 85 percent. 
(j) Percentage of SM+ TB Case Detection Rate /DOTS increased from 50 percent 
in 2006 to 52 percent in 2007 against the 2010 target of 70 percent. 
 
7.3.5 Human Resource Management  
Health service delivery is faced with multiple challenges. One of the major problems is a 
critical human resource constraint. Overall, the health sector is operating at less than 50 percent 
of the current recommended establishment. Addressing this is therefore an issue of high 
priority. The FNDP target for human resources development and management is to train and 
retain adequate and appropriate staff at all levels. Table 7.3 shows the human resource gap for 
selected frontline positions in the health sector. The capacity building and training programme 
of health workers recorded several positive achievements. Ministry of Health personnel 
increased from 23,176 in 2006 to 24,051 in 2007 against the approved establishment of 51,404. 
The sector continued to face the challenge of high staff attrition during the review period, 
which contributed to the Ministry’s inability to maintain the desired staffing levels. To partially 
address this, the Ministry introduced incentives to retain certain categories of health workers 
especially in rural areas. Consequently, doctors per population ratios improved from 1:18,100 
in 2005 to 1:14,423 in 2008, while nurses per population ratios marginally reduced from 
1:1,918 in 2005 to 1:1,957 in 2008. Midwives per population ratios reduced from 1: 5,144 in 
2005 to 1:5,189 in the same period.   
 
Table 7.3: Staffing levels – Ministry of Health 
 
Staff category 
 
Existing 
staff 2006 
Number of 
staff 2008 
Approved Staff 
establishment 
2007 
Variance 
(2005) 
 
Recruited 
Doctors 646 853 2,380 1,527 207 
Nurses 6,096 6,490 16,732 10,242 394 
Mid Wives 2,273 2,389 5,600 3,211 116 
Clinical Officers 1,161 1,228 3,470 2,242 67 
Nutritionist 65 69 200 131 4 
Radiologists 3 3 33 30 0 
Pharmacist 24 104 110 6 80 
Laboratory Technologists 100 223 1,148 925 123 
Other paramedics and staff 12,808 12,692 21,731 8,732  
Total  23,176 24,051 51,404 27,353 875 
Source: Ministry of Health MoH HRIS database 
 
The numbers for pre-service and in-service training for health workers was scaled-up during the 
review period. Intakes in all health training schools that produce health workers were also 
increased by about 50 percent across the board. For pre-service training, intakes into the 
various institutions increased during the period under review by 12.7 percent for medical 
students. Registered and Enrolled nurses cumulative figures for 7 registered nursing schools 
showed an increase of 29.2 percent.  
 
In addition, a number of new areas of specialisation were introduced during the review period. 
They included internship for newly qualified pharmacists; training of doctors in HIV and 
AIDS, and training of doctors and nurses in the new management skills for malaria. Specialized 
services were increasingly made available at the 2nd level (general) hospitals. Specialists were 
posted to the different 2nd level hospitals and more specialized clinics and services were made 
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MoH National Health Strategic Plan (2006-2010) (page 23) 
 
 
 
Government of the Republic of Zambia 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH National Health Strategic Plan 2006 - 2010
 
November 2005 
 
“ equity of access to cost-effective, quality healthcare ”
 
23
 
Dental Surgeon 14 33 19 14 811,629 344,327 
Dental 
Technologist 40 300 260 40 284,070 37,876 
Dental Therapist 2 300 298 2 5,681,402 37,876 
Physiotherapist 
(Degree level) 0 50 50 0 
   
-   227,256 
Physiotherapist 
(Diploma level) 86 250 164 86 132,126 45,451 
Radiologists 3 33 30 3 3,787,601 344,327 
Radiographers 139 200 61 139 81,747 56,814 
Paramedics 320 6,000 5,680 320 35,509 1,894 
Nutritionist 65 200 135 65 174,812 56,814 
Support Staff 11,003 10,000 -1,003 11,003 1,033 1,136 
Total 23,176 49,360 26,184 23,176 490 230 
Source: M inistry of H ealth H RI S database     
 
Based on the above analysis, the current health sector human resource capacity is estimated at 
about 50% of the recommended establishment.  
 
Figure 1:  Ratio of professional staff to population by province 
Staff/pop ratio
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
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Source:  Ministry of Health HRIS Database 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has recommended the Staff/Population ratios for Africa, 
of 1:5,000 and 1:700 for doctors and nurses respectively.  Based on Table 7 and Diagram 1, it 
could be observed that the aggregate Staff/Population ratio for Zambia is three times higher than 
the recommended WHO staff population ratios for doctors and nurses, which means that the 
Zambian health staff are significantly overworked.   
 
An analysis of provincial data shows significant disparities. Although provinces such as Lusaka 
might have a doctor population ratio of 1:6,247, remote provinces such as the Northern Province 
have a ratio of 1:65,763. This illustration demonstrates inequities in the delivery of the BHCP in 
the country.  There are significant imbalances in the distribution of staff across provinces, districts 
and health facilities.  
 
 
Extracts: 
The minimal increases in staffing are not really addressing staff shortages. Reports from the field visits 
suggest that health worker shortages are still  major constraint to the delivery of health services. This 
is substantiated by recent surveys and research that found very high rates of staff vacancies, staff turn-
over and a heavy reliance on expatriates and volunteers in health facilities. It has been reported that 
Environmental Health Technicians are often the only health workers in charge of the rural health centres 
and are often executing complex duties with limited skills, while neglecting their designated tasks. (Se-
cond Phase Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia (2011) page 41) 
Despite improvements in service delivery, the sector faces huge challenges. Staffing levels have re-
mained inadequate, es ecially in rural areas. The number of frontline health workers (doctors, certified 
medical professionals, clinical officers, nurses and midwives) increased from 12,000 in 2005 to 17,000 
in 2010, but the total number was still far below the required number of 39, 00. Furthermore, the num-
ber of public sector frontline health workers was far below the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) tar-
gets (0.93 per 1000 with a target of 2.5 per 1000) (SNDP). More than half of the frontline positions are 
still unfilled (MoFNP, 2008). In order to meet the basic WHO recommendations on staff–population rati-
os (1:5000 for doctors and 1:700 for nurses), Zambia would require a  dditional 1500 doctors and 
10,000 nurses. As a result of existing hortag , pos tions in facilities as well as in the District Health 
Management Teams (DHMTs) were in many cases filled by staff who did not have the necessary skills 
for the position and the tasks that had to be carried out (Leiderer et al., 2010, 84 and 91) (Evaluation BS 
synthesis report 2011 p165) 
 One of the causes of the understaffing is the poor capacity to produce skilled professionals. In 2007, 
Zambia had only one medical school, three nursing schools and three technical colleges producing doc-
tors, nurses, laborator  technicians a d ph rmacists respectively. The training output of 1720 health 
workers per year over the FNDP period could not meet the required demand (SNDP). Several authors 
also pointed to the brain drain as one of the main causes of staff shortages in Zambian health facilities 
(Lusale, 2007; Schatz, 2008) (Evaluation BS synthesis report 2011 p165) 
The Zambian government has taken several measures to counter the human resources crisis. One of 
them is to exempt the health sector from the public sector employment freeze. Also, the Ministry of 
Health allocated ZMK 32 billion in addition to the normal personal emolument budget for recruitment 
and retention of staff under the Zambia Health Worker Retention Scheme. This scheme was introduced 
in 2003 primarily to address the shortage of health workers in rural areas and scaled up in 2009. How-
ever, a recent study concluded that up to 2007 the scheme had not succeeded in increasing staff levels 
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in rural areas (GHIN, 2010, 3). This finding is consistent with assessments of the effectiveness of com-
parable incentives in the education sector. (Evaluation BS synthesis report 2011 p165) 
Cooperating partners’ commitment on Human Resources came reluctantly, as it incurs recurrent costs 
assumed to be an exclusively domestic concern.(TAPS Retention of Human resources for health TAPS 
Retention of Human resources for health) 
Following the dissolution of Central Board of Health and restructuring of the Ministry of Health between 
2005 and 2006, a new Ministry of Health establishment was approved by Cabinet, increasing the origi-
nal 23,000 to about 50,000. However, the financing of this establishment is still under debate, not only 
linked to public health funding but also to issues related to overall wage bill sustainability. There has 
never been, though, a freeze imposed by the IMF on recruitment of health workers, and a prioritisation 
within government should allow a scaling up of the payroll, if allocations to MoH allow. For 2007, MoH 
plans to recruit 1,900 health workers.  
The Ministry of Health and co-operating partners, in the context of sector dialogue mechanisms, have 
strengthened the Human Resources Technical working group with the recruitment of a long term Tech-
nical Assistant (funded by Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). (JARZ 2006 (Sept 2007) 
p. 16) 
 
 “The health sector in Zambia is experiencing a human resource crisis, which is undermining capacity to 
provide basic health care services to the people. Currently, the health sector is operating at 50 per cent 
of the establishment, with nearly 45 per cent of the rural health centres run by unqualified health work-
ers. In some provinces such as the Northern province, the doctor to population ratio is as high as 
1:69,000 compared to the World Health Organisation recommended ratio of 1:5,000. In 2004, the Gov-
ernment set up a human resource task force to develop an emergency Human Resource Rescue Plan 
and criteria for implementation.” (Zambia Fifth National Development Plan FNDP (2006-2010), page 
148) 
 
 “Based on the above analysis, the current health sector human resource capacity is estimated at about 
50% of the recommended establishment. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) has recommended the Staff/Population ratios for Africa, of 
1:5,000 and 1:700 for doctors and nurses respectively. Based on Table 7 and Diagram 1, it could be 
observed that the aggregate Staff/Population ratio for Zambia is three times higher than the recom-
mended WHO staff population ratios for doctors and nurses, which means that the Zambian health staff 
are significantly overworked. 
An analysis of provincial data shows significant disparities. Although provinces such as Lusaka might 
have a doctor population ratio of 1:6,247, remote provinces such as the Northern Province have a ratio 
of 1:65,763. This illustration demonstrates inequities in the delivery of the BHCP in the country. There 
are significant imbalances in the distribution of staff across provinces, districts and health facilities. MoH 
National Health Strategic Plan (2006-2010) – 5.1. Human resource crisis, Situation Analysis, p.24) 
There are also initiatives implemented through support from Cooperating Partners such as: the Zambia 
Health Workers’ Retention Scheme, currently being piloted amongst medical doctors in rural areas; the 
recruitment of Clinical Care Specialists for the provincial offices, through the Health Systems Support 
Project (HSSP); programme specific top-up allowances within various district health management 
teams; the Luapula province renovation and construction of housing for medical staff; the North Western 
province Zambia Enrolled Midwifery training that has institutional and scholarship support where stu-
dents are trained within North Western province and bonded for two years.  There is need for the Minis-
try to accelerate the scaling up of these initiatives based on the lessons learnt. Following Government’s 
decision to merge MOH Headquarters and CBoH, the main challenge in this area will be to carefully 
manage the transformation in order to ensure that reasonable levels of staff motivation are maintained 
and critical staff is retained.” (MoH National Health Strategic Plan (2006-2010) – 5.1. Human resource 
crisis, Situation Analysis, p.24) 
 
“The extent of the crisis is such that many Rural Health Centres have no staff or are staffed by untrained 
personnel and new facilities have been opened without additional staff to run them. Hospital wards are 
grossly understaffed with dozens of patients attended to by one nurse. Several contributing factors have 
been associated with this crisis, including: 
Poor and un-attractive conditions of service;  
Emergence of a competitive local, regional and international market for health staff;  
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Growing reluctance of qualified medical staff to serve in rural locations;  
Increased absence from work and high staff deaths attributable to the HIV/AIDS epidemic;  
Increasing demands on health staff due to increases in the numbers of HIV/AIDS patients;  
Restrictions on new staff recruitments arising from the HIPC completion conditionalities.” (MoH National 
Health Strategic Plan “(2006-2010) – 5.1. Human resources crisis, Situation Analysis, page 22) 
 
“The capacity building and training programme of health workers recorded several positive achieve-
ments. Ministry of Health personnel increased from 23,176 in 2006 to 24,051 in 2007 against the ap-
proved establishment of 51,404. The sector continued to face the challenge of high staff attrition during 
the review period, which contributed to the Ministry’s inability to maintain the desired staffing levels. To 
partially address this, the Ministry introduced incentives to retain certain categories of health workers 
especially in rural areas. Consequently, doctors per population ratios improved from 1:18,100 in 2005 to 
1:14,423 in 2008, while nurses per population ratios marginally reduced from 1:1,918 in 2005 to 1:1,957 
in 2008. Midwives per population ratios reduced from 1: 5,144 in 2005 to 1:5,189 in the same period. 
(…) A number of new areas of specialisation were introduced during the review period. They included 
internship for newly qualified pharmacists; training of doctors in HIV and AIDS, and training of doctors 
and nurses in the new management skills for malaria. Specialized services were increasingly made 
available at the 2nd level (general) hospitals. Specialists were posted to the different 2nd level hospitals 
and more specialized clinics and services were made available. For example, during the period under 
review, there were in 7 out of the 9 provinces specialist in ophthalmologists, up from only 2 provinces 
before. Laboratory services were also strengthened in all these hospitals.” (MoH National Health Strate-
gic Plan (2006-2010) – 5.1. Human resources crisis, Situation Analysis, page 87) 
 
Paradoxically, the HR shortage is worsening at a time when the health sector is being flooded with do-
nor resources. The causes are well understood in Zambia. 
Firstly, vertical projects rarely, if ever, provide direct salary support. Belatedly, the Global Fund through 
Round IV has allowed the funding of health systems strengthening including human resource develop-
ment. (Curiously, the Global Fund has funded NGO project staff from the very beginning, but not gov-
ernment staff.) Indeed, most of the other large vertical initiatives (e.g., the U.S. Government's PEPFAR) 
lie outside the purview of government, even though they involve the MOH service delivery system and 
rely on MOH health workers.  
Secondly, the basket-funding cooperating partners still haven't created a fund to support personal emol-
uments directly.  
Thirdly, MOH has been unable to adjust to the emerging era of budget support that could have in-
creased the funding for human resources overall, preferring instead health-sector-specific support that it 
can control. Moreover, efforts in the 1990s to de-link health workers from the civil service so that they 
can be provided higher salaries failed. 
The combined result of these trends is depicted starkly for the year 2006 in Figure 10. As total per capi-
ta health expenditures increase with the addition of more funding into the health system, the proportion 
of PE to total health expenditures declines (even as the proportion of PE to MOH expenditures increas-
es, as mentioned above). In short, it is the inability of the basket funds, health projects, and vertical fi-
nancing to formally2 finance PE that causes "so much money chasing so few workers". The imbalance 
in this factor ratio has not been properly analysed. The Zambian Health Workforce as Depicted in the 
Public Expenditure Tracking and Quality of Service Delivery Survey, Picazo (2008) p.17) 
 Indicator 5.3.2: Increased density of clinical staff affected in rural health facilities  
The tables presented below have been elaborated with the data extracted from the health statistics bul-
letin
53
 with ratios calculated with the results of the 2011 Census. The results presented below represent 
the inverse of HMIS ratios which are calculated per 100,000 population, whereas those below give the 
number of population per clinical staff in order to facilitate the comparison with WHO recommendations. 
Contrary to what is generally asserted, the overall density of the main clinical staff has been improving 
between 2006 and 2010 in Zambia and all regions, especially the most remote. 
The number of medical doctors almost doubled between 2006 and 2010 (one MD for 21018 persons in 
2006, one for 12125 in 2010). On the regional repartition, only Lusaka, with 1 MD for 4406 persons 
would meet the WHO recommendation of 1:5000. Notable however are the progresses registered from 
                                               
53
  The number of health staff extracted from HMIS corresponds to employed health staff including both registered and enrolled 
midwives and nurses. 
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the most remote areas between 2006 and 2010 : the ration in Northern Province jumped from 79338 to 
31993, Eastern from 1:56.296 to 1:38.812, Western from 1:45.065 to 1:19.589, North-Western from 
1:39.507 to 1:18.591 and Luapula from 1:35.032 to 1:19.771.  
 
Table 15: provincial repartition of Medical Doctors 
Indicators : Medical Doctors 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Central  26  33  55   54   54  
Copperbelt  165  183  170   157   183  
Eastern  29  26  36   33   44  
Luapula  27  29  29   35   49  
Lusaka  218  317  367   442   499  
Northern  20  23  25   42   55  
North-Western  18  22  24   32   38  
Southern  51  60  56   85   109  
Western  20  28  33   32   45  
Zambia  574   721   795   912   1.076  
Sources : Annual Health Statistical Bulletin -year 2007 2007 2010 2010 2010 
 
Table 16: Density nurses by province 
Indicator : population per Medical Doctor 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Central  47.586,58   -   23.667,24   24.860,46   23.477,83  
Copperbelt  11.585,28   -   11.598,54   12.811,87   10.702,86  
Eastern  56.295,97   -   47.017,72   52.679,36   38.812,07  
Luapula  35.032,15   -   34.329,69   29.209,80   19.570,94  
Lusaka  7.589,81   -   4.619,30   3.898,31   4.406,81  
Northern  79.337,65   -   63.120,64   39.134,26   31.992,73  
North-Western  39.507,06   -   31.522,25   24.461,75   18.591,11  
Southern  29.091,25   -   27.626,39   18.761,68   14.741,22  
Western  45.064,95   -   28.462,94   30.017,78   19.589,42  
Zambia  21.018,62   -   15.695,39   14.056,44   12.125,01  
Sources : Mission calculation from Health statistical bulletins 
Annual Health Statistical Bulletin -year 2007 2007 2010 2010 2010 
 
After a counter performance in 2009 the density of midwives slightly increased by 13% between 2010 
and 2006: one midwife for 5,386 persons in 2006, 1:6,210 in 2009 and 1:4,753 in 2010. On the regional 
repartition the density of midwives oscillated in 2010 between 1:3,065 in Copperbelt and Southern and 
1:8,583 in Northern. In this later region however the same ratio represented however 1: 24,793 in 2006, 
the worst of the country at that time. All other regions followed the same improving trend between 2006 
and 2010: the ratio in Luapula jumped from 1:13,9010 to 1:9,989, Western from 1:8,584 to 1:6.833, 
Eastern from 1:8,042 to 1:6,697. But North-Western is a noticeable exception as the ration midwives per 
population significantly worsened between 2006 and 2008 from 1:4,363 to 13044 in 2008, 1:11.511 in 
2009 and 1:7,436 in 2010. But on the same time the number of nurses working in North Western 
dropped from 163 in 2006 to 64 in 2006 then raised again up to 95 in 2010. 
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Table 17: provincial repartition of midwives  
Indicators : midwives (RM end EM) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Central  234  235  290   222   248  
Copperbelt  500  501  550   568   639  
Eastern  203  206  201   148   255  
Luapula  68  68  74   75   96  
Lusaka  428  437  500   349   554  
Northern  64  163  177   138   205  
North-Western  163  64  58   68   95  
Southern  475  476  450   406   524  
Western  105  105  100   90   129  
Zambia  2.240   2.255   2.400   2.064   2.745  
Sources : Annual Health Statistical Bulletin -year 2007 2007 2010 2010 2010 
 
Table 18: Density of midwives by province 
Indicators : distribution of midwives (RM end EM) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Central  5.287,40   -   4.488,61   6.047,14   5.112,11  
Copperbelt  3.823,14   -   3.585,00   3.541,31   3.065,14  
Eastern  8.042,28   -   8.421,08   11.746,07   6.696,98  
Luapula 13.909,82   -   13.453,53   13.631,24   9.989,33  
Lusaka  3.865,84   -   3.390,57   4.937,12   3.969,31  
Northern 24.793,02   -   8.915,34   11.910,43   8.583,41  
North-Western  4.362,74   -   13.043,69   11.511,41   7.436,44  
Southern  3.123,48   -   3.437,95   3.927,94   3.066,40  
Western  8.583,80   -   9.392,77   10.672,99   6.833,52  
Zambia  5.386,02   -   5.199,10   6.210,98   4.752,83  
Sources : Annual Health Statistical Bulletin -year 2007 2007 2010 2010 2010 
 
The density of nurses slightly increased as well by 15% between 2010 and 2006: one nurse for 1,857 
persons in 2006, 1:1,674 in 2010. On the regional repartition the density of midwives oscillated in 2010 
between 1:1,139 North Western, 1:1,216 in Copperbelt and 1:1,302 in Lusaka and1:3,364 in Northern. 
In this later region however the same ratio represented however 1: 4,069 in 2006, the worst of the coun-
try at that time. All other regions followed the same improving trend between 2006 and 2010: the ratio in 
Eastern jumped from 1:2,874 to 1:2,615, Luapula from 1:2,606 to 1:2,416, Western from 1:2,443 to 
1:1,773. In this case it is in Lusaka, where the ratio worsened from 1:1,123 in 2006 to 1:1,302 in 2010: 
the number of nurses did not increase as fast as the population. 
 
Table 19 : Provincial repartition of nurses 
Indicators : nurses (RN&EN) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Central  530  532  402   641   682  
Copperbelt  1.403  1415  2.011   1.595   1.611  
Eastern  568  581  627   643   653  
Luapula  363  362  342   385   397  
Lusaka  1.473  1497  1.451   1.643   1.689  
Northern  390  487  414   503   523  
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North-Western  492  389  315   514   620  
Southern  908  907  737   1.097   1.123  
Western  369  364  392   440   497  
Zambia  6.496   6.534   6.691   7.461   7.795  
Sources : Annual Health Statistical Bulletin -year 2007 2007 2010 2010 2010 
 
Table 20: Density of nurses by province 
Indicators : distribution of nurses (RN&EN) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Central  2.334,44   -   3.238,05   2.094,33   1.858,95  
Copperbelt  1.362,49   -   980,48   1.261,11   1.215,78  
Eastern  2.874,27   -   2.699,58   2.703,61   2.615,21  
Luapula  2.605,70   -   2.911,00   2.655,44   2.415,56  
Lusaka  1.123,27   -   1.168,35   1.048,72   1.301,95  
Northern  4.068,60   -   3.811,63   3.267,67   3.364,44  
North-Western  1.445,38   -   2.401,70   1.522,91   1.139,45  
Southern  1.633,98   -   2.099,16   1.453,73   1.430,80  
Western  2.442,54   -   2.396,11   2.183,11   1.773,69  
Zambia  1.857,25   -   1.864,87   1.718,20   1.673,70  
Sources : Annual Health Statistical Bulletin -year 2007 2007 2010 2010 2010 
In sum, the density of health cadres substantially improved over the evaluation period and geographic 
disparities, slightly smoothened. Still the shortage of midwives mainly causes a serious threat on mater-
nal health. 
Data, figures, tables: 
Second Phase Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia (2011) 
Table 21 : Distribution of Health workers by province and population 
 
 
 
National Health Strategic Plan (2005-2010) page 22 
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Extracts: 
The above described crisis is even more severe in rural areas such as Eastern, Luapula Western and 
Northern Provinces: in the later, the doctor to population ratio is even more than three times as high as 
the national ratio with one doctor for 69,000 persons. In 2007, 70% of all doctors employed in the coun-
try and 44% of all the available health workers were based in Lusaka and Copper Belt provinces. Data 
available on distribution of health personnel at all levels in the 2007 Annual Health Statistical Bulletin 
shows that the distribution of staff across all the provinces remains relatively unchanged. The number of 
doctors in post increased by 146 between 2006 and 2007, with 67% of this number based in Lusaka 
(Annual Health Statistical Bulletin, 2007). (Second Phase Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris 
Declaration in Zambia (2011) page 40) 
The survey revealed inconsistency in the number of posts actually filled. The total established posts for 
the health facilities included in the survey are 5,038 (See Table 5). Of this number, the vacant posts are 
1,690, as reported in the discussion on vacancy rates above. Hence, the filled posts must be 3,348 
(5,038 less 1,690). However, in the staff count made to assess staff absenteeism, health facilities reck-
oned a total of 3,885 filled posts. (WB The Zambian Health Workforce as Depicted in the Public Ex-
penditure Tracking and Quality of Service Delivery Survey, Picazo (2008) p.7) 
A significant number of staff is posted in one facility but working elsewhere: 13 in RHCs, 20 in UHCs, 
and 4 in hospitals (or 1.0 per cent of all posted staff). Because these could not be physically accounted 
for in the facility where the survey was conducted, there is uncertainty about their actual existence. (WB 
The Zambian Health Workforce as Depicted in the Public Expenditure Tracking and Quality of Service 
Delivery Survey, Picazo (2008) p.8) 
 Indicator 5.3.3: Increased health facilities meeting the human requirements for diagnosis 
and first intention treatment of HIV/AIDS 
In response to the growing HIV epidemic, the Zambian government rapidly rolled out the Voluntary 
Counselling and Testing services throughout the country and in 2006 it introduced mobile VCT services 
which contributed to an increased number of HIV tested clients. However it appears that this specific 
and time-consuming performance could not be sustained on the long run as it contributed to increase 
the major strain on the medical staff in both urban and rural areas.  
 
Table 22 : Voluntary counselling and Testing activities in Health facilities 
Indicators 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
I.3.3 Number of clients tested for HIV and receiving results 127655 229231(234430) (843722) na 1215737 1696123 
Sources annual Statistical bulletins, year : 
*for figures in brackets : Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006 
(march 2009) 
2006 2006 (*)  (*) 
 
2010 2010 
 
Extracts: 
Findings show that significant scale-up of HIV/AIDS services has occurred between 2004 and 2006, 
which have stretched Zambia’s health system’s capacity including human resources and district coordi-
nation of services (GHIN, 2008, p. 7).(BS evaluation health case study p.40) 
The WHO reports that ‘the high prevalence of HIV-related illness in Zambia has seriously overburdened 
the health care system at all levels, accentuating the burden on a thinly stretched workforce whose 
numbers are also diminishing due to HIV/AIDS’ (WHO, 2005-b). GHI’s, 2010, p. 98). The situation is 
 
 
Government of the Republic of Zambia 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH National Health Strategic Plan 2006 - 2010
 
November 2005 
 
“ equity of access to cost-effective, quality healthcare ”
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Dental Surgeon 14 33 19 14 811,629 344,327 
Dental 
Technologist 40 300 260 40 284,070 37,876 
Dental Therapist 2 300 298 2 5,681,402 37,876 
Physiotherapist 
(Degree level) 0 50 50 0 
   
-   227,256 
Physiotherapist 
(Diploma level) 86 250 164 86 132,126 45,451 
Radiologists 3 33 30 3 3,787,601 344,327 
Radiographers 139 200 61 139 81,747 56,814 
Paramedics 320 6,000 5,680 320 35,509 1,894 
Nutritionist 65 200 135 65 174,812 56,814 
Support Staff 11,003 10,000 -1,003 11,003 1,033 1,136 
Total 23,176 49,360 26,184 23,176 490 230 
Source: M inistry of H ealth H RI S database     
 
Based on the above analysis, the current health sector human resource capacity is estimated at 
about 50% of the recommended establishment.  
 
Figure 1:  Ratio of professional staff to population by province 
Staff/pop ratio
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Source:  Ministry of Health HRIS Database 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has recommended the Staff/Population ratios for Africa, 
of 1:5,000 and 1:700 for doctors and nurses respectively.  Based on Table 7 and Diagram 1, it 
could be observed that the aggregate Staff/Population ratio for Zambia is three times higher than 
the recommended WHO staff population ratios for doctors and nurses, which means that the 
Zambian health staff are significantly overworked.   
 
An analysis of provincial data shows significant disparities. Although provinces such as Lusaka 
might have a doctor population ratio of 1:6,247, remote provinces such as the Northern Province 
have a ratio of 1:65,763. This illustration demonstrates inequities in the delivery of the BHCP in 
the country.  There are significa t imbal nces in the distribution of staff across provinces, districts 
and health facilities.  
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further exacerbated by the emigration of skilled health workers to other countries as discussed in chap-
ter 2. Health infrastructure is particularly constrained in rural, remote areas. Apart from addressing these 
constraints the WHO also advises that systems for drug procurement and supply management be 
strengthened (WHO, 2005-b). (BS evaluation health case study p.40)  
“Counselling and Testing - In response to the growing HIV epidemic, the Zambian government imple-
mented VCT services. In 2004, there were 254 VCT sites in the country. By the end of 2005, the VCT 
National programme had established 500 VCT/PMTCT centres in the country.”(CSO, 5 year global fund 
impact evaluation, district comprehensive assessment, 2008, p.19) 
In order to attract more people to know their HIV status and benefit from programmes such as PMTCT 
and others, voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) programmes were rolled out the same year. In addi-
tion Government appointed working groups to spearhead various activities such as PMTCT, VCT, vac-
cines, ART, traditional remedies, epidemiology, counselling and referral. VCT, unfortunately, is primarily 
delivered in health institutions up to date and access is very limited. It was only in 2006 that mobile VCT 
services were launched in one part of Lusaka. (ZHDR 2007: Enhancing household capacity to respond 
to HIV and AIDS) 
 
 Indicator 5.3.4: Level of health worker absenteeism 
The level of health workers absenteeism represents a way of verifying the level of disease burden 
among health staff, as well as his appropriation of the government led strategy in terms of human re-
sources for health. Finally it should complement the elements from the current indicator I-5.3.1. Related 
to the proportion of health care workers assigned in rural areas in order to further access the functionali-
ty of rural health facilities. 
According to the WB 2008 survey this rate was still extremely high, a situation which determinants were 
analysed in terms of work dissatisfaction, disincentive payrolls, family status considered as incompatible 
with assignments in remote areas…But these elements could not be updated during the field mission. 
 
Data, sources, extracts: 
 
Data, figures, tables: 
(WB The Zambian Health Workforce as Depicted in the Public Expenditure Tracking and Quality of Ser-
vice Delivery Survey, Picazo (2008)  
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8. A significant number of staff are posted in one facility but working elsewhere: 13 
in RHCs, 20 in UHCs, and 4 in hospitals (or 1.0 percent of all posted staff).  Because 
these could not be physically accounted for in the facility where the survey was 
conducted, there is uncertainty about their actual existence.  
9. Staff absenteeism is considerable.  Some 9.6 percent of staff were not in the 
health facility during the survey: 7.5 percent in RHCs, 12.8 percent in UHCs, and 6.7 
percent in hospitals. The composition of absent staff include 1.0 percent who were posted 
in the facility but working elsewhere; 3.3 percent who were on long- or s ort-term 
training; 1.4 percent who were on outreach or supervision; 3.2 percent who were on sick, 
annual, or vacation leave; and 0.2 percent who were absent without leave or cannot be 
accounted for. 
10. Clinical staff have the highest rates of absenteeism. On the day of the survey, 31.0 
percent of the doctors were not on site, as were 20.1 percent of clinical officers and 
medical licentiates, 13.8 percent of midwives and nurses, and 14.1 percent of other 
clinical staff. Administrative and other staff have much lower rates of absenteeism. 
11. Staff self-reported rate of absenteeism is much higher than the rate found in the 
facility survey.  For the previous month of the survey, 30 percent among RHC staff, 16 
percent among UHC staff, 16 percent among hospital staff (or 21 percent overall) 
reported being absent from work at least once . The average number of days absent the 
previous month was 6 fo  RHC staff, 8 for UHC staff, 3 for hospital staff (or 5 days 
overall).  The main reasons for being absent were sick self (40 percent of al responses), 
sick relatives (18 percent), and another extra job to attend to (9 percent) (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Composition of Absentees
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1
 "Absentees" are defined broadly as total number of posted staff not in the health facility during the 
survey. 
 19 
Figure 11.  Summary Rates (%) of Staff Vacancy, Absenteeism, Tardiness, Involvement 
in Income-Augmenting Activities, and Dissatisfaction, 2006 
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4. An overall wage strategy is needed. The salary structure is highly compressed and 
although the allowance system has given a reprieve in decompressing such structure, it is 
not the best way of dealing with the problem. While the retention scheme was a right 
stop-gap measure at the beginning of the human resource crisis, it involved only a tiny 
minority of staff.  The fragmented cash allowance and in-kind benefit system need to be 
consolidated. The wide variety of allowances and benefits only caters to a small segment 
of the health workforce, and it is difficult to forecast the budget implications of such a 
wide range of benefits. 
5. GRZ salary management needs to be strengthened.  The discrepancy in the 
number of filled posts, workers' payment of facilitation fees to receive salaries especially 
the 10 percent who continue to receive them in cash, delays in the receipt of salaries, and 
unexplained salary deductions in some workers call for a thorough review of the salary 
payment, and to plug the holes cited in this study.   
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
6. Obtain national commitment to increase fungible (flexible) financing. First of all, 
there must be recognition at the highest levels of Government that the health sector is in a 
state of crisis - the increasing flows of external assistance notwithstanding - and that the 
crisis must be dealt with in a coordinated manner. This requires closer dialogue between 
the Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MOFNP) and MOH that should result in 
stronger agreement on the level of spending that the sector needs over the medium term. 
MOFNP must recognize, first of all, that most of the donor financing are non-fungible, 
and therefore it cannot abdicate its duty of increasing the allocation to health. (The 
percentage share of Government health expenditures to total health expenditures has 
fallen from 7.7 percent in 1997 to 4.7 percent in 2004).  Allowing non-fungible donor 
financing to increase while fungible government financing shrinks only results in further 
distortions in factor use (lack of funding for health workers, increasing administrative 
intensity, increasing off-budget financing - all classic symptoms of the imbalance 
between donor and domestic financing that were documented in the Zambia Public 
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Extracts: 
Staff absenteeism is considerable. Some 9.6 per cent of staff was not in the health facility during the 
survey: 7.5 per cent in RHCs, 12.8 per cent in UHCs, and 6.7 per cent in hospitals. The composition of 
absent staff include 1.0 per cent who were posted in the facility but working elsewhere; 3.3 per cent who 
were on long- or short-term training; 1.4 per cent who were on outreach or supervision; 3.2 per cent who 
were on sick, annual, or vacation leave; and 0.2 per cent who were absent without leave or cannot be 
accounted for. 
Clinical staff has the highest rates of absenteeism. On the day of the survey, 31.0 per cent of the doc-
tors were not on site, as were 20.1 per cent of clinical officers and medical licentiates, 13.8 per cent of 
midwives and nurses, and 14.1 per cent of other clinical staff. Administrative and other staff has much 
lower rates of absenteeism. 
Staff self-reported rate of absenteeism is much higher than the rate found in the facility survey. For the 
previous month of the survey, 30 per cent among RHC staff, 16 per cent among UHC staff, 16 per cent 
among hospital staff (or 21 per cent overall) reported being absent from work at least once. The aver-
age number of days absent the previous month was 6 for RHC staff, 8 for UHC staff, 3 for hospital staff 
(or 5 days overall). The main reasons for being absent were sick self (40 per cent of al responses), sick 
relatives (18 per cent), and another extra job to attend to (9 per cent) (Figure 3). 
(WB The Zambian Health Workforce as Depicted in the Public Expenditure Tracking and Quality of Ser-
vice Delivery Survey, Picazo (2008) p.8) 
Absenteeism and tardiness severely restrict the actual number of full-time equivalent ("real") workers, 
and these twin problems must be tackled head-on. Human resource discussions in Zambia have overly 
focused on the need to fill vacancies, and have relegated the issue of staff absenteeism and tardiness 
to the background. The rates of absenteeism and tardiness derived from the PET/QSDS imply a total 
loss of 4,108 working days per month. Thus, if absenteeism and tardiness were fully eliminated, Zambia 
would gain virtually 187 full-time equivalent staff, enough to staff 2 hospitals, or 4 UHCs, or 21 RHCs. 
HR systems need to have a better handle on the problem, and how to deal with it. WB The Zambian 
Health Workforce as Depicted in the Public Expenditure Tracking and Quality of Service Delivery Sur-
vey, Picazo (2008) p.18) 
 Indicator 5.3.5: Average waiting time at health facility or provider 
The information related to the average waiting time at health facility need to be analysed cautiously as 
the waiting time for rural patients usually arriving in the early morning from remote areas might indicate 
either a rather well performing health facility with a catchment radius more important than the standard, 
or a bad performing heath facility unable to provide due services to the patients. 
The field phase gave the chance of visiting the Kaoma district hospital, where clinics activity in the af-
ternoon kept the staff very active. The focus group organized in Chimano village confirmed however 
developments read from NHA with health care users coming reluctantly in public health facilities and 
preferring the private sector for supply of drugs and services. This is further developed in household 
contribution in I-5.4.2 
Data, sources, extracts: 
Household’s expenditure on health in private for profit facilities has continued to increase despite gov-
ernment’s policy of providing free health services in rural areas. One of the reasons for this trend could 
be explained by the perceived good quality in terms of availability of drugs, waiting times and cleanli-
ness of private facilities compared to the public facilities. To address this perception, there is need for 
government to put in place deliberate policies that forge strong partnerships with the private sector to 
influence it in a manner that leads to the achievement of the goal of providing quality, affordable and 
cost effective health care as close to the family as possible. (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 
2003-2006, March 2009) 
 
JC 5.3:  EU support contributed to enhanced service availability & quality related to health care 
workers 
Besides financial and material inputs (JC 5.2), enhanced service availability and quality results from 
improved availability of well-trained health care workers as well. 
In Zambia, the staff attrition became obvious after the approval of the revised establishment for MoH 
short after the dissolution of Central Board of Health in 2006: the needed posts were re-evaluated in 
accordance with WHO recommendations from an initial 23,000 to about 50,000 and the health sector 
reported that nearly 45% of the rural health centres were run by unqualified health workers. The situa-
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tion was severe to an extent that it challenged the country’s ability to achieve the Millennium Develop-
ment goals related to maternal health for instance. And in a context marked by the debate on the wage 
sustainability, the MoH could be exempted from the public sector employment freeze. 
The Human resources for Health strategic plan (2006-2010) aimed at ensuring an adequate and equi-
table distribution of appropriately motivated, skilled and equitably distributed health workers providing 
quality services. This allowed incorporating the corresponding financing needs in the country’s macro-
framework and corresponding MTEF.  
In order to address the issue of retaining qualified health workers in remote rural areas, MoH started in 
2003 to develop the Zambian Health Worker Retention Scheme, a three years commitment that allowed 
MoH to allocate ZMK 32 billion in addition to the normal personal emolument. This was implemented 
with the initial support of the Netherland for the period 2003-2006, followed by an EU sector budget 
support implemented in 2007-2008, in line with the EU Strategy for Action on the Crisis in Human Re-
sources for Health in Developing countries approved in December 2005.  
 
This €10m sectorial budget support programme for retention of human resources in health intended to 
provide a well motivated, committed and skilled professional workforce who will deliver cost effective 
quality health care services as close to the family as possible. The release of the fixed tranches was 
subject to the implementation of the Human Resources for Health Strategic Plan with appropriate fi-
nancing in GoZ Budget for funding the recurrent costs linked to the expansion of retention schemes 
derived from best practice at district level. The disbursement of the variable tranche was conditioned by 
the indicator that there should be no district showing an enrolled nurse to population ratio of above 
7000, which finally lowered the final disbursement to €8,571,450, the remaining being decommitted. 
The government efforts sustained by the EU commitment on both financial and technical as-
pects yielded to some notable achievements. Besides specific efforts for developing specialities 
such as pharmacists, nutritionists, radiologists or dental surgeons (I-5.3.1) MoH strengthened its clinical 
staff. At the national level
54
, the number of medical doctors doubled between 2006 and 2010 (from 574 
to 1,076 respectively), the number of midwives slightly increased (from 2,240 to 2,745) and the number 
of nurses increased from 6,496 to 7,795 (+20%). In terms of density the figures obtained with the up-
dated population from the last census indicate a substantial improvement in the density of medical doc-
tors (1:21,019 in 2006, 1:12,125 in 2010), and slight improvements in the density of midwives (1:5,386 
in 2006, 1:4,753 in 2010) and nurses (1:1,857 in 2006, 1:1,674 in 2010)
55
. However this has not been 
sufficient for solve the issue of staff shortages, as stressed as well in the 2011 evaluation report of Paris 
declaration, which mentions very high rates of staff vacancies, staff turnover and a heavy reliance on 
expatriates and volunteers in health facilities
56
.  
In addition, the overall density of the main clinical staff has been improving between 2006 and 2010 in 
Zambia and all regions, especially the most remote. The figures obtained with the updated population 
data from the last census indicate a substantial improvement in the density of medical doctors 
(1:21,019 in 2006, 1:12,125 in 2010). On the regional repartition, only Lusaka, with 1 MD for 4406 per-
sons would meet the WHO recommendation of 1:5,000. Notable however are the progresses registered 
from the most remote areas between 2006 and 2010: the ratio in Northern Province jumped from 
79,338 to 31,993, Eastern from 1:56,296 to 1:38,812, Western from 1:45,065 to 1:19,589, North-
Western from 1:39,507 to 1:18,591 and Luapula from 1:35,032 to 1:19,771.  
After a counter performance in 2009 the density of midwives slightly increased by 13% between 2010 
and 2006: one midwife for 5,386 persons in 2006, 1:6,210 in 2009 and 1:4,753 in 2010. On the regional 
repartition the density of midwives oscillated in 2010 between 1:3,065 in Copperbelt and Southern and 
1:8,583 in Northern. The density of nurses slightly increased as well by 15% between 2010 and 2006: 
one nurse for 1,857 persons in 2006, 1:1,674 in 2010. On the regional repartition the density of mid-
wives oscillated in 2010 between 1:1,139 North Western, 1:1,216 in Copperbelt and 1:1,302 in Lusaka 
and1:3,364 in Northern. (I-5.3.2) 
However this is still not sufficient to solve the issue of staff shortages, as stressed as well in the 2011 
evaluation report of Paris declaration, which mentions very high rates of staff vacancies, staff turnover 
and a heavy reliance on expatriates and volunteers in health facilities. 
Partial answers could be given on remaining elements on the availability of health care workers at their 
working place in remote areas, (patients waiting time (I-5.3.5) and skills for HIV voluntary testing for 
instance-(I-5.3.3), level of staff absenteeism, (I-5.3.4)) from the field visit in the western region. Howev-
er, they cannot be taken into account in this general conclusion. 
                                               
54
  The EU monitoring of this ratios was at district level 
55
  refer to the tables presented with the next indicator. 
56
  Country Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia Phase II, Feb 2011 
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The HR Development Plan is currently being updated with EC support, focusing on the objective of 
improvements in (i) training of health workers, (ii) equitable distribution of health workers with appropri-
ate skills mix, and in (iii) the performance of health workers with adequate HR planning and manage-
ment. 
In sum, EU’s support brought a relevant response to the identified issue of acute staff attrition, ad-
dressed by the Government with a coherent strategy. Its substantial financial commitment impacted 
positively on the implementation of the Health Worker Retention Scheme and on the current update of 
the HR development Program 
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JC 5.4: EU support contributed to increased affordability of Health Care 
 Indicator 5.4.1: Decreased patient’s contribution (in absolute value and share)57 to the total 
health spending  
Over the period 1995-2008, the total health expenditure has been representing a share below 10% of 
GDP. However, as the domestic wealth substantially improved on the same time, the total expenditure 
per capita doubled in purchasing power parity
58
. 
Besides the Government strong involvement supported by the donors
59
 a substantial contribution is 
coming from the private expenditure, mainly NGOs, with a 5-fold increase of expenditure in real terms, 
followed by household which expenditure increased by 30% in real terms in the period 1995-2008.  
As indicated in the figure 2.5 below (BS evaluation 2011), the private health expenditure is overwhelm-
ingly driven by households out-pocket expenditure, a long standing trend noticed in the previous Na-
tional Health accounts (2002) as well. Households account for close to half of all curative care spending, 
whereas their contribution to insurance scheme appears to play a marginal part with only 1% of their 
total health expenditure.  
In April 2006, the government abolished yet once more the user fees for primary health care in rural 
areas, established in 1993 within a cost-sharing scheme introduced for increasing ownership of service 
delivery by communities as well as resource mobilisation
60
. The Basic Health Care Package (BHCP) 
developed then is a set of high impact interventions offered through the public health system freely or 
on a cost-sharing basis at different levels of the health care delivery system whereas interventions out-
side this package are offered on a full cost recovery. What would thus justify such significant out-pocket 
expenditure? 
World Bank PER (2008) mentions situations of persisting fee programs: this might bring a marginal ex-
planation only as MoH facilities are capturing only 5 % of the total health household expenditures 
whereas expenditures incurred in mission facilities represent less than 1 %.
61
 Household’s expenditures 
are overwhelmingly done in private facilities for purchasing drugs or services, a trend that was con-
firmed in the focus group organized in the village neighbouring Kaoma during the field phase. 
This leads to a dual conclusion: from one side, EU successfully contributed with its sector budget sup-
port to strengthen a public health delivery system that provides free treatment and reduced thus the 
household contribution. But the public system seems to capture a decreasing part of the household 
concerns, which might be confirmed by relatively low levelled off utilisation rate of health facilities
62
. To 
address this perception, there is need for government to consider other partnerships with the private 
sector to influence it in a manner that leads to the achievement of the goal of providing quality, afforda-
ble and cost effective health care as close to the family as possible. (MoH Zambia National Health Ac-
counts 2003-2006, March 2009) 
Data, figures, tables: 
Between high expectations and reality: An evaluation of budget support in Zambia (2005-2010): 
Health case study (Amsterdam Institute of International Development, (jan 2011): chapter 2 
health sectors indicators. ` 
                                               
57
  This indicator is the result of a merger with former Indicator 5.4.3: Decreased share of patients out-of-pocket in their total 
expenditure 
58
  refer to the figures 2.1 and 2.2 from 2011 BS evaluation below 
59
  further detailed with the JC 5.3 
60
  MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009 : full quotation in the extracts below 
61
  MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009 full quotation in the extracts below 
62
  refer to I.5.1.1 
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Figure 2 .4 Pr ivate expenditure as share of total health expenditure, 1 99 5 - 20 0 8
Source: WHO, 2010-b
Figure 2 .5 Pr ivate health expenditure over t im e, 1 99 5 -20 08
Source: WHO, 2010-b
2 .7 Conclusion
Health indicators in Zambia are generally poor when ranked on a global scale. In comparison to its
peers, that face similar health challenges, Zambia is performing reasonably well. The most striking
phenomenon looking at its health indicators is the reverse in earlier improvements in life expectancy
and mortality towards the millennium and the gradual improvement in the past decade. The main
reason for this trend is the devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic, coinciding with a TB epidemic. During the
last two decades, adult health has indeed been seriously affected by the HIV and tuberculosis co-
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Figure 7: H ousehold Expenditure by Provider  type 
 
 
 
Given the large amounts spent in private health facilities, it is important that collaboration 
between MoH and the private sector is promoted as a way of enhancing the provision of 
quality healthcare. It should be noted from the table below that household expenditure on 
healthcare has been trending downwards since 2003. Household expenditure in most 
healthcare providers has reduced in absolute terms except for expenditure in drug stores 
and chemists. This shows the important role played by drug stores and chemists in 
healthcare provision and the resultant need to make their services more accessible to the 
general public.  
 
Employer expenditure by type of provider 
Expenditure by employers has been fluctuating over the three years with a marginal 
increase from K90 billion in 2003 to K109 billion in 2005 and reduced to K95 billion in 
2006. The table below indicates that most of the expenditure on healthcare by employers 
was made in private for-profit facilities and only a small amount was made in MoH 
facilities.  For instance, expenditure in private for-profit facilities averaged 81% percent 
while that in MoH facility only averaged 6% over the period. It should be noted that no 
expenditures were made in private not-for-profit facilities. This could be attributed to the 
fact that private not-for-profit facilities have a rural bias in distribution while most 
employers are situated in urban areas. The substantially big amounts spent on private for-
profit institutions could be explained by the (perceived) high quality of care associated 
with private healthcare facilities. 
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Rest of the world’s to MoH increased from K 273 billion (71 %) in 2003 to K 308 billion 
(60%) in 2005 and declined to K 287 billion or 46% in 2006.  Overall, MoH accounted 
for a period average of 59% of the resources. This could be explained by the fact that a 
number of these donors are part of the SWAp mechanism. 
The amount of money channelled through local NGOs from the rest of the world stood at 
K 8 billion (2% of total) in 2003 and increased to K 29 billion (16.5 % f total) in 2005 
before reducing to ZMK 38 billion (6.2 % of total) in 2006. On the other hand, the funds 
disbursed from this category to other donor agencies increased dramatically from K 90 
billion (23%) in 2003 to K 275 billion (44 %) in 2006. This implies that most of the funds 
from this donor category are directly given to providers by the donors themselves.  
 
Table 13: Distribution of Funds from Rest of the World (K’ 000,000) 
  2003   2005   2006   
   V alues  %   V alues  %   V alues  %  
MoH  272,890   70.8   308,079         59.7  286,632        46.2  
Other Ministries       -         1,252           0.2              -    
National AIDS Council      7,533     2.0     29,477          5.7    20,560          3.3  
Other Public Institutions      7,373     1.9              -                -    
Local NGOs      7,574     2.0     85,130        16.5    38,404          6.2  
Rest of the World    89,832   23.3     92,391        17.9   274,591        44.3  
 T OTAL   385,203    100   516,330         100   620,188         100  
 
Households 
 
Household expenditures are largely the out-of-pocket expenditures incurred by 
households when they seek care at health facilities and when they procure drugs from 
drug stores and pharmacies. Households also spend on health care from traditional 
healers. The data shows that households managed a period   average of 99 % their total 
health expenditures. This only left about 1 % is channelled through the  private insurance 
companies (Table 14).  
 
Table 14: Distribution of Funds from Households (K’000,000) 
  2003   2005   2006   
   V alues  %   V alues  %   V alues  %  
Private Insurance            4,226     1.1             3,933     0.6            9,987    1.5  
Households        395,152   98.9         614,446  99.4        658,739  98.5  
 T OTAL         399,379   100   618,380   100   668,727   100  
 
Employers 
 
Table 15  below presents the distribution of employers’ funds to other agents in 2003, 
2005 and 2006. The data revealed that employers managed a period average of 87 % of 
their resources. The private insurance only accounted for an average  14 % between 2005 
and 2006. Households only accounted for 12 % of the funds in 2006.  
 
40 
 
billion respectively but the increase was marginal in 2006. In all the three years, most of 
the household expenditure (in excess of 65%)  was on curative care. Inpatient care took 
up an average of 59 % of expenditure on curative care except for 2003 when outpatient 
care took up most of the resources. Expenditure on preventive care was minimal; only 
about 1 % was recorded for the year 2005.  
T able 26 H ousehold Expenditure by Function (ZM K  000,000) 
Function 2003 % 2005 % 2006 % 
Curative care 260,527 65.9 421,515 68.6  463,805 68.8 
Inpatient         
120,696 
46.3                
249,027 
59.1  275,051 59.3    
Outpatient        
139,831 
53.7                 
172,487 
40.9  188,754 40.7  
Preventive care 0 0.0 5,555 0.9 0 0.0 
Research 185 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Capital formation - - 61 0.0 - - 
Administration 4,287 1.1 5,880 0.96 12,464 1.8 
Other Expenditures  130,338 33.0 181,436 29.5 197,766 29.3 
T otal  395,338 100.0 614,447 100.00 674,035 100.0 
 
Employer Expenditure by Function  
 
Expenditure by employers on healthcare shows a mixed trend. Table 27 below shows a 
small increase in expenditure between 2003 and 2005. This was followed by an equally 
small reduction in expenditure from K109 billion in 2005 to K95 billion in 2006.  The 
expenditure is predominantly on curative healthcare.  
 
Table 27 Employer Expenditure by Function (ZMK 000,000)  
Function  2003 % 2005 % 2006 % 
Curative care 87,081 97.0 103,314 95.1 91,091 96.3 
Inpatient  57,982 66.6 81,404 78.8 70,915 77.9  
Outpatient 29,099 33.4 21,910 21.2 20,176 22.1 
Preventive care 2,693 3.0 - - 2,022 2.1 
Administration - - - - 1,517 1.6 
Other Expenditure - - 5,343 4.9 - - 
Total  89,774 100.0 108,657 100.0 94,629 100.0 
 
Over 95 % of the expenditure was on curative healthcare. Expenditure on preventive 
healthcare remained dismally low with no expenditure being recorded for 2005.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WB Health Public Exp nditure Review (2008) 
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Extracts: 
Before the advent of health reforms, the design, packaging and delivery of health care were guided by 
the Government’s policy of free health care. The policy was adopted after independence as a strategy 
of taking modern health care close to the majority of the population. However, in the wake of the deteri-
oration of the economy, the capacity to continue dispensing free social services, such as health care 
became constrained. Thus, the health reforms re-oriented the health care delivery system from one 
based on full government participation to one founded on a strategic partnership among the govern-
ment, consumers, the private sector and other local and international development partners. In 1993, 
Government introduced cost sharing as policy measure for increased resource mobilisation and antici-
pated increased sense of ownership of service delivery by communities. This was intended to facilitate 
accountability as well as participation in the application of resources through the community prioritisa-
tion process of health services. (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009) 
Another interesting development in health funding has been the rise of out-of-pocket expenditure as part 
of Total Health Expenditure (THE). Also the increasing share of non-profit institutions as part of the pri-
vate expenditure is worth noting. As a share of THE private expenditure on health was the same in 2008 
as it was in 1995. In nominal terms though, private expenditure has grown considerably over the years 
(see figure 2.4 below). Figure 2.5 also shows a sharp increase of non-profit institutions’ share in private 
expenditure. These institutions, like NGO’s for instance, have seen a 5-fold increase in real terms, 
whereas out-of-pocket’s increase was only 1.3 times in the period 1995-2008, also in real terms BS 
evaluation Health case study (2011)  
Nominal Household expenditure followed an increasing trend. It increased from K 400billion in 2003 to 
K618 billion in 2005 and K 669 billion in 2006. This trend represents an overall household expenditure 
growth of 32% over the period. In real terms household expenditure increased from K 44.9 billion in 
2003 to K 52.3 billion in 2005 and slightly declined to K 48.1 billion in 2006. This represents the real 
growth rates of 16% between 2003 and 2005 and 8% between 2005 and 2006. (MoH Zambia National 
Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009)  
Household expenditure on health has been increasing during the three years under review. It increased 
by 56% between 2003 and 2005 rising from K395billion to K614 billion respectively but the increase was 
marginal in 2006. In all the three years, most of the household expenditure (in excess of 65%) was on 
curative care. Inpatient care took up an average of 59 % of expenditure on curative care except for 2003 
when outpatient care took up most of the resources. Expenditure on preventive care was minimal; only 
about 1 % was recorded for the year 2005. (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 
2009)  
Household expenditures are largely the out-of-pocket expenditures incurred by households when they 
seek care at health facilities and when they procure drugs from drug stores and pharmacies. House-
holds also spend on health care from traditional healers. The data shows that households managed a 
period average of 99 % their total health expenditures. This only left about 1 % is channelled through 
the private insurance companies (Table 14)(…) The figure indicates that over 70 % of the healthcare 
expenditures made by households were on private for-profit health facilities and drug stores/chemists. 
This reflects the relative importance of the private healthcare providers in the provision of healthcare 
(MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009)  
The second largest destination of healthcare expenditure by households during the three years was the 
traditional health practitioners. Figure 7 indicates that an average of 20 % of expenditure by households 
went to traditional health practitioners. This is an indication that traditional health practitioners are an 
important source of healthcare. Only about 5 % of the household expenditures went to MoH facilities. 
Household expenditure in mission facilities stood at less than 1 %. This could partially be explained by 
the fact that most mission facilities are situated in rural areas where government suspended user fees to 
reduce the cost of accessing healthcare by the poor rural population. Given the large amounts spent in 
private health facilities, it is important that collaboration between MoH and the private sector is promot-
ed as a way of enhancing the provision of quality healthcare (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 
2003-2006, March 2009). 
The expenditure by level of care shows that government spends US$9.49 per capita on primary health 
care. This is far below the estimated US$17.58 in the Basic Health Care Programme (MoH Zambia Na-
tional Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009). 
Zambia abandoned user fees for lower-level facilities (health centres) and for services deemed of a 
public health nature in 2006. Even before fees were abolished for health centres and for public health 
services in hospitals, the fee programme was already stumbling along. As the survey showed, only 4 
per cent of RHCs and barely a fourth of the hospitals charged fees. Fee programs were strongest in 
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UHCs where 58 per cent of them had formal fee programs generating considerable revenues. In most 
cases (60–80 per cent), fees were set by the district health boards or DHMTs, with informal approval of 
neighbourhood health committees where they exist. Only a fifth of the facilities admitted that “fee rates 
have always been like this.” Most facilities have copies of the official fee guidelines, although this is not 
universal. Most facilities also display the applicable fee schedules. However, only very few health facility 
staff explained to the patients what the fees were for. (WB Health public expenditure review, (2008) 
page 51) 
 
“Since the onset of the health reforms, the focus of the Government has been on Primary Health Care 
(PHC) which has been identified as the main vehicle for delivering health services. The reasoning be-
hind the PHC approach is that most of the diseases in Zambia can be prevented or managed at primary 
health care level which in itself can lower the cost of referral curative care by reducing the number of 
people seeking services. Further, in an attempt to promote allocative efficiency in a climate of limited 
resources, the Government has developed a Basic Health Care Package (BHCP), which is a set of 
carefully selected high impact interventions that is offered through the public health system freely or on 
a cost-sharing basis at different levels of the health care delivery system. Interventions outside this 
package are offered on a full cost recovery basis. Interventions included in the BHCP were selected on 
the basis of an epidemiological analysis of those diseases and conditions that cause the highest burden 
of disease and death. Currently, ten priority areas for health services have been identified for inclusion 
in the BHCP as indicated in Table 17.3. Further work is needed to refine the packages and use them in 
the manner they were intended.(Zambia National Health Development Plan .” (2006-2010), 2006, page 
73) 
 Indicator 5.4.2: Increased proportion of population with access to affordable essential 
drugs on a sustainable basis 
In principle the drugs belonging to the basic health care package are free for inpatients as well as out-
patients are free in public health facilities. That was confirmed by the hospital staff met in Kaoma. A 
consistent drugs storage arrangement was in place with updated fiches and no visible issues on availa-
bility could be raised during the interview in Kaoma hospital. 
However, as mentioned with the previous indicator, one of the main outcomes from the focus groups 
organized in the neighbouring village was the high concern over drugs expenditure. A trend mentioned 
by the 2008 WB public expenditure review pointing that the share of drugs and supplies jumped from 
approx. 10% of total health expenditure for health facilities in 1999 to 22% in 2004 at the first, second or 
third level. And confirmed by the most recent National Health Accounts available, (2009 for 2003-2006 
period), which indicates that over 70 % of the healthcare expenditures made by households, were on 
private for-profit health facilities and drug stores/chemists. In addition, whereas household expenditure 
appear to be stabilizing, according to the last available national health accounts
63
 expenditure for drugs 
related products and services keep growing, which raises the issue of financial accessibility of drugs for 
the general public. 
Data, sources, extracts: 
Extracts: 
As in previous NHA studies, households remained the second largest financing sources after the donors 
and financing agents after MoH. Their expenditures for health services are mainly used to buy curative 
services at private health care facilities and drugstores/ pharmacies. They spend more on inpatient ser-
vices as opposed to outpatient services. Studies have shown that households prefer private health care 
providers because of the perceived good quality in terms of good personnel attitudes and availability of 
drugs compared to the Government facilities (See Wake et al, 2006). Although still very high, the per-
centage contribution of to THE has shown a slight decrease over the study period slightly decreasing 
the burden on the poor. With the abolition of cost sharing at government lower health units in rural are-
as, this figure is likely to decrease further. (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 
2009) 
This implies that households bear a huge burden of financing curative care and account for close to half 
of all curative care spending. This point is important and ought to be explored further, particularly when 
determining future resource allocation decisions. Household’s expenditures are mainly incurred at pri-
vate facilities. The overall expenditure pattern shows that most of the expenditure on curative care are 
spent on inpatients as opposed to outpatients. (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, 
March 2009)  
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It should be noted that household expenditure on healthcare has been trending downwards since 2003. 
Household expenditure in most healthcare providers has reduced in absolute terms except for expendi-
ture in drug stores and chemists. This shows the important role played by drug stores and chemists in 
healthcare provision and the resultant need to make their services more accessible to the general pub-
lic. (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009) 
 
 Indicator 5.4.3: Increased proportion of population among vulnerable groups benefiting 
from care from the health facilities  
In line with the decisions taken within the Basic Health Care package, the government took additional 
measures to protect the vulnerable and formulated exemptions for selected target groups such as chil-
dren under the age of five, adults over the age of 65, patients with chronic illnesses such as TB or 
STDs, those affected by epidemics or needing women for obstetrics and family planning services.  
This choice was coherent as recalls the negative correlation between poverty and successful perfor-
mance of basic health care: in the poorest districts, deliveries at home are more common and children 
born at home are neither examined at their birth, nor are likely to reach the full immunisation under the 
age of one. In addition, access to secondary health facilities is more often on a cost-sharing basis, 
which appears to be very dissuasive for the poorest families. 
Data, figures, tables: 
Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006 (March 2009): malaria sub-account 
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Table 47: Distribution of Households Malaria Funds (K’M) 
  2003   2005   2006   
   Values  %  Values  %  Values  % 
Government Tertiary Hospitals     2,719      5.3        5,150      4.6        5,614      4.7  
Government Specialized Hospitals        347      0.7           657      0.6           717      0.6  
Government Secondary Hospitals        647      1.2        1,356      1.2        1,478      1.2  
Government District Hospitals     1,653      3.2        2,650      2.3        2,889      2.4  
Government District Health Facilities             -          -          1,168      1.0                -          -    
Health Facilities owned by private for 
profit entities   46,347    89.5      80,210    70.9      88,405    74.3  
CHAZ Health Facilities          84      0.2             93      0.1           122      0.1  
 Malaria goods (Drugs and supplies, nets 
etc)              -          -        21,772   19.3      19,776    16.6  
Total 51,799 100 133,061 100 199.003 100 
  
The tertiary hospitals accounted for and average of 5% over the period while the mission 
hospitals received the least amount of household expenditures on malaria treatment.   
NGOs Expenditure by Provider  
Table 48  shows that while 97% malaria health expenditure by NGOs was spent on 
CHAZ facilities in 2003. The proportion dropped to 22% and 17% in 2005 and  2006 
respectively.  Providers of public health programmes absorbed 3%  in 2003 and increased 
to 33%  in 2005 and 31% in 2006. 
Table 48: Distr ibution of NGOs Funds(K’M) 
  Distr ibution of NGOs M alaria Funds   
  2003   2005   2006   
   Values  %  Values  %  Values  % 
CHAZ Health Facilities            1,950  97%            6,233  22%      4,027  17% 
Public Health Providers                  55  3%            9,232  33%       7,228  31% 
Health Administration                    -    0%           12,796  45%    12,017  52% 
Total Malaria Health Expenditure            2,006  100%          28,261  100%     23,272  100% 
Health Related Expenditures                    -              
Institutions Providing Health-Related Services             1,013                       -                  -      
Research                    -                 1,545             825    
Training                135                  196            118    
Other Institutions Providing Health-Related Services                     -            -                       -            1,182    
TOTAL           3,154       100           30,001    100      25,397    100  
 
Other Financing Agents by Provider 
The proportion of resources spent on providers on public health programmes drastically 
dropped from 85% in 2005 to 23% and 21% in 2005 and 2006 respectively.  At the same 
time, expenditures on administration of malaria programmes by the financing agents 
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Table 42: Pr incipal Recipients of Global Fund Resources among FA (K ’M  ) 
 Distribution of Global Fund Malaria Funds Among FAs 
  2003   2005   2006   
   Values  %  Values  %  Values  % 
PUBLIC SECTOR             
  MoH           19,801       85.2      31,625   57.1               6,569   32.3  
 Other Public Institutions             2,222         9.6       3,708     6.7                  1,109     5.5  
NON PUBLIC SECTOR                     -              -                 -           -                            -           -    
  Non-profit Institutions             1,204         5.2     20,079    36.2                12,635   62.2  
TOTAL            23,227        100     55,413    100                20,313     100  
 
The disbursement of malaria funds by the global fund has fluctuated over the years. 
While the MoH received the largest share, 85% and 57% in 2003 and 2005 respectively, 
the proportion it received in 2006 declined to 32.3% of the global funds disbursed funds 
for malaria.  The declined in government allocation over the years has been recouped by 
CHAZ.  ZNAN receives the least amount of malaria funds from the global fund. 
 
Out-of-Pocket Expenditure  
H us holds’ spend almost the same amount of money on malaria as the government.  
Out-of pocket expenditures on malaria grew by 133% between 20 3 and 2006  from 
K51.8 billion in 2003 to K120billion in 2006. The data in Table 43  below shows  that  
99% of the out-of pocket expenditures are channelled through the households themselves 
while the remaining 1% is handled by insurance companies..   
Table 43 Distr ibution of H ousehold M alar ia Funds Among FAs (K ’000,000) 
  2003   2005  2006   
   Values  %  Values  %  Values  % 
PUBLIC SECTOR             
  Private Insurance 0        -             828      0.7        1,683 
     
1.4  
  Households         51,800 
 
100.0    113,061    99.2    119,003 
   
98.6  
  Non-profit Institutions 0        -               93       0.1  
                          
-           -    
TOTAL         51,800, 
       
100    113,983        100    120,686 
       
100  
 
Distr ibution of Employer Funds 
The contribution by employers to malaria expenditure has declined from K16.2 billion in 
2003 to K5.1 billion in 2006.  Most of the malaria expenditures by employers    were 
transferred through the private insurance companies.   
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Table 47: Distribution of Households Malaria Funds (K’M) 
  2003   2005   2006   
   Values  %  Values  %  Values  % 
Government Tertiary Hospitals     2,719      5.3        5,150      4.6        5,614      4.7  
Government Specialized Hospitals        347      0.7           657      0.6           717      0.6  
Government Secondary Hospitals        647      1.2        1,356      1.2        1,478      1.2  
Government District Hospitals     1,653      3.2        2,650      2.3        2,889      2.4  
Government District Health Facilities             -          -          1,168      1.0                -          -    
Health Facilities owned by private for 
profit entities   46,347    89.5      80,210    70.9      88,405    74.3  
CHAZ Health Facilities          84      0.2             93      0.1           122      0.1  
 Malaria goods (Drugs and supplies, nets 
etc)              -          -        21,772   19.3      19,776    16.6  
Total 51,799 100 133,061 100 199.003 100 
  
The tertiary hospitals accounted for and average of 5% over the period while the mission 
hospitals received the least amount of household expenditures on malaria treatment.   
NGOs Expenditure by Provider  
Table 48  shows that while 97% malaria health expenditure by NGOs was spent on 
CHAZ facilities in 2003. The proportion dropped to 22% and 17% in 2005 and  2006 
respectively.  Providers of public health programmes absorbed 3%  in 2003 and increased 
to 33%  in 2005 and 31% in 2006. 
Table 48: Distr ibution of NGOs Funds(K’M) 
  Distr ibution of NGOs M alaria Funds   
  2003   2005   2006   
   Values  %  Values  %  Values  % 
CHAZ Health Facilities            1,950  97%            6,233  22%      4,027  17% 
Public Health Providers                  55  3%            9,232  33%       7,228  31% 
Health Administration                    -    0%           12,796  45%    12,017  52% 
Total Malaria Health Expenditure            2,006  100%          28,261  100%     23,272  100% 
Health Related Expenditures                    -              
Institutions Providing Health-Related Services             1,013                       -                  -      
Research                    -                 1,545             825    
Training                135                  196            118    
Other Institutions Providing Health-Related Services                     -            -                       -            1,182    
TOTAL           3,154       100           30,001    100      25,397    100  
 
Other Financing Agents by Provider 
The proportion of resources spent on providers on public health programmes drastically 
dropped from 85% in 2005 to 23% and 21% in 2005 and 2006 respectively.  At the same 
time, expenditures on administration of malaria programmes by the financing agents 
 
Extracts: 
Researchers from the Amsterdam Institute for International Development analysed the impact of im-
provements in service delivery on child mortality and maternal perinatal mortality. The authors used the 
availability of Diphtheria–Pertussis–Tetanus (DPT) vaccines (against diphtheria, whooping cough and 
tetanus), deliveries supervised by trained Traditional Birth Assistants, as indicators of the district health 
centres’ general quali y of service de ivery, and they discovered a significant impact: one standard dev i-
ation more of DPT stocks p r ca ita is associated with a 17% drop in chil  mortality (per patient). The 
impact of supervised deliveries is even higher, with a fall of 25%. The significant coefficients for the 
number of patients per capita shows that the outreach of health centres matters: the more the health 
centres are used, measured in terms of the number of patients per capita, the greater the drop in child 
mortality per treated patient. This impact suggests that the facilities have become more accessible. The 
authors found a similar pattern in maternal deaths. Stocks of ntibiotics have a strongly negative impact 
on maternal deaths: one standard deviation more of stocks per capita reduces mortality by 
50%.).(Between high expectations and reality: An evaluation of budget support in Zambia (2009) p.166.) 
To protect the vulnerable, government formulated an exemption policy based on demographic, age and 
disease-based characteristics as criteria in providing exemptions. Children under the age of five and 
adults ove  th  age of 65 were to be treated free of charge. Patients with chronic illnesses such as TB, 
STDs and those affected by epidemics such as cholera were to be exempted from paying user-fees. In 
addition, those in need of obstetrics and family planning services were equally exempted from paying 
fees. The implementation of the exemption policy has been poor due to knowledge gaps in both con-
sumers and the providers of health care services. As stated above, user fees were removed from rural 
and peri-urban based districts as a form of resource mobilisation. This measure went almost concurrent-
ly with the dissolution of the health boards. (MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 
2009). 
Although c re was taken, to capture all expenditures under disease specific accounts, it was difficult to 
isolate HIV/AIDS and TB related expenditures and vice versa. However, it is noted that about 70% of 
the TB patients in Zambia are also HIV positive while 40% of the HIV positive patients also have TB(..) 
Hous holds’ spend almost the same a ount of money on malaria s the government. Out-of pocket 
expenditures on malaria grew by 133% between 2003 and 2006 from K51.8 billion in 2003 to 
K120billion in 2006. The data in Table 43 below shows that 99% of the out-of pocket expenditures are 
channelled through the households themselves while the remaining 1% is handled by insurance com-
panies. (National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009, TB sub-account) 
The Social Welfare Department in the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, in part-
nership with the Department for International Development and the Germany Technical Aid to Zambia, 
has established a mechanism to provide foster-parent household allowances for orphans and vulnera-
ble children (OVC). This is being piloted in Southern and Eastern provinces. It involves cash transfers of 
40,000 to 50,000 Kwacha to vulnerable households. In Eastern Province the sup- port is from UNDP in 
form of a soft loan of 500,000 Kwacha for income generation activities. The results of these initiatives 
are yet to be disseminated (DFID, 2005). In addition, the introduction of community schools has been a 
mitigating strategy for OVCs affected by HIV and AIDS. In 2002 alone, the Ministry of Education record-
ed in excess of 176,629 OVCs as having enrolled in community schools. (ZHDR 2007: Enhancing 
household capacity to respond to HIV and AIDS) 
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 Indicator 5.4.4: Increased financial accessibility of secondary health care to HIV infected 
patients  
In 2003, households were the major financing source of HIV/AIDS inpatient care with about 63% of total 
HIV/AIDS inpatient health expenditures. Since 2003 HIV infected patients have a free access to ARV as 
well as TB treatment
64
. However, Households still continue to be the second largest source of HIV/AIDS 
health expenditures although their share declined from 19.7% in 2003 to 13.9% in 2006.  
However the provision of free ART to HIV/AIDS positive individuals contributed to a sharp decrease of 
household expenditure on HIV/ hence reducing the frequency of HIV/AIDS opportunistic infections 
among PLWHA. 
However The distribution of remaining HIV/AIDS expenditures by function indicates that most resources 
are still consumed for curative care and Outpatient treatment of Opportunistic infections and provision of 
ARVs consumed a larger proportion of the expenditures than inpatient care for HIV/AIDS. With the ref-
erence of the largely underfinanced TB program, this raises the issue of the sustainability of ART treat-
ments in the hypothesis of a withdrawal of the large bilateral current funding programs. 
Data, figures, tables: 
Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006 (March 2009): HIV/AIDS sub-account 
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 70% of the TB patients in Zambia are also HIV positive while 40% of the HIV positive patients also have TB 
63 
 
Households and USG AND PEPFAR.   HIV/AIDS prevention and public health services 
were mainly funded by all Rest of the World (excluding USAID and Global Fund) 
estimated at 45.2%. Global Fund came second at 38% of the total HIV/AIDS prevention 
and public health services. 
 
Figure 15: Sources of funds for HIV/AIDS health functions,: 2003 
 
 
 
Figure 16  shows that in 2005 households were the major financing source of HIV/AIDS 
inpatient care at estimated at 75.3% of total HIV/AIDS health expenditures. Ministry of 
Finance came second at 13.7% of total HIV/AIDS health expenditures. Global Fund and 
Employers came third and fourth at 6.0% and 5.0% respectively. When it came to 
outpatient treatment services for HIV/AIDS, USAID was the major financing source 
contributing almost half of the total HIV/AIDS health expenditures for outpatient 
services. These expenditures by USAID were mainly incurred on procurement and 
distribution of ARVs among others. Government (MoFNP) came second at 18.9% and 
Global Fund came third at 15.8% of the total HIV/AIDS health expenditures for 
outpatient treatment. HIV/AIDS prevention and public health services were mainly 
funded by all Rest of the World (excluding USAID and Global Fund) estimated at 50.2%. 
Global Fund came second at 27.6% of the total HIV/AIDS prevention and public health 
services. 
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Extracts: 
During 2003, households were the major financing source of HIV/AIDS inpatient care. They spent at 
about 63% of total HIV/AIDS inpatient health expenditures. Households were followed by the Ministry of 
Finance came second at 23% of total HIV/AIDS health expenditures. Global Funds came third at 12%. 
MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009. 
In terms of households, their contribution in absolute terms has continued to increase although their 
share in total HIV/AIDS spending has reduced by 6 percentage points from 20% to 14% probably due to 
increased donor inflow and introduction of free ART. This level of expenditure by households remains 
high considering that almost two-thirds of the population lives on less than US$1 a day. There is need to 
mobilise extra resources to cushion households against catastrophic expenditure on health. (..) 
Households have continued to be the second largest source of HIV/AIDS health expenditures although 
their share declined from 19.7% in 2003 to 16% in 2005 and 13.9% in 2006. The fall in household ex-
penditure on HIV/AIDS is attributed to the commencement of the provision of free ART to HIV/AIDS 
positive individuals hence reducing the frequency of HIV/AIDS opportunistic infections among PLWHA. 
(MoH Zambia National Health Accounts 2003-2006, March 2009) 
In 2003, the Government launched its national policy of providing free and universal access to anti-
retroviral therapy, which was expanded in 2005 to include all anti-retroviral therapy related services. By 
the end of 2005, an estimated 43,000 persons living with HIV and AIDS, out of an estimated 200,000 
persons requiring treatment, were on anti- retroviral therapy.” (Zambia Fifth National Development Plan 
FNDP (2006-2010): 32 HIV and AIDS, page 268) 
JC 5.4:  EU support contributed to increased affordability of health care 
The indicators under this judgement criterion attempt to collect elements for assessing the specific im-
pact of the EC support on health in terms of increased affordability of Health Care. 
Over the period 1995-2008, the total health expenditure has been representing a share below 10% of 
GDP. However, as the domestic wealth substantially improved on the same time, the total expenditure 
per capita doubled in purchasing power parity (I-5.4.1). 
According to the Basic Health Care package (BHCP) developed by the government in April 2006, in an 
effort strengthen existing operational systems, financing mechanisms and governance arrangements for 
efficient and effective delivery of health services formulated in the National Health priorities, the gov-
ernment abolished the user fees for primary health care (including drugs). Most of the MoH resources 
are spent on primary health care at district and health centre levels, a commitment that is in line with 
government policy to provide health care as close to the family as possible. But the total Health ex-
penditures which were estimated at US$9.49 per capita in 2008 are still below threshold the US$17.06 
per capita estimated in BHCP  
This effort should have increased the financial accessibility of health care: it did as health expenditure 
incurred by the households in the public health facilities or missions represent 5% and 1% respectively 
of their total expenditure. In ensuring timely disbursements EC financial contribution within budget sup-
port certainly contributed to financing this scheme, at least until 2009 BS suspension related to financial 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 136 - 
governance issues.  
But Besides the Government strong involvement supported by other donors as well
65
 a substantial con-
tribution remains from the private expenditure: NGOs, come first with a 5-fold increase of expenditure in 
real terms, followed by household which expenditure increased by 30% in real terms in the period 1995-
2008. Households account for nearly half of all curative care spending, whereas their contribution to 
insurance scheme appears to play a marginal part with only 1% of their total health expenditure (I-
5.4.1). Over the long period of the successive National Health accounts performed in the country, 
household expenditure has been steadily consisting of out-pocket expenditure for private for-profit 
healthcare providers including traditional health practitioners, private hospitals and clinics as well as 
drugs supply. (I-5.4.2).  
The specific efforts made in direction of the most vulnerable groups, especially HIV infected patients (I-
5.4.4) do contribute to ease the financial burden related to a chronically need of health care. But the 
exemptions granted to selected target groups such as children under the age of five, adults over the age 
of 65, patients with chronic illnesses such as TB or STDs, patients affected by epidemics or needing 
women for obstetrics and family planning services do not protect household from bearing a significant 
part of the financial charge for their care (I-5.4.3).  
The provision of free ART helped decreasing the household expenditure on health, which increased 
proportionally the cost of care for opportunistic infections among PLWHA, whereas the sustainability of 
ART financing remains as a sword of Damocles (I-5.4.4) 
As a conclusion to these developments, EC support to financing of the BHCP contributed to increase 
the affordability of health care. But we are now at a turning point and EU needs to consider in its future 
commitments the changes in the patients expenditure patterns, especially their increased preference to 
for health products or services from private suppliers.  
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  further detailed with the JC 5.3 
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EQ6:  To what extent have EU interventions contributed to enhance democratic 
governance? 
JC 6.1:  The legal and regulatory framework for civil society is conducive to CSOs involvement in 
policy processes 
JC 6.2:  The presence and interface of CSOs with the population and the government is ensured 
JC 6.3:  CSOs become sustainable entities operating in all relevant policy areas and in complemen-
tarity with other NSAs 
JC 6.4:  The EU support has contributed to that the electoral process was transparent and well or-
ganised 
JC 6.5:  The EU has ensured the overall coherence of its interventions for reinforcing civil society 
capacity in relation to governance processes 
JC 6.6:  Cross-cutting issues advocacy and implementation are supported by CSOs supported by the 
EU 
 
Support : Portfolio Analysis of EU Grant Contracts Funding of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in 
Zambia (2001-2010) 
 
JC 6.1: The legal and regulatory framework for civil society is conducive to CSOs involvement 
in policy processes 
 Indicator 6.1.1: Positive change in the legal framework for civil society organisations 
(CSOs) over the period 
Most of the Zambian Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are governed at present under the Societies or 
Associations Act, the Companies Act, Trustees Act or other legislation, so not thoroughly adapted to the 
specific situation, needs and characteristics of Civil Society Organisations. On 26th August 2009, the 
Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Act was enacted into Law, but its implementing rules and regu-
lations have not been issued yet. The purpose of the Act is to co-ordinate and register all NGOs (na-
tional and international) to enhance their transparency, accountability and performance. The Act how-
ever is contested as many NGOs see it as a threat to their independence since the regulatory power is 
concentrated in the executive branch (through the Ministry of Community Development and Social Wel-
fare – MCDSW, now renamed into the Ministry of Community Development and Mother and Child 
Health). Another controversial issue is the selection and appointment of Board Members and members 
to the joint working group to work on aspects of the implementation of the Act. Another source of dissat-
isfaction is that currently this NGO Act No. 16 does not apply to as series of CSOs (e.g. professional 
groups or organisations, trade unions, churches, clubs and religious organisations) requiring a further 
revisiting of the act based on a commonly agreed upon definition and classification of civil society or-
ganisation recognized as such. In short, the legal framework for CSOs has changed over the period, 
but the appreciation of this change can only be described as mixed at best. As a result, there still is no 
conducive legal enabling environment and framework for institutionalised participation of civil society in 
national development policies and strategies in Zambia. One cannot but conclude that space still largely 
depends on government “good will” and “donor pressure. It however is also noted that with the new 
government in power since September 2011, there generally is a relative optimism with the CSOs of an 
improved openness and their positive recognition as partners in development.
66
 Although not an explicit 
area of intervention, the EC has been indirectly supporting such positive change in the legal framework 
for CSOs and their Apex structures through the GBS policy dialogue and capacity strengthening com-
ponents which cover the non-government sector as a matter of principle. An EU commissioned institu-
tional analysis of Non-State Actors in Zambia of February 2006 argued that given its strategic im-
portance, CSOs not only should take a proactive role, with the support of the donor community, to influ-
ence the shape of the NGO bill, but also for them to build up a consensus on the necessary governance 
and self-regulation mechanisms (mainly a Code of Conduct and a self regulatory council) in order to be 
in a position to guide the discussion vis-à-vis the government and donors. 
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  As for example surfaced from the CSOs focus group discussion organised in the framework of this evaluation on 14 De-
cember 2012 and from the interviews with other key stakeholders including Cooperating Partners. 
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Extracts: 
EU Delegation (EUD) NSO file (2011) “Subject: Information on NGO Act Implementation – Joint Work-
ing Group, by AAIZ dated 01 March 2011: The meeting that was supposed to have been held on the 
18th February 2011 to update you on the discussions between our committee on the NGO Act and the 
Ministry of Community Development did not take place. The committee has met once more after that 
and below is a brief update on what has been going on. The Ministry of Community Development and 
Social Services (MCDSS) were agreeable to our representatives and the Ministry’s representatives 
forming a joint working group to work on aspects of the implementation of the Act. The main mandate of 
this working group will be to develop a roadmap and build consensus on the process, timing and modal-
ities for the implementation of the NGO Act. Particular aspects that will be looked at are the NGO Act 
itself, the setting up of the Council, the holding of the Congress and the work to be done by the NGO 
Department of the Ministry. A draft TOR for the group was drawn up by the Ministry and the Committee 
commented on it and has since responded to the Ministry. As of now, we are not sure if they are agree-
able to some of the suggested changes that were proposed on the TORs. The six representatives from 
the NGOs are : 
(i) Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) 
(ii) Non-Governmental Organisations’ Coordinating Council (NGOCC) 
(iii)  ActionAid International Zambia (AAIZ) 
(iv)  Zambia Civic Education Association (ZCEA) 
(v) Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) 
(vi) Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD)” 
EUD Note to the File, 24 Aug. 11: “Interim Board to be launched but CSOs decide not to take part 
since not agreeable to appointments to the Board.”  
“Since 1996, the Zambian government has been trying to introduce legislation to govern NGO opera-
tions in the country. In 2007, a draft NGO bill was presented to Parliament for debate, but it was even-
tually withdrawn in the face of criticism from different sections of society. Critics argued that government 
was trying to constrain and limit the space for civil society operations in the country by tightening rules 
regarding the registration, management and operation of NGOs (Mumba, 2010). The bill was eventually 
passed in 2009. 
In certain instances CSOs have cooperated with the government and they have participated in im-
portant national policy processes. More often than not, however, the government has been mandated 
by the donor community to engage civil society in government policy processes, and government actors 
have very mixed feelings about the outcomes. Sometimes CSOs are just used to rubberstamp govern-
ment policy decisions. Nevertheless, civil society umbrella organisations and consultation forums have 
influenced national policy processes such as the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evalua-
tion of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). They have participated in Sector Advisory 
Groups (SAGs) and the formulation of the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) and the Vision 2030 
12 (Mutesa, 2006). Some have been involved in the national constitutional amendment processes. 
Currently the NGO Act No. 16 of 2009 does not apply to churches, clubs, professional groups or organ-
isations, trade unions and religious organisations. As such there is need for further revision of the Act in 
order to accommodate the types of CSOs which are not covered.” ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011) p33: 
Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia - The Status of Civil Society in Zambia: Chal-
lenges and Future Prospects. 
Talking notes on the implementation of the NGO Act: “On 28th January the Ministry called Civil 
Society Organisations to a meeting to brief them on the status of the implementation of the NGO Act. At 
this meeting the CSOs were requested to select among themselves six representatives to serve on the 
Technical Working Group.” Working Group created on 3 March 2011 with three subcommittees: Opera-
tions and Mapping, Legal framework, and Council and Congress organisation.” Ministry of Community 
Development and Social Services (2011);  
Democratisation, State and Civil Society – Good Governance Programme (2011) pp 3-4: “Most of 
the Zambian CSOs are governed at present under the Societies or Associations Act, the Companies 
Act, Trustees Act or other legislation.”  
EU    saka; “Ra io a e  or EDF10 NSAs capacity building project in Zambia”;    er a  No e; 
2011: “(2) Relations between the Government (GRZ) and NSA are not always easy. GRZ sees an add-
ed value of NSA engagement mainly in providing services in line with the National Development Plans. 
NGOs focusing on Advocacy Work are finding it more difficult to have their contributions being recog-
nised as useful towards achieving poverty reduction goals. In 2007 GRZ has issued an 'NGO-Act', 
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which GRZ sees as a means to bring about urgently required improvements of transparency and ac-
countability and many NGOs as a threat to their independence. To facilitate the implementation of the 
NGO act, GRZ had established a participatory board to oversee the process. For several months a 
window of improved cooperation between the Ministry in charge (MCDSS) and several NSAs seemed 
to have opened. However, in mid-2011 differences of views caused several NSAs to withdraw from the 
board.”  
AFN (2010) – Posting of 17 May 2010 on the NGO Act; “Until recently, non-governmental organisa-
tions (“NGOs”) in Zambia were largely unregulated and could operate freely as long as they had some 
form of registration, normally under the Societies Act. This has however changed with enactment into 
law of the Non-Governmental Organisation Act, 2009 (the “Act”). The Act was assented to on 26th Au-
gust 2009 but has not yet come into force. The purpose of the Act is to co-ordinate and register and to 
enhance the transparency, accountability and performance of NGOs. “NGO” is defined to mean a pr i-
vate voluntary grouping of individuals or associations, whether corporate or unincorporated, not estab-
lished or operated for profit, partisan politics or any commercial purposes, and who have organized 
themselves for the promotion of civic education, advocacy, human rights, social welfare, development, 
charity, research or other activity for the benefit or interest of the public, through resources mobilised 
from sources within or outside Zambia. 
The Act requires all NGOs as well as international NGOs operating in Zambia to be registered in ac-
cordance with the Act. An NGO is required to apply to the Registrar of NGOs for registration within 30 
days of its formation. The Minister has powers to exempt any NGO from registration. 
The Act requires any NGO registered under the Societies Act or any other written law to within 90 days 
or such extended period as the Minister may allow for the registration of the NGO apply for a certificate. 
An NGO shall not be deemed unlawful until the period or extended period for registration has lapsed. 
The Act establishes the NGO Board (the “Board”) which shall consist of 15 part time members appoint-
ed by the Minister. 
STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p11; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; Chap-
ter 3.1 Analysis of the Existing Legal Context: The efforts of the 1990s reached a dead-end when 
NGOs objected vehemently to the draft NGO Bill prepared by government, which they felt did not reflect 
what was agreed upon during the consultative process and was basically going to fetter their opera-
tions. Not surprisingly, the process stalled and was only revived in 2005 when government invited 
NGOs to make contributions to the preparation of an NGO draft bill. Although nothing is yet in place, 
NGOs have seized the initiative to prepare an elaborate code of conduct to promote self-regulation. The 
draft NGO code of conduct is a product of the collaborative efforts of ten NGOs, with the Zambia Coun-
cil for Social Development (ZCSD) providing the secretariat.  
STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p30; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; Chap-
ter 4.1.1 CSOs Participation at National Level – Main Challenges: There are various challenges that 
civil society has faced in terms of participating in policy development at the national level: There is no 
framework for institutionalised participation of civil society in national development policies in Zambia. 
One cannot but conclude that space largely depends on government “good will” and “donor pressure”. 
The latter poses a question around ‘genuine or forced” space for civil society. 
 Indicator 6.1.2: Trends (amount, distribution by CSOs or themes) in public subsidies for 
CSOs 
With the partial and scattered registration of CSOs, it is difficult to ascertain the amount, distribution and 
trends in public subsidies for CSOs. In fact no data are available in the consulted documentation and 
EUD also indicated not have information on this item at hand. The Department of Registrar for Non 
Governmental Organisations in the Ministry of Community Development and Mother and Child Health 
indicated not to have statistics and other detailed information on the number of CSOs.
67
 Consensus has 
been growing that the definition of CSOs needs to be broad based, encompassing all types of organisa-
tions / entities which are non-government / non-state. Relations between the Government (GRZ) and 
CSOs have not always been always easy. GRZ sees an added value of CSO engagement mainly in 
providing services in line with the National Development Plans. CSOs focusing on advocacy work are 
finding it more difficult to have their contributions being recognised as useful towards achieving poverty 
reduction goals. To date, no legislation for state funding to CSOs is existent. In addition to the CSOs 
strengthening project programmed under EDF9 (budget 5m €, but cancelled in the process), it is not 
easy to quantify or assess the additional EC resources in support of CSOs under the CSPs/NIPs since 
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  A rough estimate is 20.000 CSOs at present. A December 2004 registered count showed 11,096 NGOs and 13,924 reli-
gious organisations. 
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these are incorporated in the overall GBS or SBS envelopes.  
A CRIS database search based on contracts extended to CSOs in the period 2001-2010 enabled a 
detailed portfolio analysis
68
 of EU funding of Civil Society Organisations over this ten year period. A 
total of 85 grant contracts have been awarded to CSOs in Zambia in this period with a total value of 68 
million Euro (a total of 129 grant contracts where approved but of these 44 have been cancelled for one 
reason or another, representing 34.1% of total committed resources cancelled in the process). There 
generally is a growing annual trend in EU CSOs funding over the ten year period both in number and 
total value of grant contracts, with a stabilisation (slight decrease) in the later years. One third (33.3%) 
of CSO’s financing comes from EDF resources but the largest CSOs funding comes from the EU verti-
cal thematic programmes / budget lines (65.5% of the total – particularly from the NSA-LG programme 
and the food security programme) with one contract financed from the sugar protocol. All contracts 
awarded up to the end of 2004 have been fully paid and are closed. From 2005 onwards, increasing 
amounts are still due for payment and contracts still ongoing, not yet closed. The largest sectors / the-
matic areas of EU support to CSOs are agriculture and food security (13m Euro or 19.3% of the total), 
relatively closely followed by health (incl. HIV/AIDS and nutrition – 17.0%) and governance with 14.5%). 
Emergency / humanitarian aid (11.1%), water and sanitation (8.6%), education and training (6.0%) and 
livelihood, poverty alleviation and IGPs (5.1%) take intermediate positions. Under the Access to Justice 
Project, the Governance Secretariat (under the Ministry of Justice) initially was a conduit for CSOs fi-
nancing (both institutional and project-related) based on a call for proposals modality. A 2010 study 
identified core funding as the most popular funding modality amongst CSOs in Zambia. Also, direct 
support is preferred to support via intermediaries, and only donors favour joint support models. CSOs 
and particularly national CSOs prefer unilateral funding. 
Data, figures, tables: 
See Figure 4: Total annual contract value of EU grants to Civil Society Organisations in Zambia, peri-
od 2001-2010 (in Euro) 
 ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011) p33: Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia – Chap-
ter 3 – Mapping Civil Society 
Table II.3.1: List of types of CSOs in Zambia Faith-based organisations  
o Trade unions  
o Women’s organisations  
o Student or youth organisations  
o Developmental CSOs (for example, NGOs working on literacy, health, or social services)  
o Advocacy CSOs (civic action, social justice, human rights or consumers‟ groups)  
o CSOs active in research, information dissemination, education and training (think tanks, re-
source centres, non-profit schools)  
o Non-profit media groups  
o Associations of socio-economically marginalised groups (poor people, homeless, landless, 
immigrants, refugees)  
o Social service and health associations (charities raising funds for health research and ser-
vices, mental health associations, associations of people with physical disabilities)  
o Other fund-raising bodies and organisations  
o Professional and business organisations (chambers of commerce, professional associations)  
o Community organisations (village associations, neighbourhood committees)  
o Community-level groups or associations (burial societies, self-help groups, parents‟ associa-
tions, village associations, indigenous peoples‟ associations, monasteries, and mosque-
based associations)  
o Economic interest organisations (cooperatives, credit unions, mutual saving associations, 
agriculture)  
o Ethnic, traditional or indigenous associations or organisations  
o Environmental organisations  
o Culture, arts and social and recreational organisations  
o CSO networks, federations, support organisations  
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  See the chapter on “Portfolio Analysis of EU Funding of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Interventions in Zambia in the 
Period 2001-2010”at the end of this information matrix on EQ-6 Democratic Governance. 
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Extracts: 
 EUD e-mail (06 Oct 2011): “Unfortunately, we do not have information on indicator 1.2 at hand.” 
 Democratisation, State and Civil Society – Good Governance Programme (2011) pp 3-4: The 
government of Zambia does not co-fund the work of civil society. Yet, in cases where cooperating 
partners make specific budget ceilings for certain sector initiatives such as HIV/Aids, environment or 
rural development available, government institutions are involved. To date no legislation for state 
funding to CSOs is existent. Regardless of the contribution of civil society to national development 
government has not yet come out with a policy which guides and supports civil society. Contrary, 
regulation seems to aim at restricting CSOs to service delivery, charity and welfare. A national civil 
society policy would outline the scope of both partners in national development and establish the 
frame for dialogue and constructive relations. Such a policy would allow to establishing state – non-
state relations through the national budget in a careful manner that does not allow CSOs to be co-
opted by government. 
 ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011) - Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia - The Status 
of Civil Society in Zambia: Challenges and Future Prospects;  
 Africa Legal Network (2010) - New Law to Regulate NGOs in Zambia; Legal Notes Series; Posted 
17 May 2010 
Until recently, non-governmental organisations (“NGOs”) in Zambia were largely unregulated and 
could operate freely as long as they had some form of registration, normally under the Societies Act. 
This has however changed with enactment into law of the Non-Governmental Organisation Act, 2009 
(the “Act”). The Act was assented to on 26th August 2009 but has not yet come into force. 
The purpose of the Act is to co-ordinate and register and to enhance the transparency, accountability 
and performance of NGOs. “NGO” is defined to mean a private voluntary grouping of individuals or 
associations, whether corporate or unincorporated, not established or operated for profit, partisan 
politics or any commercial purposes, and who have organized themselves for the promotion of civic 
education, advocacy, human rights, social welfare, development, charity, research or other activity 
for the benefit or interest of the public, through resources mobilised from sources within or outside 
Zambia. 
The Act requires all NGOs as well as international NGOs operating in Zambia to be registered in ac-
cordance with the Act. An NGO is required to apply to the Registrar of NGOs for registration within 
30 days of its formation. The Minister has powers to exempt any NGO from registration. 
The Act requires any NGO registered under the Societies Act or any other written law to within 90 
days or such extended period as the Minister may allow for the registration of the NGO apply for a 
certificate. An NGO shall not be deemed unlawful until the period or extended period for registration 
has lapsed. 
The Act establishes the NGO Board (the “Board”) which shall consist of 15 part time members ap-
pointed by the Minister. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on I-6.1.2: 
 STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p11; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 1.2.2: The working definition of the term “civil society”: According to this working approach, 
civil society is constituted by the array of collective actors operating at local, regional, national and/or 
international level, and which are oriented towards social responsibility. As such, they experiment 
and deliberately act in favour of the social, economic and cultural development of their territory for 
the benefit of the community, often through the production of goods and/or services of public interest. 
 STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p11; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 1.2.2: Categorisation of CSOs: Whereas in the past, development agendas used to be “mo-
nopolised” by traditional development NGOs, recent years have witnessed an increasing important 
role of a wider and more complex spectrum of organisations and constituencies within global, na-
tional and local civil society. Cooperation and the development agenda has thus opened up to alter-
native forms of civil society organisations, which are traditionally excluded from national debates. 
This is the case of trade unions, popular movements, farmers’ organisations, locally elected govern-
ments, etc. Box 3 below outlines the various types of civil society organisations active in developing 
countries, although there is no one accepted definition of the various types. The categorisation has 
been drawn up in order to specify whether the organisations work for themselves or for others, to in-
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dicate the degree of popular legitimacy, and also to demonstrate whether the organisations operate 
at national or local level. These types of civil society organisations in development countries cover: 
(i) Non-Governmental Organisations – NGOs; (ii) Popular and grass roots organisations; (iii) Church 
and other faith-based organisations; (iv) Traditional organisations, (v) Cultural organisations; (vi) Pro-
fessional groupings and organisations (membership based organisations, created to represent and 
defend the professional interests of their members), and; (vii) Other. 
 STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p23; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 1.2.2: Categorisation of CSOs: As at December 2004 there were 33 political parties, 11,096 
NGOs and 13,924 religious organisations as reflected in the Registrar of Societies Annual Report for 
2004. There were also 41 trade unions registered with the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. 
From the information given above it is very clear that there are many Non-State Actors in the coun-
try. Even with this large number of actors, there is insufficient information on quite a number of them. 
 STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p30; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 4.1.1 CSOs Participation at National Level – Main Challenges: There are various challenges 
that civil society has faced in terms of participating in policy development at the national level: De-
spite the amount of input provided by civil society, the government does not provide any resources to 
non-state actor engagement in national development policy. Complete reliance on donor good will for 
resources to engage in the PRSP and NDP can be challenging and unpredictable; 
 Embassy of Sweden (2010) p6; Implementation of the Nordic+ Conclusions on Civil Society Sup-
port; Chapter 3.1 Results on Funding Modalities: The Zambia study supports the Nordic+ guidelines 
in so far as to identify core funding as the most popular funding modality. Respondents in Zambia 
however rate direct support before support via intermediaries, and only donors favour joint support 
models. CSOs and particularly NCSOs prefer unilateral funding. 
 Scanteam (2007) pp. 8&10; Chapter 3: Support to Civil Society in Zambia – 3.2 Support Models to 
CSOs in Use: All of the Nordic+ donors use the three main categories of support models that the 
survey team prepared before going to the field. This typology was based on the previous studies that 
form the foundation for this study (see the Terms of Reference). The three categories are (i) unilat-
eral direct support, (ii) support through an intermediary, and (iii) joint funding models3. Support can 
be given as core funding to the organisations or to specific projects… 
3.2.4. Summing up on models: The pre-definition of the model universe seems to have been relative-
ly accurate. All of the donors felt comfortable using the models and their sub‐categories to classify 
their support to CSOs. All of the Nordic+ donors state that they are definitely moving towards a more 
harmonised and joint approach to civil society support. This change is not driven by stated civil so-
ciety preferences, nor by explicitly stated donor objectives for support to civil society since the latter 
in general are not that specific. The main driving force seems to be a HO need for cost- efficiency 
and reduced costs at Embassies and agencies. For sectors that are non‐controversial both for civil 
society and donors, various forms of joint support is already dominant. Unilateral direct support is still 
used, but often to fund organisations that have a political mandate of some sort, or carry out advoca-
cy activities that challenge government actions or policies. The donor’s need for better information 
and closer dialogue with the CSO in question is obvious, since the donors are also running a risk, 
and hence the additional direct costs seem to be accepted. 
 Scanteam (2007) pp. 13-14; Chapter 3: Support to Civil Society in Zambia – 3.5.1: Partners’ Views 
of Each Other – CSO Views:  
CSOs interviewed had generally a less benign view of the process and situation. They agree that the 
last three years have seen a distinct shift towards harmonisation of civil society support. But this has 
led to less general dialogue and consultation with CSOs. Donors have instead focused their interac-
tion on fewer CSOs, in particular larger and better known ones, and network or apex organisations. 
This means that both information and funding is channelled through a reduced number of CSOs, vir-
tually all based in Lusaka. 
The pooling of funding is viewed with mixed feelings. It is clear that the reporting on both use of 
funds and results achieved is now streamlined, and therefore appears less costly to all parties. CSOs 
now only have to provide one consolidated statement to the focal donor, who then distributes this to 
the other donors supporting that particular pool. CSOs were also concerned about the joint decision 
making in joint or basket funding, because a conflict or misunderstanding with one donor could result 
in loss of funding – in practice losing the support from all the donors in that basket. Joint funding is 
seen to be better geared to help organisations pursue strategic objectives that are consistent with 
their mandates. A joint fund is more strategic and targeting annual plans, so it is experienced as be-
ing more stable and predictable over the medium term. 
But there is a general feeling that overall funding to civil society has been reduced. There are two 
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sets of exceptions. In the first place, priority sectors like HIV/Aids and those focusing on poverty re-
duction have seen an increase in their funding. The other exception is some of the larger, more pro-
fessional organisations that are able to attract more funding. This overall reduction in funding is in 
part attributed to increased pooling to the public sector. But it may also be that CSOs that are sup-
ported under a joint fund become less visible and thus have less ability to argue for and make clear 
their needs and results. The increased attention to accountability, on the other hand, has led to in-
creased demands on CSOs administration. While the number of reports is reduced, the demands on 
quality and comprehensiveness of reporting have increased, so the overall burden may be greater. 
The joint support modalities, either through intermediaries or pooled funding, have also tended to in-
crease the share of funding that is for activities/projects. This is in line with the increased attention to 
results, where funding is more targeted in order to produce measurable results. This has led to less 
core funding and less support for capacity building and other forms of non‐financial support. CSOs 
find themselves having to operate more as commercial entities, competing for funds on efficiency 
grounds. Project funding carries a component of administrative financing that usually ranges from 5 
to 20% of total costs, which most organisations view as inadequate. 
Figure 2 CP contributions 2009-2011  
+/- US$ 16m in total 
 
Figure 3 Breakdown of ZGF spend 
 
Source: Mid-Term Review of the Zambia Governance Foundation, May 2011, p3 
• The IDL Group (2011)
69
 pp 6-8; Mid-term Review of the Zambia Governance Foundation, Final 
Draft; May 2011 – Chapter 1. Background – ZGF financing of CSOs :The ZGF has issued two calls 
for proposals, inviting Zambian CSOs to apply for funding. The calls have not been restricted to a 
particular sector or theme – all Zambian organisations with an interest in policy are invited to apply. 
Institutional grants are roughly US$ 500,000, intended for well-established CSOs with a good policy 
track record, and administrative systems robust enough to make the most of core funding. Initiative 
grants are roughly US$80,000, and are tied to an agreed budget against specific ‘policy-related’ ac-
tivities. The ZGF’s total grant portfolio is 33 GPs – though a few more institutional GPs (Grant Part-
ner – ZDF grantee) may be added in April-May 2011, if individual CSO applicants are able to ad-
dress issues raised in the assessment process.
70
 One GP has received a rapid response grant, and 
several GPs have made use of the Foundation’s capacity development service. 
 Indicator 6.1.3: Evidence of involvement in GBS design 
In accordance with the prescribed EU procedures concerned, CSO’s are routinely invited to EDF pro-
gramming events including those related to the CSP/NIP, and thus in principle also are, directly or indi-
rectly, involved in aid modalities decision making processes, including those related to General Budget 
Support (GBS). A recent 2011 study by the Democratisation, State and Civil Society – Good Govern-
ance Programme on the other hand concluded that generally speaking CSOs are not integrated in 
Zambia’s aid architecture. They basically operate outside the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia 
(JASZ), the main Cooperating Partners’ (CPs) platform for policy dialogue and harmonizing aid flows 
with GRZ. Also a ZCSD/CIVICUS (2011) study came to more or less the same conclusion when exam-
ining the potential influence of CSOs in all stages of the budgeting process (from the drafting to the 
implementation stage). The Government’s policy is described as ambiguous with regard to the role of 
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  In view of the non approval of the originally foreseen EU supported CSOs capacity building project under EDF IX and its 
successor programme under EDF X still under preparation, some findings are presented here in relation to the CSO related 
JCs and Indicators under this EQ-6 as a kind of proxy indication, originating from the Mid-Term Review of the Zambia Gov-
ernance Foundation which is supported by a number of European Union Member States and with the EU as observer. 
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 Four more GPs were approved in late April 2011. 
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civil society: It does provide an opportunity to civil society to submit proposals but it is not obliged to 
take these CSOs submissions into account. 
Extracts: 
 EDF10 - CSP/NIP 2008-2013: EDF10 programming – Meeting with CSOs (3 August 2006), main 
conclusions: In relation to budget support and the national budget, CSOs indicated that under the 
PRSP, the PRSP policies and priorities were not reflected and translated into to the annual budget, 
and that this is an essential problem to avoid under the FNDP… CSOs also raised the question of 
the statistical information systems in health (HMIS) and education (EMIS) funded under the EDF9. It 
is useful to have this information, but what is happening after? … The perspectives considered for 
the road transport sector under the EDF10 were also examined. Why the road Luangawa Bridge- 
Chipata is taken into account?  
 ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011) pp 74-76: Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia – 
Chapter 3 – Mapping Civil Society Case study 3 : An Assessment of Civil Society Impact on the Na-
tional Budgeting Process in Zambia 
The aim of the study was to assess the impact of civil society on the national budgeting process in 
Zambia. It examined the potential influence of CSOs in all stages of the budgeting process, from the 
drafting stage through to the implementation stage, and it also examined whether governments actu-
ally take these interventions and influences seriously. At this point, it suffices to mention that the 
Zambian government policy is said to be ambiguous on the role of the civil society in the budgetary 
process. Mudenda, Ndulo and Wakumelo, (2005) pointed out that government does provide an op-
portunity to civil society to submit proposals to the budget, but it is not obliged to take CSOs submis-
sions into account. CSOs also lack information on the processes and capacity to effectively interact 
with the public institutions, in order for them to make meaningful submissions. The study highlighted 
both the opportunities and challenges CSOs face in their endeavour to influence important national 
programmes such as the budget. The findings of the study will therefore enable the stakeholders in 
issues of public policy to see the need for the development of a legal and policy framework for civil 
society participation in the budget process and other national programmes. This will help to clarify 
the extent of civil society’s role in the in the national programmes budget process inclusive and how 
they can participate meaningfully. 
 Democratisation, State and Civil Society – Good Governance Programme (2011), pp 6-7 : 
CSOs are not included in the Zambian aid architecture (hence also not in GBS design) 
CSOs are not integrated in Zambia’s aid architecture. They operate outside the JASZ. Little infor-
mation is available on aid flows and modes of operation. This grey area or even black box is a cause 
for concern in relation to government’s efforts to regulate national and international CSOs. The lack 
of disclosure of programmatic and financial information may fuel the observed criticism that govern-
ment expresses against civil society’s engagement in advocacy. Another concern is the value based 
and one might even say ideological orientation of some ICSOs as is e.g. manifested in the distribu-
tion of print material to print material to national CSOs. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on JC 6.1.: 
CSOs (2011); Letter (draft) by a group of CSO umbrella organisations (TIZ, AAZ, NGOCC and ZCSD) 
to the Minister of Community Development, Mother and Child Care; Appeal for Review / Repeal of 
NGO Act No 16/2009; Lusaka, 21 October 2011 - We the undersigned Non Governmental Organisa-
tions (NGOs) acting for and on behalf of our constituent NGOs and Community Based Organisations 
(CBOs) members in Zambia and being CSO representatives of the working group / interim board of 
the NGO Act, would like to take this opportunity to engage with the PF government, in particular with 
your Ministry, on the NGO Act No 16/2009, a law that we in civil society consider redundant and that 
your government has made a commitment to revisit… …, we wish to urge your good office to repeal 
the Non Governmental Organisations’ Act No. 16 of 2009. This is because the law is obnoxious to the 
operations of the NGOs in Zambia and was obviously enacted in bad faith and with intent to make the 
operating environment of certain vocal and genuine NGOs difficult. We say this because the fact on 
the ground is that even before 2009 (when the NGO Act was hurriedly promulgated), NGOs had not 
been operating in a vacuum as they had always been registered under Zambian specific laws which 
imposed Certain specific obligations. It also ought to be stated from the onset that Zambian NGOs are 
not opposed to having a specific legislation for the regulation of NGOs, provided such legislation is 
aimed at creating an enabling environment for the growth of NGOs. It is because of this willingness 
that we decided to engage with government to look at the best way forward in terms of legislation for 
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regulating NGOs… The arguments advanced for the enactment of this act include the need to protect 
public interest by ensuring that NGOs in Zambia operate in an accountable and transparent manner. 
We as NGOs welcome this rationale, but ... the act contains a number of problematic provisions 
whose net-effect would seriously limit the scope of NGOs’ operations in Zambia.  
Zambia Analysis (November 2011Edition) p21: “Post Election Analysis: A New Start: The Election 
in Charts - Women in Parliament 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of Community Development and Mother & Child Health – Department of Registrar for 
Non Governmental Organisations (2011); Interview 09 December 2011: 
- On statistics on CSOs: No data on CSOs available. 
- Definition of CSO is still a contentious issue.  
- Are presently excluded in accordance with the NGO Act provisions concerned: churches, 
church organisations, professional organisations, trade unions, employers organisations, 
amongst others. 
- Main overall /generic criterion for recognition and registration as CSO at present: provision of 
services to the general public (and thus not to own membership and/or affiliates only) 
- A classification of CSOs requires a mapping exercise first. 
- Two other registration processes for other types of Non-State Actors: (i) The registrar of socie-
ties is the Ministry of Home Affairs, (ii) PACRA, the Patents and Companies Registration Au-
thority is located in the Ministry of Commerce 
- MCDM&CH Department of Registrar has the LT objective / ambition of becoming a one-stop-
shop for all CSO related issues as far as the GRZ is concerned 
Scanteam (2007) pp. 4-5; Chapter 2 Civil Society in the National Context – 2.1. National CSO Policy 
and Regulation: To date
71
, Zambia has no comprehensive legislation that addresses the role of civil 
society. It is widely felt that the disparate pieces of legislation with a bearing on the operations of civil 
society are archaic and out of step with the needs of a democratic society. Although the right of asso-
ciation is guaranteed in Part III of the republican constitution, it is felt that several pieces of enabling 
legislation serve to undermine the enjoyment of this right. Cap 119 (1958), for example, is the princi-
pal legislation providing for the registration of societies. The same legislation also regulates the opera-
tions of political parties, which many activists do not consider to belong to civil society proper. The 
main objection to this law is that it accords excessive powers to the Minister of Home Affairs and the 
Registrar of Societies that are detrimental to the smooth operations of civil society. The minister, for 
example, can unilaterally decide to deregister an organisation without proffering any reasons. 
Section 4(1) of Cap 116 (1966) is of particular relevance to this study. This law requires that any or-
ganisation receiving assistance from a foreign government or agency must first get written approval 
from the President. In practice, this requirement has not been enforced, but it cannot be taken for 
granted that this will always be the case. The Public Order Act (1955), enacted to, among other 
things, regulate public processions, meetings and demonstrations, is widely considered retrogressive 
and incompatible with existence of a democratic society. 
                                               
71
  Attention: This is the status as of early 2007. The excerpt nevertheless is quoted in extensu here in view of its historic rele-
vance for the current evaluation covering the 10 year period 2001-2010 and also as illustration for the fact that issues tabled 
earlier in the period (and even before that in the nineties) are still valid / not addressed as of the present day. 
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In view of the above, there have been calls for comprehensive legislation addressing the role of civil 
society. In 1997 government tabled a draft NGO national policy and invited NGOs to contribute to 
drafting an NGO bill. But when government published the draft NGO bill, NGOs objected on the 
grounds that it did not reflect what was discussed, and that it was more tilted towards control rather 
than creating an enabling environment. As a result the process stalled and only resumed in 2005 
when government again invited NGOs to contribute to a draft NGO bill. The NGOs responded to this 
challenge by drafting their own code of conduct to promote self regulation. The Ministry of Community 
Development and Social Services as host ministry for civil society has been working with the Ministry 
of Justice to spearhead this process, but so far nothing conclusive has been accomplished. 
As indicated above, all organisations should be registered with the Registrar for Societies and there 
are formal requirements for registration and also for reporting and accounting to be followed. The 
Registrar cannot be said to have a good and updated overview of the CSO universe and it struggles 
to keep up to date with the formal requirements. It was said that the Registrar has more than 20,000 
organisations registered, which is a considerable over‐ estimate of the currently active CSOs in Zam-
bia. Legally some CSOs should be registered with relevant Councils or statutory bodies: youth organi-
sations need to register with the National Youth Development Council, organisations for the disabled 
with the Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities, and others with the Zambia Council for Social 
Development, though this is often not observed. 
All organisations wanting to register need a “letter of recommendation” from the relevant line ministry 
under which they would want to operate. This, and the fact that they have to report on annual returns, 
ensure accountability to a certain degree. In addition, CSOs also have to register with provincial sub-
offices of the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services in the regions in which they in-
tend to conduct work. 
STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p57; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; Chap-
ter 7: Conclusions and Critical Issues: A prerequisite for the ability of civil society organisations to play 
a role as an active and critical voice or development partner is that legislation and its enforcement se-
cure the rights of organisations to exist and to conduct their activities, whether in the social or the ad-
vocacy/governance sphere. This implies not only securing freedom of expression and assembly, the 
right to organise (even to demonstrate), etc. but also the appropriate formulation of a registration poli-
cy of voluntary organisations. Given its strategic importance, CSO should take a proactive role, with 
the support of the donor community, to influence the shape of the NGO bill. In addition, they need to 
build up a consensus on the necessary governance and self-regulation mechanisms (mainly a Code 
of Conduct an a self regulatory council) in order to be in a position to guide the discussion vis-à-vis 
the government and donors. 
 
JC 6.1:  The legal and regulatory framework for civil society is conducive to CSOs involvement 
in policy processes 
At present there is no conducive legal and regulatory enabling environment to maximize the potentials 
of Civil Society Organisations as development actors. CSOs are still governed under rules and regula-
tions which are not suitable for their needs and characteristics. The NGO Act No. 16 enacted into Law 
on 26 August 2009 is contested as it mainly concentrates on the obligation for CSO to register with the 
public authorities (MCDSW, now MCDMCH) and thus perceived by the CSOs as threatening their inde-
pendence, rather than effectively bringing about the intended enhanced transparency, accountability 
and performance. The restricted coverage of CSO types by the law (e.g. professional groups or organi-
sations, trade unions, churches, clubs and religious organisations are excluded) are another issue of 
contention, as is the composition of the Board and the Working Groups in charge of drafting the imple-
menting rules and regulations. An EU commissioned institutional analysis of Non-State Actors in Zam-
bia of February 2006 argued that given its strategic importance, CSOs not only should take a proactive 
role, with the support of the donor community, to influence the shape of the NGO bill, but also for them 
to build up a consensus on the necessary governance and self-regulation mechanisms (mainly a Code 
of Conduct and a self regulatory council) in order to be in a position to guide the discussion vis-à-vis the 
government and donors. (I-6.1.1) It should come as no surprise that in this context no or hardly any 
data are available on amounts, let alone trends, in public subsidies for CSOs, as was further verified 
during the field phase.  
In the context of this evaluation a portfolio analysis has been made of EUs support to CSOs in the 10 
year period 2002-2010. . A total of 85 grant contracts have been awarded to CSOs in Zambia in this 
period with a total value of 68 million Euro (a total of 129 grant contracts where approved but of these 
44 have been cancelled for one reason or another, representing 34.1% of total committed resources 
cancelled in the process). There generally is a growing annual trend in EU CSOs funding over the ten 
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year period both in number and total value of grant contracts, with a stabilisation (slight decrease) in the 
later years. One third (33.3%) of CSO’s financing comes from EDF resources but the largest CSOs 
funding comes from the EU vertical thematic programmes / budget lines (65.5% of the total – particular-
ly from the NSA-LG programme and the food security programme) with one contract financed from the 
sugar protocol. All contracts awarded up to the end of 2004 have been fully paid and are closed. From 
2005 onwards, increasing amounts are still due for payment and contracts still ongoing, not yet closed. 
The largest sectors / thematic areas of EU support to CSOs are agriculture and food security (13m Euro 
or 19.3% of the total), relatively closely followed by health (incl. HIV/AIDS and nutrition – 17.0%) and 
governance with 14.5%). Emergency / humanitarian aid (11.1%), water and sanitation (8.6%), educa-
tion and training (6.0%) and livelihood, poverty alleviation and IGPs (5.1%) take intermediate positions.  
Under the Access to Justice Project, the Governance Secretariat (under the Ministry of Justice) initially 
was a conduit for CSOs financing (both institutional and project-related) based on a call for proposals 
modality. A 2010 study identified core funding as the most popular funding modality amongst CSOs in 
Zambia. Also, direct support is preferred to support via intermediaries, and only donors favour joint 
support models. CSOs and particularly national CSOs prefer unilateral funding. (I-6.1.2) Relations be-
tween the Government (GRZ) and CSOs are not always easy, with GRZ recognizing the added value of 
CSO engagement mainly in providing services in line with the National Development Plans, away from 
advocacy work. To date, no legislation for state funding to CSOs is existent. In accordance with the 
prescribed EU procedures concerned, CSOs are routinely invited to EDF programming events including 
those related to the CSP/NIP, and thus in principle also are, directly or indirectly, involved in aid modali-
ties decision making processes, including those related to General Budget Support (GBS). However, 
the quality, added value and impact of this CSOs involvement is mixed at best. (I-6.1.3)  
 
JC 6.2:  The presence and interface of CSOs with the population and the government is en-
sured 
 Indicator 6.2.1: Number of dialogue processes/mechanisms between CSOs and Govern-
ment on various sectors at central and district levels 
The 2010 EUD - GRZ Joint Annual Review (JAR) flatly indicated that the dialogue with Non-State Ac-
tors has remained limited. The Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the EDF10 CSP referred to a certain lack of 
continuity in the progress of Zambia-EU political dialogue since 2003 but gained momentum from 2009 
onwards. A wide range of issues were addressed and concerns were raised in the various meetings, 
including with non-government stakeholders. The NSAs form part of Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) 
which are formal government structures established under each sector. SAGs meetings should be held 
on a quarterly basis and discuss policy issues in the sectors, progress of implementation of relevant 
projects and programmes and they also provide a forum for the sharing of information between GRZ, 
NSA and CPs. This is working well in some sectors (health, education, macro-economics, but less in 
others as Private Sector Development (PSD), transport and agriculture. NSAs are also involved in the 
reviews of the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS), which is the framework for general budget 
support in Zambia. The programming phase of the EDF10 has also included a process of consultation 
with civil society representatives and NSAs. A number of meetings were organised in 2006 and begin-
ning 2007 to discuss the main EDF10 programming documents, including the Governance Profile. The 
EU commissioned institutional analysis of Non-State Actors in Zambia concluded to very substantive 
contribution made by the CSOs to the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) following a broad 
based and inclusive internal consultation process organised by the CSOs themselves drawing from 
over 230 organisations and hundreds of people from various communities at both national (through 12 
thematic groups) and provincial level (through poverty assessments and consensus building work-
shops). The study also asserted that like before for the PRSP, the donor community showed high levels 
of support and included funding towards civil society’s NDP activities. Furthermore, the CPs proved to 
be an important ally in the form of a channel for critical information, i.e. government timeliness, policy 
directions, and taking back civil society concerns to government and other donors. 
Non-State Actors have also been consulted for the planning and implementation of a number of pro-
jects involving their participation. During the in-country CSP Mid-Term Review (MTR) process, a total of 
eight consultative meetings were organised in Lusaka. NSAs participated in five of these. The MoU 
signed between GRZ and Cooperating Partners on development and aid effectiveness in Zambia fore-
sees for a dialogue architecture which sets out the complementary fora where GRZ, CPs and Non-
State Actors interact in policy dialogue to improve the effectiveness of development assistance in Zam-
bia (Sector dialogues, dialogues on cross-cutting issues, reforms and aid effectiveness, High Level 
Policy Dialogue. The Annual Poverty / SAG conference allows for sectoral (line Ministries) and regional 
(Provincial Permanent Secretaries) discussion of development achievements, reforms and plans. This 
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as far as the formal provisions for dialogue processes / mechanisms between CSOs and Government 
and a limited quantitative presentation are concerned. Another matter of course is an appreciation of 
the quality of these dialogue events and their outcomes, as was learned from the CSOs focus group 
discussion conducted during the evaluation field visit and also from the interviews with different other 
stakeholders concerned, including GRZ and CPs.  
Figure 4: Total annual contract value of EU grants to Civil Society Organisations in Zam-
bia, period 2001-2010 (in Euro) 
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Figure  CS-G2 :  Total Annual Contract Value of EU Grants to Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) in Zambia, Period 2001 - 2010  (in Euro)
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Source:  CRIS database search of 09 Dec 2011.  
Extracts: 
 JAR 2010, p4; In-country dialogue: Dialogue with Non State Actors remained limited. 
 MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p1: Political dialogue: A certain lack of continuity has been noted 
in the progress of Zambia-EU political dialogue since 2003. Several Article 8 dialogues where 
held in 2007 mostly relating to issues of relevance to the Ministries of Home Affairs and Justice, 
i.e. the death penalty and prison conditions. Article 8 dialogues were also held with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs on the Zimbabwe question. The dialogue gained momentum from 2009 with an 
ambitious plan including line ministries as well as other stakeholders in Zambian political life. Arti-
cle 8 Dialogues were held with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Industry, Trade and 
Commerce, the Vice President/Minister of Justice, the Human Rights Commissioner, the Chair-
person of the Electoral Commission of Zambia, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Accounts 
Committee and the Chairman of the National Constitutional Conference. A visit to Lusaka prison 
also took place as a preparation for the meeting with the Minster of Home Affairs. The dialogue 
has generally been open and characterised by a positive attitude on both sides. A wide range of 
issues were addressed and concerns raised in the various meetings, including with non-
government stakeholders. 
 MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p16: NSA/LA involvement in policy dialogue? Frequency of dia-
logue: “NSA form part of Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs), which are formal government structures 
established under each sector. SAGs meetings should be held on a quarterly basis and discuss 
policy issues in the sectors, progress on implementation of relevant projects and programmes and 
they also provide a forum for the sharing of information between GRZ, NSA and CPs. This is 
working well in some sectors (health, education, macro-economic, but less in others (PSD, agri-
culture). In addition, NSAs are involved in the reviews of the Poverty Reduction Budget Support 
(PRBS), which is the framework for general budget support in Zambia. In particular Civil society 
has been given capacity building support to engage on the monitoring of budget support in Zam-
bia at national, provincial and district levels. The Delegation regularly involves NSA in its pro-
gramming and implementation processes, notably in focal sector 2: Health, where NSAs are con-
sulted on the assessment of sector budget support. Dialogue with NSAs is also particularly in-
tense around the Economic Partnership Agreements, where the EC Delegation regularly interacts 
at workshops and seminars.” 
 MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p17: During the in-country MTR process, the Delegation organ-
ised a total of eight consultative meetings in Lusaka. NSAs participated in five of these. Of these 
five, one meeting was organised solely for NSAs input into the whole process; one were focused 
on the focal sectors supported by the Delegation; one focused on the poverty and social situation 
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of the country; one on the economic situation and one on the update of the governance action 
plan. Inputs into the process were also solicited through email communication with NSAs. 
 EAMR, July 2007, p2: NSA. The programming phase of the EDF10 has also included a process 
of consultation with civil society representatives and NSAs. A number of meetings were organized 
in 2006 and beginning 2007 to discuss the main EDF10 programming documents, including the 
Governance Profile. Moreover, Non-State Actors have been also consulted for the planning and 
implementation of a number of projects involving their participation. Some NSA representatives 
are also members of the steering committees of EDF funded projects. After too long a process of 
approval at HQ, the implementation of the EDF9 project to support NSA could start during the se-
cond half of 2007. 
 GOZ and Cooperating Partners - MoU (2011) p7 ; Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Government of the Republic of Zambia and its Cooperating Partners on Development and Aid Ef-
fectiveness in Zambia; Draft Version of 20 August 2011. Section 5.3: The Dialogue Architecture in 
Annex 5 sets out the complementary fora where GRZ, CPs and Non-state actors interact in policy 
dialogue to improve the effectiveness of development assistance in Zambia. The signatories will 
work together to strengthen these fora during the course of the SNDP: 
• Sector Dialogue: Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) provide a forum through which Government, 
CPs and non-state actors engage in sector planning, budgeting, and monitoring processes, and 
sector-level policy and technical discussions on a quarterly basis. SAGs are expected to ration-
alise intra-sectoral allocation of resources and related expenditures, and to ensure that annual 
sector budgets presented to MoFNP reflect sector priorities and are in line with the Vision 2030, 
the goals and objectives of the SNDP and are linked to district plans. Joint annual sector re-
views shall become a standard procedure and will enhance sector coordination, alignment and 
transparency as well as joint learning. Generic ToR for Joint Sector Reviews will be developed 
and agreed upon. Reviews of large sector programmes will be shared with the stakeholders in 
the respective sectors. SAGs will prepare short summaries of progress and challenges to feed 
into discussions at the High-level Policy Dialogue. CPs are committed to support the SAGs. 
Their participation in SAGs is determined through the DOL process. Furthermore: 
• Dialogue on Cross-Cutting Issues, Reforms and Aid Effectiveness takes place in another set of 
fora.  
• High Level Policy Dialogue is held on a regular basis in the monthly ST – CPG-Troika meetings, 
comprising of the ST and the CP-Troika, to discuss development and aid effectiveness issues.  
• The Annual Poverty/SAG Conference allows for sectoral (line Ministries) and regional (Provin-
cial Permanent Secretaries) discussion of development achievements, reforms and plans.  
 Democratisation, State and Civil Society – Good Governance Programme (2011), p3: Gov-
ernment on occasions recognises and comments CSOs, e.g. the CSO SNDP report is recom-
mended by the Secretary to the Treasury to government institutions; CSPR and other CSOs are 
commended by Parliamentary Sub-Committees for their contributions; CSOs’ contributions are 
acknowledged in the National Anti-Corruption Policy. Yet the argumentation of CSOs against the 
mid-term gratuity of MPS in 2009 and the broad coalition against corruption scandals saw state 
institutions hitting out at CSOs. This situation ultimately may have lead government to bring the 
NGO Bill to Parliament and Parliament to pass the act in August 2009. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on I-6.2.1 : 
STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p11; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; Chap-
ter 4: Practices of Different Levels of Government regarding Non-State Actors Participation - Partici-
pation at National Level: …, apart from the space on the Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) and in a 
similar way to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) formulation process, civil society pre-
pared an independent NDP civil society input drawn from over 230 organisations and hundreds of 
people from various communities at both national (through approximately 12 thematic groups) and 
provincial level (through poverty assessments and consensus building workshops). After a national 
consensus building workshop, this input has been collated in a report entitled “A National Develop-
ment Plan for Zambia: A Civil Society Perspective”. The independent input of civil society was for-
warded to the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, as well as to the various Sector Advisory 
Groups (SAGs) for inclusion in the NDP. The outcomes of the PRSP and NDP activities of civil society 
cannot be ignored. Government is increasingly recognising the importance of civil society in Zambia’s 
development agenda. Like the PRSP, the donor community, especially GTZ, showed high levels of 
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support and included funding towards civil society’s NDP activities. Furthermore, the donors proved to 
be an important ally in the form of a channel for critical information, i.e., government timeliness, policy 
directions, and taking back civil society concerns to government and other donors. 
 
 Indicator 6.2.2: Nature of changes attributable to CSOs’ dialogue processes on sectoral 
strategies 
Achievements on this indicator are rather difficult to ascertain not only because of the limited availability 
of documentation and aggregate analysis on this issue, but also for methodological reasons of attribu-
tion. Nevertheless, the Mid-Term Review of the EDF10 CSP concluded to have benefited greatly from 
the inputs of the NSA during the in-country consultations, the drafting of the JAR and governance action 
plan update. For HIV/AIDS for instance, such collaboration with HIV/NGOs was established and more 
than half of the health infrastructures are reported to have a relationship with such organisations. These 
suggestions, although not directly affecting the setup of the CSP could make its implementation in the 
different sectors more successful for the remainder of the EDF10. A 2011 case study by ZCSD and 
CIVICUS of civil society impact on the national budgeting process in Zambia, showed both the opportu-
nities and challenges CSOs face in their endeavour to influence important national programmes such 
as the national budgeting process. CSOs’ contributions are acknowledged by Government in the Na-
tional Anti-Corruption Policy, but particularly in relation to the Poverty Reduction Strategy and related 
sectoral strategy documents. There is less inclination to acknowledge CSOs’ effects and impact on 
governance and accountability issues, apart from some relatively substantive budget tracking and moni-
toring. These preliminary desk findings based on piecemeal evidence were more or less confirmed 
during the different interviews on the occasion of the evaluation field visit... 
Data, figures, tables: 
CSO Global fund evaluation health facilities (2008) 
 
Extracts: 
 MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p19: Conclusions: overall value/impact of NSA/LA participation 
in the MTR process and next steps: “The MTR process benefited greatly from the input of NSA 
during the in-country consultations and drafting of the JAR and governance action plan update. 
NSA made a number of proposals during the meetings including the provision of extra capacity 
building for monitoring of budget implementation and the increased lobbying by the EC for a more 
inclusive role for civil society in policy processes. These suggestions, although not directly affect-
ing the setup of the CSP, could make its implementation more successful for the remainder of the 
EDF10. The EC Delegation for its part should make a greater effort in future to involve Local Au-
thorities in dialogue.” 
 ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011) pp. 74-76: Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia – 
Chapter 3 – Mapping Civil Society Case study 3 : An Assessment of Civil Society Impact on the 
National Budgeting Process in Zambia 
The aim of the study was to assess the impact of civil society on the national budgeting process in 
Zambia. It examined the potential influence of CSOs in all stages of the budgeting process, from 
the drafting stage through to the implementation stage, and it also examined whether govern-
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ments actually take these interventions and influences seriously. At this point, it suffices to men-
tion that the Zambian government policy is said to be ambiguous on the role of the civil society in 
the budgetary process. Mudenda, Ndulo and Wakumelo, (2005) pointed out that government does 
provide an opportunity to civil society to submit proposals to the budget, but it is not obliged to 
take CSOs submissions into account. CSOs also lack information on the processes and capacity 
to effectively interact with the public institutions, in order for them to make meaningful submis-
sions. The study highlighted both the opportunities and challenges CSOs face in their endeavour 
to influence important national programmes such as the budget. The findings of the study will 
therefore enable the stakeholders in issues of public policy to see the need for the development of 
a legal and policy framework for civil society participation in the budget process and other national 
programmes. This will help to clarify the extent of civil society’s role in the in the national pro-
grammes budget process inclusive and how they can participate meaningfully. 
 Indicator 6.2.3: Degree of institutionalisation and mainstreaming of civil society consulta-
tion 
In the dialogue on national policies and strategies, civil society plays a rather weak role only. While this 
may be partly due to Government’s hesitation to see CSOs as a partner for dialogue on macro issues, 
capacity constraints may also play an important role. Under the capacity building component of the 
PRBS2 project local civil society organisations’ ability to monitor budget execution and service delivery 
in urban and rural areas is strengthened and also their ability to engage in policy dialogue on these 
issues.  
Overall, the institutionalisation and mainstreaming of civil society consultation process experienced a 
major setback because of the non-approval and closure of the comprehensive programme of support to 
NSAs under EDF9 (CRIS 19-150 – budget 5.5m €). The reasons to a certain extent are symptomatic for 
the state-of-play of civil society in Zambia: Difficult cooperation with the Government of Zambia who 
delayed the signing of the FA, the tender failure, the changed overall CSO environment since the be-
ginning of the programming of the EDF9, and the appearance of a new major actor (the Zambian Gov-
ernance Foundation - ZGF), supported through basket funding by a number of EU Member Countries 
and with the EU involved under observer status. These factors finally led to close the FA after a process 
which lasted more than 2.5 years, with the intention to start anew under the EDF10 (after more than 2.5 
years of negotiations and procedural battles). In the transport sector, private sector CSO stakeholders 
reportedly are closely involved in policy formulation and implementation. Consultation is institutionalised 
through representation of stakeholders in most decision-making bodies. For example in the National 
Roads Board the private sector is in a majority position.  
Generally however the degree of institutionalisation and mainstreaming of civil society consultation in 
the dialogue on national policies remains weak. At the same time, as also asserted in the 211 ROM 
mission report, the EU support to Zambian NSAs has the potential of high impact in that it can really 
“make the difference”. An important tool is the reinforcement of existing structures (such as the Sectoral 
Advisory Groups and the Governance Secretariat as support mechanism and capacity strengthening 
facilitator) in order to strengthen citizen participation in policy-making processes. This also covers the 
need to strengthen networking and coordination between CSOs and Government to avoid duplication 
and non-alignment of development interventions. From the numerous consultations with CPs and na-
tional stakeholders during the field visit strong signals were received for a capacity strengthening of 
CSOs to become capacitated partners in the political dialogue process particularly regarding democrat-
ic and economic governance issues in their broad variety and especially in relation to transparency and 
accountability issues. Evaluation and research studies as the EU commissioned institutional analysis of 
non-state actor in Zambia, the 2007 report on support models for CSOs and the 2011 mid-term review 
of the Zambia Governance Foundation all point out the necessity of a necessary conducive enabling 
environment for CSOs in order to be able to effectively fulfil such role. They elaborate on the concrete 
measures necessary for this as well as on the concrete modalities of capacity strengthening support to 
CSOs in this respect, both organisationally and institutionally and in terms of human resources. 
Extracts: 
 EAMR, Jan 2011, p5: The implementation of the civil society project under the capacity building 
component of PRBS2 was initiated; the project will develop communities' and local civil society 
organisations’ ability to monitor budget execution and service delivery in urban and rural areas 
and to engage in policy dialogue on these issues. A number of civil society organisations at differ-
ent levels through the NGO umbrella organisation CSPR (Civil Society for Poverty Reduction) will 
be involved in the implementation of this pilot project. 
 JAR 2007, p25: 2.4. Utilisation of resources for NSAs: After a lengthy process of approval at 
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headquarters the Financing Agreement for the EDF9 project (€5 million) to strengthen NSA ca-
pacities was ready for National Authorising Officer’s (NAO) signature by the end of the year. 
However, the Zambian Government was reluctant to sign the FA in the absence of a legal frame-
work for creating a mutual accountability relationship between the government and civil society 
that was part of the stalled NGO Act. The problem has been raised in all the meetings held with 
the NAO since November 2007. The Delegation has already sent two letters to the NAO, explain-
ing the importance of this type of project under Cotonou, giving assurances of NAO involvement 
in its implementation, and asking for a final formal position. The Delegation pointed out that the 
project is in line with the provisions of Cotonou Agreement for the involvement of Civil Society in 
development policies and strategies in ACP countries. Accordingly, it will be implemented under 
the legal and financial regulations that apply to the EDF9. An official reply is currently expected. 
 EDF10 – CSP/NIP 2008-2013, Annexes p xxi: CSOs referred to the need of capacity building for 
NGOs, not only in the more classic areas, but also in new areas like trade. The current negation 
of EPAs should involve NSAs, but for that sufficient training and capacities are required. The Del-
egation replied that there is a provision under the EDF9 private sector project to support NSAs 
and intermediary organisations. 
 EDF9 – CSP-NIP, Annex 8 p16 : Transport sector regarding stakeholder involvement and donor 
co-ordination. Relatively short (very short) chapter only with no mentioning of CSOs, as follows: 
“As part of Government’s philosophy regarding the role of the private sector in the economy, 
stakeholders in the transport sector are closely involved in policy formulation, and implementation. 
Consultation is institutionalised through representation of stakeholders on most decision-making 
bodies. In the National Roads Board the private sector is in a majority position. ROADSIP has 
provided a well-established focal point for policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. Its 
annual reviews involving all stakeholders are a forum where the entire sector, including high level 
representation of the Government, meets, exchanges views and contributes to the way forward. 
Since early 2000, the donors consult regularly on transport matters in the Transport Sector Donor 
Forum. The group has monthly meetings with the Permanent Secretary of Communications and 
Transport. 
 EUD Document: Note for the file dtd. 5 May 2010 on the Decision to Close the FA CRIS 19-150 
on support to NSAs 
“For history please also refer to note for the file of 24th November 2009 prepared by F&C. After 
the tender failure, and considering the difficult cooperation with the Government of Zambia (GRZ) 
who delayed the signing of the FA then the constitution of the evaluation committee, we have de-
cided to opt for a Centralized Management. We had also realized that the scene for support to lo-
cal NGOs had changed since the beginning of the programming of the EDF9 Non State Actors 
support. A new actor had appeared, the Zambian Governance Foundation (ZGF), a private Sector 
body with a non profit status which is a basket fund supported by DK, UK, IRL, SE, DE, FL. To-
gether with F&C and after consultation with HQ in Brussels, we considered five possible scenarios 
as a way forward to manage the programme in cooperation with this new entity in the best possi-
ble way. The most feasible way forward proved to be a Delegation Agreement with one of the CPs 
who contributes to the pool fund of ZGF. We therefore contacted DANIDA, and started a discus-
sion with them on a Delegation agreement. In the meantime, we have been in consultation with 
HQ to assess the possibility of approving a rider to the FA.  
Current situation: The reply from Brussels, especially on the timeline to get the rider approved, 
discouraged us form starting the procedure for the rider, as the time for approval would go beyond 
the deadline of 2nd July 2010. Furthermore, we have been advised by F&C colleagues in Brus-
sels that the possibility to get such a rider approved would be very uncertain.  
Proposal by Section 3: We therefore propose to close the current FA and start on new basis with 
the foreseen envelope for support to NSAs under the EDF10. Furthermore we suggest opting for 
a Centralized Management with a Delegation Agreement with one of the CPs contributing to the 
pool fund of ZGF, possibly DANIDA or DIFID. 
 EUD Document: Rationale for EDF10 NSAs capacity building project in Zambia pp 1-2: (3) 
In the dialogue on national policies, strategies NSAs play a weak role only. While this situation 
may partly be due to Government's hesitation on seeing NSA as a partner for dialogue on macro 
issues, capacity constraints may also play an important role… (4) Several Cooperation Partners 
(CPs), as the international Donors are named in the Zambian context, in recent years attempted 
to build capacity of NSA. On the part of the EU an EDF9-project has been developed but became 
a non-starter after GRZ signed the FA with a major delay only. (5) In spite of the above con-
straints, the 2011 Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) Mission in Zambia has shown that EU sup-
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port to Zambian NSAs has the potential of high impact, in that it can really "make the difference". 
Zambian NSAs can play a key role in the area of social protection and generally the EU supported 
projects they manage have good design, are based on demand for actions and have good chanc-
es of positive impact and sustainability. (6) The main lessons to be learned from other CPs expe-
rience relate to the fact that donor responses have not focused on supporting the role of NSAs to 
hold government accountable by entering into constructive engagement. The focus has been 
more on the NSA's role in ‘demand-side accountability’ and less on the need to strengthen the 
capacity of GRZ ('supply–side') Budget as included in ID Fiche: 5.5m € 
 ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011) p33: Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia – 
Chapter 5 – Recommendations: This section contains recommendations which synthesise from 
the various consultations held during the CSI process in Zambia, including Regional Consultative 
Meetings held in four provinces (Copperbelt, Southern, Luapula and Lusaka provinces), the NAG 
and the National Consultative workshop that was held on 24 November 2010. These recommen-
dations are not only directed to CSOs, but its partners in the government and the business sector. 
One of the features of the recommendations is the weakness of civil society, and how to strength-
en it. 
- Currently the NGO Act No. 16 of 2009 does not apply to churches, clubs, professional 
groups or organisations, trade unions and religious organisations. As such there is need for 
further revision of the Act in order to accommodate the types of CSOs which are not cov-
ered. 
- Civil society should lobby government to reinforce existing structures (such as Sectoral Advi-
sory Groups) in order to strengthen citizen participation in policy-making processes. 
- There is need for further inquiry on how dialogue between government and civil society 
should be strengthened, particularly on issues of governance, participation, human rights 
and the rule of law. 
- It was felt that CSOs are highly dependent on donor funding and usually have no say on how 
funds should be used. Therefore, there is need for them to develop income generating activi-
ties in order to have more independence in their development interventions. 
- Since rural communities seem to be underserviced by CSOs, it was felt that there was need 
for CSOs to spread their activities to rural areas and help in mobilising self-help groups and 
networking. 
- There is need for networking and coordination between CSOs and the Government to avoid 
duplication and contradiction in development interventions. 
- In addition to the guidelines provided in the NGO Act on how CSOs should carry their opera-
tions, there was a felt need that CSOs should institute a code of conduct to address matters 
pertaining to their accountability. 
 Democratisation, State and Civil Society – Good Governance Programme (2011), p3 : 
“Government on occasions recognises and comments CSOs, e.g. the CSO SNDP report is rec-
ommended by the Secretary to the Treasury to government institutions; CSPR and other CSOs 
are commended by Parliamentary Sub-Committees for their contributions; CSOs’ contributions 
are acknowledged in the National Anti-Corruption Policy. Yet the argumentation of CSOs against 
the mid-term gratuity of MPS in 2009 and the broad coalition against corruption scandals saw 
state institutions hitting out at CSOs. This situation ultimately may have led government to bring 
the NGO Bill to Parliament and Parliament to pass the act in August 2009.” 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on JC 6.2: 
 Governance Secretariat (2008) p140; Governance Data Mapping – Assessing the Quality and 
Availability of Governance Data: Chapter 5 Conclusion: The governance data quality assessment 
comprises some recommendations that emerge from a larger process of data mapping. These 
recommendations are as follows: 
- Governance data and information should be acknowledged as assets and used for effective 
programme implementation and service delivery; 
- Governance institutions should value websites as valuable productive “office space” as they 
can be the entry point for researchers ad clients and also for data dissemination; 
- Institutionalise the concept and practice of Monitoring and Evaluation in the governance insti-
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 154 - 
tutions; 
- Invest in data management systems and competencies to facilitate monitoring and evalua-
tion of national governance processes and programmes; 
- The Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for governance should detail the boundaries of 
what is called “governance data”; 
- The data generated and reported by civil society should be assessed for its potential to in-
form not only the outputs but also outcomes monitoring in the governance sector; 
- Relate the annual SAG Conference reporting to the targets embedded in the Fifth National 
Development Plan. 
 Scanteam (2007) p24; Support Models for CSOs at Country Level – Zambia Country Report: 
Chapter 7 Findings and Conclusions: The cooperation between the Government and the civil so-
ciety functions relatively well, but there is still some suspicion between the actors. This is espe-
cially true when CSOs take on the role as advocates and monitors of public spending, and Presi-
dent Mwanawasa has stated his suspicion on several occasions. The line between political activi-
ty as conducted by civil society and partisan politics is less clear than in more mature democra-
cies, and so suspicion on behalf of the ruling party is sometimes unavoidable, but nevertheless 
problematic. 
 STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p30; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 4.1.1 CSOs Participation at National Level – Main Challenges: There are various chal-
lenges that civil society has faced in terms of participating in policy development at the national 
level: 
- There is no framework for institutionalised participation of civil society in national develop-
ment policies in Zambia. One cannot but conclude that space largely depends on govern-
ment “good will” and “donor pressure”. The latter poses a question around ‘genuine or 
forced” space for civil society; 
- Despite the amount of input provided by civil society, the government does not provide any 
resources to non-state actor engagement in national development policy. Complete reliance 
on donor good will for resources to engage in the PRSP and NDP can be challenging and 
unpredictable; 
- A number of inefficiencies existed around the PRSP working groups and SAGs, e.g. incon-
sistency in meetings, late invitations or none at all, late documents, etc, thus undermining the 
effective participation of civil society; 
- Civil society engagement in policy dialogue is only at “consultative levels”, with government 
deliberately omitting non-state actors at the “higher decision-making levels”. Despite contin-
uous lobbying, civil society was sidelined from the technical and drafting committees of the 
PRSP and now those of the NDP, an issue attributed to low levels of political will; 
- Other major national debates and civil society: 
o Participation of NSA in political national debates like the constitution and electoral re-
form : No doubt, NSAs have become key players in the political processes in Zambia; 
o Participation of NSA in the decentralisation debase: The decentralisation debate has 
no attracted as much interest from NSAs as constitution-making and poverty reduc-
tion; 
o Participation of NSA in the fight against corruption and good governance issues: NSAs 
have played and continue to play an important role in raising awareness against the 
evils of corruption; 
o NSAs have also played a leading role in the promotion of media law reforms in the 
country 
 STEM-VCR Srl (2006) pp. 32-33; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final 
Report; Chapter 4.1.1 CSOs Participation at Local Level – Challenges and lessons Learnt: There 
are various challenges that civil society has faced in terms of participating in policy development 
at the local level: 
- National development policy formulation is still highly top down – lower levels tend to be the 
“forgotten levels”; 
- National decentralisation policy is not fully implemented, resulting in national policy planning 
being largely centralised; 
- Weak or no civil society coordination forums at the provincial level; 
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- Weak engagement capacities at provincial and district level, e.g. preparation for input to 
meetings; 
- There is no framework for institutionalised participation of civil society in national develop-
ment policies in Zambia; 
- According to a survey conducted in the Copperbelt province, civil society organisations 
which sit on the Provincial Development Coordinating Committee (PDCC) and District De-
velopment Coordinating Committee (DDCC) are expected to submit reports on their activi-
ties, but the organisations tend to shy away from financial transparency. This makes it diffi-
cult for government to assess the impact of these organisations. 
 The IDL Group (2011) p11; Mid-term Review of the Zambia Governance Foundation, Final Draft; 
May 2011 – Chapter 3.5 Reviewing Progress Against the Logical Framework – Purpose: CSOs at 
national and sub-national levels engage effectively with the GRZ, influencing pro-poor policy 
processes and policy implementation monitoring.” 
Achieving ZGF’s purpose will take time. Pro-poor social and political change is a long-term pro-
cess, which is characterized by regular setbacks and circumstances well beyond the control of any 
single actor. It is an ambitious purpose, and most Zambian CSOs have a long way to go before 
they have significant and sustained impact on policy. Most of ZGF’s founding CPs appreciate this 
reality. It will be an ongoing challenge, however, to ensure that all stakeholders share an under-
standing of what the ZGF can realistically achieve in the short, medium, and long term. The Board 
and CPs should reflect regularly on their collective expectations of the ZGF, including the refine-
ment of specific milestones at purpose and outcome levels. Time will need to be invested in the ‘in-
dication’ of new faces to the CP group, so that they fully appreciate why the ZGF is formed the way 
it is, what the Zambian CS landscape implies for the ZGF, and what levels of success can be ex-
pected at purpose level in the medium term. Results: The review team found encouraging evidence 
of ZGF impact at both the organisational level (within the GPs themselves) and on individual poli-
cies (sub-national and national levels). 
 
JC 6.2:  The presence and interface of CSOs with the population and the government is ensured 
As asserted in different EUD-GRZ Joint Annual Reviews (JARs), the dialogue with Non-State Actors / 
Civil Society Organisations has remained limited. There is a certain lack of continuity in the progress of 
Zambia-EU political dialogue with involvement of the CSOs since 2003, but this dialogue gained mo-
mentum from 2009 onwards. Successful platforms include for example the Sector Advisory Groups 
(SAGs), but substantive differences are noted across the sectors: Successful in some sectors as 
health, education, macro-economics, but less in others as Private Sector Development (PSD), transport 
and agriculture. NSAs are also involved in the design and reviews of the Poverty Reduction Budget 
Support (PRBS), which is the framework for general budget support in Zambia. Non-State Actors have 
also been consulted for the planning and implementation of a number of projects involving their partici-
pation. The EU commissioned institutional analysis of Non-State Actors in Zambia concluded to very 
substantive contribution made by the CSOs to the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) following a 
broad based and inclusive internal consultation process organised by the CSOs themselves. The MoU 
signed between GRZ and Cooperating Partners on development and aid effectiveness in Zambia fore-
sees for a dialogue architecture which sets out the complementary fora where GRZ, CPs and Non-
State Actors interact in policy dialogue to improve the effectiveness of development assistance (e.g. 
Sector dialogues, dialogues on cross-cutting issues, reforms and aid effectiveness, High Level Policy 
Dialogue). (I-6.2.1) It thus appears that (the institutionalisation of) the interfacing of CSOs with govern-
ment and with the population is something basically externally induced / facilitated by the Cooperating 
Partners, rather than an endogenous national process. This for example is evidenced by the cancella-
tion of the comprehensive support programme to CSOs under EDF9 signifying a major setback for the 
institutionalisation and mainstreaming of the civil society consultation process. (I-6.2.2)  
The reasons for this cancellation to a certain extent are symptomatic for the actual state-of-play of civil 
society in Zambia, with as main factor the generally difficult cooperation between CSOs and the Gov-
ernment of Zambia, having led the latter to keep delaying the signing of the Financing Agreement ulti-
mately leading to its termination. However, with the new Government in place there are prudent indica-
tions of an improved relationship. Whereas a number of interfaces are established, another matter is 
the appreciation of the quality of these dialogue events and their outcomes, as was learned from the 
CSOs focus group discussion conducted during the evaluation field visit and also from the interviews 
with different other stakeholders concerned, including GRZ and CPs. (I-6.2.1) The extent and nature of 
changes attributable to CSOs’ dialogue processes on sectoral strategies is difficult to ascertain not only 
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because of the limited availability of documentation and aggregate analysis on this issue, but also for 
methodological reasons of attribution (what is caused / triggered by what?). However, the positive 
acknowledgements for example in the MTR of the EDF10 CSP or by Government itself as emanating 
from documents study particularly in relation to the poverty reduction strategy were further validated 
during the desk phase. There is less inclination to acknowledge CSOs’ effects and impact on govern-
ance and accountability issues, apart from some relatively substantive budget tracking and monitoring. 
These preliminary desk findings based on piecemeal evidence were more or less confirmed during the 
different interviews on the occasion of the evaluation field visit (I-6.2.2). Generally, the degree of institu-
tionalisation and mainstreaming of civil society consultation in the dialogue on national policies remains 
weak. At the same time, as also asserted in the 211 ROM mission report, the EU support to Zambian 
NSAs has the potential of high impact in that it can really “make the difference”. An important tool is the 
reinforcement of existing structures (such as the Sectoral Advisory Groups and the Governance Secre-
tariat as support mechanism and capacity strengthening facilitator) in order to strengthen citizen partici-
pation in policy-making processes. This also covers the need to strengthen networking and coordination 
between CSOs and Government to avoid duplication and non-alignment of development interventions. 
One of the eight weaknesses of CSOs cited as constituting the rationale for a EDF10 NSAs capacity 
building project is weak vertical linkages with the grassroots level of society, thus limiting the pressure 
from below for accountability. Generally, CSOs are strongly dependent on aid flows, with limited (if any) 
constituencies, low transparency and accountability. From the numerous consultations with CPs and 
national stakeholders during the field visit strong signals were received for a capacity strengthening of 
CSOs to become capacitated partners in the political dialogue process particularly regarding democrat-
ic and economic governance issues in their broad variety and especially in relation to transparency and 
accountability issues. Evaluation and research studies as the EU commissioned institutional analysis of 
non-state actor in Zambia, the 2007 report on support models for CSOs and the 2011 mid-term review 
of the Zambia Governance Foundation all point out the necessity of a necessary conducive enabling 
environment for CSOs in order to be able to effectively fulfil such role. They elaborate on the concrete 
measures necessary for this as well as on the concrete modalities of capacity strengthening support to 
CSOs in this respect, both organisationally and institutionally and in terms of human resources. (I-6.2.3) 
JC 6.3: CSOs become sustainable entities operating in all relevant policy areas and in comple-
mentarity with other NSAs 
 Indicator 6.3.1: Level of skills of CSOs staff (professional background, experience and 
training) 
Important introductory note: Generally, in the literature a broad interpretation is given to the term Civil 
Society Organisation (CSO), in as much as CSOs also cover non-government entities often referred to 
as Non-State Actors (NSAs), for example those actors active in the economic sector (e.g. professional 
associations, business organisations, labour unions, etc.) or trade sector. This broad interpretation and 
dito classification are also used in this evaluation report. (e.g. see the CSO classification under Data, 
Figures, Tables related to indicator 6.1.2). As transpired from the consultations during the field visit, 
most stakeholders adhere to this broad definition and classification, whereas the NGO Act of 2009 
gives a more restrictive interpretation to the concept. This is one of the main areas of dispute and dis-
content with this legation.  
Generally, not sufficient / no substantive data are available in the documentation on this indicator, nei-
ther could precise data being obtained during the field visit from any party, since reliable base infor-
mation and statistics appear to be lacking. 
As per a recent report on the status of civil society in Zambia (CIVICUS, 2011), human resources is 
assessed as the weakest performance dimension of CSOs in Zambia. Only 30.7% of the surveyed 
CSOs claimed to have enough human resources. Most CSOs do not have a sustainable staff base; 
almost 70% of CSOs depend on volunteers to carry out activities. The voluntary nature of employment 
in CSOs brings about a high level of turnover, with people moving from small to bigger CSOs or interna-
tional and donor agencies for more attractive conditions of service. CSOs referred to the need of capac-
ity building, not only in the more classic areas, but also in new areas like trade (e.g. in connection with 
the negotiation of EPAs). Also cited amongst CSO weaknesses are lack in / weaknesses in institutional 
and management capacity. As reported in relation to JC 6.2 earlier, in spite of these and other con-
straints the 2011 ROM mission to Zambia concluded to the Zambian CSOs’ potential of high impact 
(e.g. in the area of social protection). 
These challenges regarding skills and capacity of CSO staff and at the organisational level are a recon-
firmation of the findings of the 2006 EU commissioned institutional analysis of CSOs in Zambia, with 
such detailed analysis for the four main types of CSOs distinguished: (i) Grass roots organisations; 
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Second-level organisations with breakdown for (ii) public benefit organisations and (iii) mutual benefit 
organisations; (iv) Third and fourth level organisations, Below are some summary excerpts of this anal-
ysis in abridged version regarding main generic features of these four types of CBOs in Zambia. The 
most prominent characteristics of grassroots organisations / Community Based Organisations regarding 
their technical skills levels are identified as: Low preparation level of the leaders; Weaknesses in the 
setting up, follow-up and evaluation of projects, and: Low knowledge level of donors ‘systems and pro-
cedures and high dependence on intermediary organisations (mainly NGOs) which often monopolise 
the dialogue with partners. For the NGOs as public benefit organisations, the technical skills level gen-
erally is characterized by: Weakness in the setting up of projects and their follow-up, and; Often struc-
tural problems regarding their human resources (in particular, the lack of qualified personnel lost to 
international NGOs) that undermine their capacity to fulfil their mission. The report concluded that often 
these problems cannot be dealt with by simple training or capacity building activities. NGO characteris-
tics at the level of organisational operation include the following:  Often evolving without a clear direc-
tion (“kite syndrome”) and according to the opportunities of their surroundings, dictated by international 
NGOs and donor policies; Organisational culture often shaped by the dominance of individual leaders; 
Lack of “professional” management systems aimed at the efficiency and effectiveness of their actions; 
Low level of specialisation; Low innovation capacity; Often adoption of a supervisory rather than an 
accompanying approach with NGOs tending to cluster in intervention areas where there are a larger 
number of donors; Competition for funds hampering long-term solidarity among organisations; Lack of 
time and financial means for coordination purposes, and; Heterogeneity that characterises the various 
ideologies and values, the diversity of man-dates, and working methodologies between organisations 
belonging to umbrella bodies. The reaffirmation of most of these characteristics in later studies is an 
indirect confirmation that capacity building efforts during the period have not been successful in achiev-
ing the capacity strengthening results aspired for. 
A 2007 study on civil society participation in the Zambian development process
72
 showed that society 
organisations are mainly divided into ones who provide services, and ones who advocate on behalf of 
particular stakeholder groups or issues. The ones who provide services have been doing so for a while 
and are generally accepted as the most mature of the CSOs. Advocacy groups generally have some 
way to go before they can actively contribute to and challenge government policies and implementation. 
There are some exceptions, where well developed networks and individual organisations are respond-
ing to the donor and Zambian need for civil society oversight of the government’s usage of the budget 
and sector support given. 
Another reported challenge is the emergence of CSOs that seem to have been set up more to tap into 
the availability of donor funds rather than based on a commitment to achieving real results on the 
ground. But people in these CSOs have skills that are appreciated by the donors, such as proposal 
writing, project management, and results based management. The EU commissioned 2006 Institutional 
Analysis of Non State Actors Study revealed monitoring and evaluation as strongest capacity building 
need, followed by policy analysis and strategic planning, and by communication and advocacy. CSO 
capacity constraints are amongst the main factors at the basis of CSOs playing a weak role in the dia-
logue on national politics and strategy. This also constitutes the main rational for the still awaited NSAs 
capacity building project under the EDF10. An important macro factor regarding CSOs capacity is the 
poor regional distribution of civil society whereas most NSAs in Zambia are concentrated in urban are-
as, while the country continues to suffer from an urban-rural divide with poverty increasing in rural are-
as.  
In this broader context, the rationale for establishing the Zambia Governance Foundation (ZGF), in 
which Board the EU is represented as observer and which is used by the Access to Justice Project as a 
conduit for channelling CSO capacity strengthening support on a call-for-proposals basis, was, amongst 
others, to lower transaction costs for both CPs and civil society organisations, broaden the base for 
funding requests as well as to facilitate networking between organisations. In addition, the aim was to 
strengthen the institutional capacity and autonomy of CSOs to engage actively in policy processes and 
undertake advocacy on behalf of the poor and socially excluded people in Zambian society. 
Data, figures, tables: 
ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011) p. 44; Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia - The Sta-
tus of Civil Society in Zambia: Challenges and Future Prospects; 
                                               
72
  Scanteam (2007) pp 11-13 
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Extracts: 
 JAR 2007, ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011) p25; Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for 
Zambia - The Status of Civil Society in Zambia: Challenges and Future Prospects; 2.4. Utilisation 
of resources for NSAs: The activities under the contract concluded with CSPR (Civil Society for 
Poverty Reduction) to assess the effectiveness of budget support for poverty reduction strategies 
from a civil society perspective suffered from the institutional problems that have affected the or-
ganisation in 2007. At the operational end of the contract in December 2007, the third component 
(civil society monitoring of national strategies) was only partially implemented. Once confirmed 
that CSPR's internal problems are now really solved it could be considered to shift those activities 
to the new contract foreseen under PRBS 2. 
 EDF10 – CSP/NIP 2008-2013, Annexes p. xxi: CSOs referred to the need of capacity building 
for NGOs, not only in the more classic areas, but also in new areas like trade. The current negoti-
ation of EPAs should involve NSAs, but for that sufficient training and capacities are required. The 
Delegation replied that there is a provision under the EDF9 private sector project to support NSAs 
and intermediary organisations.  
 ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011) p33: Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia – 
Chapter 2.4 – Human resources: “This sub-dimension reports on human resources available for 
CSOs and how adequate they are for achieving their objectives. Only 30.7% of the surveyed 
CSOs claimed to have enough human resources. Most CSOs do not have a sustainable staff 
base; almost 70% of CSOs depend on volunteers to carry out activities. The main reason is that 
most donor-funded projects exclude administrative costs such as salaries. The voluntary nature of 
employment in CSOs brings about a high level of turnover, with people moving from small to big-
ger CSOs or international and donor agencies for more attractive conditions of service.” 
 EUD Lusaka (2011) p1; “Rationale for EDF10 NSAs capacity building project in Zambia”; Internal 
Note; 2011: In the dialogue on national policies, strategies NSAs play a weak role only. While this 
situation may partly be due to Government's hesitation on seeing NSA as a partner for dialogue on 
macro issues, capacity constraints may also play an important role. Some of the current weakness-
es of NGOs in Zambia are summarized in the below listing 
 Lack in effective coordination and collaboration 
 Lack in institutional and management capacity 
 Weak vertical linkages with the grassroots level of society, thus limiting the pressure from be-
low for accountability 
 Heavy reliance on donor funding leading to competition among NSAs for funding and a lack of 
autonomy in devising strategies for development 
 Poor regional distribution of civil society - most NSAs in Zambia are concentrated in urban ar-
eas, while the country continues to suffer from an urban-rural divide with poverty increasing in 
rural areas 
 Duplication and contradictions in activities due to a lack of effective coordination and collabora-
Figure 5 : Level of Organisation of CSOs in Zambia (human resources and 
international linkages as weakest performance dimensions 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report  
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
  
Page - 159 - 
tion within and between sectors of activity, regions and issues 
 High dependence on volunteers and high staff turnover 
 Absence of a code of conduct: some NSAs have abrogated their mandate to pursue their own 
interests 
In spite of the above constraints, the 2011 Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) Mission in Zambia 
has shown that EU support to Zambian NSAs has the potential of high impact, in that it can really 
"make the difference". Zambian NSAs can play a key role in the area of social protection and gen-
erally the EU supported projects they manage have good design, are based on demand for actions 
and have good chances of positive impact and sustainability. 
 ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011); Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia - The Status 
of Civil Society in Zambia: Challenges and Future Prospects:  
Only 30.7% of the surveyed CSOs claimed to have enough human resources. Most CSOs do not 
have a sustainable staff base; almost 70% of CSOs depend on volunteers to carry out activities. 
The main reason is that most donor-funded projects exclude administrative costs as salaries. The 
voluntary nature of employment in CSOs brings about a high level of turnover, with people moving 
from small to bigger CSOs or international and donor agencies for more attractive conditions of ser-
vice. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on I-6.3.1: 
 Scanteam (2007) p8; Chapter 3: Support to Civil Society in Zambia – 3.1 Strategic framework for 
civil society support: On orientation towards donors and its impact: The competition among CSOs 
is seen to have led to improved organisational capacity and competence in important areas like ac-
counting and financial management. But it also has some negative effects, as seen by donors and 
especially CSOs; organisations turn their focus, at least to a certain degree, to what they believe 
donors want at any certain point in time, often away from their core business. Another challenge, 
again according to informants from both civil society and the donor group, is the emergence of 
CSOs that seem to have been set up more to tap into the availability of donor funds rather than 
based on a commitment to achieving real results on the ground. But people in these CSOs have 
skills that are appreciated by the donors, such as proposal writing, project management, and re-
sults based management.  
The general problem of how donor funding may distort the CSO community, both by moving CSO 
objectives in the direction that donor money flows, and attracting “rent seekers”, puts new obliga-
tions on the donors, since it is their actions and resources that are contributing to these phenome-
na. While the issues are recognised, there has so far been little done in terms of practical dialogue 
and collaboration to find answers. One of the questions is thus if different support models may con-
tribute more than others in tackling these distorting tendencies, since the pressures on the donors 
to down‐scale their own staff and reduce administrative and other transaction costs are not likely to 
disappear. 
 STEM-VCR Srl (2006) pp. 39-52; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Re-
port; Chapter 5. Institutional Analysis of Zambian Civil Society Organisations: Second-Level Organ-
isations: (i) Public benefit organisations (NGOs) : Characteristics regarding technical skills levels: 
o Weakness in the setting up of projects and their follow-up 
o Organisations often face structural problems regarding their human resources (in particular, the 
lack of qualified personnel lost to international NGOs) that undermine their capacity to fulfil their 
mission. Often these problems cannot be dealt with by simple training or capacity building activi-
ties 
 STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p44; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 5. Institutional Analysis of Zambian Civil Society Organisations: Second-Level Organisa-
tions: (i) Public benefit organisations (NGOs) : Capacity building in second-level organisations – 
Requirements and tools/instruments: 
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Source: STEM-VCR (2006) p44 
 
Source: STEM-VCR (2006) p44 
 Indicator 6.3.2: Availability of methodological and technical documented expertise 
An important number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), faith based organisations (FBOs) and 
community based organisations (CBOs) provide services to the population mainly in the fields of educa-
tion and health. Their expertise is recognized among users, but is not systematically documented.  
Generally, not sufficient / no substantive data are available in the documentation on this indicator. Dur-
ing the evaluation field phase father information and evidence was collected on this indicator confirming 
the need for more broad-based and intensified capacity strengthening of CSOs... The recently conduct-
ed mid-term review of the Zambia Governance Foundation (ZGF) which reportedly has been innovative 
and thorough in its approach to CSO capacity building concluded that there are only a handful of Zam-
bian CSOs who currently qualify for core funding. Even these relatively well-established and institution-
alised CSOs have proven to need significant improvements in key functions such as M&E, and most 
are not able to clearly articulate their policy achievements in a way that ZGF can immediately translate 
into data for its own M&E needs.
73
 An earlier study
74
 concluded that overall it is difficult to assess the 
quality of the broader civil society in Zambia, since a large part of the support from donors goes to Lu-
saka based networks or large organisations. For that reason it would be fair to say that in the new aid 
architecture established in Zambia, smaller organisations have to be part of networks to stand a chance 
of gaining support for their programmes. The same study reported on a number of risks which were 
identified regarding working with civil society and that the support models handle these risks differently. 
The most commonly noted risk is the financial or fiduciary risk of handing over donor funds to organisa-
tions that have weaker administrative and financial management capacities, and whose legal status 
may make it difficult to reclaim funds that are lost or misspent. 
                                               
73
  The IDL Group (2011), p11 
74
  Scanteam (2007), pp11-13 
Figure 6  Second Level Civil Society Organisations Capacity Building Requirements 
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The EU supported institutional analysis of non state actors in Zambia of 2006 provided a concrete ex-
ample of documented methodological and technical expertise in connection with the civil society stake-
holders participation in the preparation for the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) as was done 
before in the preparation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Apart from the space there-
to on the Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs), civil society prepared a broad based national and local con-
sultation which resulted in a national consensus building workshop. The civil society contribution to the 
FNDP has been collated in a report entitled “A National Development Plan for Zambia: A Civil Society 
Perspective”. This independent input of civil society was forwarded to the Ministry of Finance and Na-
tional Planning, as well as to the various Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) for inclusion in the NDP. The 
donors proved to be an important ally in the form of a channel for critical information, i.e., government 
timeliness, policy directions, and taking back civil society concerns to government and other donors. 
Extracts: 
 MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p18: General awareness of Cotonou Agreement provisions on 
NSA and local authorities, including assessment of progress EDF9 → EDF10? - Awareness of the 
Cotonou Agreement in general is quite good amongst the NSA community in Zambia. The level of 
knowledge related to the provisions on NSA and local authorities is perhaps less so, however all 
are aware that NSA must be involved in the programming and review processes… NSAs have 
shown willingness to participate in the process and have a good understanding of the processes 
and issues involved. Their views on the monitoring of direct budget support were especially useful 
and the meetings with NSA provided a good forum also to share information on continuing NSA 
support by the EC. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on I-6.3.2: 
 The IDL Group (2011) p11; Mid-term Review of the Zambia Governance Foundation, Final Draft; 
May 2011 – Chapter 3.2 Reviewing Progress Against the Logical Framework – Outcome One: 
CSO skills and capacities to influence policy :  
ZGF has, in its first years, been both innovative and thorough in its approach to capacity building. It 
has:  
- Analyzed CSO applications to identify patterns of self-identified capacity building needs;  
- Linked with partners such as GIZ to link local CD resources to ZGF GP needs;  
- Refined the assessment process to ensure that applicants feel supported and learn from the 
application process;  
- Supported ‘promising but not successful’ CSOs to improve their applications, e.g. by sharpen-
ing the policy focus of the proposal, shaping up financial systems, making budgets more real-
istic;  
- Created demand-driven services such as the roster of pre-qualified service providers;  
- Designed and delivered set training courses and materials on M&E, policy making, and gen-
der;  
- Undertaken monitoring visits in a spirit of shared learning and true partnership with GPs. 
There is, however, a natural limit to the improvements in CSO capacity that a small Secretariat can 
deliver. There are only a handful of Zambian CSOs who currently qualify for core funding; even 
these relatively well-established and institutionalised CSOs have proven to need significant im-
provements in key functions such as M&E, and most are not able to clearly articulate their policy 
achievements in a way that ZGF can immediately translate into data for its own M&E needs.  
 Indicator 6.3.3: Level of involvement in advocacy/negotiation activities of CSOs supported 
by the EU 
Dialogue with CSOs, implying their involvement in advocacy and negotiation activities, occurs on a wide 
range of aspects, amongst others as part of their participation in Sectoral Advisory Groups (SAGs), in 
over twenty sectors. In the Government poverty reduction strategy documents NGOs are systematically 
listed among the key stakeholders. CSOs are particularly active on issues of governance, human rights, 
health service delivery, the fight against HIV/AIDs, education and gender mainstreaming. In the main, 
those CSOs that are active include civil society networks, well-established nationwide organisations 
and faith-based organisations. The participation of professional associations, trade unions, local gov-
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ernment and Community Based Organisations could be improved. One of the explicit objectives of the 
EDF9 institutional reform and capacity building focal sector was to build the capacities of non-state 
actors / CSOs and foresaw to define a special CSO capacity building programme. This was way back in 
2003, and is still not realised as of now, 8 years later. A recent study (ZCSD and Civicus, 2011) re-
vealed that civil society in Zambia has been quite active in intervention on social issues such as poverty 
and public expenditure management. However, success in pushing policy reforms has been limited. 
According to the organisational survey findings, slightly more than half (53.7%) of the CSOs surveyed 
have been pushing for policy reforms and these have had limited success. CSOs face substantive chal-
lenges in influencing policy processes, including a lack of institutionalized mechanisms and governmen-
tal mistrust and suspicion. CSOs focusing on advocacy work are finding it more difficult to have their 
contributions being recognized as useful towards achieving poverty reduction goals. 
In a recent note by the EU Delegation on the rationale for the CSO capacity building project to be in-
cluded in the EDF10 after the failure to do in the prior EDF9, it was stressed that generally in the dia-
logue on national policies and strategies CSOs play a weak role only. The note furthermore asserts that 
while this situation may partly be due to Government's hesitation on seeing CSOs as a partner for dia-
logue on macro issues, capacity constraints may also play an important role.  
Extracts: 
 MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p17: NSA/LA involvement in policy dialogue? (ii). Topics/ sectors 
discussed: Nature of NSAs participating - Dialogue with NSA occurs on a wide range of aspects, 
as part of their participation in SAGs, in over twenty sectors. NSAs are particularly active on is-
sues of governance, human rights, health service delivery, the fight against HIV/AIDs, education 
and gender mainstreaming. In the main, those NSA that are active include civil society networks, 
well-established nationwide organisations and faith-based organisations. The participation of 
trade unions, local government and professional associations could be improved.  
 JAR 2003, pp. 30-31: ii) Institutional reform and capacity building: The EDF9 Institutional Reform 
and capacity building focal sector has the following specific objectives: … (iii) Build capacities of 
non-State actors. … As regards the third objective, the discussions with non-State actors have 
just started. As part of the preparation of the Mid Term Review, the Delegation and the NAO will 
engage in a dialogue with the Non-State Actors in order to define a capacity building programme. 
Note: Way back in 2003 (still not realised 8 years later). 
 EDFX, CSP-NIP 2008-2013, Annex 5: CSP Drafting Process Consultative Meetings: This over-
view matrix on page XIX shows a total of 4 consultative meetings with Civil Society of which 1 ex-
plicitly with CSOs and Local authorities (on 26 September 2006) with regard to the draft CSP/NIP. 
The other three meetings’ main topics were: (i) Issues paper, draft governance profile; (ii) Support 
to EPAs, link with CSP and RSP, and; (iii) Draft CSP/NIP, EU GP profile. 
 ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011) p33; Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia – 
Chapter 4 – Perception of Impact: The perceived impact that civil society has on policy, social is-
sues and social attitudes is analysed from the perspective of both observers within civil society 
and external stakeholders belonging to the state, private sector, media, academia, international 
governmental 51 CIVICUS Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia organisations 
and donor organisations.18 The perception of impact is assessed along the following sub-
dimensions: responsiveness; social impact; policy impact; and impact on attitudes. The overall 
perception of impact from CSI findings in Zambia stood at 60.3%. Scores on individual sub-
dimensions on the perception of impact are presented in Figure III.4.1 below.  
From the CSI findings, it is interesting to observe that CSOs themselves and external stakehold-
ers perceive civil society to be highly responsive. The difference in the scores on responsiveness 
of 72.6% (internal perception) and 71.8% from external observers is very minimal. Civil society in 
Zambia has been quite active in intervention on social issues such as poverty and public expendi-
ture management. However, success in pushing policy reforms has been limited. This is reflected 
by the relatively lower scores of 53.7% (internal perception) on CSOs impact on policy. Results 
from one of the CSI case studies show a lack of institutionalised mechanisms and government 
mistrust and suspicion as some of the main reasons for the limited impact. 
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Figure III 4.1: Dimension scores for Perception of Impact  
 
4.2 Policy impact : This sub-dimension looks at how active and successful civil society has been 
in influencing public policy. According to the Organisational Survey findings, only 53.7% of the 
CSOs surveyed have been pushing for policy reforms and these have had limited success20. On-
ly 20% have had success in at least in one policy-related field. Much as the low success rate 
(20%) among those few CSOs that push for policy reforms should be a concern, the fact that al-
most half (46.3%) of surveyed CSOs reporting not advocating policy reforms is also worrisome. 
This is so particularly if we consider the many policy challenges that Zambia is facing (Matenga, 
2010). CSOs and other relevant stakeholders in Zambia must pay particular attention to this area. 
From the case study findings, government seems not to value much civil society input in policy 
processes. There are neither laws nor regulations obliging the Government to involve civil society 
in national policy processes or to take up CSO submissions. Even where the Government has 
provided space for civil society to engage in public policy decisions (A typical example is the for-
mulation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy), it has not been able to provide civil society with all 
the information necessary for effective engagement. Other reasons leading to CSOs limited im-
pact on policy include a lack of information and knowledge of policy processes, poor use of com-
munication strategies, weak links with other actors, and the Government’s perception of CSOs as 
competitors for donor funding and influence.22 However, contrary to how Government perceive 
civil society, findings from the Population survey showed that 63.1% of the Zambian population 
have trust in civil society. 
Conclusion: CSO responsiveness in Zambia, as perceived by themselves and external stakehold-
ers, has been quite high. However, their involvement in pushing for policy reforms has had a lim-
ited impact. To some extent, they have contributed to improved policy interventions, especially on 
poverty and public expenditure management. The scores from the organisational and external 
perception surveys at 71% and 68.2% respectively are very close. CSOs, however, face numer-
ous challenges in influencing policy processes, including a lack of institutionalised mechanisms 
and government mistrust and suspicion. It is up to the Government, civil society and other stake-
holders to provide a more conducive environment for influencing policy. 
 EU    saka       ; “Ra io a e  or EDF10 NSAs capacity building project in Zambia”; Inter-
nal Note; 2011:  
(2) Relations between the Government (GRZ) and NSA are not always easy. GRZ sees an added 
value of NSA engagement mainly in providing services in line with the National Development 
Plans. NGOs focusing on Advocacy Work are finding it more difficult to have their contributions 
being recognised as useful towards achieving poverty reduction goals. In 2007 GRZ has issued 
an 'NGO-Act', which GRZ sees as a means to bring about urgently required improvements of 
transparency and accountability and many NGOs as a threat to their independence. To facilitate 
the implementation of the NGO act, GRZ had established a participatory board to oversee the 
process. For several months a window of improved cooperation between the Ministry in charge 
(MCDSS) and several NSAs seemed to have opened. However, in mid-2011 differences of views 
caused several NSAs to withdraw from the board. 
In the dialogue on national policies, strategies NSAs play a weak role only. While this situation 
may partly be due to Government's hesitation on seeing NSA as a partner for dialogue on macro 
issues, capacity constraints may also play an important role. 
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Field Visit Additional Information on JC 6.3: 
 Embassy of Sweden (2010) pp. 10-11; Implementation of the Nordic+ Conclusions on Civil So-
ciety Support – Chapter 3.3. Results – Direct and Indirect Support: The answer to why NCSOs 
(National CSOs) prefer unilateral support may be found in the high scores this model gets for 
promoting results, dialogue, ownership and alignment. As pointed out by Scanteam and by many 
NCSOs since then, unilateral funding tends to create stronger, strategic and more equal partner-
ships between donors and NCSOs, which in turn gives better dialogue, enables alignment and 
creates stronger ownership. This is particularly true when unilateral and joint support is direct and 
the chain of actors the shortest possible, thus strengthening the position of the end recipient 
CSOs… Another support model that is recommended by the Nordic+ guidelines is indirect support 
i.e. funding via intermediaries... However, if there is one clear preference in the Zambia survey 
besides that for core funding, it is that for direct support  
 Scanteam (2007) pp. 11-13; Chapter 2.2 – Civil Society Participation in the Zambian Develop-
ment Process: The Zambian civil society organisations are mainly divided into ones who provide 
services, and ones who advocate on behalf of particular stakeholder groups or issues. 
The ones who provide services have been doing so for a while and are generally accepted as the 
most mature of the CSOs. Advocacy groups generally have some way to go before they can ac-
tively contribute to and challenge government policies and implementation. There are some ex-
ceptions, where well developed networks and individual organisations are responding to the donor 
and Zambian need for civil society oversight of the government’s usage of the budget and sector 
support given. These tend to among the donor favourites. It is nonetheless fair to say that civil so-
ciety, at least in Lusaka, has become more influential after having cooperated in conducting some 
very useful campaigns since the election in 2001 where they played a pivotal role in ousting Mr 
Chiluba and supporting Mr Mwanawasa. During this first coordinated campaign, Oasis Forum – 
an alliance of the three biggest church bodies, the NGO Coordinating Committee (NGOCC), and 
the Law Association of Zambia – was founded. It has since become one of the strongest advo-
cates for constitutional changes. 
Network organisations, and in particular NGOCC, the Zambia National Aids Network (ZNAN) and 
the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR), but also some individual organisations, have 
carved themselves a relatively large part of the support to civil society. Since both technical and 
administrative capacity among CSOs is quite variable, donors tend to flock around the large and 
seemingly capable ones. It is difficult to assess the quality of the broader civil society in Zambia, 
since a large part of the support from donors goes to Lusaka based networks or large organisa-
tions. It would be fair to say that in the new aid architecture established in Zambia, smaller organi-
sations have to be part of networks to stand a chance of gaining support for their programs. This 
is an important challenge and one the report will return to. 
 Scanteam (2007) p22; Chapter 4.4 – Different Support Modalities - Risks: A number of risks were 
mentioned by some of the informants regarding working with civil society in a developing country. 
The support models handle these risks differently. The most commonly noted risk is the financial 
or fiduciary risk of handing over donor funds to organisations that have weaker administrative and 
financial management capacities, and whose legal status may make it difficult to reclaim funds 
that are lost or misspent. This risk is higher in countries that are notorious for corruption, or where 
legal systems are poor and thus the ability to ensure redress through the courts are too expen-
sive, too slow or too cumbersome to make this a viable avenue. The donor community has 
worked a lot on the issues of fiduciary risk in connection with budget and sector wide support to 
the public sector, so the issue is well known and a number of analytical tools have been devel-
oped to capture the risk. 
 STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p29; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 4: Practices of Different Levels of Government regarding Non-State Actors Participation - 
Participation at National Level: …, apart from the space on the Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) 
and in a similar way to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) formulation process, civil 
society prepared an independent NDP civil society input drawn from over 230 organisations and 
hundreds of people from various communities at both national (through approximately 12 thematic 
groups) and provincial level (through poverty assessments and consensus building workshops). 
After a national consensus building workshop, this input has been collated in a report entitled “A 
National Development Plan for Zambia: A Civil Society Perspective”. The independent input of 
civil society was forwarded to the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, as well as to the var-
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ious Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) for inclusion in the NDP. The outcomes of the PRSP and 
NDP activities of civil society cannot be ignored. Government is increasingly recognising the im-
portance of civil society in Zambia’s development agenda. Like the PRSP, the donor community, 
especially GTZ, showed high levels of support and included funding towards civil society’s NDP 
activities. Furthermore, the donors proved to be an important ally in the form of a channel for criti-
cal information, i.e., government timeliness, policy directions, and taking back civil society con-
cerns to government and other donors. 
 STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p30; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 4.1.1 CSOs Participation at National Level – Main Challenges: There are various chal-
lenges that civil society has faced in terms of participating in policy development at the national 
level: 
- A number of inefficiencies existed around the PRSP working groups and SAGs, e.g. incon-
sistency in meetings, late invitations or none at all, late documents, etc, thus undermining the 
effective participation of civil society; 
- Civil society engagement in policy dialogue is only at “consultative levels”, with government 
deliberately omitting non-state actors at the “higher decision-making levels”. Despite contin-
uous lobbying, civil society was sidelined from the technical and drafting committees of the 
PRSP and now those of the NDP, an issue attributed to low levels of political will; 
 STEM-VCR Srl (2006) pp. 39-52; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final 
Report; Chapter 5. Institutional Analysis of Zambian Civil Society Organisations: Under this chap-
ter an institutional analysis is made by the authors of four distinguished types of CSOs: (i) Grass 
roots organisations; Second-level organisations with breakdown for (ii) public benefit organisa-
tions and (iii) mutual benefit organisations; (iv) Third and fourth level organisations, Below are 
some summary excerpts of this analysis in abridged version regarding main generic features of 
these four types of CBOs in Zambia:  
 Grass Roots Organisations – Community Based Organisations (CBOs):  
 Characteristics regarding technical skills levels: 
o Low preparation level of the leaders. 
o Weaknesses in the setting up, follow-up and evaluation of projects. 
o Low knowledge level of donors ‘systems and procedures and high dependence on interme-
diary organisations (mainly NGOs) which often monopolise the dialogue with partners. 
 At the level of organisational operation, CBOs are often characterised by: 
o Inadequacy of the structures and their procedures as regards donor requirements (legal sta-
tus, bank account, etc.). 
o General lack of resources limits the development capacity of these organisations. 
o Unequal position vis-à-vis intermediary organisations which often adopt a top-down ap-
proach 
o Lack of resources to start new projects, to network with other organisations, etc. 
o Often isolation at the territorial level. 
 Second-Level Organisations: (i) Public benefit organisations (NGOs) – By November 2004 some 
twelve thousand organisations had been registered as NGOs: 
 Characteristics regarding core values and mandates: 
o Without sufficient secured resources and being heavily dependent on external funding, na-
tional NGOs are increasingly focusing on providing professional development and capacity 
building services, sometimes neglecting the goals and visions that had given rise to their 
creation. 
o As a result, instead of roots in Zambian society NGOs seem to have built up their strongest 
links with donors. 
o Many NGOs are set up to channel donor funds and have a relatively small membership. 
However, despite their limited popular legitimacy they continue to play an important role in 
development cooperation as facilitators of cooperation with, for example, grassroots organi-
sations and informal local organisations. 
o Such disaffection with the actions of development NGOs in relation to their mandates and 
missions often triggers a rupture with the actors that they should be accompanying. 
o Danger that the local and international NGOs become a complement or a substitute for the 
government. 
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 Characteristics regarding technical skills levels: 
o Weakness in the setting up of projects and their follow-up 
o Organisations often face structural problems regarding their human resources (in particular, 
the lack of qualified personnel lost to international NGOs) that undermine their capacity to 
fulfil their mission. Often these problems cannot be dealt with by simple training or capacity 
building activities 
Characteristics at the level of organisational operation: 
o Often evolving without a clear direction (“kite syndrome”) and according to the opportunities 
of their surroundings, dictated by international NGOs and donor policies. 
o Organisational culture often shaped by the dominance of individual leaders. Lack of “profes-
sional” management systems aimed at the efficiency and effectiveness of their actions. 
o Low level of specialisation 
o Low innovation capacity. Often adoption of a supervisory rather than an accompanying ap-
proach. 
o NGOs tend to cluster in intervention areas where there are a larger number of donors. 
o Features regarding sectoral relations: 
o Competition for funds hampers long-term solidarity among organisations 
o Lack of time and financial means for coordination purposes 
o Heterogeneity that characterises the various ideologies and values, the diversity of man-
dates, and working methodologies between organisations belonging to umbrella bodies. 
 Second-Level Organisations: (ii) Mutual Benefit Organisations – The major features of two (Trade 
Unions and Professional Groupings) of the three major categories are summarized in the below 
boxes: 
  
Features of Mutual Benefit Organisations in Zambia: 
Trade Unions and Professional Grouping 
 
 Third and Fourth Level Organisations: Selective features of the selected Zambian umbrella CSOs 
(12 in total) 
Institutional Dynamics (and Democratic Management) 
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Aptitude to Programme and Planning 
 
Consistency of Structure (Organisation and Personnel) 
 
 
The IDL Group (2011) pp 1-2; Mid-term Review of the Zambia Governance Foundation, Final Draft; 
May 2011 - Chapter 1: Background:  
 
In July 2009, the Zambian Governance Foundation was officially established and registered as a non-
profit Company Limited by Guarantee. ZGF is being supported with financial contributions from DFID, 
SIDA, DANIDA, Irish Aid and GIZ (the Cooperating Partners). Netherlands, Finland and the European 
Union do not contribute to the basket fund, but have observer status. The Foundation has a Board of 
Governors, which is comprised of prominent Zambians with backgrounds that encompass civil socie-
ty, business, and academia. The rationale for establishing ZGF was, amongst others, to lower trans-
action costs for both CPs and civil society organisations, broaden the base for funding requests as 
well as to facilitate networking between organisations. In addition, the aim was to strengthen the insti-
tutional capacity and autonomy of CSOs to engage actively in policy processes and undertake advo-
cacy on behalf of the poor and socially excluded people in Zambian society. The ZGF offers multi-
annual funding -- including core funding -- to well-established CSOs selected on a competitive basis. 
The ZGF also offers one-off grants and capacity-building to small and emerging CSOs. The vision of 
this multi-donor initiative is to contribute to a steady, measurable improvement in governance and ac-
countability in Zambia by assisting civil society in strengthening their policy engagement work. The 
programme was designed to last for three years with the possibility of extension.  
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JC 6.3:  CSOs become sustainable entities operating in all relevant policy areas and in comple-
mentarity with other NSAs 
Introductory remark: Generally, in the literature a broad based interpretation is given to the term Civil 
Society Organisation (CSO) in the Zambian context, in as much as CSOs also cover non-government 
entities often referred to as Non-State Actors (NSAs), for example those actors active in the economic 
sector (e.g. professional associations, business organisations, labour unions, etc.) or trade sector. This 
broad interpretation and dito classification are also used in this evaluation report. (e.g. see the CSO 
classification under Data, Figures, Tables related to indicator 6.1.2) As transpired from the consulta-
tions during the field visit, most stakeholders adhere to this broad definition and classification, whereas 
the NGO Act of 2009 gives a more restrictive interpretation to the concept. This is one of the main are-
as of dispute and discontent with this legation.  
Detailed information, let alone quantitative data on the level of skills of CSOs staff (professional back-
ground, experience and training) are scarce. An institutional analysis of CSOs in Zambia commissioned 
by the EU in 2006 however provides such detailed analysis for the following four main types of CSOs 
distinguished: (i) Grass roots organisations; Second-level organisations with breakdown for (ii) public 
benefit organisations and (iii) mutual benefit organisations, and (iv) Third and fourth level organisations, 
The most prominent characteristics of grassroots organisations / Community Based Organisations re-
garding their technical skills levels are identified as: Low preparation level of the leaders; Weaknesses 
in the setting up, follow-up and evaluation of projects, and: Low knowledge level of donors ‘systems and 
procedures and high dependence on intermediary organisations (mainly NGOs) which often monopo-
lise the dialogue with partners. For the NGOs as public benefit organisations, the technical skills level 
generally is characterized by: Weakness in the setting up of projects and their follow-up, and; Often 
structural problems regarding their human resources (in particular, the lack of qualified personnel lost to 
international NGOs) that undermine their capacity to fulfil their mission. The report concluded that often 
these problems cannot be dealt with by simple training or capacity building activities. NGO characteris-
tics at the level of organisational operation include the following: Often evolving without a clear direction 
(“kite syndrome”) and according to the opportunities of their surroundings, dictated by international 
NGOs and donor policies; Organisational culture often shaped by the dominance of individual leaders; 
Lack of “professional” management systems aimed at the efficiency and effectiveness of their actions; 
Low level of specialisation; Low innovation capacity; Often adoption of a supervisory rather than an 
accompanying approach with NGOs tending to cluster in intervention areas where there are a larger 
number of donors; Competition for funds hampering long-term solidarity among organisations; Lack of 
time and financial means for coordination purposes, and; Heterogeneity that characterises the various 
ideologies and values, the diversity of man-dates, and working methodologies between organisations 
belonging to umbrella bodies. The reaffirmation of most of these characteristics in later studies is an 
indirect confirmation that capacity building efforts during the period have not been successful in achiev-
ing the capacity strengthening results aspired for. 
In broad terms, human resources are assessed as the weakest performance dimension of CSOs in 
Zambia. Less than one third of the surveyed CSOs claimed to have enough human resources. More 
than two-thirds of the CSOs do not have a sustainable staff base as they depend on volunteers to carry 
out activities. The voluntary nature of employment in CSOs brings about a high level of turnover, with 
people moving from small to bigger CSOs or international and donor agencies for more attractive condi-
tions of service. CSOs referred to the need of capacity building, not only in the more classic areas, but 
also in new governance areas as constitutionalism, human rights, accountability and transparency and 
sectoral areas like trade (e.g. in connection with the negotiation of EPAs). Lack of institutional and 
management capacities are other cited weakness. In spite of these and other constraints the 2011 
ROM mission to Zambia remained optimistic regarding the Zambian CSOs’ potential of high impact 
(e.g. in the area of social protection).  
In this broader context, the rationale for establishing the Zambia Governance Foundation (ZGF), in 
which Board the EU is represented as observer and which is used by the Access to Justice Project as a 
conduit for channelling CSO capacity strengthening support on a call-for-proposals basis, was, amongst 
others, to lower transaction costs for both CPs and civil society organisations, broaden the base for 
funding requests as well as to facilitate networking between organisations. In addition, the aim was to 
strengthen the institutional capacity and autonomy of CSOs to engage actively in policy processes and 
undertake advocacy on behalf of the poor and socially excluded people in Zambian society. (I-6.3.1)  
Also regarding the indicator (I-6.3.2) on availability of methodological and technical documented exper-
tise, only limited information and few hard data are available. The above mentioned EU supported insti-
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tutional analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia of 2006 however provided a solid example of docu-
mented methodological and technical expertise in connection with the civil society stakeholders partici-
pation in the preparation for the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) as was done before in the 
preparation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Apart from the space thereto on the Sec-
tor Advisory Groups (SAGs), civil society prepared a broad based national and local consultation which 
resulted in a national consensus building workshop. The civil society contribution to the FNDP has been 
collated in a report entitled “A National Development Plan for Zambia: A Civil Society Perspective”. This 
independent input of civil society was forwarded to the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, as 
well as to the various Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) for inclusion in the NDP. The donors proved to 
be an important ally in the form of a channel for critical information, i.e., government timeliness, policy 
directions, and taking back civil society concerns to government and other donors. 
Generally however, not sufficient / no substantive data are available in the documentation on this indi-
cator. During the evaluation field phase further information and evidence was collected on this indicator 
confirming the need for more broad-based and intensified capacity strengthening of CSOs. The recently 
conducted mid-term review of the Zambia Governance Foundation (ZGF) concluded that there are only 
a handful of Zambian CSOs who currently qualify for core funding. Even these relatively well-
established and institutionalised CSOs have proven to need significant improvements in key functions 
such as M&E, and most are not able to clearly articulate their policy achievements in a way that ZGF 
can immediately translate into data for its own M&E needs.75 (I-6.3.2)  
Civil society in Zambia has been quite active in intervention on social issues such as poverty and public 
expenditure management. However, success in pushing policy reforms has been limited. According to a 
recent organisational survey, only slightly more than half of the CSOs surveyed have been pushing for 
policy reforms and these have had limited success. CSOs face substantive challenges in influencing 
policy processes, including a lack of institutionalized mechanisms and governmental mistrust and sus-
picion. CSOs focusing on advocacy work are finding it more difficult to have their contributions being 
recognized as useful towards achieving poverty reduction goals. Dialogue with CSOs, implying their 
involvement in advocacy and negotiation activities, occurs on a wide range of aspects, as part of their 
participation in Sectoral Advisory Groups (SAGs), in over twenty sectors. CSOs are particularly active 
on issues of governance, human rights, health service delivery, the fight against HIV/AIDs, education 
and gender mainstreaming. In the main, those CSOs that are active include civil society networks, well-
established nationwide organisations and faith-based organisations. The participation of professional 
associations, trade unions, local government and Community Based Organisations could be improved. 
In a recent note by the EU Delegation on the rationale for the CSO capacity building project to be in-
cluded in the EDF10 after the failure to do so in the prior EDF9, it was stressed that generally in the 
dialogue on national policies and strategies CSOs play a weak role only. The note furthermore asserts 
that while this situation may partly be due to Government's hesitation on seeing CSOs as a partner for 
dialogue on macro issues, capacity constraints may also play an important role. (I-6.3.3) 
 
JC 6.4: The EU support has contributed to that the electoral process was transparent and well 
organised 
 Indicator 6.4.1: Degree of transparency of the election according to international observers 
The culminating point of the long term support to the electoral process provided through a EDF10 CSP 
A-envelope project were the recently held General Elections. The “Statement of Preliminary Findings” 
on the 20
th
 September 2011 General Elections in Zambia by the EU Election Observation Mission to 
Zambia summarily concluded to “A generally well administered election day and a highly competitive 
campaign despite the absence of a level playing field”. The EO Mission statement furthermore reads 
that regional principles and international commitments for periodic and genuine elections have been 
mostly respected, but reform of key aspects of the electoral framework is required for future elections. It 
also stated that the Electoral Commission has acted with impartiality and transparency. Nationally, vot-
ing and counting of ballots was smooth, although there were a few glitches. Fundamental freedoms of 
expression and assembly were respected during a highly competitive campaign, although unequal ac-
cess to resources meant there was not a level playing field for campaigning. Whilst commercial radio 
and television stations provided viewers and listeners with a range of information, the state-owned me-
dia failed to meet even their minimal obligations as public service media, as key programming such as 
news bulletins lacked any degree of balance in their coverage. It needs to be stressed that these Sep-
tember 2011 General Elections were only one highlight of EU support to electoral processes in Zambia 
                                               
75
  The IDL Group (2011), p11 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 170 - 
which spans over an extended period of time and includes longer term preparatory assistance to elec-
tion events (e.g. voters education, voters registration, etc.) and post-elections process institutionalisa-
tion and after-care assistance. The EU inputs should also be seen as integral part of a multi-CP basket 
funded support programme spearheaded by UNDP consortium leader. 
A large number of regional and international observer missions were also deployed from the African 
Union (AU), the Commonwealth, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of De-
mocracy in Africa (EISA) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Civil society organisations played 
an important role in providing increased transparency during election day and then during counting and 
aggregation processes. The Civil Society Election Coalition 2011 deployed over 9,000 monitors to all 
the 6,456 polling stations to observe the polling and results management process. 
Data, figures, tables: 
EUD Zambia Website: EU long-term election observers deployed across Zambia (02/09/2011). Ahead 
of the 20th September general elections, the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) 
has deployed 24 Long -Term Observers, coming from 21 different EU countries as well as Norway. 
Each team of two observers was deployed on 30th August to all of Zambia's nine provinces, well ahead 
of polling day. In addition to the long term observers, 56 international Short -Term Observers will be 
mobilised as well as 30 local Short -Term Observers from EU Member States as well as Norwegian and 
Canadian diplomatic missions in Zambia. The early deployment of the Long-Term Observers will enable 
the team to get a clear understanding of the situation in the area and to meet with all the relevant 
stakeholders in the field. The Long-Term Observers will conduct a comprehensive assessment of all 
phases of the elections, focussing on the pre-election campaign, voting, counting and tabulation as well 
as the period immediately after the announcement of the results. EU EOM deputy chief observer, David 
Ward, said: "This is an important stage in our mission and it allows us to reach all corners of the country 
to observe developments. Having a field presence means that not only do we receive updated infor-
mation from the field, but also it allows the mission to build a clear national overview."  
Extracts: 
 EU; Handbook for European Union Election Observation; Feb 2008; Excerpt related to the 
methodology of European election observation: “The assessment of the elections is based on sev-
en key criteria that have been adopted by the European Union in assessing the quality of elections. 
These are: 
 The degree of impartiality shown by the election administration, 
 The degree of freedom of political parties and candidates to assemble and express their views, 
 The fairness of access to state resources made available for the election, 
 The degree of access for political parties and candidates to the media, in particular the state 
media, 
 The universal franchise afforded to voters, 
 Any other issue which concerns the democratic nature of the election, e.g. campaign violence, 
rule of law, legislative framework, 
 The conduct of polling and counting of votes. 
Since 2000, the EU has organised 90 EOMs across the world in 54 countries. 
 EU Election Observation Mission to the Zambia; Press Release for the Presentation of the Pre-
liminary Statement; 22 Sept 2011 
“A generally well administered election day and a highly competitive campaign, despite the ab-
sence of a level playing field. The preliminary findings of the European Union Election Observation 
Mission (EU EOM) conclude that presidential and parliamentary elections held on 20 September 
2011 were conducted in a generally calm and well organised manner, despite isolated incidents. 
Regional principles and international commitments for periodic and genuine elections have been 
mostly respected, but reform of key aspects of the electoral framework is required for future elec-
tions. So far, the Electoral Commission has acted with impartiality and transparency. Nationally, 
voting and counting of ballots was smooth, although there were a few glitches. The enthusiasm 
shown by the Zambian public for the elections demonstrated their desire to further consolidate de-
mocracy. The European Union Election Observation Mission continues to observe the aggregation 
of results. This statement is preliminary and the EU EOM will not draw final conclusions until the 
results process, their certification and acceptance are completed in a manner that is in line with all 
the stakeholders’ responsibilities. Fundamental freedoms of expression and assembly were re-
spected during a highly competitive campaign, although unequal access to resources meant there 
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was not a level playing field for campaigning. Whilst commercial radio and television stations pro-
vided viewers and listeners with a range of information, the state-owned media failed to meet even 
their minimal obligations as public service media, as key programming such as news bulletins 
lacked any degree of balance in their coverage.” 
 EU Election Observation Mission to the Zambia; Statement of Preliminary Findings; 20 Septem-
ber 2011 – Selective excerpts:  
A large number of regional and international observer missions were also deployed from the African 
Union (AU), the Commonwealth, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Electoral Institute for the Sus-
tainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). 
Civil society organisations played an important role in providing increased transparency during elec-
tion day and then during counting and aggregation processes. The Civil Society Election Coalition 
2011 deployed over 9,000 monitors to all the 6,456 polling stations to observe the polling and re-
sults management process. 
 Indicator 6.4.2: Degree of timeliness and appropriateness of the EU inputs in support to the 
electoral process  
The EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) for the 20 September 2011 general elections has been 
present in Zambia since 12 August 2011 following invitation from the President of the Republic of Zam-
bia. The mission deployed 120 observers from 27 European Union member states, Canada and Nor-
way across the country. A delegation of members of the European Parliament also jointed the mission. 
On election day, observers visited 522 polling streams in 77 of the 150 constituencies throughout Zam-
bia to observe voting and counting.  
EU long term support to the electoral process (of which the recent general elections were just one 
event), which was originally formulated under the EDF9 already, has been provided through a EDF10 
Zambia CSP-NIP A-envelope as a Support to the Zambian Electoral Cycle 2009-2012 project with a 
total budget of 7.4 million and with an operational implementation phase of 44 months. It is a “classical” 
project embedded in a trust fund setting with a total trust fund of €14.9m with 5 other CPs plus GRZ and 
with UNDP as trust lead agency. The Jan 2011 External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) men-
tioned that certain difficulties remained with information on this trust fund setting, which is not always 
complete and timely, to the extent that it hampers effective supervision. In the preceding year 2010 the 
project mainly focused on voter registration, on civil society organisations to carry out voter education 
activities, increase women’s participation and dialogue between the political parties. It was estimated 
that close to 80% of the eligible voters had been registered. On the other hand, in was also mentioned 
in the mid-term review report of the EDF10 CSP that the official launch of continuous voter registration 
in June 2010 marked a significant improvement but voter education activities and ECZ development 
plans have continued to be hampered by budgetary constraints. Interviews at the implementing agency, 
the Electoral Commission of Zambia indicated that there are still major outstanding challenges regard-
ing the institutionalisation and mainstreaming of the project’s accomplishments in as much as many of 
the trained personnel under the project were hired on a contractual basis, with transfer of knowledge 
into the mainstream organisation now jeopardized with the pending end of these contracts. Other out-
standing issues pertain to the solid anchoring of the ICT system and tools (a major contribution of the 
EU), electoral support capacity strengthening at the provincial level and the establishment of civil regis-
tration as necessary precondition for fully transparent voter registration. 
In the EDF10 CSP Mid-Term Review of 2009, a series of notable successes in the democratic govern-
ance area are mentioned. But with respect to the electoral process, capacity and budgetary constraints 
are explicitly mentioned as having caused delayed progress. The official launch of continuous voter 
registration in June 2010 marked a significant improvement but voter education activities and ECZ 
(Electoral Commission of Zambia) development plans have continued to be hampered by budgetary 
constraints. 
Data, figures, tables: 
 EC: FA Support to the Zambian Electoral Cycle 2009-2012; signed 19 August 2009 – Selective 
Excerpts: 
EDF10 Zambia CSP (A-envelope) 
Title:  Supporting the electoral system in Zambia, FED/2008/20975 
Total cost: 7.4 M€ 
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Aid Method / Management Mode: Project approach – Centralised management-Joint Manage-
ment with international organisation (UNDP) 
Execution period of Agreement : 68 months (2 phases: Operational implementation phase of 44 
months and closure phase of 24 months) 
 
Technical and Administrative Provisions (TAPs) Chapter 2.2 on expected results  
Key expected results are: 
E1 The Capacity of the Electoral Commission of Zambia is enhanced so that the 2011 Tripartite 
Elections (and subsequent elections) are planned and held in a transparent and credible man-
ner in accordance with international standards (credible counting process and timely transmis-
sion and publications of results). 
E2 DNR can support the continuous voter registration in a sustainable manner, through the digiti-
sation of the civil registry and national registration card 
E3 Continuous voter registration implemented 
E4 Legislative Framework for Elections Reviewed 
E5 Increased participation of women as voters, candidates, and staff. 
E6 Enhanced media capacity and monitoring mechanisms 
E7 Increased capacity of civil society organisations to conduct credible domestic observation and 
engage in civic and voter education 
E8 Enhanced Capacity of Political Parties. 
 
The total of the trust fund at the time of signing is EUR 14,901,375, and the contributions of other CPs and 
GRZ are as follows: 
The Netherlands EUR 1,000,000 
Canada  EUR 1,568,175 
Finland  EUR 160,000 
UK  EUR 484,335 
UNDP core funds EUR 574,582 
GRZ funds Committed to ECZ EUR 2,461,538 
GRZ funds Committed to DNRPC EUR 1,538,462 
 
TAPS Chapter 5 on Monitoring and Evaluation :  
5.1  Monitoring 
Internal monitoring will be carried out by the UNDP Country Office in Zambia and the EC Delegation, 
while external ROM will be undertaken by external consultants. … Independent consultants recruited 
directly by the Commission on specifically established terms of reference will carry out external moni-
toring ROM system, which in principle will start from the sixth month of project activities, and will be 
finalised at the latest 6 months before the end of the operational implementation phase.  
5. 2  Evaluation 
The external audit carried out by the jointly implementing international organisation (UNDP). Never-
theless, the European Commission, OLAF and the Court of Auditors of the European Communities 
may still undertake checks, including on the spot, of the actions financed. External evaluations, dur-
ing or after the operational implementation phase, will be specifically launched and funded unless a 
joint, country-led process will run such exercises from domestic or joint programme resources, in line 
with JASZ principles. In this case, however, the ToR of these exercises will also take into account 
EC requirements. 
Extracts: 
EAMR, Jan 2011, p30: At national level, certain difficulties remain in the cooperation agreement with 
UNDP in the project for supporting the electoral cycle. Information is not always complete and timely 
and hampers effective supervision. EUD and member states are intensifying their efforts to improve 
the access to information and some progress was noted in the second part of the year. 
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JAR 2010, p12: The EDF10 Support to the 2009-2012 Zambian Electoral Cycle (EU: €7.4 million) 
continued to be implemented by UNDP with a view to strengthening the electoral processes in Zam-
bia. Ahead of the 2011 elections, the project in 2010 mainly focused on voter registration (with ECZ 
announcing the registration of 5,223,365 people). Support was also provided to civil society organisa-
tions to carry out voter education activities, increase women's participation and dialogue between po-
litical parties. As a result, the stakeholders reviewed the electoral Code of Conduct and the media 
were trained on ethical reporting. The voter registration process achieved satisfactory results. In 2011, 
it was estimated that close to 80% of the eligible voters had been registered. The updated voter regis-
ter provides a sound basis for the subsequent steps of the election process and – on the part of the 
EU – for effective election monitoring. 
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p1: On the Governance Action Plan – “Notable successes in the in-
tervening period include: the launching of a national anti-corruption policy, concrete action on human 
trafficking, implementation of payroll management reforms, a long awaited change in the budget cycle 
and progress in the area of access to justice. Conversely, capacity and budgetary constraints delayed 
progress in other areas, notably with respect to the electoral process. The official launch of continuous 
voter registration in June 2010 marked a significant improvement but voter education activities and 
ECZ development plans have continued to be hampered by budgetary constraints.” 
 
 
JC 6.4:  The EU support has contributed to that the electoral process was transparent and well 
organised 
It may be averred that the EU support has contributed to it that the September 2011 national electoral 
process was transparent and well organised. The “Statement of Preliminary Findings” on the 20
th
 Sep-
tember 2011 General Elections in Zambia by the EU Election Observation Mission to Zambia summarily 
concluded to “A generally well administered election day and a highly competitive campaign despite the 
absence of a level playing field”. Some critical aspects and challenges mentioned in the Mission’s 
statement refer to (i) reforms of key aspects of the electoral framework for future elections; (ii) A few 
glitches in voting and counting of ballots ; (iii) Unequal access to resources meant that there was not a 
level playing field for campaigning, and; (iv) The state-owned media failing to meet even their minimal 
obligations as public service media, as key programming such as news bulletins lacked any degree of 
balance in their coverage. (I-6.4.1)  
It needs to be stressed that these September 2011 General Elections were only one highlight of EU 
support to electoral processes in Zambia which spans over an extended period of time and includes 
longer term preparatory assistance to election events (e.g. voters education, voters registration, etc.) 
and post-elections process institutionalisation and after-care assistance. This long term support to the 
electoral process has been provided through a EDF10 Zambia CSP (A-envelope) support to the Zam-
bian Electoral Cycle 2009-2012 project with a CSP-NIP A-envelope totalling 7.4 million and with an 
operational implementation phase of 44 months. It is a “classical” project approach aid method project 
embedded in a trust fund setting with 5 other CPs and with UNDP as lead. The January 2011 External 
Assistance Management Report (EAMR) mentioned that certain difficulties remained with (especially 
monitoring) information, which is not always complete and timely, hampering effective supervision. In 
the preceding year 2010 the project mainly focused on voter registration, on civil society organisations 
to carry out voter education activities, increase women’s participation and dialogue between the political 
parties. It was estimated that close to 80% of the eligible voters had been registered. On the other 
hand, in was also mentioned in the mid-term review report of the EDF10 CSP that the official launch of 
continuous voter registration in June 2010 marked a significant improvement but voter education activi-
ties and ECZ development plans have continued to be hampered by budgetary constraints.  
In the EDF10 CSP Mid-Term Review of 2009, a series of notable successes in the democratic govern-
ance area are mentioned. But with respect to the electoral process, capacity and budgetary constraints 
are explicitly mentioned as having caused delayed progress. The official launch of continuous voter 
registration in June 2010 marked a significant improvement but voter education activities and ECZ 
(Electoral Commission of Zambia) development plans have continued to be hampered by budgetary 
constraints. Evaluation field interviews at the project implementing agency, the Electoral Commission of 
Zambia, indicated that there are still major outstanding challenges regarding the institutionalisation and 
mainstreaming of the project’s accomplishments in as much as many of the trained personnel under the 
project were hired on a contractual basis, with transfer of knowledge into the mainstream organisation 
now jeopardized with the pending end of these contracts. Other outstanding issues pertain to the solid 
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anchoring of the ICT system and tools (a major contribution of the EU), electoral support capacity 
strengthening at the provincial level and the establishment of civil registration as precondition for trans-
parent voter registration. (I-6.4.2) 
 
JC 6.5:  The EU has ensured the overall coherence of its interventions for reinforcing civil 
society capacity in relation to governance processes 
 Indicator 6.5.1: Existence of a logically arranged scheme between EU’s political and devel-
opment responses; Implementation of initially identified synergies 
The composition of the EDF10 CSP-NIP into focal sectors, general budget support and other non focal 
sectors and programmes aims at a logical and balanced structure for EU’s political and development 
response strategies. Both focal sectors (regional integration / transport infrastructure and health) have 
integral policy dialogue components. One of the three main input clusters of general budget support is 
policy dialogue. The other programmes in the NIP A envelope in principle are also based on this general 
principle and architecture. For some programmes the capacity development, policy dialogue and politi-
cal responses more explicit, if not pre-dominant e.g. for governance, for the support to initiatives of non-
state actors and also capacity building for EPA/trade related support. Other programmes as food securi-
ty and agriculture diversification are more geared towards the EU’s development response. The as-
sessment of the actual implementation of these initially identified synergies and its quality needed to be 
further investigated during the field visit based on the appreciation by the different key parties con-
cerned. It was learned that basically all development interventions also have a political or at least of 
policy dialogue component, be it with different levels of pronunciation and intensity and also with differ-
ent levels of success. Budget support theoretically has these explicit provisions for a balanced mix of 
policy dialogue / policy and development objectives as already transpires from the very selection of key 
performance indicators to measure programme results. For some the emphasis on political / policy is-
sues (particularly on accountability and transparency) is too predominant to the detriment of the devel-
opment objectives (development outcome and impact on the ground). It is in this light that also the two 
cases of misappropriations may be viewed leading to a (prolonged) stalemate in two of the most im-
portant sectors (health and transport). Also the protracted and ultimately non approval of the CSO ca-
pacity strengthening and institutional support programme under EDF9 is interpreted by some at the 
result of a not yet found balance between the political and development objectives and components of 
the country strategy and programme, despite the progress made and initial accomplishments achieved 
in this regard. It in this connection was also mentioned by key stakeholders at the EUD that the syner-
getic symbiosis of the political and development components of its country level response strategy with 
Zambia would need more proactive steering and coordination at the level of the EUD, especially also in 
the light of the Lisbon treaty placing strong emphasis on the political dimension of national and regional 
development and integration. 
The European Union’s lead in Governance issues amongst the Cooperating Partners has been con-
firmed in spring of last year 2011 when all CPs received the proposed Government-Oriented Division of 
Labour (GO-DOL) for JASZ II, to be applied under the Sixth National Development Programme (SNDP - 
2011-2015). EU has been requested and meanwhile confirmed by GRZ to “lead” the Governance sec-
tor/thematic area, while in the CP proposal it originally was put up as “active” only. Pending further clari-
fication on the scope covered by the Governance group EU would favour a focused approach looking 
mainly at performance strengthening and accountability, anti-corruption, elections and democratic gov-
ernance. 
Some basic principles for a better balanced political and development response strategy with links to 
the preferred choice / mix of aid modalities emanated from the implementation discussions of the NGO 
Act early this year, including as transpired from the talking notes: (i) EU should better link in its dialogue 
with Government the whole range of aid modalities: the final aim is to attain the MDGs and improve 
good governance / PFM, not to deliver aid through a specific modality as Budget Support; (ii) There is 
room to improve dialogue and interaction with the Government – however this requires thinking outside 
the box and identify how the existing fora (joint Sector Advisory Groups in particular) can be used better; 
(iii) Need also to review the own way of interacting as CPs (linkage PRBS Group to the wider CPG, 
DOL, Article 8); (iv) In a country such as Zambia where both GBS and SBS are made available, should 
be assessed which of the two modalities has been more effective in influencing PFM reforms and policy 
dialogue. There is a view that SBS may offer more of leverage as the focus is on specific sector targets; 
(v) EU should strengthen political economy analysis to identify resistances and drivers for change; (vi) 
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CPs should improve on the delivery of capacity building activities in order to reinforce the institutions 
and CSO that can enhance accountability and contribute to the fight against corruption, and; (vii) The 
local political agenda should be placed before EU’s own when assessing the effectiveness of BS; (vii) 
The focus should be on poverty reduction and not simply on PFM (Public Finance Management) pro-
gress.  
The EU commissioned institutional analysis of NSA in Zambia refers to the Cotonou Agreement which 
recognises the need to involve non-governmental actors throughout the whole country level planning 
and implementation process. This process comprises five well-established stages, namely: (i) Strategic 
programming; (ii) Identification of programmes and projects; (iii) Instruction of programmes and projects; 
(iv) Implementation of programmes and projects, and; (v) Evaluation and capitalisation. From the Non-
State Actor perspective, in addition to being informed throughout the process, their involvement must be 
effective at both the level of dialogue, during the programme exercise and cooperation follow-up, and 
the level of programme execution. The involvement of non-state actors in the new context of EU-ACP 
relations, as defined in the Cotonou Agreement, thereto must be effective at three levels: (i) at the level 
of access to information; (ii) at the level of dialogue and consultation for the definition and follow-up of 
the implementation of the EC Country Strategy, the National Indicative Programme and the subsequent 
programmes, and (iii) at the level of the implementation of programmes and projects by providing added 
value in terms of skills, knowledge or legitimacy, or by delivering services (such as education and 
health). As such, one can conclude to the existence of a logically arranged scheme between EU’s politi-
cal and development responses. The extent and quality of the implementation of these initially identified 
synergies is another matter as also transpired from the different interviews with key stakeholders during 
the field visits, both government and non-government. What is sure is that the protracted approval pro-
cess and ultimately non approval of the CSOs capacity strengthening project under EDF9 signified a 
major set-back in this mutually reinforcing balancing process between both core components of the EU 
response strategy as far as civil society is concerned. 
EUD regularly involves CSOs/NSAs in its programming and implementation processes, notably in the 
focal sector 2 on health, where CSOs/NSAs are consulted on the assessment of sector budget support. 
Dialogue with NSAs is also particularly intense around the Economic Partnership Agreements, where 
the EC Delegation regularly interacts at workshops and seminars. The ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011) 
country report for Zambia concluded that civil society in Zambia has been quite active in intervention on 
social issues such as poverty and public expenditure management. However, success in pushing policy 
reforms has been limited. This is reflected by the relatively lower scores on CSOs impact on policy: Only 
53.7% of the CSOs surveyed have been pushing for policy reforms and these have had limited success. 
Only 20% have had success in at least in one policy-related field. This low success rate (20%) among 
those few CSOs that push for policy reforms should be a concern, whereas the fact that almost half 
(46.3%) of the surveyed CSOs reporting not advocating policy reforms is also worrisome. 
Data, figures, tables: 
EUD; EU response to the Government-Oriented DOL for JASZ II; March 2011; pp 1-3 In early 
March all CPs received the proposed Government-Oriented Division of Labour (GO-DOL) to be applied 
under the SNDP. In parallel, CPs have put together what they consider should be the DOL among CPs 
under the JASZ II. While some of GRZ proposals are in line with CPs', this is not always the case for 
all sectors. This note aims at describing and explaining the EU position in the CP proposal, sector by 
sector (following GO-DOL document). The absence of the macro-economic sector as one of the core 
ones should be flagged to GRZ through the CPG troika, especially as the critical PFM sub-sector is 
part of it. 
10. Governance - GO-DOL sees us as lead with UK, while we put ourselves as active.  
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EAMR, Jan 2011, p17: EDF9 Non State Actors CRIS number: FED/2007/019-150 
 Project title: Capacity Building for Non-State Actors 
 Committed: €5 million – Disbursed: €0 (xx %) 
 
Results/Actions 
Forecast at 
31/12/09 
Situation at 
31/12/10 
1) Procurement by NAO of Long Term TA  Jun NA 
2) Start up Programme Estimate Aug NA 
3) Closure of programme Not in AMP 2010 Dec 
 
Extracts: 
EAMR Jan 2011, p17; regarding the Civil Society Capacity Building Programme (FA 9ACP ZA 26) - 
Activities and major deviations: Evaluation of the Expressions of Interest for the TA component was 
delayed, as the NAO was slow in appointing the members of the Committee. When the tender was 
launched in September, it was unsuccessful as the available budget had decreased due to exchange 
rate fluctuations and eventually became insufficient for implementing the planned activities. Alternative 
implementation modalities were examined (especially the one of a delegation agreement with DANI-
DA) without success. The closure of the FA has therefore been undertaken. Major obstacles encoun-
tered: Late start of programme implementation due to extremely delayed signature of the FA by the 
NAO has jeopardize the project. 
Major obstacles encountered in the period: difficulties in co-ordinating a programme managed by three 
ROs; the role of the Programme Co-ordinator who is also acting as Project Manager of Intergovern-
mental Authority on Development (IGAD) component was not clear and personalities' issues have not 
facilitated an effective co-ordination between components. There is little if any interlink between the 
three components, including COMESA's.  
 
EUD; EU response to the Government-Oriented DOL for JASZ II; March 2011 - 10. Governance - 
GO-DOL sees us as lead with UK, while we put ourselves as active. The reduction of CPs to be en-
gaged in the sector according to GRZ is dramatic, from 11 to 3, and possibly not tenable for such an 
important cross-cutting sector. Pending clarification on the scope covered by the Governance group 
(EU would favour a focused approach looking mainly at Anti-corruption, elections and democratic gov-
ernance), EU would not object being designated as co-lead together with UK/DFID. To raise with CPG 
Troika. 
 
JAR 2007, p25; regarding the Civil Society Capacity Building Programme (FA 9ACP ZA 26) - 2.4. Uti-
lisation of resources for NSAs: After a lengthy process of approval at headquarters the Financing 
Agreement for the EDF9 project (€5 million) to strengthen NSA capacities was ready for NAO's signa-
ture by the end of the year. However, the Zambian Government was reluctant to sign the FA in the ab-
sence of a legal framework for creating a mutual accountability relationship between the government 
and civil society that was part of the stalled NGO Act. The problem has been raised in all the meetings 
held with the NAO since November 2007. The Delegation has already sent two letters to the NAO, ex-
plaining the importance of this type of project under Cotonou, giving assurances of NAO involvement 
STATUS 
CP   proposal 
 
GO-DOL proposal for SNDP 
JASZ CPs Non-JASZ CPs 
Lead UK, UNDP EU, UK - 
Active 
 
WB, EU, Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, USA 
UNDP - 
Background/     
Silent 
Finland, - - 
Phasing Out  - - 
New Entry - - - 
Sub-Total - 3 0 
Total 11 3 
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in its implementation, and asking for a final formal position. The Delegation pointed out that the project 
is in line with the provisions of Cotonou Agreement for the involvement of Civil Society in development 
policies and strategies in ACP countries. Accordingly, it will be implemented under the legal and finan-
cial regulations that apply to the EDF9. An official reply is currently expected. 
 
FA 9ACP ZA 26 – Civil Society Capacity Building Programme, pp 6-8; Chapter 3.3. Stakeholders: 
The proposed support programme is directly aiming at Non-State Actors, excluding private sector or-
ganisations or their representatives, already supported through the EDF9 project “Capacity building for 
Private Sector Development”. In other words, it targets Zambian Civil Society organisations. All four 
levels of intervention (ranging from grass root organisations to national platforms) and all different sec-
tors of intervention have been considered. The mapping study conducted in 2005 contributed to a bet-
ter understanding of the positioning of various CS organisations, as well as the problems linked to 
each level and the solutions to be recommended in the framework of the present support and capacity 
building programme. Other primary stakeholders of the programme include the central and local Gov-
ernment institutions in Zambia, including the respective coordination mechanisms (such as the SAGs, 
PDCCs, and DDCCs), donors and donor agencies, international NGOs, the media, the legislative and 
the judiciary and related institutions, the private sector (mainly service providers of capacity building) 
and their representatives. 
 
Chapter 3.1 programme purpose: It is the expected outcome of the programme’s endeavour to 
strengthen institutionally, organisationally, strategically and technically these structures in order to in-
crease their capacity to represent the views of local populations, effectively engage with both the gov-
ernment and the donor community and/or provide collective services.  
Chapter 3.2 Expected results and main activities: (1): Empowerment of local communities; (2) Institu-
tional and organisational development of CSO (both 2
nd
 level and umbrella); (3) An institutional envi-
ronment conducive for an enhanced developmental role of CSOs, and (4)Improve information and en-
hance coordination efforts 
Chapter 3.4 Risks and assumptions: A prerequisite for the ability of civil society organisations to play a 
role as an active and critical voice or development partner is that they are increasingly seen as credi-
ble institutions/ organisations by the local population. Legislation and its enforcement shall secure the 
rights of organisations to exist and to conduct their activities, whether in the social or the advoca-
cy/governance sphere. This implies the appropriate formulation of a registration policy of voluntary or-
ganisations. The legislative framework for NGO activity in Zambia is currently under discussion, and 
the outcome of this discussion could have far reaching implications for the operations of NGOs. In ad-
dition, the programme could face a number of other risks:  
(i) there is considerable distrust and suspicion between the government and CSO, as well as 
among CSO themselves;  
(ii) fake NGOs might hinder the introduction of the tools aimed at the improvement of the trans-
parency and accountability of CSO;  
(iii) lack of commitment to the decentralisation process that should transfer capacities and re-
sources from the central towards the local levels;  
(iv) pressures from “deprived” local government structures to “share” the resources allocated to 
CSO;  
(v) donors not overcoming their often utilitarian focus and therefore, not being able to shift from 
efficient project management;  
(vi) absence of appropriate coordination mechanisms intended to avoid parallel financing and 
duplication of effort. 
Chapter 3.5 Conditionalities: The following conditionalities are considered: 
(i) Zambia continues to enjoy relative political stability; 
(ii) Poverty eradication remains the priority of development policies; 
(iii) CSO/NGO regulatory environment is enabling CSO to operate freely and without restraint. 
(iv) CSO adopt regulatory framework 
(v) Government continues to implement the NDP; 
(vi) Government and donor agencies remain open to engage CSO in policy dialogue, program-
ming and implementation; 
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EUD Internal Note (2011) – Some excerpts:  
o EU should better link in its dialogue with Government the whole range of aid modalities (the final 
aim is to attain the MDGs and improve good governance / PFM, not to deliver aid through a specific 
modality as BS; 
o There is room to improve dialogue and interaction with the Government – however we must think 
outside the box and identify how the existing fora (joint Sector Advisory Groups in particular) can be 
better used; need also to review our own way of interacting as CPs (linkage PRBS Group to the 
wider CPG, DOL, Article 8); 
o In a country such as Zambia where both GBS and SBS are made available, we should assess 
which of the two modalities has been more effective in influencing PFM reforms and policy dia-
logue. There is a view that SBS may offer more of leverage as the focus is on specific sector tar-
gets.  
o EU should strengthen political economy analysis to identify resistances and drivers for change; 
o CPs should improve on the delivery of Capacity Building activities in order to reinforce the institu-
tions and NSA that can enhance accountability and contribute to the fight against corruption. 
o The local political agenda should be placed before our won when assessing the effectiveness of 
BS; the focus should be on poverty reduction and not simply on PFM progress. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on I 6.5.1: 
STEM-VCR Srl (2006) pp. 34-36; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 4.3.1 NSA Involvement in the European Cooperation in Zambia: … one of the innovative as-
pects of the Cotonou Agreement is its legal recognition of the participation of certain actors, other 
than the state, in the development and cooperation process… From a cooperation perspective, the 
Cotonou Agreement recognises the need to involve non-governmental actors throughout the whole 
planning and implementation process. This process comprises five well-established stages, namely: 
(i) Strategic programming; (ii) Identification of programmes and projects; (iii) Instruction of pro-
grammes and projects; (iv) Implementation of programmes and projects, and; (v) Evaluation and capi-
talisation. 
From the non-state actor perspective, in addition to being informed throughout the process, their in-
volvement must be effective at both the level of dialogue, during the programme exercise and coop-
eration follow-up, and the level of programme execution. The following diagram illustrates these stag-
es. As shown in the diagramme, the involvement of non-state actors in the new context of EU-ACP 
relations, as defined in the Cotonou Agreement, must be effective at three levels: (i) at the level of ac-
cess to information; (ii) a the level of dialogue and consultation for the definition and follow-up of the 
implementation of the EC Country Strategy, the National Indicative Programme and the subsequent 
programmes, and (iii) at the level of the implementation of programmes and projects by providing 
added value in terms of skills, knowledge or legitimacy, or by delivering services (such as education 
and health). 
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NSA Participation in European Cooperation 
Source: STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p35 
 
STEM-VCR Srl (2006) p11; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; Chap-
ter 1 Preface – Non-state actors in the National Indicative Programme EDF9 in Zambia: The NIP (Na-
tional Indicative Programme), whilst foreseeing direct support of non-sate actors within support pro-
grammes or capacity building in the field, places particular emphasis on their role in the democratisa-
tion and modernisation processes in the country. In addition to the relevant budget lines specifically 
dedicated to civil society actors, the EDF9 has adopted an approach linked to both the involvement of 
non-state actors in programmes and projects and to their participation in the communitarian coopera-
tion review. This study, which aims at gaining a better understanding of civil society actors, their dy-
namics and characteristics, plays a role in a framework where increasing attention is paid to their po-
tential and role in the development of the country, not to mention the fight against poverty which re-
mains the main objective of both the Zambian government and EU strategies. 
  
 Indicator 6.5.2: Existence of complementarity among the projects within EDF (agriculture, 
private sector interventions) and under the different (financial) instruments available for 
promoting civil society (e.g. EDF and EIDHR) 
It goes beyond the scope of the current macro evaluation at country level to in-depth examine the exist-
ence of complementarity among individual projects within EDF and under the different instruments 
available for promoting civil society. This moreover would require in-depth knowledge of the Zambia 
CSP/NIP portfolio of EU projects, not only of their design but also of their implementation features. This 
institutional memory cannot be taken for granted, especially with the high turnover of staff at the EUD
76
  
In general terms, for the period 2007-2013, the EU aims at supporting development actions, to be im-
plemented by CSOs (including NSAs and Local Authorities - LAs) to the benefit of the most vulnerable 
population groups and strengthening their capacity to become key actors of democratic governance 
processes and poverty reduction strategies. This support is financed through two different instruments: 
(1) EDF allocations, including under the EDF10 CSP-NIP where an indicative amount of €5.5 million 
has been made available to support initiatives of NSAs in the areas of capacity-building, advocacy, 
research, awareness-raising, monitoring and delivery of services to the population (and which ultimately 
did not push through for reasons indicated earlier and has been re-programmed under EDF10), and; (2) 
                                               
76
  Just by way of illustration, at the moment of the evaluation preparatory field visit in September 2011, the incumbents of 
some 5 senior professional positions changed. 
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Through specific thematic programmes, including: (i) The thematic programme " Non-state Actors and 
Local Authorities in development" which aims at encouraging non-state actors and local authorities, 
both from the EU and Zambia, to get more involved in development issues, and; (ii) The European In-
strument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) which provides support for the promotion of de-
mocracy and human rights in Zambia. Outside the EDF, numerous grants have been provided to NSA 
in Zambia. In 2010, 40 projects were in implementation. In addition, 15 new grants were awarded under 
the Non State Actors / Local Authorities budget line, 5 under the Food Security budget line and 2 under 
the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights budget line. The projects mainly focus on 
advocacy related activities, service delivery and empowerment of vulnerable groups, in the thematic 
areas of nutrition and food security, education (community schools), good governance, decentralisation, 
human and civil rights. 
A more detailed portfolio analysis of EU support to CSOs in Zambia in the period 2001-2010 based on 
a CRIS database filtering of contracts awarded to these CSOs in this period is presented at the end of 
this information matrix on EQ 6 Democratic Governance. For the analysis of the main sources of EU 
funding of CSOs in Zambia, the EuropeAid classification of sources of funding related to the EU Devel-
opment Cooperation Instrument (DCI) since 2007 has been used. This same thematic/sectoral classifi-
cation is applied to the grant contracts awarded before 2007. In accordance with this classification, the 
three main EU sources of funding / cooperation instruments are: (i) the European Development Fund 
(EDF); (ii) The vertical thematic programmes, and; (iii) the sugar protocol with accompanying measures 
for 18 ACP countries. Of the 84 awarded contracts to CSOs in the 2001-2010 period, 28 or one third 
(33.3%) have been financed under the EDF representing a total value of 24 million Euro (or 36.1% of 
total foreseen grants contracts amount). The largest CSO funding however comes from EU vertical 
thematic programmes / budget lines, both in number of grants (55 or 65.5% of the total) and in contract 
money value (59.4% of the total). One grant contract representing 4.5% of the total CSO funding origi-
nated from the sugar protocol. Of the EU vertical thematic programmes / budget lines, the largest CSO 
funding originates from the Non-State Actors and Local Government programme (31 contracts repre-
senting more than a quarter (27.9%) of the total CSO funding, followed by food security (18 contracts 
representing 17.9% of total CSOs contract value). A distant third source is the health programme (es-
pecially HIV/Aids) (one programme, but 7.4% of the total resources). The democracy and human rights 
programme (EIDHR and DDH) provided 3.7% of the total CSO funding in the ten year period 2001-
2010 via three grants. The Environment and Natural Resources (ENRTP) budget line and the Instru-
ment for Stability (IFS-RRM) provided relatively minor funding (resp. 1.0% and 1.5% of the total). 
Data: 
Figure 7: Breakdown of total amount of EU grant contracts with CSOs in Zambia funded by 
EU thematic budget lines, by individual thematic budget line (2001-2010), in Euro 
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Figure  CS-G8 :  Breakdown of Total Amount of EU Grant Contracts with 
CSOs in Zambia Funded by EU Thematic Budget lines, by Individual             
Thematic Budget Line (2001-2010), in Euro
Source:  CRIS database search of 09 Dec 2011.  
Extracts: 
JAR 2010, p13: Outside the EDF, numerous grants have been granted to NSA in Zambia. In 2010, 40 
projects were in implementation. In addition, 15 new grants were awarded (5 with non state actors 
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and 3 with local authorities) under the Non State Actors / Local Authorities budget line, 5 under the 
Food Security budget line and 2 under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
budget line bringing the total of EU funded grants in Zambia to €36.209 million. The projects mainly 
focus on advocacy related activities, service delivery and empowerment of vulnerable groups, in the 
thematic areas of nutrition and food security, education (community schools), good governance, de-
centralisation, human and civil rights. 
EUD Website – Webpage on Governance and Civil Society Organisations; For the period 2007-2013, 
the EU aims at supporting development actions, to be implemented by Non-State-Actors (NSA) or Lo-
cal Authorities (LA), in close cooperation with the local communities and to the benefit of the most 
vulnerable population groups, aiming at promoting an inclusive and empowered society in Zambia and 
strengthening their capacity to become key actors of democratic governance processes and poverty 
reduction strategies. This support is financed through two different instruments: 
o  EDF allocations, including under the EDF10 CSP-NIP (link to page 023-01) where an indica-
tive amount of €5.5 million has been made available to support initiatives of NSAs in the areas 
of capacity-building, advocacy, research, awareness-raising, monitoring and delivery of ser-
vices to the population.  
o  Through specific thematic programmes : (i) the thematic programme " Non-state Actors and 
Local Authorities in development" which aims at encouraging non-state actors and local au-
thorities, both from the EU and Zambia, to get more involved in development issues, and (ii) 
the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) which provides support 
for the promotion of democracy and human rights in Zambia.  
EU    saka; “Ra io a e  or EDF10 N  s ca aci   b i  i    rojec  i  Zambia”;    er a  No e; 
2011: p2 (6) The main lessons to be learned from other CPs experience relate to the fact that donor 
responses have not focused on supporting the role of NSAs to hold government accountable by enter-
ing into constructive engagement. The focus has been more on the NSA's role in ‘demand-side ac-
countability’ and less on the need to strengthen the capacity of GRZ ('supply–side')  
 Indicator 6.5.3: Level of comprehensiveness of the EU responses to the different actors in 
the governance arena (governments, parliaments, electoral process, CSOs, others) 
The design of the EU response to the different actors in the governance arena has been quite compre-
hensive indeed as it targets the main stakeholder clusters and different actors, including government, 
parliament, electoral processes, police, civil society organisations, etc. either explicitly and/or exclusive-
ly through special project approach type of interventions, or in the broader framework of an encompass-
ing programme (PRSP, PEMFA, PRBS, …). It however is not clear if and how these different compo-
nents of the governance response strategy targeting the different stakeholder groups are related to 
each other, how they are complementary and mutually reinforcing. This particularly pertains to the dif-
ferent components of the Access to Justice Programme. Moreover a crucial component of the compre-
hensive response package in the governance arena (CSOs capacity building programme) was can-
celled and transferred to the following EDF10 programming cycle. 
The 2010 extensive review of Budget Support to Zambia since 2006, discussed in the 2010 JAR by the 
EU and GRZ is outspoken in its assessment of EU-GRZ cooperation when mentioning that the main 
criticisms to the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) process in Zambia relates to the insufficient 
attention to the demand-side, be it for domestic accountability (active participation of NSAs, Parliament, 
etc.) or for capacity-building. At the same time it is recognized that needs are not always clearly spelled 
out. In short, the PRBS as flagship programme absorbing about half (48.9%) of the total budget of the 
EDF10 CSP-NIP lacks demand-driven focus and ownership. The Mid-Term Review of the EDF10 CSP-
NIP comes to about a similar conclusion about the NSA/LA involvement in the policy dialogue: The 
NSAs have been actively consulted with by the EC Delegation during the EDF10 MTR process and 
good intentions have been made to strengthen the support and dialogue with NSA’s, but no roadmap 
has been developed for strategizing the actual interaction between the EU and NSAs in Zambia.  
Component 10 of the Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) pro-
gramme (12m Euro financing by the EU through general budget support with a total programme cost of 
57.6m Euro) aims at developing the capacity of the Parliament to play its oversight role in public re-
sources management in order to promote the culture of democratic governance, transparency and ac-
countability. The 2010 PEMFA evaluation concluded to no change of all relevant indicators for compo-
nent 10 as at June 2010 in comparison to the 2005 and 2008 assessments. The overwhelming contri-
bution of PEMFA to Component 10, however, has been the provision of the buildings, with very little 
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ongoing capacity building of staff and parliamentarians. The majority of the capacity building support, 
particularly in respect of the effective operation of general purpose committees (PAC and Estimates 
Committee), has come from the wider Parliamentary Reform Project (PRPIII).  
The approval process of the Civil Society Capacity Building Programme (FA 9ACP ZA 26) followed a 
rocky road. After a lengthy process of approval at headquarters the Financing Agreement for the EDF9 
project (€5 million) to strengthen NSA capacities was ready for NAO's signature by the end of 2007. 
However, the Zambian Government was reluctant to sign the FA in the absence of a legal framework 
for creating a mutual accountability relationship between the government and civil society that was part 
of the stalled NGO Act. The Act finally got approved and the FA signed but then the tender failed, the 
CSO scene had so drastically changed since the project’s design phase that it ultimately was decided 
to close the current FA and to start on a new basis with the foreseen envelope for support to NSAs 
under the EDF10 (Centralized Management with a Delegation Agreement with one of the CPs contrib-
uting to the pool fund of the Zambia Governance Foundations (ZGF), possibly DANIDA or DIFID. 
Long term support to the electoral process has been provided through a EDF10 Zambia CSP (A-
envelope), which was originally formulated under the EDF9 already. Support to the Zambian Electoral 
Cycle 2009-2012 project with a CSP-NIP A-envelope totalling 7.4 million and with an operational im-
plementation phase of 44 months. It is a “classical” project approach aid method embedded in a trust 
fund setting with a total trust fund of 14.9 million € with 5 other CPs plus GRZ, and with UNDP as lead. 
It may be confidently averred that the EU support has contribute to it that the electoral process was 
transparent and well organised. However, as transpired from the field interviews, important challenges 
still remain regarding the mainstreaming and institutionalisation of the project as the bulk of expertise to 
the project has been provided by contractual whose contracts are about to end. Other important re-
maining challenges remain to electoral processes capacity building at Provincial level and to civil regis-
tration as precondition to transparent and genuine voter registration. 
The “Support to the Strengthening of the Justice Sector in Zambia: Access to Justice” intervention 
(FED/2010/021-651/1) is a 6m Euro project indirectly centralised managed through the signing of a 
Delegation Agreement with GTZ. The AtoJ project aims at easier access to justice for all, including the 
poor and vulnerable, women and children. The specific objective is to improve performance of their 
mandates by justice agencies and institutions. The AtoJ in itself is a governance and human rights pro-
gramme. The fulfilment of citizens’ rights (including that of access to justice) is core and underlying 
principle of this project. In addition, it will partially address the linked issues of gender and child rights, 
which will be addressed through training and strengthening of new law enforcement mechanisms, like 
new penal code dispositions on sexual crimes and community service sentences. From the field inter-
views it was learned that the achievement of the above objectives and delivery of results is rather lim-
ited in as much as project activities so far have mainly concentrated on infrastructure and equipment 
(especially ICT), thus laying the basis for actual results production in the next phase as aspired for. 
Another reported challenge is overcoming the relative isolation of the different programme components 
and converting these into an integrated programme approach and dito network. This particularly per-
tains to the different types of courts covered by the programme. 
The 2008 Governance Secretariat mid-term review chapter on accountability and transparency as one 
of the main weaknesses in the system was observed the fact that there still is a two year lag between 
the time the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) presents its report to the PAC and the release of the 
PACs report. The report asserts that during this long lag, the officers responsible for any misappropria-
tion if any, could easily have tampered with evidence, been transferred, retired, left the country or even 
died, and that this is a governance issue which should be addressed. With regard to the effectiveness 
of the Governance Programme, the review observed that the overall assessment of sector performance 
against the identified Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) shows that out of a total of seven indicators, 
only one has been met, another one has been partly met while a third does not have a target… On the 
basis of the table, is concluded that during the period under review, despite the valiant efforts of the 
sector, most of the KPIs were not me. The review concluded that the Governance Secretariat (GS) 
could do much more besides the primary coordinating role. Also, the current positioning of the GS, at a 
level which is below that of a government department, and also housed within the Ministry of Justice, 
could be interpreted by some as a weak institution which is under the control of the Ministry of Justice.  
Extracts: 
JAR 2010, p8: On the 2010 extensive review of Budget Support to Zambia since 2006: “The main crit-
icisms to the PRBS process in Zambia relate to the insufficient attention to the demand-side, be it for 
domestic accountability (active participation of NSAs, Parliament) or for capacity-building (though it 
recognises that needs are not always clearly spelled out).”  
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MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p17: NSA/LA involvement in policy dialogue? (iii) Following the Re-
port elaborated by DG DEV on the consultation of NSA and LA in the EDF10 programming process, 
has a roadmap been developed and shared with the stakeholders? If yes, outcomes? Is it available 
from the EC Delegation website? No roadmap has been developed for interaction between the EC 
and NSA in Zambia. However, the EC Delegation has actively consulted NSA during the EDF10 MTR 
process and intends to strengthen its support to and dialogue with NSAs going forward, particularly 
surrounding their monitoring of budget support. 
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p18: Level of involvement of other government bodies such as Par-
liaments? Parliament was involved in a very busy period with an early introduction of the budget for 
debate during the three weeks of the in-country MTR exercise, and so was largely unavailable for 
consultation during this period. One MP did however attend the discussion on social and poverty situ-
ation in Zambia. 
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p x - To what extent and how has the implemen-
tation of the Paris Declaration led to an improvement in the efficiency of aid delivery, the management 
and use of aid and better partnerships (process and intermediate outcomes) – Core Question 2. 
“There is also increased openness by government and development partners to include civil society in 
development planning processes with formal representation as evidenced in the health sector by 
CHAZ in aid coordination, although the extent of civil society participation and engagement is per-
ceived differently across stakeholder groups. 
 
REPIM & Oxford Policy Management (2010); PEMFA Evaluation pp B65-B68; B10. Component 
10: Enhanced Parliamentary Oversight 
The longer term improvement focus for this component is to develop the capacity of the Parliament to 
play its oversight role in public resources management in order to promote the culture of democratic 
governance, transparency and accountability. This will be measured by: 
• Increased meaningful participation of MP’s in the oversight of budget preparation, budget im-
plementation and the Auditor General’s report. 
• Increased response by the Executive to the reports of the PAC, the Estimates Committee and 
departmentally related committees. 
• Increased public participation and awareness. 
All relevant indicators for Component 10 are assessed as no change with reference to the 2005 and 
2008 assessments as at June 2010 which is reflected in the table below. PI-27 has shown improve-
ment in the first two dimensions (from ‘C’ to ‘B’ in each case), however, as noted in the following ta-
ble. Whilst this improvement is welcome, it has been driven largely by the reform measures support-
ed outside of the PEMFA 
PEMFA Component Relevant Indicators 2005 2008 2010 
PI-27 Legislative scrutiny of the annual budget law. C+ C+ C+ 
PI-28 Legislative scrutiny of external audit reports C+ C+ C+ 
The overwhelming contribution of PEMFA to Component 10, however, has been the provision of the 
buildings, with very little ongoing capacity building of staff and parliamentarians. The majority of the 
capacity building support, particularly in respect of the effective operation of general purpose com-
mittees (PAC and Estimates Committee), has come from the wider Parliamentary Reform Project 
(PRPIII). The Parliamentary Reform Programme also supported study visits, website development 
and is providing funding for a number of pilot constituency office in different provinces and districts. 
Project reports and interviews with Assembly staff indicate that there has been some learning from 
the PEMFA ‘’know how’’ support although it is difficult to quantify. As indicated by the detailed analy-
sis of work plans it was not always clear as to which training and placement activities were provided 
by PEMFA or outside of PEMFA. 
 Indicator 6.5.4: Level of internalisation of CSOs issues in other relevant EU policies with 
Zambia (regional integration, trade, food security) 
 
In connection with the EDF8, from the very onset in the 2001-2010 period under review, explicit refer-
ences to CSOs as partners in development are made explicitly in both strategy and programming 
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documents. The EDF8 Export Development Programme II for example financed the functioning of the 
National Working Group on Trade (NWGT), a committee of government, private sector and civil socie-
ty representatives responsible for examining Zambia’s international trade relations including EPA and 
regional agreements. In the successor EDF9 and 10 CSP-NIPs, references to non-state actors get 
more prominent and broader. But in general, by 2006 the EU commissioned institutional analysis of 
Non State Actors in Zambia still was to conclude that Non-State Actor involvement in EC cooperation 
in Zambia was at an early stage of development 
 
In the EDF10 CSP-NIP, CSOs are explicitly referred to as special paragraph under the section on 
other non-focal sectors. The strategic document sees support to Non-State Actors in a holistic context 
covering (i) human development (transfer of knowledge, experience, skills, values, etc.), (ii) organisa-
tion strengthening (establishment of management systems, development of an organisational culture, 
improvement of work processes, etc.) and (iii) institutions and policies (improvement of the legal and 
administrative framework, promotion of cooperation between state, private sector and civil society). 
This 2008-2013 CSP/NIP moreover sees capacity building for NGOs not only in the more classic are-
as of support, but also in new areas like trade. It for example is mentioned that the negotiation of 
EPAs (Economic Partnership Agreements) should involve NSAs, but that for that also sufficient train-
ing and capacities are required. In this connection under the EDF9 private sector project a special 
project to support NSAs and intermediary organisations was foreseen originally.  
 
On the other hand, no evidence was found of explicit provisions or references to CSOs or CSO relat-
ed issues in the Regional Strategy Paper / Regional Indicative Programme (RSP/RIP) technical and 
administrative provisions for the Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. (ESA-IO) Region. 
Also in the EDF10 CSP-NIP section on food security and agricultural diversification no explicit provi-
sions for or references to CSOs or CSO related issues were found, whereas in the EC accompanying 
measures for ACP Sugar Protocol countries as far as the Zambia strategy component is concerned 
only reference is made to the expansion of sugar production through outgrower schemes. From the 
field interviews with different stakeholders concerned and from the advance portfolio analysis
77
 it 
however was learned that food security related support was mainly provided through the food security 
special vertical programme and budget line outside the EDF and that these funds had a major CSO 
support component and to a large extent even have been channelled through CSO (farmers organisa-
tions and associations). It was also argued that the links between the vertical budget lines and the 
EDF need to be further strengthened. The Mid-Term Review of the EDF10 learned that generally 
NSAs form part of Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs), which are formal government structures estab-
lished under each sector. SAGs meetings should be held on a quarterly basis and discuss policy is-
sues in the sectors, progress on implementation of relevant projects and programmes and they also 
provide a forum for the sharing of information between GRZ, NSA and CPs. The MTR concluded that 
this is working well in some sectors (health, education, macro-economic), but less in others (Private 
Sector Development, agriculture). The review furthermore indicated that the Delegation regularly in-
volves NSAs in its programming and implementation processes, notably in the focal sector 2 on 
health, where NSAs are consulted on the assessment of sector budget support. Dialogue with NSAs 
is also particularly intense around the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), where the EC Del-
egation regularly interacts at workshops and seminars.” 
 
The recent Mid-Term Review of the Zambia Governance Foundation concluded that it is too soon to 
judge whether the accomplishments achieved with the help of ZGF support are enough to bring the 
changes required to achieve the ambitious purpose of the ZGF. The review team concluded that the 
groundwork for a high quality grant-making facility is in place, but considerable additional investment 
will be needed to realise ZGF’s purpose.  
 
Extracts: 
EAMR Jan 2011, p3.: The ToR of the IRCC [Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee] have been ex-
tended to include aid for trade and wider co-ordination issues. 
 
RSP & RIP 2008-2013; p20 -.EU; Annual Action Programme 2007 Accompanying Measures for Sug-
ar Protocol Countries – Allocation 2007 Zambia – Financing Agreement; December 2007: There are 
no explicit provisions for or references to CSOs or CSO related issues in the TAPs 
 
EDF10 CSP-NIP 2008-2013, Annexes p. xxi: CSOs referred to the need of capacity building for 
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  See the summary results of the portfolio analysis at the end of this section on EQ-6 under this information matrix. 
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NGOs, not only in the more classic areas, but also in new areas like trade. The current negotiation of 
EPAs should involve NSAs, but for that sufficient training and capacities are required. The Delegation 
replied that there is a provision under the EDF9 private sector project to support NSAs and intermedi-
ary organisations. 
 
EDF10 CSP-NIP 2008-2013 p33: Section IV.5 on Other non-focal sectors: Non-state actors are in-
cluded as special paragraph under 86. Other non-focal sectors as follows: “Non-State Actors: support 
in a holistic context i.e. including human development (transfer of knowledge, experience, skills, val-
ues, etc.), organisation strengthening (establishment of management systems, development of an or-
ganisational culture, improvement of work processes, etc.) and institutions and policies (improvement 
of the legal and administrative framework, promotion of cooperation between state, private sector and 
civil society) 
 
EDF10 CSP-NIP 2008-2013; .33 - Section IV.4 on Main non-focal sectors – Food security and agricul-
ture diversification: There are no explicit provisions for or references to CSOs or CSO related issues 
in the section on food security and agriculture diversification in the EDF10 CSP-NIP 2008-2013. In re-
lation to the EC accompanying measures for ACP Sugar Protocol countries makes as far as the Zam-
bia strategy component is concerned reference to the expansion of sugar production through out-
grower schemes. 
 
10 CSP-NIP 2008-2013; p33 - Section IV.5 on Other non-focal sectors – EPA / Trade related support 
(capacity building): There are no explicit provisions for or references to CSOs or CSO related issues 
in the in this section as far as 10
th
 and EDF9 are concerned. Only in connection with the EDF8 refer-
ences to CSOs are mentioned explicitly; “Regarding institutional support, the EDF8 Export Develop-
ment Programme II is already financing the functioning of the National Working Group on Trade 
(NWGT), a committee of government, private sector and civil society representatives responsible for 
examining Zambia’s international trade relations including EPA and regional agreements. EDF10 
funding could continue to provide such support during the early implementation phases of EPAs. 
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p16: NSA/LA involvement in policy dialogue? Frequency of dialogue: 
“NSA form part of Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs), which are formal government structures estab-
lished under each sector. SAGs meetings should be held on a quarterly basis and discuss policy is-
sues in the sectors, progress on implementation of relevant projects and programmes and they also 
provide a forum for the sharing of information between GRZ, NSA and CPs. This is working well in 
some sectors (health, education, macro-economic, but less in others (PSD, agriculture). In addition, 
NSAs are involved in the reviews of the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS), which is the 
framework for general budget support in Zambia. In particular Civil society has been given capacity 
building support to engage on the monitoring of budget support in Zambia at national, provincial and 
district levels. The Delegation regularly involves NSA in its programming and implementation pro-
cesses, notably in focal sector 2: Health, where NSAs are consulted on the assessment of sector 
budget support. Dialogue with NSAs is also particularly intense around the Economic Partnership 
Agreements, where the EC Delegation regularly interacts at workshops and seminars.” 
Field Visit Additional Information on JC 6.5: 
Governance Secretariat (2008) pp 15-17; Governance Mid-Term Review (2006-2008) – Chapter 6 
on Efficiency of Implementation of Governance Programme – 6.3 Accountability and Transparency: 
One obvious weakness … is the fact that there still is a two year lag between the time the Office of the 
Auditor General (OAG) presents its report to the PAC and the release of the4 PACs report. Respons-
es on the matters raised by the Auditor General (AG) to controlling officers also take long to be ad-
dressed by Cabinet Office. During this long lag, the officers responsible for any misappropriation if 
any, could easily have tampered with evidence, been transferred, retired, left the country or even died. 
There is no immediate formal action in the form of investigations launched on the OAG’s findings as 
soon as the report is released. This is a governance issue which should be addressed. Other than 
that, overall, the limited number of indicators on the programme right from the start was a serious 
omission considering the importance of this component of governance. Indicators could have been 
developed to measure specific areas such as the level of corruption, quality of service delivery and 
actions taken on corruption (such as domestication of international conventions and protocols as well 
as convictions of high profile corrupt officials).  
 
Governance Secretariat (2008) pp. 18-19; Governance Mid-Term Review (2006-2008) – Chapter 7 
on Effectiveness of Governance Programme: Overall assessment of sector performance against KPIs 
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(as presented in the table) shows that out of a total of seven indicators, only one has been met, an-
other one has been partly met while a third does not have a target… On the basis of the table, one 
can see that during the period under review, despite the valiant efforts of the sector, most of the KPIs 
were not met… One also needs to take into account that the governance sector is still a fairly new 
phenomenon (and the number of new governance institutions is testimony to the fact). It therefore re-
quires time to sip through the entire Government system… Nonetheless, the Governance Secretariat 
(GS) could do much more besides the primary coordinating role. The secretariat should be mandated 
to advise other governance institutions, work alongside these institutions to design tools and method-
ologies of enhancing governance and make recommendations to higher authorities on policy related 
matters. The current positioning of the GS, at a level which is below that of a government department 
– thus minus its own Permanent Secretary, and also housed within the Ministry of Justice, could be 
interpreted by some as a weak institution which is under the control of the Ministry of Justice. 
 
 
STEM-VCR Srl (2006) pp 36-37; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 4.3. NSA Involvement in the European Cooperation in Zambia : Non-state actor involvement in 
EC cooperation in Zambia is at an early stage of development. Some ad hoc initiatives have hitherto 
been taken, both at the level of dialogue/consultation (i.e. the involvement of NSA in the mid-term re-
view under the coordination of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; the inclusion of NSA members on the steer-
ing committees of EDF funded projects) and at the level of implementation, with some programmes 
(mainly in the agricultural and private sector development) addressing the capacity building needs of a 
group of NSA and a number of budget lines available for local CSO… The above table summarizes the 
initiatives taken so far by the Delegation of the European Commission in Zambia in favour of non-state 
actors:  
 
… it can be concluded that while Zambian civil society has moved forward, and is strong in compari-
son with some neighbouring countries, it would be a mistake to overestimate the strength or impact 
that could be expected from its engagement with government. 
 
STEM-VCR Srl (2006) pp 36-37; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 4.3. NSA knowledge and familiarity with Cotonou and with EC policies and strategy instru-
ments: …, as interviewed CSOs reported in the team of consultants, information on Cotonou and, 
more specifically, on EC strategy and its programmes remains insufficient. In this sense, it is im-
portant to highlight that access to information is a key and sine qua non condition to promote empow-
erment and effective participation, which in turn contributes to better governance and public account-
ability. In general, CSOs recognize that the EU has made important progress in expanding disclosure 
but further efforts need to be made. In general, CSOs view greater disclosure as a key step forward 
operationalising the civic engagement framework put forward by the Cotonou Agreement, so that all 
non-state stakeholders have the background and information they need to engage effectively in dia-
logue with both the government and the EU. 
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The IDL Group (2011)
78
 pp 23-24; Mid-term Review of the Zambia Governance Foundation, Final 
Draft; May 2011 – Chapter 8: The midterm review spent three weeks assessing the Zambia Govern-
ance Foundation’s progress between its launch in July 2009 and March 2011, when the MTR field 
work was undertaken. The review team concluded that the concept of a pooled multi-annual civil soci-
ety fund offering core funding and smaller grants was sound. This structure offers clear advantages 
for both CSOs and donors, including but not limited to: reduced transaction costs, better quality 
screening and monitoring processes, and (while limited) better quality support to partners in the life-
time of the grant. Despite these advantages over more ‘traditional’ funding arrangements, ZGF will 
always need to be complemented by other funding CS sources.  
The review team found convincing evidence of results in the field. ZGF funds have supported a wide 
variety of activities (in its initiative and institutional GPs) and institution strengthening efforts (particu-
larly in its partners receiving institutional funding, but also through the assessment process of its initia-
tive GPs). Noteworthy accomplishments include the strengthening of financial and human resource 
practices in larger CSOs, and marked improvements in the M&E skills and policy awareness in small-
er grant partners. Issues in which ZGF funds have helped GPs make a contribution to policy include: 
land disputes, prisoners’ rights, education policy, and mental health policy.  
It is too soon, however, to judge whether these and other accomplishments achieved with the help of 
ZGF support are enough to bring the changes required to achieve the ambitious purpose of the ZGF. 
The review team concluded that the groundwork for a high quality grant-making facility is in place, but 
considerable additional investment will be needed to realise ZGF’s purpose. The review team recom-
mends that the analytic and lesson-learning capacities of the Foundation be strengthened considera-
bly, in order to develop and refine ‘theories of change’ that explain how ZGF’s funds and capacity 
building efforts are (or are not) contributing to substantive policy change and CSO capacity in Zambia. 
In addition, the review team recommends that size of the Secretariat be increased. Current staff levels 
are not sufficient to provide grant partners the ongoing support they need to ‘transform’ as individual 
organisations, nor are resources sufficient to create innovative platforms for lesson-learning across 
CSOs. 
 
JC 6.5:  The EU has ensured the overall coherence of its interventions for reinforcing civil soci-
ety capacity in relation to governance processes 
The composition of the EDF10 CSP-NIP into focal sectors, general budget support and other non focal 
sectors and programmes aims at a logical and balanced structure for EU’s political and development 
responses. Both focal sectors (regional integration / transport infrastructure and health) have integral 
policy dialogue components. One of the three main input clusters of general budget support is policy 
dialogue. The other programmes in the NIP A-envelope in principle are also based on this general prin-
ciple and architecture, with for some the capacity development, policy dialogue and political responses 
more explicit, if not pre-dominant (e.g. governance, and support to initiatives of non-state actors and 
also capacity building for EPA/trade related support), whereas food security and agriculture diversifica-
tion is more geared towards the EU’s development response.
79
  
The assessment of the actual implementation of these initially identified synergies and its quality need-
ed to be further investigated during the field visit based on the appreciation by the different key parties 
concerned. It was learned that basically all development interventions also have a political or at least of 
policy dialogue component, be it with different levels of pronunciation and intensity and also with differ-
ent levels of success. Budget support theoretically has these explicit provisions for a balanced mix of 
policy dialogue / policy and development objectives as already transpires from the very selection of key 
performance indicators to measure programme results. For some the emphasis on political / policy is-
sues (particularly on accountability and transparency) is too predominant to the detriment of the devel-
opment objectives (development outcome and impact on the ground). It is in this light that also the two 
cases of misappropriations may be viewed leading to a (prolonged) stalemate in two of the most im-
portant sectors (health and transport). Also the protracted and ultimately non approval of the CSO ca-
pacity strengthening and institutional support programme under EDF9 is interpreted by some as the 
result of a not yet found balance between the political and development objectives and components of 
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  In view of the non approval of the originally foreseen EU supported CSOs capacity building project under EDF IX and its 
successor programme under EDF X still under preparation, some findings are presented here in relation to the CSO related 
JCs and Indicators under this EQ-6 as a kind of proxy indication, originating from the Mid-Term Review of the Zambia Gov-
ernance Foundation which is supported by a number of European Union Member States and with the EU as observer. 
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 See Figure 7: Breakdown of total amount of EU grant contracts with CSOs in Zambia funded by EU thematic budget lines, 
by individual thematic budget line (2001-2010), in Euro 
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the country strategy and programme, despite the progress made and initial accomplishments achieved 
in this regard. It in this connection was also mentioned by key stakeholders at the EUD that the syner-
getic symbiosis of the political and development components of its country level response strategy with 
Zambia would need more proactive steering and coordination at the level of the EUD, especially also in 
the light of the Lisbon treaty placing strong emphasis on the political dimension of national and regional 
development and integration. 
The European Union’s lead in Governance issues amongst the Cooperating Partners has been con-
firmed in spring of last year 2011 when all CPs received the proposed Government-Oriented Division of 
Labour (GO-DOL) for JASZ II, to be applied under the Sixth National Development Programme (SNDP 
- 2011-2015). EU has been requested and meanwhile confirmed by GRZ to “lead” the Governance 
sector/thematic area, while in the CP proposal it originally was put up as “active” only. Pending further 
clarification on the scope covered by the Governance group EU would favour a focused approach look-
ing mainly at performance strengthening and accountability, anti-corruption, elections and democratic 
governance. 
The EU commissioned institutional analysis of NSA in Zambia refers to the Cotonou Agreement which 
recognises the need to involve non-governmental actors throughout the whole country level planning 
and implementation process. Based on this analysis, the existence of a logically arranged scheme be-
tween EU’s political and development responses can be concluded to. The extent and quality of the 
implementation of these initially identified synergies is another matter as also transpired from the differ-
ent interviews with key stakeholders during the field visits, both government and non-government. What 
is sure is that the protracted approval process and ultimately non approval of the CSOs capacity 
strengthening project under EDF9 signified a major set-back in this mutually reinforcing balancing pro-
cess between both core components of the EU response strategy as far as civil society is concerned. (I-
6.5.1)  
Under EDF9 and especially EDF10, the promotion of civil society has been facilitated through a series 
of projects within different sectors of the EDF and under different (financial) instruments. However, the 
complementarity and/or mutually reinforcing character of these different projects within the EDF is not 
always obvious or clear. In general terms, for the period 2007-2013, the EU aimed at supporting devel-
opment actions to be implemented by CSOs (including NSAs and Local Authorities - LAs) to the benefit 
of the most vulnerable population groups and strengthening their capacity to become key actors of 
democratic governance processes and poverty reduction strategies. This support is financed through 
two different instruments: (1) EDF allocations, including under the EDF10 CSP-NIP where an indicative 
amount of €5.5 million has been made available to support initiatives of NSAs in the areas of capacity-
building, advocacy, research, awareness-raising, monitoring and delivery of services to the population 
(and which ultimately did not push through for reasons indicated earlier and has been re-programmed 
under EDF10), and; (2) Through specific thematic programmes, including: (i) The thematic programme 
"Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development" which aims at encouraging non-state actors 
and local authorities, both from the EU and Zambia, to get more involved in development issues, and; 
(ii) The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) which provides support for the 
promotion of democracy and human rights in Zambia. Outside the EDF, numerous grants have been 
provided to NSAs in Zambia. In 2010, 40 projects were in implementation. In addition, 15 new grants 
were awarded under the Non State Actors / Local Authorities budget line, 5 under the Food Security 
budget line and 2 under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights budget line. The 
projects mainly focus on advocacy related activities, service delivery and empowerment of vulnerable 
groups, in the thematic areas of nutrition and food security, education (community schools), good gov-
ernance, decentralisation, human and civil rights.  
A more detailed portfolio analysis of EU support to CSOs in Zambia in the period 2001-2010 based on 
a CRIS database filtering of contracts awarded to these CSOs in this period is presented at the end of 
this information matrix on EQ 6 Democratic Governance. For the analysis of the main sources of EU 
funding of CSOs in Zambia, the EuropeAid classification of sources of funding related to the EU Devel-
opment Cooperation Instrument (DCI) since 2007 has been used. This same thematic/sectoral classifi-
cation is applied to the grant contracts awarded before 2007. In accordance with this classification, the 
three main EU sources of funding / cooperation instruments are: (i) the European Development Fund 
(EDF); (ii) The vertical thematic programmes, and; (iii) the sugar protocol with accompanying measures 
for 18 ACP countries. Of the 84 awarded contracts to CSOs in the 2001-2010 period, 28 or one third 
(33.3%) have been financed under the EDF representing a total value of 24 million Euro (or 36.1% of 
total foreseen grants contracts amount). The largest CSO funding however comes from EU vertical 
thematic programmes / budget lines, both in number of grants (55 or 65.5% of the total) and in contract 
money value (59.4% of the total). One grant contract representing 4.5% of the total CSO funding origi-
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nated from the sugar protocol. Of the EU vertical thematic programmes / budget lines, the largest CSO 
funding originates from the Non-State Actors and Local Government programme (31 contracts repre-
senting more than a quarter (27.9%) of the total CSO funding, followed by food security (18 contracts 
representing 17.9% of total CSOs contract value). A distant third source is the health programme (es-
pecially HIV/Aids) (one programme, but 7.4% of the total resources). The democracy and human rights 
programme (EIDHR and DDH) provided 3.7% of the total CSO funding in the ten year period 2001-
2010 via three grants. The Environment and Natural Resources (ENRTP) budget line and the Instru-
ment for Stability (IFS-RRM) provided relatively minor funding (resp. 1.0% and 1.5% of the total). (I-
6.5.2) 
The design of the EU response to the different actors in the governance arena has been quite compre-
hensive indeed as it targets the main stakeholder clusters and different actors, including government, 
parliament, electoral processes, justice and police, civil society organisations, etc. either explicitly 
and/or exclusively through special project approach type of interventions, or in the broader framework 
of an encompassing programme (PRSP, PEMFA, PRBS, …). It however is not clear if and how these 
different components of the governance response strategy targeting the different stakeholder groups 
are related to each other, how they are complementary and mutually reinforcing. This particularly per-
tains to the different components of the Access to Justice Programme. Moreover a crucial component 
of the comprehensive response package in the governance arena (the civil society capacity building 
programme) was cancelled and transferred to the following EDF10 programming cycle.  
The main criticism to the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) process and general budget sup-
port as main aid modality in Zambia relates to the insufficient attention to the demand-side, be it for 
domestic accountability (active participation of NSAs, Parliament, local government, etc.) or for capaci-
ty-building. At the same time it is recognized that needs are not always clearly spelled out. In short, the 
PRBS as flagship programme absorbing about half of the total budget of the EDF10 CSP-NIP lacks 
demand-driven focus and ownership. The Mid-Term Review of the EDF10 CSP-NIP comes to about a 
similar conclusion about the NSA/LA involvement in the policy dialogue: Yes, the NSAs have been ac-
tively consulted with by the EC Delegation during the EDF10 MTR process and good intentions have 
been made to strengthen the support and dialogue with NSA’s, but no roadmap has been developed for 
strategizing the actual interaction between the EU and NSAs in Zambia. 
The mid-term review of the Governance Secretariat support programme concluded with regard to its 
effectiveness that, based on the assessment of sector performance against the identified Key Perfor-
mance Indicators (KPIs), out of a total of seven indicators only one has been met despite the valiant 
efforts of the sector. The review concluded that the Governance Secretariat (GS) could do much more 
besides the primary coordinating role, but that such would require far more substantive resources. Also, 
the current positioning of the GS, at a level which is below that of a government department, and also 
housed within the Ministry of Justice, could be interpreted by some as a weak institution which is under 
the control of the Ministry of Justice. (I-6.5.3)  
From the very onset in the 2001-2010 period under review, explicit references to CSOs as partners in 
development are made explicitly in both EDF8 strategy and programming documents. The EDF8 Export 
Development Programme II for example financed the functioning of the National Working Group on 
Trade (NWGT), a committee of government, private sector and civil society representatives responsible 
for examining Zambia’s international trade relations including EPA and regional agreements. In the 
successor EDF9 and 10 CSP-NIPs, references to non-state actors gradually get more systematic, 
prominent and broader. But in general, by 2006 the EU commissioned institutional analysis of Non 
State Actors in Zambia still was to conclude that Non-State Actor involvement in EC cooperation in 
Zambia was at an early stage of development still. In the EDF 10 CSP-NIP, CSOs are explicitly referred 
to as special paragraph under the section on other non-focal sectors. The strategic document sees 
support to Non-State Actors in a holistic context covering (i) human development (transfer of 
knowledge, experience, skills, values, etc.), (ii) organisation strengthening (establishment of manage-
ment systems, development of an organisational culture, improvement of work processes, etc.) and (iii) 
institutions and policies (improvement of the legal and administrative framework, promotion of coopera-
tion between state, private sector and civil society). This 2008-2013 CSP/NIP moreover sees capacity 
building for NGOs not only in the more classic areas of support, but also in new areas like trade. It for 
example is mentioned that the negotiation of EPAs (Economic Partnership Agreements) should involve 
NSAs, but that for that also sufficient training and capacities are required. In this connection under the 
EDF9 private sector project a special project to support NSAs and intermediary organisations was fore-
seen originally.  
On the other hand, no evidence was found of explicit provisions or references to CSOs or CSO related 
issues in the Regional Strategy Paper / Regional Indicative Programme (RSP/RIP) technical and ad-
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ministrative provisions for the Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. (ESA-IO) Region. 
Also in the EDF10 CSP-NIP section on food security and agricultural diversification no such references 
were found, whereas in the EC accompanying measures for ACP Sugar Protocol countries as far as the 
Zambia strategy component is concerned only reference is made to the expansion of sugar production 
through outgrower schemes. From the field interviews with different stakeholders concerned and from 
the advanced portfolio analysis
80
 it however was learned that food security related support was mainly 
provided through the food security special vertical programme and budget line outside the EDF and that 
these funds had a major CSO support component and to a large extent even have been channelled 
through CSOs (farmers organisations and associations). It was also argued that, overall, the links be-
tween the vertical budget lines and the EDF need to be further strengthened. The Mid-Term Review of 
the EDF10 learned that generally NSAs form part of Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs), which are formal 
government structures established under each sector. SAGs meetings should be held on a quarterly 
basis and discuss policy issues in the sectors, progress on implementation of relevant projects and 
programmes and they also provide a forum for the sharing of information between GRZ, NSA and CPs. 
The MTR concluded that this is working well in some sectors (health, education, macro-economic), but 
less in others (Private Sector Development, agriculture). The review furthermore indicated that the Del-
egation regularly involves NSAs in its programming and implementation processes, notably in the focal 
sector 2 on health, where NSAs are consulted on the assessment of sector budget support. Dialogue 
with NSAs is particularly intense around the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), where the EC 
Delegation regularly interacts at workshops and seminars. 
The recent Mid-Term Review of the Zambia Governance Foundation concluded that it is too soon to 
judge whether the accomplishments achieved with the help of ZGF support are enough to bring the 
changes required to achieve the ambitious purpose of the ZGF. The review team concluded that the 
groundwork for a high quality grant-making facility is in place, but considerable additional investment 
will be needed to realise ZGF’s purpose. (I-6.5.4) 
 
JC 6.6:  Cross-cutting issues advocacy and implementation are supported by CSOs sup-
ported by the EU 
 Indicator 6.6.1: Existence of CSOs background documents on CCIs 
Only limited hard data and information on this indicator are available in the documentation. Moreover, 
purpose and relevance of this indicator in the context of a country level evaluation are not evident.  
The availability of background documents on Cross-Cutting Issues (CCIs) as gender, environment, 
governance, human rights, social protection, etc. has been confirmed by the participants in the evalua-
tion focus group discussion with CSOs, however without further specifications on the types, contents, 
quality and quantity of such documents. This general observation on the existence and ready availabil-
ity of background documents on CCIs with the CSOs was also confirmed in umbrella programmes on 
CSOs capacity strengthening as for example of the Zambia Governance Foundation (ZGF), as tran-
spired for example from its recent mid-term review. Moreover, the availability of documentation on de-
velopment issues in general is not considered an issue in as much as most information is readily avail-
able on the internet, including reports etc.  
By way of illustration, the Foundation’s CSOs’ capacity development strategy is a two-pronged ap-
proach which aims at creating a balance between supply-led and demand-driven interventions. By 
providing ZGF commissioned training on cross-cutting thematic topics such as M&E, gender, and policy 
influencing, the Foundation is attempting to ensure all of its GPs have a basic level of capacity in core 
areas. Some interviewed grant partners felt that the supply-led trainings were a catalyst for self-
focused, longer term training – though the training courses were still in process during the MTR, so it is 
too soon to judge whether grant partners (GPs) will successfully internalize what they learned at the 
ZGF-supplied courses. Some of the more established CSOs reported that the courses were too basic 
for their senior staff, but a useful cost-effective introduction to core concepts for junior staff. Addressing 
the complex capacity building needs of the ZGF’s GPs is likely to require more a bespoke and time-
intensive approach than the current design provides for. 
More directly related to the EU strategy and programmes, the EU commissioned institutional analysis of 
Non State Actors in Zambia of 2006 indicated that NSA knowledge and familiarity with Cotonou and 
with EC policies, strategy instruments and its programmes remains insufficient. In general, CSOs rec-
ognize that the EU has made important progress in expanding disclosure but further efforts need to be 
made. CSOs generally view greater disclosure as a key step forward operationalising the civil engage-
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  See the summary results of the portfolio analysis at the end of this section on EQ-6 under this information matrix. 
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Figure  CS-G10 :  Breakdown of Total Value of EU Grant Contracts with  CSOs in 
Zambia by Sector / Thematic Area (period 2001-2010) ,  in  million €
Source:  CRIS database search of 09 Dec 2011. 
ment framework put forward by the Cotonou Agreement, so that all non-state stakeholders have the 
background and information they need to engage effectively in dialogue with both the government and 
the EU. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on I-6.6.1: 
This Country Level Evaluation Portfolio Analysis of EU Grants to CSOs (December 2011): The 
December 2011 portfolio analysis of EU grants to CSOs in the period 2001-2010 conducted under the 
present Country Level Evaluation in December 2011 with regard to the sectoral distribution of EU 
grants to CSOs both in number and total volume of grants shows that these grants are still basically 
allocated to “traditional” development sectors as agriculture and food security, and health and nutrition. 
Governance comes third. Other cross-cutting themes as gender, human rights, and environment are 
less prominently present in the EU portfolio of CSO projects in Zambia. However a gradually increasing 
focus on these cross-cutting themes is noted over time.
81
  
Sectoral / Thematic Areas of Support to CSOs: The largest EU support to Civil Society Organisations in 
the ten year period 2001-2010 has been in the sector of agriculture and food security (17 grants or 
20.7% of the total) with a total of 13 million Euro (or 19.3% of the total). This is relatively closely fol-
lowed by the health (incl. HIV/AIDS) 
and nutrition sector (17% of CSO 
funding resources) and governance 
with 14.5% of the total CSO grant 
contracts value. Intermediate posi-
tions are taken by emergency / hu-
manitarian aid (11.1%), water and 
sanitation (8.6%), education and 
training (6.0%) and livelihood, pov-
erty alleviation and IGPs (5.1%). At 
the lower end of thematic / sectoral 
funding of CSO funding are: trade, 
SMEs and business development 
(3.5%), local, community and rural 
development (2.8%), Vulnerable 
groups (2.3%), Environment and 
natural resources (1.9%), gender 
(1.1%), tourism development (0.3%) 
and human rights (0.1%). It should 
be noted that some concerns are 
also mainstreamed in other sectors / 
thematic areas (e.g. human rights 
under governance, environment 
under agriculture and food security, 
etc.). 
The IDL Group (2011) p11; Mid-term Review of the Zambia Governance Foundation, Final Draft; May 
2011 – Chapter 3.1 Reviewing Progress Against the Logical Framework – Outcome One: CSO skills 
adn capacities to influence policy : ZGF set courses: M&E, gender, policy making: The Foundation’s 
capacity development strategy is a two-pronged approach which aims at creating a balance between 
supply-led and demand-driven interventions. By providing ZGF commissioned training on topics such 
as M&E, gender, and policy influencing, the Foundation is attempting to ensure all of its GPs have a 
basic level of capacity in core areas. Some grant partners interviewed felt that the supply-led trainings 
were a catalyst for self-focused, longer term training – though the training courses were still in process 
during the MTR, so it is too soon to judge whether GPs will successfully internalize what they learned at 
the ZGF-supplied courses. Some of the more established CSOs reported that the courses were too 
basic for their senior staff, but a useful cost-effective introduction to core concepts for junior staff. Ad-
dressing the complex capacity building needs of the ZGF’s GPs is likely to require more a bespoke and 
time-intensive approach than the current design provides for. 
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  It must be acknowledged that the sectoral / thematic area classification of grants in the database in not uniform and com-
pleted, with also some overlaps between different categories (e.g. governance and human rights) or that some sec-
tors/thematic areas also cover (part of) other sectors / thematic areas (e.g. HIV/AIDS included under health and nutrition). 
The figures and statistics therefore need to be treated with the necessary caution. 
Figure 8: Breakdown of total value of EU grant con-
tracts with CSOs in Zambia by sector / thematic area (period 
2001-2010), in Euro 
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STEM-VCR Srl (2006) pp. 36-37; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 4.3. NSA knowledge and familiarity with Cotonou and with EC policies and strategy instru-
ments: …, as interviewed CSOs reported in the team of consultants, information on Cotonou and, more 
specifically, on EC strategy and its programmes remains insufficient. In this sense, it is important to 
highlight that access to information is a key and sine qua non condition to promote empowerment and 
effective participation, which in turn contributes to better governance and public accountability... In gen-
eral, CSOs recognize that the EU has made important progress in expanding disclosure but further 
efforts need to be made. In general, CSOs view greater disclosure as a key step forward operationalis-
ing the civic engagement framework put forward by the Cotonou Agreement, so that all non-state 
stakeholders have the background and information they need to engage effectively in dialogue with 
both the government and the EU. 
 Indicator 6.6.2: Increase of the number of CSOs and Apex involved in CCIs 
Among the CSO actors, the Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ) has long established a 
working relation with Government in the health sector. In 2007, 8.0% of all health facilities belonged to 
CHAZ, whereas private facilities represented 5.6% of all health facilities (2007 Health Facility Census, 
in MTR FNDP (2009) p83 ). With the proliferation of HIV and AIDS, HIV NGOs are playing a growing, 
and increasingly important role. An estimated 600 NGOs reportedly are operating in Zambia, among 
which 150 focus exclusively on HIV/AIDS. However, estimates of the total number of CSOs in Zambia 
go as high as 20,000.  
But no further hard figures or data are available in the documentation, neither from the evaluation field 
interviews with key stakeholders concerned, also not from the Department of Registrator for Non Gov-
ernmental Organisations under the Ministry of Community Development and Mother and Child Health. 
With the NGO Act still not operationalized through implementing rules and regulations, also CSO regis-
tration is not yet formalised / officialised. Hence the number of CSOs is difficult to determine. Moreover 
the definition of a CSO is not uniformly determined, with different key stakeholders using different 
names comprising different categories of CSOs/NSAs. If it already is very difficult to get a statistic on 
the number of CSOs, this a fortiori pertains to the number of CSOs and Apex organisations involved in 
cross-cutting issues and their increase over the years.  
In terms of sectoral distribution of CSOs, a recent ZCSD-Civicus (2011) study revealed that education, 
youth and child development organisations have the highest number of CSOs standing at 43%. These 
seem to be among current donor funding priority areas as they relate to Millennium Development 
Goals. The Governance thematic Group had 13% and this can be attributed to the importance placed 
on issues of Governance. Additionally, the HIV/Aids thematic group stands at 11%. Generally, what is 
clear from research is that the number of CSOs is strongly related to the availability of (international) 
funding. For example, since the early 1990s, with the increased availability of funding, there has been a 
ten-fold increase in the number of civil society organisations working in HIV/Aids in Zambia – involved 
in a wide range of roles. One of the leading CSO support programmes in the country (Democratisation, 
State and Civil Society – Good Governance Programme) indicates to be particularly addressing gender, 
HIV/Aids and anti-corruption through civil society and to encourage innovative civil society responses in 
this regard. The mainstreaming strategy of these cross-cutting issues is illustrated by for example mo-
bile legal aid clinics, a campaign for enhanced political participation of women or training for key gov-
ernment partners and donor representatives on the National Anti-Corruption Policy.  
Data, figures, tables: 
ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011) p33; Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia – Appendix 4 
– Summaries for Case Studies 
In terms of sectoral distribution of CSOs, the study has revealed that education, youth and child devel-
opment organisations have the highest number of CSOs standing at 43%. These seem to be among 
current donor funding priority areas as they relate to Millennium Development Goals. The Governance 
thematic Group had 13% and this can be attributed to the importance placed on issues of Governance. 
Additionally, the HIV/Aids thematic group stands at 11% (Figure 2 below shows the sectoral distribution 
of CSOs in the country). 
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Source: ZCSF and Civicus (2011); p33 
According to NAC (2008), since the early 1990s, with the increased availability of funding, there has 
been a ten-fold increase in the number of civil society organisations (CSOs) working in HIV in Zambia – 
involved in a wide range of roles. The case study created a good starting point for identifying CSOs 
distribution in different sectors as well as their regional distribution in Zambia. 
Extracts: 
JAR 2003, p24; 4.2.3.3 Integration of crosscutting themes - The EC macroeconomic support will, 
through its support to the PRSP, indirectly affect the main cross-cutting issues recognised in the 
PRSP: HIV/AIDS, environment and gender. The EC macro-economic support will single out indicators 
related to HIV/AIDS and gender equality to create further focus in these two cross-cutting issues for 
reducing poverty in Zambia. 
 
JAR 2003, p26; 4.3.3 Human Rights - The Women in Active Life Programme of Rights Education 
was funded in 2000, under the EC-budget line for promotion of human rights, democracy and good 
governance. The project aims at enhancing the recognition of women’s rights and the rule of law 
through innovative educational campaigns. The project is a follow up to the regional programme fund-
ed by the European Commission in neighbouring countries and aimed at raising awareness of the 
rights of the children and women. The project has so far been successful in engaging communities in 
project activities and discussions, acknowledging concerns related to women and children’s rights. 
The three year project is now in its final stage. 
 
CSO Global Fund Evaluation Health Facilities (2008), p25: In the high burden intervention districts 
87 per cent of facilities providing ART are in urban areas. In medium and low intervention districts 
smaller proportions of clinics providing ART are in urban areas (14% and 25% respectively) In terms 
of administration, 44% of the sites in high intervention districts are public government facilities and 
40% are parastatal or private facilities. Non public government facilities comprise 3% and NGO facili-
ties 7% of all facilities.  
 
Democratisation, State and Civil Society – Good Governance Programme (2011), p2; Address-
ing Gender, HIV/AIDS and Anti-corruption through Civil Society: In a situation, in which the misappro-
priation of public funds, the accelerated spread of HIV/Aids and unequal gender relations are regard-
ed as pressing social problems, the Good Governance Programme encourages innovative civil socie-
ty responses. Mobile legal aid clinics, a campaign for enhanced political participation of women or 
training for key government partners and donor representatives on the National Anti-Corruption Policy 
represent examples, which illustrate the mainstreaming approach of the programme.” 
 
 
Figure 9 Sectoral Distribution of CSOs in Zambia 
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Field Visit Additional Information on I-6.6.2: 
STEM-VCR Srl (2006) pp 57-58; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 7 : Conclusions and Critical Issues: As a number of observers have reported, the copious 
number of Lusaka-based CSOs, even when they are operational NGOs mainly serving rural commu-
nities, might be a reflection of Zambia’s centralist government structures, where all decision-making is 
done, top-down, from the capital. The decentralisation debate has yet to attract as much interest from 
CSO as have constitution-making or poverty reduction issues. Considering the opportunity that decen-
tralisation entails as a devolution process, which places local structures at the centre of the decision 
making and planning process, CSO should become more actively engaged. One idea would be for in-
termediary organisations to refocus their outlook and structures bottom-up and to integrate local gov-
ernance and local citizenship promotion in their work, while umbrella Lusaka-based organisations in-
clude decentralisation in their priority advocacy and lobbying agenda.... Organisation development is 
also a priority for a number of civil society organisations. Organisations need to align their organisa-
tions and procedures to their respective mandates, and efforts need to be made and supported by the 
international community to develop effective management structures and systems, ranging from stra-
tegic planning exercises to fundraising strategies and volunteer management.  
 
A detailed list of capacity building needs and tools/instruments are discussed in the report by main 
type of CSO. 
 
The IDL Group (2011) p11; Mid-term Review of the Zambia Governance Foundation, Final Draft; 
May 2011 – Chapter 4.2 Beyond the logical framework: Other Issues Arising in the ToR: Gender and 
HIV/AIDS: The ZGF spent most of its first year establishing itself as a legal entity, recruiting staff, set-
ting up offices and internal systems. Its second year has largely been occupied with establishing and 
refining grant making procedures. Thus, the Secretariat has not had the time nor personnel required 
to ‘fully mainstream’ gender into its working culture or its day-to-day operations. Despite these con-
straints, the ZGF Board includes prominent women as well as men; the Secretariat’s staff include both 
men and women; a proportion of its grants are made to women’s rights or gender-focused organisa-
tions such as the Girl Guides and NGOCC; and gender features in the GP assessment process. Gen-
der training is mandatory for all GPs, gender content is encouraged in the human resources policies 
of GPs, and ZGF has developed gender toolkits for its GPs. It is not clear whether, because of the 
ZGF partnership, there is a larger volume of gender programming in the wider community of Zambian 
CSOs nor was the review team able to find evidence that GPs are engaging more effectively in their 
gender equity work. The Secretariat commissioned a major piece of analytical work on gender in 
2010, undertaken by NCG Uganda. The study generated a large number of recommendations, which 
were presented at the Joint Annual Review in 2010. 
 
 
 Indicator 6.6.3: Increase of the number of projects and volume of funding mobilized by 
CSOs on CCIs 
No direct numerical - statistical evidence is available regarding the number of projects and volume of 
funding mobilized by CSOs on CCIs from the documents. For HIV related issues, NGOs are claimed to 
channel increasing funding from the donors, creating recurrent tensions as well as doubts over the effi-
ciency of their actions (IPS-Health Zambia, 2011). But indirectly empirical evidence of such growth in 
the CSOs portfolio of CCI projects is provided by the prioritisation of CCIs in the CPs country strategies. 
For example, EC macro-economic (general) budget support throughout the period under review wheth-
er related to the PRSP under the EDF9 or more to the MDGs under the EDF10 has HIV/AIDS and gen-
der equality as cross-cutting issues for reducing poverty in Zambia. On the one hand, the EU Gender 
Action Plan 2010- 2015 requires all projects to contribute to the attainment of the MDGs, particularly 
MDG 3 and MDG 5 and other development goals related to gender equality. It foresees actions at the 
level of political and policy dialogue, programming and also the implementation of development cooper-
ation. On the other hand, most actions on poverty reduction and for accelerating human capacity build-
ing – particularly in rural areas – include women as an important group of beneficiaries or as key actors 
or stakeholders. Maintaining a focus on actions with the ultimate goal of improving women's opportuni-
ties and choices will allow for effectively combining service delivery and advocacy activities. This is also 
the rationale behind the CSOs capacity building project in Zambia under the EDF10 (cancelled earlier 
under the EDF9 for a variety of reasons). Environmental considerations weigh heavily in the design of 
requested proposals called for under the Agriculture Diversification Programme, with the aim of encour-
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aging a more innovative and effective use of land and natural resources in the selected areas covered 
by the programme. 
The CRIS based portfolio analysis of EU grants to CSOs in the period 2001-2010 conducted under the 
present Country Level Evaluation in December 2011 with regard to the sectoral distribution of EU 
grants to CSOs both in number and total volume of grants shows that these grants are still basically 
allocated to “traditional” development sectors as agriculture and food security, and health and nutrition. 
Governance comes third. Other cross-cutting themes as gender, human rights, environment are less 
prominently present in the EU portfolio of CSO projects in Zambia. However a gradually increasing 
focus on these cross-cutting themes is noted over time.
82
 A more detailed analysis of the sectoral / 
thematic areas of EU support to CSOs learns that the largest EU support to Civil Society Organisations 
in the ten year period 2001-2010 has been in the sector of agriculture and food security (17 grants or 
20.7% of the total) with a total of 13 million Euro (or 19.3% of the total). This is relatively closely fol-
lowed by the health (incl. HIV/AIDS) and nutrition sector (17% of CSO funding resources) and govern-
ance with 14.5% of the total CSO grant contracts value. Intermediate positions are taken by emergency 
/ humanitarian aid (11.1%), water and sanitation (8.6%), education and training (6.0%) and livelihood, 
poverty alleviation and IGPs (5.1%). At the lower end of thematic / sectoral funding of CSO funding are: 
trade, SMEs and business development (3.5%), local, community and rural development (2.8%), Vul-
nerable groups (2.3%), Environment and natural resources (1.9%), gender (1.1%), tourism develop-
ment (0.3%) and human rights (0.1%). It should be noted that some concerns are also mainstreamed in 
other sectors / thematic areas (e.g. human rights under governance, environment under agriculture and 
food security, etc.).
83
  
The 2010 Joint Annual Review (JAR) by GRZ and CPs explicitly mentioned the mainstreaming of cross-
cutting issues as priority area. In first instance, efforts are being stepped up for the promotion of gender 
equality to implement the 'EU Plan of Action 2010-2015 for Gender Equality Women's Empowerment in 
Development', notably through dialogue with Member States (November) and training at the EU Dele-
gation. The EU Delegation is associated to the preparation of a Gender Sector Analysis and Mapping of 
Civil Society and Cooperatives Partners Initiatives to identify strategic issues, assess achievements in 
tackling gender inequalities, and propose a coordinated response to address gender inequality. With 
regard to the mainstreaming of Environment and Climate Change a seminar was organised in May in 
Lusaka to raise awareness and strengthen capacities on environment and climate change integration in 
development. This mainstreaming of crosscutting issues is a recurrent annual theme in the subsequent 
JARs. In the 2007 JAR for example is reported that HIV/AIDS and gender issues are being considered 
in all the EC activities. In particular, capacity building funds have specifically been earmarked for the 
gender analysis of the budget. HIV/AIDS threaten the country’s capacity building efforts because it 
strikes the educated and skilled as well as the uneducated. Consequently, it impedes the country’s 
capacity by shortening human productivity and life expectancy. The HIV/AIDS will be considered in 
most of EC projects in the sector. A 2011 EUD Lusaka internal note on the rationale for the EDF10 NSA 
capacity building project in Zambia puts gender up as central issue in accordance with the EU Gender 
Action Plan 2010- 2015 which requires all projects to contribute to the attainment of the MDGs, particu-
larly MDG 3 and MDG 5 and other development goals related to gender equality. 
Data: 
Figure 10: Breakdown of total number of EU grant contracts with CSOs in Zambia by sector / 
thematic area (period 2001-2010), in Euro 
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  It must be acknowledged that the sectoral / thematic area classification of grants in the database in not uniform and com-
pleted, with also some overlaps between different categories (e.g. governance and human rights) or that some sec-
tors/thematic areas also cover (part of) other sectors / thematic areas (e.g. HIV/AIDS included under health and nutrition). 
The figures and statistics therefore need to be treated with the necessary caution. 
83 See Graph CS-G10 above under Field Visit Additional Information on I.6.6.2 
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Figure  CS-G9 :  Breakdown of Total Number of EU Grant Contracts with  CSOs in Zambia by Sector 
/ Themactic Area (period 2001-2010) ,  in  Number of  Awarded  Grant Contracts
Source:  CRIS database search of 09 Dec 2011.  
Extracts: 
JAR 2010, p4; (1) Promoting Gender equality: Efforts stepped up to implement the 'EU Plan of Action 
2010-2015 for Gender Equality Women's Empowerment in Development', notably through dialogue 
with Member States (November) and training at the EU Delegation. EU Delegation associated to the 
preparation of a Gender Sector Analysis and Mapping of Civil Society and Cooperatives Partners Ini-
tiatives to identify strategic issues, assess achievements in tackling gender inequalities, and propose 
a coordinated response to address gender inequality. (2) Mainstreaming the Environment and Climate 
Change: Seminar organised in May in Lusaka to raise awareness and strengthen capacities on envi-
ronment and climate change integration in development. 
 
JAR 2007, p22; 4.2.2.3 Integration of crosscutting issues - HIV/AIDS and gender issues are being 
considered in all the EC activities in this sector. In particular, capacity building funds have specifically 
been earmarked for the gender analysis of the budget. HIV/AIDS threaten the country’s capacity 
building efforts because it strikes the educated and skilled as well as the uneducated. Consequently, it 
impedes the country’s capacity by shortening human productivity and life expectancy. The HIV/AIDS 
will be considered in most of EC projects in the sector. 
 
EUD Lusaka (2011) p2; “Rationale for EDF10 NSAs capacity building project in Zambia”; Internal 
Note; 2011: p2: (10) Gender issues are central. On one hand the EU Gender Action Plan 2010- 2015 
requires all projects to contribute to the attainment of the MDGs, particularly MDG 3 and MDG 5 and 
other development goals related to gender equality. It foresees actions at the level of political and pol-
icy dialogue, programming and also the implementation of development cooperation. On the other, 
most actions on poverty reduction and for accelerating human capacity building – particularly in rural 
areas – will include women as an important group of beneficiaries or as key actors or stakeholders. 
Maintaining a focus on actions with the ultimate goal of improving women's opportunities and choices 
will allow for effectively combining service delivery and advocacy activities. As all political parties are 
supportive of gender issues at this point, a strong gender focus of the proposed EU project would al-
low focusing more sensitive actions – like e.g. the monitoring of performance of Government Services 
– on issues, which at this point are non-controversial in Zambia, as they find the support of the most 
important political stakeholders. 
 
JAR 2007, p28: 3. Policy Coherence for Development (PCD): The Country Environmental profile was 
established in 2006, and has not been further adapted. Within Agricultural Diversification programme 
a call for proposals was launched for NGO-projects (seven projects were eventually selected). Envi-
ronmental considerations weigh heavily in the design of the requested proposals, as they aim to en-
courage a more innovative and effective use of land and natural resources in the selected areas. 
 
 
ROADSIP II MTR 2008, draft final report, p.11 - “Stakeholder Participation: 
a) National Roads 
It has been difficult to ascertain the basis of the selection or degree of participation of stakeholders in 
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the selection of the targeted roads. However, all of these projects have to fit into the process of estab-
lishing the Annual Works Programme which are considered by the Boards of NRFA and RDA. Conse-
quently, it can be concluded that sufficient stakeholder participation has taken place. 
b) Rural Roads 
The District Councils were consulted during the design of the rural roads component with regard to 
identification of the priority roads during the feasibility study. Presently the first batch of road work con-
tracts is being let by RDA. It is doubtful whether the RDA ever will have the capacity to secure proper 
management, including maintenance, of the unclassified network in the districts. The geographical dis-
tances are extensive and only the District Councils can manage that task. The involvement of the TA 
team in the preparation of works has been intensive: “During the reporting period the TA team assisted 
RDA to liaise with District Councils / Road Authorities to reconfirm the continued priority of the roads 
earmarked for rehabilitation in the first cycle; to re-survey the first cycle roads to validate or adjust the 
findings of the feasibility study as necessary; to review the draft tender documents prepared by the 
feasibility study and propose necessary changes, and to prepare detailed engineering cost estimates 
for the first cycle of roads.” TA Report Oct-Dec 2007 The capacity of the District Councils varies, but 
they do all have Public Works Departments. More emphasis on smaller contracts for spot improve-
ment and for routine maintenance may lead to greater involvement of the District Councils.” SPS1 
MTR, 2008, p.17 
“Finally a system should be introduced, by the ROADSIP coordinating entity, to ensure that all stake-
holders (including all levels within GRZ) are given timely information concerning the prioritisation and 
project preparation and design cycles. Furthermore, all stakeholders need to be given hard deadlines 
to provide input and comments (i.e., to speak now or forever hold their peace), so that time is not lost 
in backtracking and unnecessarily modifying projects when it is no longer timely to do so.”  
 
Field Visit Additional Information on I-6.6.3: 
This Country Level Evaluation Portfolio Analysis of EU Grants to CSOs (December 2011): The 
portfolio analysis of EU grants to CSOs in the period 2001-2010 conducted under the present Country 
Level Evaluation in December 2011 with regard to the sectoral distribution of EU grants to CSOs both in 
number and total volume of grants shows that these grants are still basically allocated to “traditional” 
development sectors as agriculture and food security, and health and nutrition (see graphs CS-G9 and 
G-10 above). Governance comes third. Other cross-cutting themes as gender, human rights, environ-
ment are less prominently present in the EU portfolio of CSO projects in Zambia. However a gradually 
increasing focus on these cross-cutting themes is noted over time.
84
 A more detailed analysis of the 
sectoral / thematic areas of EU support to CSOs learns that the largest EU support to Civil Society Or-
ganisations in the ten year period 2001-2010 has been in the sector of agriculture and food security (17 
grants or 20.7% of the total) with a total of 13 million Euro (or 19.3% of the total). This is relatively 
closely followed by the health (incl. HIV/AIDS) and nutrition sector (17% of CSO funding resources) and 
governance with 14.5% of the total CSO grant contracts value. Intermediate positions are taken by 
emergency / humanitarian aid (11. 1%), water and sanitation (8.6%), education and training (6.0%) and 
livelihood, poverty alleviation and IGPs (5.1%). At the lower end of thematic / sectoral funding of CSO 
funding are: trade, SMEs and business development (3.5%), local, community and rural development 
(2.8%), Vulnerable groups (2.3%), Environment and natural resources (1.9%), gender (1.1%), tourism 
development (0.3%) and human rights (0.1%). It should be noted that some concerns are also main-
streamed in other sectors / thematic areas (e.g. human rights under governance, environment under 
agriculture and food security, etc.). 
JC 6.6:  Cross-cutting issues advocacy and implementation are supported by CSOs supported 
by the EU 
Only limited hard data and information on this indicator are available in the documentation. Moreover, 
the purpose and relevance of this indicator in the context of a country level evaluation are not so evi-
dent directly.  
The availability of background documents on Cross-Cutting Issues (CCIs) as gender, environment, 
governance, human rights, social protection, etc. has been confirmed by the participants in the evalua-
                                               
84
  It must be acknowledged that the sectoral / thematic area classification of grants in the database in not uniform and com-
pleted, with also some overlaps between different categories (e.g. governance and human rights) or that some sec-
tors/thematic areas also cover (part of) other sectors / thematic areas (e.g. HIV/AIDS included under health and nutrition). 
The figures and statistics therefore need to be treated with the necessary caution. 
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tion focus group discussion with CSOs, however without further specifications on the types, contents, 
quality and quantity of such documents. This general observation on the existence and ready availabil-
ity of background documents on CCIs with the CSOs has also been confirmed in umbrella programmes 
on CSOs capacity strengthening as for example of the Zambia Governance Foundation (ZGF), as tran-
spired for example from its recent mid-term review. Moreover, the availability of documentation on de-
velopment issues in general is not considered an issue in as much as most information is readily avail-
able on the internet, including reports etc. By way of illustration, the Foundation’s CSOs’ capacity de-
velopment strategy includes training on cross-cutting thematic topics such as M&E, gender, and policy 
influencing, the Foundation is attempting to ensure all of its GPs have a basic level of capacity in core 
areas. Some of the more established CSOs reported that the courses were too basic for their senior 
staff, but a useful cost-effective introduction to core concepts for junior staff. Addressing the complex 
capacity building needs of the ZGF’s GPs is likely to require more a bespoke and time-intensive ap-
proach than the current design provides for. 
More directly related to the EU strategy and programmes, the EU commissioned institutional analysis of 
Non State Actors in Zambia of 2006 indicated that NSA knowledge and familiarity with Cotonou and 
with EC policies, strategy instruments and its programmes remains insufficient. In general, CSOs rec-
ognize that the EU has made important progress in expanding disclosure but further efforts need to be 
made. CSOs generally view greater disclosure as a key step forward operationalising the civil engage-
ment framework put forward by the Cotonou Agreement, so that all non-state stakeholders have the 
background and information they need to engage effectively in dialogue with both the government and 
the EU. (I-6.6.1)  
With the proliferation of HIV and AIDS, HIV NGOs are playing a growing, and increasingly important 
role. An estimated 600 NGOs reportedly are operating in Zambia, among which 150 focus exclusively 
on HIV/AIDS. However, estimates of the total number of CSOs in Zambia go as high as 20,000. But 
other than this and on a few other instances, no further hard figures or data are available in the docu-
mentation, neither from the evaluation field interviews with key stakeholders concerned, thus also not 
from the Department of the Registrator for Non Governmental Organisations under the Ministry of 
Community Development and Mother and Child Health. With the NGO Act still not operationalized 
through implementing rules and regulations, also CSO registration is not yet formalised / officialised. 
Hence the number of CSOs in itself already is difficult to determine. Moreover the definition of a CSO is 
not uniformly determined, with different key stakeholders using different names comprising different 
categories of CSOs/NSAs. If it already is very difficult to get a statistic on the number of CSOs, this a 
fortiori pertains to the number of CSOs and Apex organisations involved in cross-cutting issues and 
their increase over the years.  
In terms of sectoral distribution of CSOs, a recent ZCSD-Civicus (2011) study revealed that education, 
youth and child development organisations have the highest number of CSOs standing at 43% of the 
total. These seem to be among current donor funding priority areas as they relate to Millennium Devel-
opment Goals. The Governance thematic Group had 13% and this can be attributed to the importance 
placed on issues of Governance. Additionally, the HIV/Aids thematic group stands at 11%. Generally, 
what is clear from research is that the number of CSOs is strongly related to the availability of (interna-
tional) funding. For example, since the early 1990s, with the increased availability of funding, there has 
been a ten-fold increase in the number of civil society organisations working in HIV/Aids in Zambia – 
involved in a wide range of roles. One of the leading CSO support programmes in the country (Democ-
ratisation, State and Civil Society – Good Governance Programme) indicates to be particularly address-
ing gender , HIV/Aids and anti-corruption through civil society and to encourage innovative civil society 
responses in this regard. The mainstreaming strategy of these cross-cutting issues is illustrated by for 
example mobile legal aid clinics, a campaign for enhanced political participation of women or training 
for key government partners and donor representatives on the National Anti-Corruption Policy. (I-6.6.2) 
No direct numerical - statistical evidence is available from the documents regarding the number of pro-
jects and volume of funding mobilized by CSOs on Cross Cutting Issues (CCIs). For HIV related issues, 
NGOs are claimed to channel increasing funding from the donors, creating recurrent tensions as well as 
doubts over the efficiency of their actions (IPS-Health Zambia, 2011). But indirectly empirical evidence 
of such growth in the CSOs portfolio of CCI projects is provided by the prioritisation of CCIs in the CPs 
country strategies. For example, EC macro-economic (general) budget support throughout the period 
under review whether related to the PRSP under the EDF9 or more to the MDGs under the EDF10 has 
HIV/AIDS and gender equality as cross-cutting issues for reducing poverty in Zambia. On the one hand, 
the EU Gender Action Plan 2010- 2015 requires all projects to contribute to the attainment of the 
MDGs, particularly MDG 3 and MDG 5 and other development goals related to gender equality. It fore-
sees actions at the level of political and policy dialogue, programming and also the implementation of 
development cooperation. On the other hand, most actions on poverty reduction and for accelerating 
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human capacity building – particularly in rural areas – include women as an important group of benefi-
ciaries or as key actors or stakeholders. Maintaining a focus on actions with the ultimate goal of improv-
ing women's opportunities and choices will allow for effectively combining service delivery and advoca-
cy activities. This is also the rationale behind the CSOs capacity building project in Zambia under the 
EDF10 (cancelled earlier under the EDF9 for a variety of reasons). Environmental considerations weigh 
heavily in the design of requested proposals called for under for example the Agriculture Diversification 
Programme, with the aim of encouraging a more innovative and effective use of land and natural re-
sources in the selected areas covered by the programme. 
The CRIS based portfolio analysis of EU grants to CSOs in the period 2001-2010 conducted under the 
present Country Level Evaluation in December 2011 with regard to the sectoral distribution of EU 
grants to CSOs both in number and total volume of grants, shows that these grants are still basically 
allocated to “traditional” development sectors as agriculture and food security, and health and nutrition. 
Governance comes third. Other cross-cutting themes as gender, human rights, environment are less 
prominently present in the EU portfolio of CSO projects in Zambia. However a gradually increasing 
focus on these cross-cutting themes is noted over time. A more detailed analysis of the sectoral / the-
matic areas of EU support to CSOs learns that the largest EU support to Civil Society Organisations in 
the ten year period 2001-2010 has been in the sector of agriculture and food security (17 grants or 
20.7% of the total) with a total of 13 million Euro (or 19.3% of the total). This is relatively closely fol-
lowed by the health (incl. HIV/AIDS) and nutrition sector (17% of total CSO funding resources) and 
governance with 14.5% of the total CSO grant contracts value. Intermediate positions are taken by 
emergency / humanitarian aid (11.1%), water and sanitation (8.6%), education and training (6.0%) and 
livelihood, poverty alleviation and IGPs (5.1%). At the lower end of thematic / sectoral funding of CSO 
funding are: trade, SMEs and business development (3.5%), local, community and rural development 
(2.8%), Vulnerable groups (2.3%), Environment and natural resources (1.9%), gender (1.1%), tourism 
development (0.3%) and human rights (0.1%). It should be noted that some concerns are also main-
streamed in other sectors / thematic areas (e.g. human rights under governance, environment under 
agriculture and food security, etc.). 
The 2010 Joint Annual Review (JAR) by GRZ and CPs explicitly mentioned the mainstreaming of cross-
cutting issues as priority area. In first instance, efforts are being stepped up for the promotion of gender 
equality to implement the 'EU Plan of Action 2010-2015 for Gender Equality Women's Empowerment in 
Development', notably through dialogue with Member States (November) and training at the EU Dele-
gation. The EU Delegation is associated to the preparation of a Gender Sector Analysis and Mapping of 
Civil Society and Cooperatives Partners Initiatives to identify strategic issues, assess achievements in 
tackling gender inequalities, and propose a coordinated response to address gender inequality. With 
regard to the mainstreaming of Environment and Climate Change a seminar was organised in May in 
Lusaka to raise awareness and strengthen capacities on environment and climate change integration in 
development. This mainstreaming of crosscutting issues is a recurrent annual theme in the subsequent 
JARs. In the 2007 JAR for example it is reported that HIV/AIDS and gender issues are being consid-
ered in all the EC activities. In particular, capacity building funds have specifically been earmarked for 
the gender analysis of the budget. HIV/AIDS threaten the country’s capacity building efforts because it 
strikes the educated and skilled as well as the uneducated. Consequently, it impedes the country’s 
capacity by shortening human productivity and life expectancy. The HIV/AIDS will be considered in 
most of EC projects in the sector. A 2011 EUD Lusaka internal note on the rationale for the EDF10 NSA 
capacity building project in Zambia puts gender up as central issue in accordance with the EU Gender 
Action Plan 2010- 2015 which requires all projects to contribute to the attainment of the MDGs, particu-
larly MDG 3 and MDG 5 and other development goals related to gender equality. (I-6.6.3) 
The Governance Secretariat routinely includes in its annual reports on Governance performance a sec-
tion on lessons learnt and recommendations. Below is an overview table compiled for this country level 
evaluation of these lessons learnt and recommendations on governance over the period 2006 – 2010 
which is self-explanatory and revealing with regard to the main recurrent themes, one of which is “The 
performance of the KPIs kept frustrating throughout the FNDP period.” 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on EQ6: 
 
Governance Secretariat (2007 - 2011) – CLE Evaluation Team (January 2012), FNDP Annual Re-
ports on Governance Performance for the years 2006 to 2010; Lessons Learnt and Recommendations 
 
GS Annual Reports on Governance Performance: Summary Overview of Lesson Learnt and 
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Recommendations for the Years 2006 to 2010 (compiled by the Evaluation Team) 
Year Lessons Learnt Recommendations 
2006  Because of the large number of institutions falling 
under the three arms of the state, the governance 
programme had to be developed in a way that ensures 
coordinated planning while honouring institutions’ au-
tonomy.  
 Further, donor coordination in the governance sector 
is not clear in terms of cooperation and prioritisation 
for the governance institutions. Civil society has lim-
ited engagement in most governance initiatives. 
 Government must own the funding mechanism under the 
Governance programme to ensure increased ownership of 
the program and predictable resource flows. 
 Civil society and cooperating partners should engage with 
governance initiatives more constructively. Specifically civil 
society should use the opportunity to discuss pertinent gov-
ernance issues in the Governance Sector Advisory Group 
and committees established under the GSAG.  
 There is need to develop policy documents for key govern-
ance issues such as human rights and democratisation. 
 A recommendation made at the National SAG Conference in 
December 2007 for continuous voter registration, is not pos-
sible at this point in time due to financial constraints, as the 
exercise required huge financial resources. 
 Some indicators should be refined.  
 MoFNP should develop a schedule for reporting. 
2007  The performance of the KPIs kept frustrating through-
out the FNDP period. 
 The tight schedule of meetings at Parliament for MPs 
throughout the year makes it difficult for them to visit 
their constituencies frequently. 
 Increase funding and human resource capacities during 
SNDP so as to fulfil the outstanding priorities. 
 Development of effective M&E system at all levels (national, 
provincial and district) during SNDP in order to efficiently 
track the implementation of activities. 
2008  Without continuous voter registration opportunities for 
citizens to exercise their franchise are reduced.  
 Disaggregation of data by gender helps to identify the 
key areas of focus during decision making process. 
 Data on some KPIs cannot be collected annually but 
bi-annually because the activities take a long period of 
time to be undertaken e.g. Public Accounts Committee 
reports from Auditor General’s Office and registration 
of eligible voters.  
 Inadequate understanding on the Monitoring and 
Evaluation linkages to the KPIs by some Institutions in 
the sector inhibits timely collection of data.  
 Survey on perception of data can easily be institution-
alised if conducted in collaboration with Central Statis-
tical Office. 
 There is need to develop management information system 
that would facilitate adequate reporting on performance in the 
sector.  
 In order to reduce the length of time for disposing of cases, 
the decentralisation process should be speeded up. 
 Strengthening the capacity of the legal aid institutions to 
expedite the disposal of cases and reduce the backlog at all 
court levels. 
 Apart from focusing on Access to Justice efforts should be 
made to ensure that other components in the sector such as 
Human Rights, Auditor General, Office of the Vice President 
are addressed. 
 MPs should visit their constituencies at least once a month. 
2009  The constitutional making process requires broad 
consultations and acceptance of debated issues by all 
stakeholders to enhance ownership of the outcome. 
 Corruption is highly secretive and consensual between 
the parties involved. If any of the two parties involved 
does not report corruption to relevant authorities, then 
it will not be known by the public. Consequently, statis-
tics on corruption always reflect a lower figure of inci-
dences of corruption and can be misleading. 
 Involvement of various stakeholder during the valida-
tion workshops for the APRM thematic reports provid-
ed key additional information for the Country Self As-
sessment Report and subsequent National Plan of 
Action.  
 Limited collaboration amongst governance institutions 
limits synergies in the sharing of pertinent information. 
 All stakeholders should be encouraged to be at liberty to 
contribute to the constitution making process in order to fos-
ter ownership of the final constitution. 
 There is need for continued sensitisation on the corruption 
issues to encourage the reporting of incidences of corruption 
to relevant authorities. 
 Focus on corruption should also be centred on corruption 
prevention as well as prosecution. 
 Establishment of effective mechanism for networking and 
collaboration. 
 In the Sixth National Development Plan, there will be need to 
double efforts so as to fulfil the outstanding priorities in the 
FNDP. 
2010  The performance of the KPIs kept frustrating through-
out the FNDP period. 
 The tight schedule of meetings at Parliament for MPs 
throughout the year makes it difficult for them to visit 
their constituencies frequently. 
 Increase funding and human resource capacities during 
SNDP so as to fulfil the outstanding priorities. 
 Development of effective M & E system at all levels (national, 
provincial and district) during SNDP in order to efficiently 
track the implementation of activities. 
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Governance Secretariat (2007) p6; FNDP annual report on governance performance for the year 
2006; Illustration of the relative lack of base data (no data for 3 KPIs): 
 
Overview of Governance Sector Performance by Key Performance Indicator 
INDICATOR ASSESSMENT 
Average time taken to dispose of cases (criminal and civil) at each stage of the 
administration of justice process 
No data 
Backlog of cases Not met 
Remand: Convict Ratio Not met but improving 
Number of verifiable interactions between MP’s and their constituen-
cies/citizens or civil society organisations 
No data 
Proportion between cases reported and investigated Not met 
Proportion of recommendations from the Public Accounts Committee based on 
OAG reports that have timely and adequate action taken by responsible gov-
ernment institution 
No report for 2007 
Proportion of Registered Voters compared to eligible Not met  
Source: Governance Secretariat (2007)  
 
Governance Secretariat (2011) p2; FNDP annual report on governance performance for the year 
2010; Chapter 1.1.- Summary sector programme performance. During the period under review the 
sector Programme Performance on the main governance strategy components was as follows: 
1. Access to Justice 
 
 
 Act No. 26 of 2009 was passed to increase the number of Judges from 9 to 11 under the Supreme 
Court and from 30 to 50 under the High Court. 
 Under the Access to Justice Programme, sector established Communication, Cooperation and 
Coordination Committees in Kitwe, Ndola, Kabwe, Lusaka and Livingstone. The committees are 
aimed at strengthening communication, cooperation and coordination between the criminal justice 
institutions; 
 Completed the construction of a modern VSU office in Lusaka –Lusaka Central Police; 
 Completed the construction of a Parole Board Office at Lusaka Central Prisons; 
 Acquisition of Forensic equipment for Zambia Police Service.  
 A total of 320 prisoners were released on parole out of a targeted 1000, representing 32% 
2. Human Rights  Under the Human Rights Commission the sector completed that preparation of the National Plan of 
Action for Human Rights (2010-2020). 
3. Constitutionalism  The National Constitution Conference deliberated all the committee reports by 30th April, 2010. The 
plenary report was compiled and subjected to further interrogation by the members of the public be-
fore the final report was submitted for adoption in August, 2010. 
4. Democratisation  The Electoral Commission of Zambia conducted registration of voters. A total of 1,045,820 voters 
out of 2,490,137, were registered representing 42% 
5. Accountability and 
Transparency 
 Under the Anti Corruption Commission, Zambia enacted the ACC Act No. 24 and prepared a 
National Plan for implementation of the Act.  
 The Parliamentary Business Division of the Office of the Vice President OVP (PBD) facilitated the 
handling of 602 parliamentary questions by the Members of Parliament against a total of 644 ques-
tions recorded. The OVP (PBD) also facilitated the consideration and enactment of 41 out of a tar-
get of 59 Bills submitted to Parliament by the line Ministries. 
 The Office of the Auditor General audited a total of 140 out of a target of 48 MPSAs for the 2009 
fiscal year. The percentage of the national budget audited was 79%.  
6. Management and 
Facilitation of Gov-
ernance Initiatives  
 The sector, through the National Governing Council, completed the preparation of Country Self 
Assessment Report and a National Programme of Action for the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) and carried out sensitisation of the general public on the APRM process.  
 
JASZ-II (2011) p5; Zambia’s changing development context requiring updating development coopera-
tion strategy and tools: Both Zambia and the global context for ODA have changed since the JASZ 
was developed in 2007. The JASZ II needs to reflect these changes if aid is to further increase its ef-
fectiveness and to contribute to poverty reduction, sustained growth and human development…  
Overall the quality of governance in Zambia has improved over the past decade albeit with slower 
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progress in the last year. Zambia is one of the most stable democracies in Southern Africa. The pro-
cess of holding multiparty elections over the past 20 years appears to be fostering democratic norms 
among citizens. According to most comparative governance indicators, the Zambian state is gradually 
becoming more capable (the state is increasingly able to set and enforce rules and regulations, man-
age finances, and deliver basic services), accountable (citizens, civil society and the private sector are 
increasingly able to scrutinise public institutions and government to hold them to account), and re-
sponsive (public policies and institutions respond to the needs of citizens and uphold their rights).  
Zambia however, continues to face some domestic governance challenges. Despite the improvements 
further reduction of corruption and safeguarding freedom of press and a vocal civil society remain 
challenges and require continued attention. Political authority in Zambia remains relatively centralised. 
Parliament and other oversight institutions are still consolidating in the multi-party era, and the partici-
pation of non-state actors in the policy process has been limited. Poverty and the patrimonial charac-
ter of politics have slowed the emergence of issues-based politics and hinder the effectiveness of for-
mal institutions of government.  
DIE & IOB (2011) pp 15-16; Regarding policy and governance reforms, budget support has per-
formed below its expected potential. While achievements in the areas of reforming PFM and strength-
ening the office of the Auditor General (OAG) can be linked to the budget support process, the instru-
ment was not effective in realizing broader objectives. The PRBS group was not able to set up a co-
herent incentive system using conditionality and alignment that could have compensated for the 
weaknesses of GRZ. Beyond bringing about some improvements, the PRBS group did not harmonize 
disbursements and conditionality to a satisfactory level, nor was it able to set up a joint knowledge 
management system that would have contributed to strategic consistency in the group’s relationship 
with GRZ. The root causes of this lack of harmonisation relate to the disagreement among cooperating 
partners about the hierarchy of budget support objectives: some cooperating partners see the provi-
sion of funding to alleviate poverty as the main objective of budget support, while others give priority to 
institutional or governance reforms. Thus, cooperating partners were often unable to offer joint and 
consistent priorities to the GRZ through dialogue and incentives. Interference from headquarters, who 
responded more to domestic political situations than to Zambia’s needs, hindered the harmonisation 
and alignment attempts being made by aid managers in Lusaka. 
 
JASZ-II (2011) pp 17-18; 3. Principles of Cooperation – 3.3. Domestic Accountability: GRZ and CPs 
are actively improving their accountability to their taxpayers. As Zambia graduates from aid the role of 
institutions in accountability and transparency will be increasingly important. Domestic accountability is 
built on a strong parliamentary oversight, the engagement of non-state actors which include all organ-
ised citizens and civil society organisations, as well as the private sector and its intermediary organisa-
tions, an the (independent) media. Responsible, impartial non-state actors (NSAs) are key partners for 
Zambia’s development and aid effectiveness dialogue. CPs would like to see NSAs increasingly as-
sume functions which CPs have performed to some extent so far, in particular accountability and fo-
cusing on value for money for Government services. Hence, within the framework of the JASZ II and 
the SNDP: 
 CPs will continue their support to parliamentary reform processes to enhance parliamentary over-
sight; 
 CPs will encourage and support civil society organisations and private sector bodies to participate 
in relevant sector level dialogue and planning processes through the SAGs; 
 CPs will engage NSAs to play a role in monitoring aid effectiveness and development outcomes 
on a topic related basis and through participation in the annual GRZ-CP High Level Policy Dia-
logue (HLPD); 
 CPs will encourage NSAs to provide input and contributions in their areas of competence, which 
can be results of qualitative or quantitative research, and which will serve as points of discussion 
for planning or re-planning in respective sectors. 
 CPs will support NSAs to provide and disseminate relevant information that allows an assessment 
of Government performance with respect to all aspects of good political and financial governance. 
 The NSA-CP group will support thematic dialogue between NSAs and GRZ, coordinate support to 
civil society organisations and develop models for external and public financing modalities for ser-
vices and advocacy. 
 
JASZ-II (2011) p14; 3. Principles of Cooperation – 4. Revised Dialogue Architecture: Open and con-
structive dialogue between GRZ and its CPs is vital for aid effectiveness. The revised dialogue archi-
tecture of JASZ II will build on the existing structures and processes and will be aligned to the National 
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Economic Management Cycle. Figure 2 below sets out the complementary fora where GRZ, CPs, 
non-state actors interact in policy dialogue to improve the effectiveness of development assistance to 
 
Figure 11: Revised Dialogue Architecture on Development and Aid Effectiveness 
 
Source: JASZ II, November 2011, p.19 
 
Zambia. This includes dialogue at the sectoral level and dialogue with central government on cross 
cutting. Both of these will inform higher level dialogue with central government on issues of national 
importance which cannot be resolved alone at the lower levels. GRZ and CPs will work to strengthen 
these fora during the course of an SNDP and JASZ II including a greater role for NSA. The three com-
plementary levels of policy dialogue to wit (1) Sector dialogue, (2) Dialogue on cross-cutting issues, 
reforms and aid effectiveness, and n(3) High level dialogue are presented in the below figure 2. 
 
STEM-VCR Srl (2006) pp 57-58; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 7 : Conclusions and Critical Issues : As a number of observers have reported, the copious 
number of Lusaka-based CSOs, even when they are operational NGOs mainly serving rural communi-
ties, might be a reflection of Zambia’s centralist government structures, where all decision-making is 
done, top-down, from the capital. The decentralisation debate has yet to attract as much interest from 
CSO as have constitution-making or poverty reduction issues. Considering the opportunity that decen-
tralisation entails as a devolution process, which places local structures at the centre of the decision 
making and planning process, CSO should become more actively engaged. One idea would be for in-
termediary organisations to refocus their outlook and structures bottom-up and to integrate local gov-
ernance and local citizenship promotion in their work, while umbrella Lusaka-based organisations in-
clude decentralisation in their priority advocacy and lobbying agenda... Organisation development is 
also a priority for a number of civil society organisations. Organisations need to align their organisa-
tions and procedures to their respective mandates, and efforts need to be made and supported by the 
international community to develop effective management structures and systems, ranging from stra-
tegic planning exercises to fundraising strategies and volunteer management.  
 
STEM-VCR Srl (2006) pp 58-60; Institutional Analysis of Non State Actors in Zambia – Final Report; 
Chapter 7.2 : Conclusions and Critical Issues - Donors and International NGOs: Donors should over-
come their often utilitarian focus and search for and find strategic ways of supporting the development 
and strengthening of civil society as an autonomous institution, which implies supporting CSOs as so-
cial and political actors rather than turning them into mere project administrators and/or government 
supplementers and/or substitutes. Two spheres appear particularly relevant for donor support: (i) 
Government – civil society dialogue and civil society involvement in the formulation, implementation 
and follow-up of the National Development Plan (both at a national and local level) through the exist-
ing mechanisms and platforms (which should nevertheless be concerned with their constituencies; 
and (ii) civil society’s advocacy and monitoring role, acting as analyst, watchdog, networker and/or 
mobilise on political, governance and social issues as a means of strengthening scrutiny over the gov-
ernment. 
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Relevant and appropriate coordination mechanisms should, however, be supported in order to avoid 
parallel financing and duplication of effort – and also to promote synergy, cost-effectiveness and in-
formation exchange. As such, we strongly recommend that before co-operating partners decide to 
embark on such an ambitious project as harmonisation, efforts are made on information flows (trans-
parent and comprehensive information should exist on current levels and channels of civic engage-
ment) and on the establishment of an effective institution-wide outcome-based monitoring and evalua-
tion system for civic engagement.  
In addition, information on donor policies, systems and procedures should be made available to civil 
society organisations, especially at decentralised level (broadly speaking, such information, though 
scattered, exists at the level of Lusaka). One idea would be to use “lead organisations” (which could 
be selected according to their level of performance and capacity), at the provincial level as focal 
points, which, being properly supported and equipped, could perform the role of resource centres at 
the service of local organisations. 
For service delivery at the grassroots level, it will often be relevant for donors to work with local NGOs 
as intermediaries, given their local knowledge and expertise and advanced organisational develop-
ment compared to that of popular organisations and movements, thus allowing them to organise pro-
ject activities. However, before entering into any form of cooperation, the legitimacy or lack of legiti-
macy of NGOs should be thoroughly assessed (which again leads us to the emphasis on the actor 
and not just the project) with a view of avoiding a situation whereby the NGOs, rather than adding val-
ue by contributing to the strengthening of grassroots organisations and movements deprive them of 
the possibility of being heard. Furthermore, efforts should be made to combine the project activities 
with support to the capacity building of civil society organisations, thus linking the project and the actor 
dimension. 
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 Evaluation Focus Group Discussion with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
Conference Room, NGOCC, Lusaka – 14 December 2011, 08:30-12:30. 
Summary Discussion Outcomes of the Focus Group Discussion Session with Main CSOs / CSOs Rep-
resentative Organisations in the Framework of the Current EU Country Level Evaluation held in the 
Conference Room of the NGO Coordinating Council (NGOCC) on Wednesday, 14 December 2011. 
A total of nine participants from the following seven CSOs / Umbrella CSOs participated in the evalua-
tion focus group discussion: (i) ZCEA - Zambia Civic Education Association; (ii) NGOCC (Non-
Governmental Organisations Coordinating Council – Chair / Moderator of the Focus Group meeting); 
(iii) World Vision Zambia; (iv) ZCSD – Zambia Council for Social Development; (v) Action Aid Zambia; 
(vi) TIZ – Transparency International Zambia, and: (vii) Civil Society for Poverty Reduction Zambia. The 
Ministry of Community Development and Maternal and Child Health as lead Ministry on CSO matters 
was also invited to the focus group discussion. The invited responsible officer apologized for not being 
able to attend.  
This CSO focus group discussion was organised as an open forum, but to keep the discussions fo-
cused the participants were sent in advance a list of guiding questions to focus and structure the dis-
cussions. The participants were invited to fill out the questionnaire and to return to the evaluation team. 
The NGOCC, hosting and facilitating the focus group discussion, also volunteered to coordinate the 
retrieval of the replies. Below are the replies to these ten questions sent by NGOCC. Some other main 
points of the focus group discussion are summarily presented thereafter in bullet style. 
1. How conducive is the present legal and regulatory framework for civil society in Zambia to Civil 
Society Organisations’ involvement in policy processes? Strengths and opportunities? Weak-
nesses and treats? Trends and developments? 
The current legal framework is uncertain and a seemingly direct control measure by government 
to regulate work of CSOs in Zambia. The NGO Act 2010 has so many areas of contention such 
as government determining areas of geographical operation for any CSO prior to getting in a cer-
tain area, the 16 member NGO Board has provision for 9 government representatives and only 7 
CSO representatives who also need to be cleared and approved by the Minister responsible, 
CSOs will have to apply for an operating licence every 5 years, CSOs face imminent closure or 
license withdrawal if any one of their employees/officers are found wanting, etc.  
This current law does not in any way provide for a self regulatory mechanism on the part of the 
CSOs concerned.  
In addition the law is selective in that other CSOs are not included such as political parties, pro-
fessional bodies, churches. Given the objectives of the NGO Act 2010 which include promotion of 
accountability and transparency among NGOs, promotion and protection of human rights, surely 
don’t the other CSOs excluded also require this aspect? 
2. What is the overall quality of the interface / dialogue process of CSOs with the government? How 
well is civil society consultation mainstreamed and institutionalized? Any changes / developments 
over time? Suggestions for further improvement? 
Dialogue process between CSOs and government is only done at the discretion of government 
and only when it suits government. With the reintroduction of the National Development Plans the 
only institutionalised dialogue forum is through the Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) which also 
only meet when the ministries’ Permanent Secretaries are available given that they chair these 
meetings. In a number of situations these SAGs are called at very short notice. Moving forward 
there is need to relook at the convening of these SAGs and restructuring the chairing of these 
meetings so that they are not anchored under the Permanent Secretaries. 
At provincial and district levels there are Provincial Development Coordinating Committees 
(PDCCs) and District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs) to which a number of 
stakeholders participate. There is however need to strengthen the feedback systems of these 
committees to inform national level planning and development pursuits. Participation by different 
stakeholders also needs to be improved upon in addition to ensuring that inputs are taken on 
board – implementation of the Decentralisation Policy and its Plan is key in this regard. 
3. How well linked / anchored is your CSO at the grassroots level? What is the quality of your or-
ganisation’s vertical linkages with the grassroots level of society? How representative is your 
CSO? Strengths and weaknesses? Evolutions over time? 
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NGOCC is an umbrella gender based organisation with membership spread throughout all the 
ten provinces of Zambia – we actually cover about 36 districts out of the 73 districts in Zambia. A 
total of 109 member organisations comprising NGOs, Community Based Organisations and Faith 
Based organisations are directly affiliated to NGOCC and we have a direct link with all of them. 
These member organisations are made up of both women and men and of course with an em-
phasis on women’s leadership within the organisations. Annual visitations are undertaken to each 
of the 109 organisations to discuss various issues ranging from their operations, challenges, suc-
cesses, capacity assessments, and their sustainability plans, among other issues.  
Obviously the challenge of coordinating 109 organisations which are at various capacity levels 
poses challenges especially when it comes to advocacy – the organisation has grown from a pal-
try 9 organisations at the time of set up in 1985, to 43 in the 1970s to 85 around the year 2000 to 
now 109 as at 2011. Communication is also another area requiring continuous improvements es-
pecially as it affects timely advocacy on critical national issues such as the national constitution, 
issues of gender based violence, etc The hard to reach are those in the far flung rural areas 
where internet is not available and mobile telephone is intermittent and not everyone has a cell 
phone. 
4. How clear is the definition of a CSO – Civil Society Organisation in the Zambian context? Is there 
a common understanding of the classification of CSO categories? Pls. list the main categories of 
CSOs. 
The current NGO Act 2010 is not clear on who a CSO is – there seems to be a distinction be-
tween the general term of CSO and what an NGO is. To a large extent the current NGO Act 
seems to have excluded those CSOs dealing in service delivery and other charity work in its def-
inition and only targeted human rights and advocacy based NGOs in its definition. There is need 
to broaden this aspect in the current law to be more encompassing. 
In Zambia the main categories of CSOs include political parties, professional bodies, churches, 
NGOs, associations, trusts and foundations, among others. 
5. How would you assess the capacity (both human and institutional) of your CSO and the lev-
el/quality of apex structure building? How strong is your CSO’s networking with other CSO’s? 
Developments over time? Crucial still outstanding needs? 
NGOCC generally has adequate capacities both human and institutional. Of course the human 
capacity is one requiring continuous working on given the levels of staff turnover in the general 
CSO environment. As an institution that has existed for over 26 years now the organisation has 
grown in terms of institutional processes and its partner base. It has the goodwill of its cooperat-
ing partners and is a model for other CSOs in Zambia when it comes to governance and man-
agement structures. This is despite that the board of governors is volunteer based while man-
agement is professional full time members employed on contractual basis. 
NGOCC has been a part of several networks when pushing for a common cause in development 
such as the Oasis Forum on constitutional matters, CSO network on elections on matters of 
women’s participation in national elections, regional network on advancing gender in southern Af-
rica (countries include Zambia, Mozambique, South Africa, Angola) 
Crucial still outstanding needs for our gender work are the national constitution, implementation 
of the Gender Based Violence law, and the need for Zambia to adopt gender responsive national 
budgets. 
6. How well has your CSO weighted on the dialogue processes in the different sectors / thematic 
areas at both central and district levels? Concrete illustrations? Trends and developments? 
NGOCC has been an active partner in development through representation on various statutory 
bodies and commissions/committee to influence decisions from a gender perspective. The issue 
has always been that not all our inputs are taken on board by government. A good example were 
our submissions on how to engender the current Sixth National Development Plan – a number of 
our submissions were left out from the adopted Plan. However gender still remains a priority on 
Zambia’s development agenda and this is an opportunity for our continued engagement. Also 
that Zambia is signatory to a number of regional and international conventions provides an ave-
nue to hold government to account to deliver on its commitments. 
7. To what extent has your CSO benefited from capacity building support from the EU, both human 
and institutional. Strengths and weaknesses? Success stories and lessons learned? Any evolu-
tions over time? 
NGOCC has made some attempts to obtain funding from the EU through proposals submitted 
but has not been successful. Efforts are still being made to keep trying – there is need for EU to 
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relook at its funding procedures to make it more accessible especially with regard to women’s 
groups. Some technical capacity building may also be required from EU competent staff to assist 
groupings like ours to access resources. 
8. To what extent has your CSO (and its members) been involved in the design and operationalisa-
tion of the EU support strategy to Zambia? This pertains to both the EDF9 (2001-2007) and 
EDF10 (2008-2013) country strategies. Strengths and weaknesses? Any concrete recommenda-
tions? 
NGOCC has always been invited by EU country team to deliberate on EU strategy and our input 
has been made at several meetings. However we still see that EU head office in Brussels still 
has an upper hand on how these procedures must be structured and our country office has lim-
ited scope to change anything. There is need to empower local EU offices and teams to adapt 
funding and other technical resources to countries’ needs and capacities. 
9. What are the priorities / expectations / recommendations of your CSO regarding the EU’s support 
to civil society and to democratic governance in general? 
EU must relax its stringent requirements for CSOs accessibility of funding and must consider 
regular interface between CSOs and government in Zambia at which EU must also be present. In 
its own interaction with government, EU must also take on an advocacy role to ensure that sub-
sequent governments appreciate the role of CSOs and commit to support their work. At the mo-
ment (example of EDF9) Zambia took long to approve CSOs funding on the assertion that CSOs 
were too critical of government. This is not progressive as the contribution of CSOs must also be 
seen to be a critical component of the development agenda. EU must have competent personnel 
to firmly collaborate with government and ensure that CSOs’ funding is approved by government 
in a timely manner – this is to say EU must play its part as a development partner to both gov-
ernment and CSOs. At present it seems EU is more inclined to government processes and 
seems to be interacting with CSOs on a one-off meeting arrangements.  
10. Any other issues regarding the EU’s support to civil society and democratic governance in gen-
eral not covered by the above questions? 
As in 9 above EU must ensure that its staff are interacting with CSOs on a regular basis to ap-
preciate their involvement in development. 
 
Some Other Topics and Outcomes of the CSO Focus Group Discussion:  
 
 As per the personal introductions, CSOs (present) cover a wide variety of sectoral and trans-
versal thematic areas, amongst which the most prominent include: food security, maternal and 
child health, HIV/aids, access to clean water, basis education, good governance, local govern-
ance and decentralisation, human rights / children rights, community development, gender and 
development, policy advocacy and lobbying, budget tracking, media; 
Q-1 – Legal framework and broader enabling environment: 
 The NGO Act of 2009 has as initial rational to enhance transparency, but it has deviated from 
its initial objectives; 
 The Act does not provide for an enabling environment but sets too many thematic boundaries, 
too many limitations. It moreover excludes certain categories of CSOs (e.g. faith based organi-
sations, churches, professional organisations, etc.); 
 There are quite some concerned about the eligibility to be qualified as NGO (definition of hav-
ing to serve national interest); 
 The legal framework guaranteeing freedom of information is still lacking and therefore the NGO 
Act is to be revised by constitutional action. (not only freedom of expression but also right of 
access to information); 
 There are an estimated more than 20.000 NGOs-CSOs but concrete figures and classifications 
are lacking; 
 Work on a sort of Code of Conduct for NGOs as a self-regulation mechanism started in 2005. 
Q-2 – Quality of the interface / dialogue process with Government: 
 At present, suggestions regarding transparency are being attended to more systematically. 
There is a window of opportunity; 
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 The SAGs in principle are a good dialogue forum but have not been exhausted to their full po-
tentials so far (particularly since depending on the goodwill of PS’s as convenors. Irregular and 
not frequent meetings of the SAGs in general. 
 Another untapped / underutilized dialogue forum are the media; 
 SAGs are basically only concerned with the technical level, not with the political level. With re-
gard to the latter we lack policy dialogue leverage; 
 CSOs need to be engaged from the beginning, at the planning stage; 
 The agenda of the SAGs needs to be broader based. Here is a window of opportunity for 
CSOs, as there CSOs can provide real alternatives; 
 In some Districts, NGOs are members of / participate in the District Development Coordinating 
Councils (DDCCs), but generally their role is rather weak in these state ruled/dominated fora. 
 CSOs need to fights their own fragmentation. Coordination and collaboration should be 
strengthened further; 
 CSOs should have a more prominent and stronger role in monitoring. The strengthening of the 
M&E Department in MoFNP and particularly also in the line ministries is a window of opportuni-
ty for CSOs but the necessary institutional and operational provisions need to be foreseen and 
effectively implemented. 
Q-3 – Anchoring of CSO at the grassroots level:  
 The different participants give concrete illustrations of actual initiatives, activities and project on 
the ground, with as common denominator the desire and aim to further strengthen presence 
and impact on the ground; 
 Need to further strengthen networking and networking services is underscored: needs assess-
ments as basis; capacity building / training on networking; exchange programmes for peer by 
peer learning; joint newsletters; e-networking with discussion fora on the web, etc. 
Q-4 – Definition of CSO: 
 The definition is very unclear and so are the classifications of CSOs / NSAs; 
 Does the definition only cover advocacy based NGOs and leaves out service providers and 
churches. As the definition appears to be selective, leaving out certain actors, it needs to be 
widened; 
 A clear, consensus based definition of CSOs is essential for a viable and enabling legal and 
administrative environment for CSOs. 
Q-6 – CSO actual weight on the dialogue processes in sectors: 
 Sectoral experiences regarding food security: Nutrition and income generation have been very 
successful. Duplication of experiences now ongoing in Northern Province (prior experiences in 
2 districts); 
 Food vouchers programme as social safety net mechanism quite successful and now starting 
to engage in policy dialogue; 
 New concepts in agricultural development and food security, with emphasis more on business 
development and savings mobilisation; 
 Budget tracking (CSPR as advocacy CSO) in six sectors with SNDP monitoring as integral part. 
For financial part IFMIS as main source of info and coordination with MoFNP essential and pos-
itive. However, main problems with IFMIS data are their quality and accessibility. 
Q-7 – Benefits from EU capacity building support to CSOs: 
 Basically limited / no capacity building support benefitted from; 
 Capacity strengthening has been brought in from Europe, often through Europe based NGOs 
(head offices); 
 More training / capacity building is needed, including refresher courses and follow-up sessions 
to enhance training effects and sustainable impact and also since rules and regulations keep 
changing; 
 The capacity strengthening programmes should be more demand driven (based on actual and 
expressed needs). 
Q-8 – Involvement in design and operationalisation of EU support strategy to Zambia:  
 Involvement in EDF9 preparation rather limited and piecemeal. Moreover, explicit CSO capacity 
development project has not pushed through for a number of reasons; 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report  
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
  
Page - 209 - 
 More substantive involvement in EDF10 design, particularly in the governance component (e.g. 
support to CSOs involvement in constitutional governance and electoral processes) but here 
political decision making necessary as precondition for being able to make the difference; 
 EUD invitations to CSOs to policy dialogue interactions much appreciated, but necessary to 
move from ad hoc initiatives to further institutionalisation in regular fora; 
 EC processes and procedures are quite complex and simplification would help; 
 Goodwill at EUD level but decision making centralized in EC Brussels making further decon-
centration recommended.  
Q-9 - Expectations re EU support to CSOs and to democratic governance in general: 
 Simplification of the EU grant procedures. Too many requirements. Need for partnering with in-
ternational NGOs etc. make requirements too tough; 
 Calls for proposals are too complicated and tedious;  
 Monitoring and evaluation of CSOs and their projects/programmes should concentrate more on 
results, instead of (solely) on financial and administrative matters. A results / performance M&E 
system is needed; 
 More flexibility in contract amendments. Revisions now take very long time; 
 EUD staff is accommodating and supportive but they in first instance are grant managers, not 
sectoral or thematic specialists. Interactions beyond funding and administration are needed, re-
quiring special sets of competencies; 
 Creation of common platforms to exchange experiences (clearinghouse and network functions), 
sharing lessons learned in regional context. 
Q-10 – Other issues and suggestions: 
 EU has an important role to play in facilitating the dialogue between CSOs and government; 
 It in this respect also has important bi-directional feedback functions; 
 Further structuring of triangular arrangements: CSOs – EUD – Government; 
 Procurement issue: Not all CSOs are VAT exempt. 
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Evaluation Matrix Support Section for EQ 6 on Democratic Governance: 
 Portfolio Analysis of EU Funding of CSO Interventions in Zambia 2001-2010 
  
Portfolio Analysis of EU Funding of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)  
Interventions in Zambia in the Period 2001-2010 
 
Basics of the CSO Contracts Portfolio Analysis: The portfolio analysis of EU funding of Civil Society 
Organisations interventions in the period 2001-2010 conducted in the framework of the current Zambia 
country level evaluation of EU support to Zambia in this ten year period particularly focuses on: (i) The 
total number and amounts of the grant contracts and their evolution over time; (ii) The total number and 
amounts of the foreseen CSO grants which were cancelled / did not push through for one reason or 
another; (iii) The analysis of CSO funding by EU cooperation instrument / source of funding; and (iv) 
The distribution of CSOs funding by sector / thematic area of intervention. The source of data is a CRIS 
database search conducted on 09 December 2011 on the combination of the following three criteria: (a) 
Contract year between 2001 and 2010; (b) “SV as type of “contract”, and (c) Zambia as benef iciary 
zone. All CSO contracts funded in this period are grants. By far the most prominent procurement meth-
od for these CSO grants has been the “Open Call for Proposals”. Most CSOs contract entries in the 
database take the format of individual grants to individual CSOs. Others concern EU umbrella pro-
grammes with a multitude of CSO beneficiaries (e.g. the EDF programme on Support of Access to Jus-
tice). Double entries in the database have been filtered out (a total of 8 entries with a total value of 
about €6.7 million). Attached to this summary portfolio analysis are the following supporting tools: (i) 
The listing tables of all EU CSO grants, both effectively paid and cancelled grants); (ii) Summary statis-
tical tables on both the number and total value of CSO grant contracts, with breakdowns by year, by 
source of funding / cooperation instrument, and by sector / thematic area of intervention, and; (iii) 
Summary graphics. The tables hereafter are coded CS-1 to CS-7, and the figures codes are CS-G1 to 
CS-G10. 
 
The Total Number and Amounts of EU Grant Contracts with CSOs in Zambia: In the 2001-2010 ten 
year period, a total of 85 grant contracts with a total value of 67 million Euro have been awarded to 
CSOs in Zambia. The average contract value is 789,862 Euro with grants varying from 24,953€ as 
smallest contract value to 6 million € as largest umbrella CSO support programme covering a multitude 
of CSO beneficiaries. As of the end of 2011, a total of 55 million Euro (or 82.6%) have been actually 
awarded. A total of 25 of these awarded contracts (or 29.4%) have been closed as of the end of 2011. 
A total of 129 grant contract with a total value of 102 million Euro had been approved, but of these 44 or 
(34.1%) have been cancelled for one reason or another with a total cancelled value of 35 million € (or 
34.#%) of the total. The cancelled grants particularly pertain to the earlier years 2001 to 2004 of the 
period under review with 35 grants cancelled representing a total value of 28 million €, with peak year 
2004 (14 project cancelled with a value of 18 million €).  
 
Trends over Time in CSOs Grant Funding: There generally is a growing annual trend in EU CSOs fund-
ing over the ten year period both in number and total value of grant contracts, with a stabilisation (slight 
decrease) in the later years. The growth is particularly outspoken in the period covered by the CSP 
2001-2007 evolving from a minimum funding at the onset of this period with a peak in 2006, both in 
number and total value of the contracts. The three years of the CSP 2008-2012 saw a consolidation of 
the CSO funding at this overall substantially higher level compared to the first CSP. All contracts 
awarded up to the end of 2004 have been fully paid and are closed. From 2005 onwards, increasing 
amounts are still due for payment and contracts still ongoing, not yet closed. 
 
EU Main Sources of Funding / Cooperation Instruments for Financing of CSO Grants: For the analysis 
of the EU sources of funding of CSOs in Zambia, the EuropeAid classification of sources of funding 
related to the EU Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) since 2007 has been used. This same 
thematic/sectoral classification is applied to the grant contract awarded before 2007. In accordance with 
this classification, the three main EU sources of funding / cooperation instruments are: (i) the European 
Development Fund (EDF); (ii) The vertical thematic programmes, and (iii) the sugar protocol with ac-
companying measures for 18 ACP countries. Of the 84 awarded contracts to CSOs in the 2001-2010 
period, 28 or one third (33.3%) have been financed under the EDF representing a total value of 24 mil-
lion Euro (or 36.1% of total foreseen grants contracts amount). The largest CSO funding however 
comes from EU vertical thematic programmes / budget lines, both in number of grants (55 or 65.5% of 
the total) and in contract money value (59.4%). One grant contract representing 4.5% of the total CSO 
funding originated from the sugar protocol. Of the EU vertical thematic programmes / budget lines, the 
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largest CSO funding comes from the Non-State Actors and Local Government programme (31 con-
tracts representing more than a quarter (27.9%) of the total CSO funding, followed by food security (18 
contracts representing 17.9% of total CSOs contract value). A distant third source is the health pro-
gramme (especially HIV/Aids) (one programme, but 7.4% of the total resources). The democracy and 
human rights programme (EIDHR and DDH) provided 3.7% of the total CSO funding in the ten year 
period 2001-2010 via three grants. The Environment and Natural Resources (ENRTP) budget line and 
the Instrument for Stability (IFS-RRM) provided relatively minor funding (resp. 1.0% and 1.5% of the 
total). 
See  
Sectoral / Thematic Areas of Support to CSOs: The largest EU support to Civil Society Organisations in 
the ten year period 2001-2010 has been in the sector of agriculture and food security (17 grants or 
20.7% of the total) with a total of 13 million Euro (or 19.3% of the total). This is relatively closely fol-
lowed by the health (incl. HIV/AIDS) and nutrition sector (17% of CSO funding resources) and govern-
ance with 14.5% of the total CSO grant contracts value. Intermediate positions are taken by emergency 
/ humanitarian aid (11.1%), water and sanitation (8.6%), education and training (6.0%) and livelihood, 
poverty alleviation and IGPs (5.1%). At the lower end of thematic / sectoral funding of CSO funding are: 
trade, SMEs and business development (3.5%), local, community and rural development (2.8%), Vul-
nerable groups (2.3%), Environment and natural resources (1.9%), gender (1.1%), tourism develop-
ment (0.3%) and human rights (0.1%). It should be noted that some concerns are also mainstreamed in 
other sectors / thematic areas (e.g. human rights under governance, environment under agriculture and 
food security, etc.). 
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Figure  CS-G9 :  Breakdown of Total Number of EU Grant Contracts with  CSOs in Zambia by Sector 
/ Themactic Area (period 2001-2010) ,  in  Number of  Awarded  Grant Contracts
Source:  CRIS database search of 09 Dec 2011.  
 
List of Portfolio Analysis Tables and Graphics: 
 Table CS-1 Portfolio list of EU grant contracts with Civil Society Organisations in Zambia in the 
period 2001-2010  
 Table CS-2 List of cancelled EU grant contracts with Civil Society Organisations in Zambia in the 
Period 2001-2010, by year  
 Table CS-3 Portfolio list of EU grant contracts with Civil Society Organisations in Zambia in the 
period 2001-2010, by year (see CS-1 with year totals)  
 Table CS-4 Summary table of annual EU grant contract totals with Civil Society Organisations in 
Zambia in the period 2001-2010, by financial year  
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 Table CS-5 Summary table of cancelled EU grant contract totals with Civil Society Organisations 
in Zambia in the period 2001-2010, by year  
 Table CS-6 Summary table of EU grant contract totals with Civil Society Organisations in Zam-
bia in the period 2001-2010, by EU source of funding   
 Table CS-7 Summary table of EU grant contract totals with Civil Society Organisations in Zam-
bia in the period 2001-2010, by sector / thematic area   
 Figure CS-G1 Total annual number of EU grant contracts with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
in Zambia, period 2001-2010  
 Figure CS-G2 Total annual contract value of EU grants to Civil Society Organisations in Zambia, 
period 2001-2010 (in Euro)  
 Figure CS-G3 Percentage of annually foreseen total contract value of EU grants to Civil Society 
Organisations in Zambia actually paid, period 2001-2010 (in %)  
 Figure CS-G4 Total approval annual contract value of grants to CSOs in Zambia with breakdown 
for actually awarded and cancelled (in Euro)  
 Figure CS-G5 Breakdown of the number of approved EU contracts with CSOs in Zambia: Actually 
awarded and cancelled (2001-2010)  
 Figure CS-G6 Breakdown of the value of approved EU contracts with CSOs in Zambia: Actually 
awarded and cancelled (2001-2010)  
 Figure CS-G7 Breakdown of the number of approved EU contracts with CSOs in Zambia my main 
type of EU funding / EU cooperation instrument (2001-2010)  
 Figure CS-G8 Breakdown of total amount of EU grant contracts with CSOs in Zambia funded by 
EU thematic budget lines, by individual thematic budget line (2001-2010), in Euro
  
 Figure CS-G9 Breakdown of total number of EU grant contracts with CSOs in Zambia by sector / 
thematic area (period 2001-2010), in Euro  
 Figure CS-G10 Breakdown of total value of EU grant contracts with CSOs in Zambia by sector / 
thematic area (period 2001-2010), in Euro  
Note:  Based on EUD CRIS database search dated 09 December 2011. Applied combination of CRIS 
database search criteria: (1) Contract year between 2001 and 2010; (2) Type of contract = SV, 
and (3) Beneficiary zone: Zambia 
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1 ONG-PVD 2001 PVD/2001/63 11855 Clôturé
CHURCHES MEDICAL ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBIA: 
PLANNING AND DEVE-LOPMENT OFFICE (PDO) AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES 
SUPPORTPROJECT(PSP)-ZAMBIA
Health and 
nutrition
NP 02/01/2002 STICHTING CORDAID Pays-Bas 01/01/2008 DELEG ET 790,372 790,372 0
2 ONG-PVD 2001 PVD/2001/134 11670 Clôturé
STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF D-WASHES 
(DISTRICT WATER SANI-TATION AND HYGIENE 
EDUCATION) IN ZAMBIA
Water and 
sanitation
NP 04/01/2002 WATERAID LBG Royaume-Uni 01/04/2009 DELEG ZM 1,000,000 1,000,000 0
3 ONG-PVD 2003 20794 Clôturé Working with Disabled People in Zambia
Health and 
nutrition
NP 24/01/2003
ACTION ON DISABILITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT LBG
Royaume-Uni 24/01/2011 DELEG ET 750,000 750,000 0
4 ONG-PVD 2003 20796 Clôturé Kaoma Rural Livelihood Improvement Project, Zambia
Livelihood, poverty 
alleviation and 
IGPs
NP 24/02/2003 SELF HELP AFRICA (UK) LBG Royaume-Uni 01/01/2010 DELEG ZM 530,717 530,717 0
5 ONG-PVD 2004 65232 Clôturé
CHIKWANDA MUKUNGULE INITIATIVE FOR POVERTY 
REDUCTION - ZAMBIA
Livelihood, poverty 
alleviation and 
IGPs
D01 15/07/2004 SELF HELP AFRICA (UK) LBG Royaume-Uni 01/10/2007 DELEG ZM 602,334 602,334 0
6 ONG-PVD 2004 65311 Clôturé
Integration of HIV/AIDS/STD Interventions into 
Reproductive Health and Child Survival Programs in 
ZAMBIA
Health and 
nutrition
D01 27/07/2004
HORIZONT 3000 OSTERREICH-
ISCHE ORGANISATION FUR 
ENTWICKLUNGSZUSAMMENARB
EIT
Autriche 01/09/2005 DELEG ZM 417,780 417,780 0
7 FED 2004 9-ACP ZA-012-001 192722 Clôturé CONTRAT ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2004/01001   IOM
Emergency / 
humanitarian aid
20/10/2004
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
FOR MIGRATION
2,000,000 2,000,000 0
8 FED 2005 9-ACP ZA-015-001 193826 Clôturé CONTRAT ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2005/01001 IOM
Emergency / 
humanitarian aid
29/04/2005
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
FOR MIGRATION
3,500,000 3,500,000 0
9 ONG-PVD 2005 96491 Clôturé
Coordinated Response to Sexual and Gender Based 
Violence (SGBV) in Zambia
Gender D01 08/12/2005 CARE INTERNATIONAL UK LBG Royaume-Uni 01/02/2007 DELEG ZM 745,199 745,199 0
10 ONG-PVD 2005 95456 En cours
PROJECT FOR THE REDUCTION OF POVERTY 
(PROP) EASTERN PROVINCE, ZAMBIA
Livelihood, poverty 
alleviation and 
IGPs
D01 19/12/2005 SELF HELP AFRICA (UK) LBG Royaume-Uni 01/01/2007 DELEG ZM 627,292 613,347 13,945
12 ONG-PVD 2005 96822 Clôturé BLOCK GRANT 2004
Livelihood, poverty 
alleviation and 
IGPs
D01 19/12/2005 SELF HELP AFRICA (UK) LBG Royaume-Uni 01/01/2007 DELEG ZM 419,760 419,760 0
13 FOOD 2005 111739 En cours
VSO Zambia Food Aid and Food Security Programme; 
Promoting a coordinated response to household well-
being through food aid and food security for HIV/AIDS 
infected and affected families
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 22/12/2005
VOLUNTARY SERVICE 
OVERSEAS LBG
Consortium 23/12/2006 DELEG ZM 306,777 276,099 30,678
14 FOOD 2005 111553 Clôturé
Food Aid and Food Security Programme for the HBC of 
Dioceses of Monze
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 23/12/2005
CENTRO LAICI ITALIANI PER LE 
MISSIONI ASSOCIAZIONE
Consortium 01/09/2005 DELEG ZM 332,660 332,660 0
15 FOOD 2005 112242 Clôturé
Improving the food and livelihood security of 
communities affected by HIV and Aids in Zambia
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 29/12/2005 PRACTICAL ACTION Consortium 01/03/2007 DELEG ZM 350,000 350,000 0
16 FED 2006 9-ACP ZA-009-016 191687 Clôturé SUPPORT TO 2006 ELECTIONS ZAMBIA Governance 01/02/2006 DELEG ZW 400,000 400,000 0
17 FED 2006 9-ACP ZA-022-001 195870 Clôturé CONTRAT ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2006/01002  UN-FAO-I
Emergency / 
humanitarian aid
29/05/2006
THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS
752,613 752,613 0
18 FED 2006 9-ACP ZA-022-002 195871 Clôturé
AGREEMENT ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2006/01001 - OXFAM 
UK
Emergency / 
humanitarian aid
08/06/2006 OXFAM GB LBG 1,027,608 1,027,608 0
19 FOOD 2006 121553 En cours Safety Nets for HIV/AIDS Infected and Affected
Health and 
nutrition
D01 26/07/2006 STICHTING CARE NEDERLAND Pays-Bas 30/04/2007 DELEG ZM 749,219 749,219 0
20 DDH 2006 126279 Clôturé EU EOM Zambia 2006 28 September 2006 Other D02 31/08/2006
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
FOR MIGRATION
Suisse 01/03/2006 AIDCO F 04 2,297,128 2,297,128 0
V.2  -  10 Jan 2011
EC-JEU  Country  Level  Evaluation  Zambia   (2011)
Analysis of EU Support to Civil Society Organisations in Zambia in the Period 2001 - 2010
Table  CS-1 :   Portfolio  List  of  EU  Grant  Contracts  with  Civil  Society  Organisations in  Zambia  in  the  Period  2001 - 2010,  by  Year   
(1) (2) (4)
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21 FED 2006 9-ACP ZA-022-003 195872 Clôturé ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2006/01003   WORLD VISION UK
Emergency / 
humanitarian aid
01/09/2006 WORLD VISION UK 171,847 171,847 0
22 ONG-PVD 2006 119108 Clôturé
“Strengthening community embedded access to 
treatment and improved coping mechanisms of 
people living with HIV/AIDS”   ZAMBIA
Health and 
nutrition
D01 27/11/2006 STICHTING CORDAID Pays-Bas DELEG ZM 227,047 227,047 0
23 FOOD 2006 128658 En cours
Food Assistance and Food Security for PLWHA 
Households of the Home Based Care of the Diocese 
of Monze
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 30/11/2006
CENTRO LAICI ITALIANI PER LE 
MISSIONI ASSOCIAZIONE
Italie DELEG ZM 749,938 747,689 2,249
24 FOOD 2006 128659 En cours Livelihoods Rehabilitation Project
Livelihood, poverty 
alleviation and 
IGPs
D01 01/12/2006 OXFAM GB LBG Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 500,062 460,702 39,360
25 SANTE 2006 105009 En cours
THEME II/Strengthening Tuberculosis, AIDS and 
Malaria Prevention Programmes (STAMPP)
Health and 
nutrition
D01 05/12/2006
CARE DEUTSCHLAND-
LUXEMBURG EV
Consortium DELEG ZM 4,953,975 3,539,595 1,414,380
26 ONG-PVD 2006 119641 En cours
The Provision of Safe Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 
Promotion in the Most Vulnerable Communities in 
Rural Luapula Province, Zambia
Water and 
sanitation
D01 12/12/2006 WATERAID LBG Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 750,000 674,999 75,001
27 ONG-PVD 2006 118876 En cours
Strengthening Partnerships with Disabled People in 
Zambia
Health and 
nutrition
D01 15/12/2006
ACTION ON DISABILITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT LBG
Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 750,000 675,000 75,000
28 ENV 2006 131594 En cours
Protecting the Environment and Natural Resources 
through Trade in High Value Chillies
Environment and 
natural resources
D01 09/01/2007 AFRICA NOW LBG Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 687,626 618,863 68,763
29 FOOD 2007 145919 En cours
Improving food security of vulnerable people in 
Senanga district, Zambia
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 30/11/2007
ADVENTIST DEVELOPMENT AND 
RELIEF AGENCY UK 
UNINCORPORATED 
Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 539,181 531,786 7,395
30 ONG-PVD 2007 134771 En cours
Strengthening Community Management of Water 
Resources for Multiple Uses
Local / community 
/ rural development
D01 05/12/2007
PLAN INTERNATIONAL UK 
LIMITED BY GUARANTEE
Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 750,000 578,388 171,612
31 ONG-PVD 2007 134758 En cours
social economic empowerment of rural communities 
in southern province of Zambia
Local / community 
/ rural development
D01 06/12/2007
FOLKEKIRKENS NODHJAELP 
FOND
Danemark DELEG ZM 604,500 544,050 60,450
32 ONG-PVD 2007 134880 En cours
Profitable Organic Vegetable Production for Rural 
Producers in Southern Province, Zambia
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 06/12/2007 AFRICA NOW LBG Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 609,800 548,819 60,981
33 FOOD 2007 145865 En cours
Project for the reduction of nutritional vulnerability in 
Western Province, Zambia (PRUVEN)
Health and 
nutrition
D01 07/12/2007 ACTIONAID LBG Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 670,099 603,089 67,010
34 FOOD 2007 146547 En cours
Food Security Initiative for Vulnerable Households 
(FSIV) in Kabompo and Mwinilunga districts of North 
Western Province
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 11/12/2007
KEEPERS ZAMBIA FOUNDATION 
HEADQUARTERS
DELEG ZM 638,794 638,794 0
35 FED 2007 9-ACP ZA-013-018 192997 Clôturé MF/ZAM/022/07 FLOATDENE INTERNATIONAL LTD Other D02 11/12/2007 SUPPLY-U LTD DELEG ZM 24,953 24,953 0
36 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-017-016 194804 En cours HIVOS (NETHERLANDS)KADFSP SC/ZAM/002/08 Other D01 01/04/2008
STICHTING HIVOS 
(HUMANISTISCH INSTITUUT 
VOOR ONTWIKKELINGS 
SAMENWERKING)
Pays-Bas DELEG ZM 671,000 603,900 67,100
37 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-017-017 194805 En cours STICHTING - HIVOS ( SC/ZAM/003/08 ) Other D01 01/04/2008
STICHTING HIVOS 
(HUMANISTISCH INSTITUUT 
VOOR ONTWIKKELINGS 
SAMENWERKING)
DELEG ZM 600,030 0 600,030
38 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-017-018 194806 En cours SC/ZAM/004/08 - HARVEST HELP
Livelihood, poverty 
alleviation and 
IGPs
D01 01/04/2008 SELF HELP AFRICA (UK) LBG Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 744,325 711,206 33,119
39 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-017-019 194807 En cours HARVEST HELP - SC/ZAM/005/08
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 07/04/2008 SELF HELP AFRICA (UK) LBG Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 730,092 716,353 13,739
40 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-017-021 194809 En cours SC/ZAM/008/08 - AFRICAN WILDLIFE FOUNDATION
Environment and 
natural resources
D01 10/04/2008 AFRICAN WILDLIFE FOUNDATION DELEG ZM 578,979 521,081 57,898
41 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-014-016 193600 En cours GR/ZAM/016/08 - ZWAP
Health and 
nutrition
D01 21/04/2008
ZAMBIA WORK PLACE AIDS 
PARTNERSHIP
85,624 68,499 17,125
42 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-017-024 194810 En cours SC/ZAM/006/08 - SAFIRE Vulnerable groups D01 21/04/2008
SOUTHERN ALLIANCE FOR 
INDIGENOUS RESOURCES 
LIMITED BY GUARANTEE
DELEG ZM 719,433 647,490 71,943
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43 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-014-013 193599 En cours MF/ZAM/009/008 - CFAO (Z) LTD Other D01 22/04/2008 CFAO ZAMBIA LTD DELEG ZM 110,488 110,488 0
44 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-014-017 193601 En cours GR/ZAM/012/08 - ZCSMBA
Trade, SMEs and 
business 
development
D01 22/04/2008
ZAMBIA CHAMBER OF SMALL AND 
MEDIUMBUSINESS ASSOCIATION
DELEG ZM 248,573 198,858 49,715
45 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-014-018 193602 En cours GR/ZAM/013/08 - ZCSMBA
Trade, SMEs and 
business 
development
D01 22/04/2008
ZAMBIA CHAMBER OF SMALL AND 
MEDIUMBUSINESS ASSOCIATION
DELEG ZM 248,134 198,507 49,627
46 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-014-019 193603 Clôturé
COTTON ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBIA CONTRACT NO 
SC/ZAM/010/08
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 22/04/2008
COTTON PRODUCERS 
ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBIA
DELEG ZM 219,935 219,935 0
47 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-014-022 193606 En cours
ZAMBIA INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS - 
GR/ZAM/014/08
Governance D01 22/04/2008
ZAMBIA INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED 
ACCOUTANTS 
DELEG ZM 250,000 200,000 50,000
48 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-017-025 194811 En cours SC/ZAM/007/08 - MICRO BANKERS TRUST
Trade, SMEs and 
business 
development
D01 22/04/2008
MICRO BANKERS TRUST 
REGISTERED TRUSTEES
DELEG ZM 656,002 590,402 65,600
49 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-014-025 193609 En cours
ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBIA - 
GR/ZAM/017/08
Trade, SMEs and 
business 
development
D01 23/04/2008
ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION OF 
ZAMBIA ASSOCIATION
DELEG ZM 108,000 86,400 21,600
50 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-014-027 193611 Clôturé GR/ZAM/011/08 - ZAMBIA HONEY COUNCIL
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 23/04/2008
ZAMBIA HONEY COUNCIL 
ASSOCIATION
DELEG ZM 135,000 135,000 0
51 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-014-029 193612 Clôturé GR/ZAM/015/08 - TOURISM COUNCIL OF ZAMBIA
Tourism 
development
D01 24/04/2008
TOURISM COUNCIL OF ZAMBIA 
ASSOCIATION
DELEG ZM 200,000 200,000 0
52 FED 2008 9-ACP ZA-017-026 194812 Clôturé GR/ZAM/015/08 - TOURISM COUNCIL OF ZAMBIA
Tourism 
development
D01 24/04/2008
TOURISM COUNCIL OF ZAMBIA 
ASSOCIATION
DELEG NE 0 0 0
53 IFS-RRM 2008 168413 Clôturé Support to the 2008 Presidential By Election in Zambia Governance D03 19/11/2008
UNITED NATIONS 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
Etats-Unis DELEG ZM 990,987 990,987 0
54 DCI-NSAPVD 2008 171464 En cours Basic Education Support in Zambia
Education and 
training
D01 05/12/2008
CENTRO LAICI ITALIANI PER LE 
MISSIONI ASSOCIAZIONE
Italie DELEG ZM 766,741 690,067 76,674
55 DCI-NSAPVD 2008 171185 En cours
Increase and improvement of education and 
vocational training opportunities for the dropouts and 
the most vulnerable people 
Education and 
training
D01 09/12/2008
CENTRO ORIENTAMENTO 
EDUCATIVO INSEGNA 
FONDAZIONE
Italie DELEG ZM 625,000 562,500 62,500
56 DCI-NSAPVD 2008 171693 En cours
CASE - Civil Society for Advocacy, Sensitisation and 
Empowerment Programme 
Governance D01 09/12/2008
MELLEMFOLKELIGT SAMVIRKE 
MS ACTIONAID DENMARK 
FORENING
Danemark DELEG ZM 566,868 384,622 182,246
57 DCI-NSAPVD 2008 171584 En cours
Partnerships for Improved Community School 
Performance 
Education and 
training
D01 11/12/2008 WORLD VISION UK Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 666,391 599,751 66,640
58 DCI-NSAPVD 2008 172574 En cours
Project to enhance LGAZ`s contribution to Local 
Governance Reform
Local / community 
/ rural development
D01 31/12/2008
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBIA
DELEG ZM 497,738 306,628 191,110
59 FED 2009 210043 Clôturé Release of tranche no1 (2008) to the Basket Fund
Water and 
sanitation
D01 25/06/2009
NATIONAL WATER SUPPLY AND 
SANITATION COUNCIL
DELEG ZM 1,620,000 1,620,000 0
60 DCI-SUCRE 2009 215744 En cours
Support to the Magobbo Sugar Cane Outgrower`s 
Scheme in Mazabuka District -Zambia
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 30/09/2009
MAZABUKA SUGAR CANE 
GROWERS TRUST
DELEG ZM 3,020,000 2,985,000 35,000
61 DCI-FOOD 2009 223863 En cours
Responding to soaring food prices: a step towards 
sustainable agriculture, income generation and 
empowerment of small scale farmers.
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 18/11/2009
CENTRO LAICI ITALIANI PER LE 
MISSIONI ASSOCIAZIONE
Italie DELEG ZM 1,073,389 966,050 107,339
62 DCI-FOOD 2009 223797 En cours
Seed Entrepreneurs for Economic Development and 
Food Security SEEDFS
Trade, SMEs and 
business 
development
D01 23/11/2009 SELF HELP AFRICA (UK) LBG Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 1,085,164 958,023 127,141
63 DCI-FOOD 2009 223980 En cours
Integrated Agricultural Development Project `Educating 
children and young people in changing climate`
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 23/11/2009
PLAN INTERNATIONAL UK 
LIMITED BY GUARANTEE
Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 1,000,000 886,274 113,726
64 FED 2009 223800 En cours
Enhancing Government`s Public Service Delivery and 
Budget Execution for the Poor 
Governance D01 30/11/2009
CIVIL SOCIETY FOR POVERTY 
REDUCTION REGISTERED 
SOCIETY
DELEG AM 250,000 210,000 40,000
65 FED 2009 224423 En cours EDF Contribution to the Basket Fund managed by DTF
Water and 
sanitation
D01 15/12/2009
NATIONAL WATER SUPPLY AND 
SANITATION COUNCIL
DELEG ZM 2,172,258 2,000,000 172,258
66 DCI-FOOD 2009 213361 En cours
Improving Productivity of the Small-Scale Agricultural 
Sector in Zambia
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 17/12/2009
ZAMBIA NATIONAL FARMERS 
UNION REGISTERED SOCIETY
Consortium DELEG ZM 2,049,444 1,844,500 204,944
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67 DCI-NSAPVD 2009 225935 En cours
Sustainable economic and social empowerment of 
vulnerable and marginalised rural communities in 
Southern Province
Vulnerable groups D01 18/12/2009
FOLKEKIRKENS NODHJAELP 
FOND
Danemark DELEG ZM 712,500 426,554 285,946
68 DCI-NSAPVD 2009 226017 En cours
Strenghtening the inclusion and influencing capacity of 
Civil Society Organisations working with People Living 
with HIV and AIDS in the Central Province of Zambia
Health and 
nutrition
D01 22/12/2009 PRACTICAL ACTION Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 562,500 217,928 344,572
69 DCI-NSAPVD 2009 226023 En cours
Empowering civil society to reduce barriers to 
education for children with disabilities and monitor its 
delivery
Education and 
training
D01 22/12/2009 POWER INTERNATIONAL LBG Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 516,580 336,581 179,999
70 DCI-NSAPVD 2009 227851 En cours
Strengthening community schools to be effective 
providers of education for vulnerable children
Education and 
training
D01 22/12/2009 CAMFED INTERNATIONAL LBG Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 698,281 421,877 276,405
71 DCI-NSAPVD 2009 224663 En cours
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS prevention, care and 
treatment: Institutionalised and effective coordination 
and referral structures in Mansa District
Health and 
nutrition
D01 23/12/2009 STICHTING PLAN NEDERLAND Pays-Bas DELEG ZM 660,000 218,060 441,940
72 DCI-NSAPVD 2009 226647 En cours
Strengthening Community Schools to provide 
Education and other related services (SCORES)
Education and 
training
D01 31/12/2009
CARE DEUTSCHLAND-
LUXEMBURG EV
Allemagne DELEG ZM 750,000 192,344 557,656
73 DCI-NSAPVD 2010 226841 En cours
Petauke District Democracy and Good Governance 
Programme
D01 21/01/2010 REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA Zambie DELEG ZM 372,287 208,670 163,617
74 EIDHR 2010 248410 En cours
Prisons Human Rights & Basic Legal Education 
Project
Human rights D01 04/10/2010
PRISONS CARE AND 
COUNSELLING ASSOCIATION
DELEG ZM 89,053 71,240 17,813
75 EIDHR 2010 248676 En cours
Advancing domestication of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Zambia
Vulnerable groups D01 06/10/2010
ZAMBIA FEDERATION OF 
DISABILITY ORGANISATIONS 
ASSOCIATION
DELEG ZM 94,994 75,995 18,999
76 FED 2010 255050 En cours
Support to the strengthening of the Justice Sector: 
Access to Justice
Governance D01 09/12/2010
DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT 
FUR INTERNATIONALE 
ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GIZ) GMBH
Allemagne DELEG ZM 6,000,000 2,739,383 3,260,617
77 DCI-FOOD 2010 256580 En cours
The Food Security and Nutrition Support Project for 
Vulnerable Households (FSNV) 
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 21/12/2010 SELF HELP AFRICA (UK) LBG Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 448,613 238,499 210,114
78 DCI-NSAPVD 2010 258452 En cours
Civil Society` s Community Based Response to 
HIV/AIDS prevention for children
Health and 
nutrition
D01 21/12/2010
RADDA BARNENS 
RIKSFORBUND IDEELLA 
FORENINGAR
Suède DELEG ZM 600,000 395,740 204,260
79 DCI-FOOD 2010 255936 En cours
Strengthening the scaling up and impact of innovative 
food security approaches for PLWHIV in Zambia
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 22/12/2010 PRACTICAL ACTION Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 404,575 231,960 172,615
80 DCI-FOOD 2010 256103 En cours
Action on HIV, Nutrition and Food Security in the 
Copperbelt
Health and 
nutrition
D01 22/12/2010 OXFAM GB LBG Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 405,000 235,445 169,555
81 DCI-NSAPVD 2010 256225 En cours
Development of a waste collection and disposal action 
plan for Choma
Water and 
sanitation
D01 22/12/2010 REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA Zambie DELEG ZM 256,908 120,817 136,091
82 DCI-NSAPVD 2010 256236 En cours
Promoting Democratic Governance and 
Decentralization at local level
Governance D01 22/12/2010 REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA Zambie DELEG ZM 346,705 142,956 203,749
83 DCI-FOOD 2010 259189 En cours Agriculture Diversification and Food Security Project
Agriculture and 
food security
D01 29/12/2010
MTHUZI DEVELOPMENT 
FOUNDATION LBG
DELEG ZM 335,977 220,142 115,835
84 DCI-FOOD 2010 256310 En cours
Project for the Reduction of Nutritional Vulnerability 
(PRUVEN II)
Health and 
nutrition
D01 30/12/2010 ACTIONAID LBG Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 404,935 244,016 160,919
85 DCI-NSAPVD 2010 257950 En cours MAKE - Media for Advocacy and Empowerment Governance D01 06/02/2011
THE BBC WORLD SERVICE 
TRUST
Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 562,500 334,654 227,846
Notes:    (1)
(2)  
(3)  
(4)  
Eight (8) double entries of contracts in the database have been removed  (total value of double entry:  6,686,263.13 Euro)
All contracts are grants. By for the most prominent procurement method for thse CSO grants has been the " Open Call for Proposals" .
Based on CRIS database search by EUD Lusaka on 09 December 2011. 
Applied CRIS database search criteria:  (1) Contract year between 2001 and 2010; (2) Type of contract = SV, and (3) Beneficiary zone: Zambia
Classification of Sectoral / Thematic Areas (by the author for this evaluation):  (1) Agriculture / food security; (2) Education and training; (3) Emergency / humanitarian aid; (4) Environment and natural 
resources; (5) Gender; (6) Governance; (7) Health and nutrition; (8) Human rights; (9) Livelihood, poverty alleviation and IGPs; (10) Local / community / rural development; (11) Multisectoral / integrated 
development; (12) Trade, SMEs & business development; (13) Tourism development; (14) Vulnerable groups; (15) Water and sanitation; (16) Other
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List of Double Entries in CRIS Database  (as emerging from the 09 December 2012 database search by EUD)
1 FED 2005 9-ACP ZA-015-001 193826 Clôturé CONTRAT ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2005/01001 IOM 29/04/2005
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
FOR MIGRATION
3,500,000 3,500,000 0
2 FOOD 2005 111553 Clôturé
Food Aid and Food Security Programme for the 
HBC of Dioceses of Monze
D01 23/12/2005
CENTRO LAICI ITALIANI PER LE 
MISSIONI ASSOCIAZIONE
Consortium 01/09/2005 DELEG ZM 332,660 332,660 0
3 ONG-PVD 2005 96491 Clôturé
Coordinated Response to Sexual and Gender 
Based Violence (SGBV) in Zambia
D01 08/12/2005 CARE INTERNATIONAL UK LBG Royaume-Uni 01/02/2007 DELEG ZM 745,199 745,199 0
4 FOOD 2005 112242 Clôturé
Improving the food and livelihood security of 
communities affected by HIV and Aids in Zambia
D01 29/12/2005 PRACTICAL ACTION Consortium 01/03/2007 DELEG ZM 350,000 350,000 0
5 FOOD 2005 111739 En cours
VSO Zambia Food Aid and Food Security 
Programme; Promoting a coordinated response to 
household well-being through food aid and food 
security for HIV/AIDS infected and affected families
D01 22/12/2005
VOLUNTARY SERVICE 
OVERSEAS LBG
Consortium 23/12/2006 DELEG ZM 306,777 276,099 30,678
6 ONG-PVD 2005 96822 Clôturé BLOCK GRANT 2004 D01 19/12/2005 SELF HELP AFRICA (UK) LBG Royaume-Uni 01/01/2007 DELEG ZM 419,760 419,760 0
7 DCI-FOOD 2010 256655 Annulé
Strengthening the Scaling Up and Impact of 
Innovative Food Security Approaches for PLWHIV 
in Zambia 
D01 PRACTICAL ACTION Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 404,575 0 404,575
11 ONG-PVD 2005 95456 En cours
PROJECT FOR THE REDUCTION OF POVERTY 
(PROP) EASTERN PROVINCE, ZAMBIA
D01 19/12/2005 SELF HELP AFRICA (UK) LBG Royaume-Uni 01/01/2007 DELEG ZM 627,292 613,347 13,945
Total 6,686,263
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1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
No Type
Contract 
Year
CRIS Reference 
Number
Contract 
Number
Contract Status Title
Sector / Thematic 
Area  (2)
Sub-Type of 
Grant 
Contract
Date 
Contract 
Signing
Name Contracted Party Nationality
Date Final 
Report
CRIS 
allocation
Foreseen 
Amount  
(EUR)
Paid
(EUR)
Balance
(EUR)
1 ONG-PVD 2001 PVD/2001/104 13621 Annulé
AIDE A L`ENFANCE EN DETRESSE EN 
ZAMBIE:RENFORCEMENT DUCHILDREN IN NEED 
NETWORK
Vulnerable groups
GROUPE DEVELOPPEMENT 
ASSOCIATION
Consortium 25/07/2001 355,781 0 355,781
2 ONG-PVD 2001 PVD/2001/126 13632 Annulé
CAPACITY BUILDING THROUGH ACTIVITY CENTRES, 
ZAMBIA
Education and 
training
HILFSWERK AUSTRIA 
INTERNATIONAL -
OSTERREICHISCHES 
HILFSWERK FUR 
Autriche 26/07/2001 296,652 0 296,652
3 ONG-PVD 2001 PVD/2001/247 13710 Annulé
COMMERCIAL SKILLS FOR SMALL SCALE 
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT -ZAMBIA
Trade, SMEs and 
business 
development
VOLUNTARY SERVICE 
OVERSEAS LBG
Consortium 18/07/2001 24,916 0 24,916
4 ONG-PVD 2002 20791 Annulé Sioma Rural Health Project, Zambia Health and nutrition NP CHRISTIAN OUTREACH Royaume-Uni EX_AIDCO F 02_2005156,750 0 156,750
5 DDH 2002 31148 Annulé
Economic and Legal Justifications for the Abolition of 
the Death    Penalty in Zambia
Human rights NP
INSTITUTE FOR SOUTHERN 
AFRICA DEVELOPMENT
Zambie EX_AIDCO F 03_2005461,927 0 461,927
6 DDH 2002 34414 Annulé
Democracy and Human Rights, Combating Racism & 
Xenophobia and Discrimination Against Ethnic 
Minorities and Indigenous people.
Human rights
THE DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE ASSOCIATION OF 
ZAMBIA
Zambie EX_AIDCO F 03_2005628,189 0 628,189
7 DDH 2002 34480 Annulé
Society Against Death and Torture (SADAT)  is a 
project proposal to study and investigate the death 
penalty in Zambia
Human rights
SOCIETY AGAINST DEATH AND 
TORTURE SADAT
Zambie EX_AIDCO F 03_20051,182,720 0 1,182,720
8 DDH 2002 35417 Annulé Torture Prevention and Rehabilitation of Victims Human rights
ZAMBIA WELFARE 
ORGANISATION
Zambie EX_AIDCO F 03_2005276,788 0 276,788
9 SANTE 2002 37169 Annulé
VOLUNTARY COUNSELLING AND TESTING FOR 
ORPHANED AND VULNERABLE CHILDREN, ZAMBIA
Vulnerable groups
CHILDREN IN DISTRESS- KITWE 
PROJECT FAMILY HEALTH 
TRUST
Zambie DELEG ML 1 0 1
10 SANTE 2002 48115 Annulé
YOUTH HIV/AIDS BEHAVIOUR CHANGE 
COMMUNICATION THROUGH THEATRE FOR 
COMMUNITY ACTION (TCA), OPERATIONS 
RESEARCH, ENTER-EDUCATE MUSICAL PROJECT, 
CAPACITY BUILDING TRAINING, YOUTH POVERTY 
REDUCTION INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES
Health and nutrition
YOUTH CULTURAL PROMOTION 
ASSOCIATION 
Consortium DEVCO D 04 1 0 1
11 CDC 2002 48697 Annulé Pre-election activity: Students voting Zambia activity Governance
VOTERS ASSOCIATION OF 
ZAMBIA
Zambie EX_AIDCO F 02_2005800,000 0 800,000
12 CDC 2002 48706 Annulé Rural empowerement project
Local / community / 
rural development
FRIENDS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
AND ITS CONSERVATION - 
FOTEC
Zambie EX_AIDCO F 02_2005713,295 0 713,295
13 CDC 2003 55484 Annulé
Agricultural knowledge sharing between the public 
and private sector to reduce poverty among the 
members of 30 Zambian NGOs belonging to the 
PELUM-Zambia network
Agriculture and food 
security
STICHTING AGROMISA 
(AGROMISA FOUNDATION)
Pays-Bas EX_AIDCO F 02_2005674,087 0 674,087
14 CDC 2003 55494 Annulé Holding Community Sensitizaion workshops Vulnerable groups
ZAMBIA NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF THE PHYSICALLY 
HANDICAPPED
Zambie EX_AIDCO F 02_2005 0 0 0
15 CDC 2003 55681 Annulé
Street vendor kantemba community market Kalulushi 
District, Zambia
Livelihood, poverty 
alleviation and IGPs
TUNTEMBA ASSOCIATION OF 
ZAMBIA
Zambie EX_AIDCO F 02_2005951,595 0 951,595
16 CDC 2003 55683 Annulé
Capacity building short courses on tools and skills for 
understanding and promoting sustainable 
development through experiential learning
Environment and 
natural resources
LEADERSHIP FOR 
ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT (LEAD) 
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Zambie EX_AIDCO F 02_2005177,063 0 177,063
EC-JEU  Country  Level  Evaluation  Zambia   (2011)
Analysis of EU Support to Civil Society Organisations in Zambia in the Period 2001 - 2010
Table  CS-2 :   List  of  Cancelled  EU  Grant  Contracts  with  Civil  Society  Organisations in  Zambia  in  the  Period  2001 - 2010,  by  Year   
(1) (2)
V.2  -  10 Jan 2011
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1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
No Type
Contract 
Year
CRIS Reference 
Number
Contract 
Number
Contract Status Title
Sector / Thematic 
Area  (2)
Sub-Type of 
Grant 
Contract
Date 
Contract 
Signing
Name Contracted Party Nationality
Date Final 
Report
CRIS 
allocation
Foreseen 
Amount  
(EUR)
Paid
(EUR)
Balance
(EUR)
17 CDC 2003 55747 Annulé CINDI - Kitwe Project Vulnerable groups
CHILDREN IN DISTRESS - KITWE 
PROJECT
Zambie EX_AIDCO F 02_2005670,442 0 670,442
18 CDC 2003 55792 Annulé
Making democracy delivered by respecting human 
rights ands freedoms
Governance
RESCUE INTERNATIONAL FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS & FREEDOMS
Zambie EX_AIDCO F 02_2005863,097 0 863,097
19 CDC 2003 55904 Annulé Decentralised Cooperation
Local / community / 
rural development
THE DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE ASSOCIATION OF 
ZAMBIA
Zambie EX_AIDCO F 02_2005989,180 0 989,180
20 ONG-PVD 2003 65102 Annulé
INTEGRATED AIDS PROGRAME (IAP) PHASE IV OF 
THE CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF NDOLA ZAMBIA
Health and nutrition STICHTING CORDAID Pays-Bas EX_AIDCO F 02_2005750,000 0 750,000
21 ONG-PVD 2003 65281 Annulé
AGRICULTURAL TRAINING AND RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS FOR SMALL FARMING 
IN THE REGION LUFUBU - LUAPULA PROVINCE  -  
ZAMBIA
Agriculture and food 
security
JUGEND DRITTE WELT 
FREUNDE UND FORDERER DER 
MISSIONSPROKUR DER 
SALISANER DON BOSCO IN 
BONN EV
Allemagne EX_AIDCO F 02_2005450,195 0 450,195
22 GENRE 2004 79580 Annulé
Capacity-building, training and advocacy campaigns 
for women in politics
Gender ANTI-VOTER APATHY PROJECT Zambie DELEG ET 844,106 0 844,106
23 GENRE 2004 79705 Annulé
Advocacy, Lobbying and Capacity Building of Women 
for Increased Women`s Participation and 
Representation in Political Decision Making in Zambia
Gender
ZAMBIA NATIONAL WOMEN`S 
LOBBY
Zambie DEVCO D 01 547,259 0 547,259
24 GENRE 2004 79745 Annulé Young Women`s Participation in Political Leadership. Gender OPERATION YOUNG VOTE Zambie EX_AIDCO F 04_2005640,750 0 640,750
25 GENRE 2004 79778 Annulé
Integrating of gender issues in development 
cooperation
Gender CHILUBI DEVELOPMENT TRUST Zambie DELEG ET 599,717 0 599,717
26 GENRE 2004 79985 Annulé Fostering Gender Equity in Education. Gender
FORUM FOR AFRICAN WOMEN 
EDUCATIONALISTS IN ZAMBIA 
Zambie EX_AIDCO F 04_2005650,000 0 650,000
27 SANTE 2004 80449 Annulé
HIV/AIDS : challenges for women and sexual and 
reproductive rights and the right to life
Health and nutrition
WOMEN AND LAW IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA RESEARCH AND 
EDUCATIONAL TRUST-ZAMBIA
Zambie DEVCO D 01 900,000 0 900,000
28 ENV 2004 80704 Annulé
Sustainable Forest and Biodiversity Management in 
the Luangwa River Basin of Zambia
Environment and 
natural resources
UNITED NATIONS FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURE ORGANISATION - 
ZAMBIA
Zambie DEVCO D 01 2,300,347 0 2,300,347
29 ENV 2004 80732 Annulé
Agroforestry/Farm Forestry project for Development 
and Poverty Reduction
Environment and 
natural resources
JESUS CARES MINISTRIES Zambie DEVCO D 01 1,374,114 0 1,374,114
30 ENV 2004 81562 Annulé
Support to national forest and land resources 
assessments in eight countries
Environment and 
natural resources
THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS
Italie 3,500,000 0 3,500,000
31 ENV 2004 81696 Annulé Sustainable Forest Management
Environment and 
natural resources
KEEPERS-ZAMBIA FOUNDATION Zambie EX_AIDCO F 04_20051,200,000 0 1,200,000
32 ENV 2004 81847 Annulé Community Based Forest Management Project                                                                                                             
Environment and 
natural resources
AFRICARE Zambie EX_AIDCO F 04_20053,500,000 0 3,500,000
33 FOOD 2004 84561 Annulé Integrated agriculture-aquaculture project
Agriculture and food 
security
MUTANDA CENTRE Zambie DELEG BJ 1,670,622 0 1,670,622
34 DDH 2004 89553 Annulé
ELECTORAL REFORMS ADVOCACY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS EDUCATION 
Governance
FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRATIC 
PROCESS
Afrique du Sud EX_AIDCO 04_2007286,400 0 286,400
35 DDH 2004 90064 Annulé Community Home Based Care Health and nutrition DIOCESE OF CHIPATA Zambie EX_AIDCO 04_2007 0 0 0
36 SANTE 2005 100344 Annulé
Promoting a coordinated multi level and multi faceted 
approach to sexual and reproductive health rights and 
services for women and youth in Zambia   
Health and nutrition D01
VOLUNTARY SERVICE 
OVERSEAS LBG
Consortium DELEG ER 1,890,000 0 1,890,000
37 FOOD 2007 146570 Annulé
Food Security Initiative for Vulnerable Households 
(FSIV) in Kabompo and Mwinilunga districts of North 
Western Province
Agriculture and food 
security
D01
KEEPERS ZAMBIA FOUNDATION 
HEADQUARTERS
DELEG ET 638,794 0 638,794
38 DCI-NSAPVD 2008 171596 Annulé
Project to enhance LGAZ’s contribution to Local 
Governance Reform 
Governance D01 09/12/2008
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBIA
DELEG ZM 0 0 0
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 220 - 
1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
No Type
Contract 
Year
CRIS Reference 
Number
Contract 
Number
Contract Status Title
Sector / Thematic 
Area  (2)
Sub-Type of 
Grant 
Contract
Date 
Contract 
Signing
Name Contracted Party Nationality
Date Final 
Report
CRIS 
allocation
Foreseen 
Amount  
(EUR)
Paid
(EUR)
Balance
(EUR)
39 EIDHR 2008 171688 Annulé
Support to the 60th Anniversary of teh Human Rights 
Declaration 
Human rights D02
UNITED NATIONS 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
Etats-Unis DELEG ZM 3,000 0 3,000
40 DCI-FOOD 2009 213925 Annulé
Seed Entrepreneurship for Economic Development 
and Food Security (SEEDFS)
D01 SELF HELP AFRICA (UK) LBG Consortium DEVCO C 07 1,085,670 0 1,085,670
41 DCI-FOOD 2009 228539 Annulé Consolidation of the Farmers register Governance D02
THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS
Italie DELEG ZM 153,000 0 153,000
42 FED 2010 245218 Annulé ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2009/01004
Emergency / 
humanitarian aid
D04
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
FOR MIGRATION
Suisse ECHO 841,827 0 841,827
43 DCI-NSAPVD 2010 256305 Annulé Lundazi Decentralization and Good Governance Plan Governance D01 REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA Zambie DELEG ZM 366,953 0 366,953
44 DCI-FOOD 2010 256407 Annulé
Strengthening the scaling up and impact of innovative 
food security approaches for PLWHIV in Zambia
Agriculture and food 
security
D01 PRACTICAL ACTION Royaume-Uni DELEG ZM 404,575 0 404,575
44 #REF! 0 33,819,813
Notes:    (1)
(2)  
(3)  
Eight (8) double entries of contracts in the database have been removed  (total value of double entry:  6,686,263.13 Euro)
TOTALS
Based on CRIS database search by EUD Lusaka on 09 December 2011. 
Applied CRIS database search criteria:  (1) Contract year between 2001 and 2010; (2) Type of contract = SV, and (3) Beneficiary zone: Zambia
Classification of Sectoral / Thematic Areas (by the author for this evaluation):  (1) Agriculture / food security; (2) Education and training; (3) Emergency / humanitarian aid; (4) Environment and natural 
resources; (5) Gender; (6) Governance; (7) Health and nutrition; (8) Human rights; (9) Livelihood, poverty alleviation and IGPs; (10) Local / community / rural development; (11) Multisectoral / integrated 
development; (12) Trade, SMEs & business development; (13) Tourism development; (14) Vulnerable groups; (15) Water and sanitation; (16) Other
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Year
Number
In  % of 10-
Year Total
Total 
in Euro
In  % of  10-
Year Total
Average of 
Contracts
Smallest             
Contract
Largest 
Contract
Total 
in Euro
In % of  Year 
Approved
In  % of  10-
Year Total
Number
In  % of  Year 
Approved
2001 2 2.4% 1,790,372 2.7% 895,186 790,372 1,000,000 1,790,372 100.0% 3.2% 2 100.0%
2002 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 -
2003 2 2.4% 1,280,717 1.9% 640,359 530,717 750,000 1,280,717 100.0% 2.3% 2 100.0%
2004 3 3.5% 3,020,114 4.5% 1,006,705 417,780 2,000,000 3,020,114 100.0% 5.4% 3 100.0%
2005 8 9.4% 6,281,688 9.4% 785,211 306,777 3,500,000 6,237,065 99.3% 11.3% 5 62.5%
2006 13 15.3% 14,017,063 20.9% 1,078,236 171,847 4,953,975 12,342,309 88.1% 22.3% 6 46.2%
2007 7 8.2% 3,837,327 5.7% 548,190 24,953 750,000 3,469,879 90.4% 6.3% 1 14.3%
2008 23 27.1% 10,419,340 15.5% 453,015 85,624 990,987 8,742,674 83.9% 15.8% 5 21.7%
2009 14 16.5% 16,170,116 24.1% 1,155,008 250,000 3,020,000 13,283,191 82.1% 24.0% 1 7.1%
2010 13 15.3% 10,321,546 15.4% 793,965 89,053 6,000,000 5,259,517 51.0% 9.5% 0 0.0%
2001-2010 85 100.0% 67,138,283 100.0% 789,862 24,953 6,000,000 55,425,838 82.6% 100.0% 25 29.4%
Notes:  (1)
(2)
(3)
Number of CSO Grant 
Contracts Awarded
Based on CRIS database search by EUD Lusaka on 09 December 2011. 
Applied CRIS database search criteria:  (1) Contract year between 2001 and 2010; (2) Type of contract = SV, and (3) Beneficiary zone: Zambia
Eight (8) double entries of contracts in the database have been removed  (total value of double entry:  6,686,263.13 Euro)
All contracts are grants. By for the most prominent procurement method for thse CSO grants has been the " Open Call for Proposals" .
EC-JEU  Country  Level  Evaluation  Zambia   (2011)
Analysis of EU Support to Civil Society Organisations in Zambia in the Period 2001 - 2010
Table  CS-4 :  Summary Table of Annual EU Grant Contract Totals with Civil Society Organisations in Zambia 
in the Period 2001 - 2010,  by Financial Year  
(1) (2) (3)
V.2  -  10 Jan 2011
Foreseen  Grant  Contract  Amount 
Paid
(EUR)
Contracts Closed / 
Completed
 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 222 - 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Number 
Projects
Approved Value 
in Euro
Number 
Projects
Awarded Value 
in Euro
Number 
Projects
Cancelled Value 
in Euro
In % of Approved 
Number of Contracts
In % of Approved 
Contract Value
2001 5 2,467,721 € 2 1,790,372 € 3 677,349 € 60.0% 27.4%
2002 9 4,219,671 € 0 0 € 9 4,219,671 € 100.0% 100.0%
2003 11 6,806,376 € 2 1,280,717 € 9 5,525,659 € 81.8% 81.2%
2004 17 21,033,429 € 3 3,020,114 € 14 18,013,315 € 82.4% 85.6%
2005 9 8,171,688 € 8 6,281,688 € 1 1,890,000 € 11.1% 23.1%
2006 13 14,017,063 € 13 14,017,063 € 0 0 € 0.0% 0.0%
2007 8 4,476,121 € 7 3,837,327 € 1 638,794 € 12.5% 14.3%
2008 25 10,422,340 € 23 10,419,340 € 2 3,000 € 8.0% 0.0%
2009 16 18,692,374 € 14 16,170,116 € 2 2,522,258 € 12.5% 13.5%
2010 16 11,934,902 € 13 10,321,546 € 3 1,613,355 € 18.8% 13.5%
Total 129 102,241,685 € 85 67,138,283 € 44 35,103,401 € 34.1% 34.3%
Notes:  (1)
(2)
EC-JEU  Country  Level  Evaluation  Zambia   (2011)
Analysis of EU Support to Civil Society Organisations in Zambia in the Period 2001 - 2010
Table  CS-5 :  Summary Table of Cancelled EU Grant Contract Totals with Civil Society Organisations 
in Zambia in the Period 2001 - 2010, by Year 
(1) (2) 
V.2  -  10 Jan 2011
Based on CRIS database search by EUD Lusaka on 09 December 2011.  Applied CRIS database search criteria:  (1) Contract year between 
2001 and 2010; (2) Type of contract = SV, and (3) Beneficiary zone: Zambia
Eight (8) double entries of contracts in the database have been removed  (total value of double entry:  6,686,263.13 Euro)
Year
CSO Grant Contracts 
Approved
CSO Grant Contracts
Actually Awarded  
Cancelled CSO 
Grant Contracts
Cancelled  in % of Total Approved 
(in CRIS database)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Main Source Areas / Fields Number
In  % of 10-
Year Total
Total Foreseen 
in Euro
In  % of  10-
Year Total
Average of 
Contracts
Smallest             
Contract
Largest 
Contract
European 
Development 
Fund 
EDF (FED) for ACP Countries 28 33.3% 24,224,894 36.1% 865,175 24,953 6,000,000
Democracy and Human Rights  (EIDHR and DDH) 3 3.6% 2,481,175 3.7% 827,058 89,053 2,297,128
Environment and Natural Resources (ENRTP) 1 1.2% 687,626 1.0% 687,626 687,626 687,626
Food security 18 21.4% 12,043,827 17.9% 669,101 306,777 2,049,444
Health 1 1.2% 4,953,975 7.4% 4,953,975 4,953,975 4,953,975
Instrument for Stability   (IFS-RRM) 1 1.2% 990,987 1.5% 990,987 990,987 990,987
Migration and asylym 0 0.0% 0 0.0% - - -
Non-State Actors and Local Government 31 36.9% 18,735,800 27.9% 604,381 227,047 1,000,000
Other 0 0.0% 0 0.0% - - -
Sub-total Thematic 55 65.5% 39,893,389 59.4% 1,455,521 89,053 4,953,975
Sugar Protocol Accompanying measures for 18 ACP Countries 1 1.2% 3,020,000 4.5% 3,020,000 3,020,000 3,020,000
Other Other 0 0.0% 0 0.0% - - -
84 100.0% 67,138,283 100.0% 799,265 24,953 6,000,000
Notes:  (1)
(2)
(3) Used Classification:  EuropeAid Classification of Sources of Funding related to the Development Cooperation Instrument (since 2007). The same (thematic) classification is applied to grants 
allocated before 2007 - See:  http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/dci_en.htm
Table  CS-6 :  Summary Table of EU Grant Contract Totals with Civil Society Organisations in Zambia
 in the Period 2001 - 2010,  by EU  Source of Funding 
(1) (2) (3)
Number of CSO Grant 
Contracts Awarded
Total Foreseen  Grant  Contracts  Amount 
V.2  -  10 Jan 2011
EU Source of Funding (3)  
(since Jan. 2007: Development Co-operation Instrument)
Totals  2001-2010
Thematic 
Programmes
Based on CRIS database search by EUD Lusaka on 09 December 2011. 
Applied CRIS database search criteria:  (1) Contract year between 2001 and 2010; (2) Type of contract = SV, and (3) Beneficiary zone: Zambia
Eight (8) double entries of contracts in the database have been removed  (total value of double entry:  6,686,263.13 Euro)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Number
In  % of 10-
Year Total
Total Foreseen 
in Euro
In  % of  10-Year 
Total
Average of 
Contracts
Smallest             
Contract
Largest Contract
17 20.7% 12,944,176 19.3% 761,422 135,000 3,020,000
6 7.3% 4,022,993 6.0% 670,499 516,580 766,741
5 6.1% 7,452,068 11.1% 1,490,414 171,847 3,500,000
2 2.4% 1,266,605 1.9% 633,303 578,979 687,626
1 1.2% 745,199 1.1% 745,199 745,199 745,199
9 11.0% 9,739,347 14.5% 1,082,150 250,000 6,000,000
12 14.6% 12,026,550 17.9% 1,002,212 85,624 4,953,975
1 1.2% 89,053 0.1% 89,053 89,053 89,053
6 7.3% 3,424,490 5.1% 570,748 419,760 744,325
3 3.7% 1,852,238 2.8% 617,413 497,738 750,000
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0 0
5 6.1% 2,345,873 3.5% 469,175 108,000 1,085,164
2 2.4% 200,000 0.3% 200,000 200,000 200,000
3 3.7% 1,526,927 2.3% 508,976 75,995 285,946
5 6.1% 5,799,166 8.6% 1,159,833 256,908 2,172,258
5 6.1% 3,703,599 5.5% 740,720 24,953 2,297,128
82 100.0% 67,138,283 100.0% 818,760 24,953 6,000,000
Notes:  (1)
(2)
(3)
Number of CSO Grant 
Contracts Awarded
Total Foreseen  Grant  Contracts  Amount 
Table  CS-7 :  Summary Table of EU Grant Contract Totals with Civil Society Organisations in Zambia
 in the Period 2001 - 2010,  by  Sector / Thematic Area 
(1) (2) (3)
V.2  -  10 Jan 2011
Classification of Sectoral / Thematic Areas (by the author for this evaluation) - in alphabetic order:  (1) Agriculture / food security; (2) Education and training; (3) Emergency / 
humanitarian aid; (4) Environment and natural resources; (5) Gender; (6) Governance; (7) Health and nutrition; (8) Human rights; (9) Livelihood, poverty alleviation and IGPs; (10) Local 
/ community / rural development; (11) Multisectoral / integrated development; (12) Trade, SMEs & business development; (13) Tourism development; (14) Vulnerable groups; (15) 
Water and sanitation; (16) Other
Sector / Thematic Area  (3)
Agriculture and food security
Education and training
Emergency / humanitarian aid
Environment and natural resources
Gender
Trade, SMEs and business development
Tourism development
Vulnerable groups
Totals  2001-2010
Based on CRIS database search by EUD Lusaka on 09 December 2011. 
Applied CRIS database search criteria:  (1) Contract year between 2001 and 2010; (2) Type of contract = SV, and (3) Beneficiary zone: Zambia
Eight (8) double entries of contracts in the database have been removed  (total value of double entry:  6,686,263.13 Euro)
Water and sanitation
Local / community / rural development
Other
Governance
Health (incl. HIV/AIDS) and nutrition
Human rights
Livelihood, poverty alleviation and IGPs
Multisectoral / integrated development
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Figure  CS-G1 :  Total Annual Number of EU Grant Contracts with Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) in Zambia, Period 2001 - 2010
CSP 01-07 CSP 08-12
Source:  CRIS database search of 09 Dec 2011.  
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Figure  CS-G2 :  Total Annual Contract Value of EU Grants to Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) in Zambia, Period 2001 - 2010  (in Euro)
CSP 01-07 CSP 08-12
Source:  CRIS database search of 09 Dec 2011.  
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Figure  CS-G3 :  Percentage of Annually Foreseen Total Contract Value of EU 
Grants to Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Zambia Actually Paid,                            
Period 2001 - 2010  (in %)
Source:  CRIS database search of 09 Dec 2011.  
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Figure  CS-G4 :  Total Approved Annual Contract Value of Grants to CSOs in 
Zambia with Breakdown for Actually Awarded and Cancelled (in €)
Awarded Value in m€ Cancelled Value in m€
Source:  CRIS database search of 09 Dec 2011.  
Awarded
85
65.9%
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44
34.1%
Figure  CS-G5 :  Breakdown of the Number of 
Approved EU Contracts with CSOs in Zambia: 
Actually Awarded and Cancelled  (2001-2010)
Awarded
67,138,283
€
65.7%
Cancelled
35,103,401 
€
34.3%
Figure  CS-G6 :  Breakdown of the Value of 
Approved EU Contracts with CSOs in Zambia: 
Actually Awarded and Cancelled  (2001-2010)
Source:  CRIS database search of 09 Dec 2011.  
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Figure  CS-G7 :  Breakdown of the Number of Approved EU Contracts 
with CSOs in Zambia by Main Type of EU Funding /  EU Cooperation 
Instrument (2001-2010)
Source:  CRIS database search of 09 Dec 2011.  
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Figure  CS-G8 :  Breakdown of Total Amount of EU Grant Contracts with 
CSOs in Zambia Funded by EU Thematic Budget lines, by Individual             
Thematic Budget Line (2001-2010), in Euro
Source:  CRIS database search of 09 Dec 2011.   
GS-G9 see above 
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EQ7:  To what extent have EU interventions contributed to promote smallhold-
er agricultural growth and food security? 
JC 7.1:  Access of smallholders to agricultural inputs improved in pilot provinces 
JC 7.2:  Production and productivity increased in pilot province and overall 
JC 7.3:  Value chain/value addition was developed 
JC 7.4:  Food security increased in rural districts, and particularly in districts supported by EU Food 
Facility 
JC 7.5:  The improvement of urban markets infrastructure supported smallholder’s production 
JC 7.6:  The food security policy and programming framework has improved 
 
JC 7.1: Access of smallholders to agricultural inputs improved in pilot provinces 
 Indicator 7.1.1: % of land area/agricultural households where there is legally recognised land 
tenure 
Land ownership in Zambia has a direct influence on agricultural production and food security. The cur-
rent land tenure system is not supportive of the emerging trends in the organisation of agricultural pro-
duction. Zambia has a dual land tenure system where about 4 per cent of the land is state owned with 
the rest under a customary system. In the early 2000s, the leasehold tenure represented some 96 per 
cent of the land owned under the traditional hold. Commercial farms in Zambia are mainly located on 
state land, which incorporates the land with the best potential. Since 2005, foreign direct investments, 
mainly from Zimbabwe, are creating new estates in the central part of the country. 
Traditional land is collectively owned by local communities and as such ownership of traditional land 
grants usufruct rights, but does not guarantee long-term tenure and thereby security and value are not 
assured. The small farms occupy mainly land held under traditional tenure systems, managed by local 
traditional authorities (chiefs and headmen). The 1995 Land Act attempted to address this issue by 
making it possible to acquire title deeds to traditional land. However, since the Act allows the President 
to alienate customary land to leasehold following consultation with the local chief, insecurity related to 
land alienation through state intervention remains high- once land is converted to state land, it cannot 
revert to the original status even if the title deed is cancelled. One of the objectives of the National Agri-
cultural Policy (NAP) is to open up farm blocks through negotiation with traditional authorities so that 
these may cede some of their land for commercial purposes. However, in practical terms this process 
has been slow and cumbersome. 
Even the land under the traditional land tenure system needs to be legally owned by rural farming 
households. This will empower more people (especially women) to own land permanently instead of 
most of the land being controlled by the traditional leadership who are sometimes manipulated to give 
out such land to rich settlers at the expense of agricultural farmers that would use the land for improving 
their household food security and nutrition. The lack of title deeds for most farmers denies access to soft 
loans with the banking system.  
Little empirical information is available on tenure security on either State Land or Customary Land in 
Zambia. The leasehold system itself can be a source of insecurity, because chiefs consent to outsiders 
being granted leases, transgressing the rights of local rights’ holders, perhaps denying the right of par-
ents to bequeath land to their offspring. At the same time, the prevailing sporadic tenure upgrading or 
titling system is susceptible to land grabbing, dispossessing the poor and vulnerable members of the 
community. When applications for land ownership (to acquire Title Deeds) were made according to the 
formal procedures, they resulted in several years delay. Furthermore, the process usually became over-
taken by graft and corruption and the integrity of the system was undermined. This resulted in statutory 
title being less secure than unrecorded customary grants. 
The EU support in the agriculture sector did not encompass specifically the land tenure issue, which has 
a strong political sensitivity in Zambia.  
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Data, charts, tables: 
 
 
Extracts: 
“Little empirical information is available on tenure security on either State Land or Customary Land in 
Zambia. The leasehold system itself can be a source of insecurity, because chiefs consent to outsiders 
being granted leases, transgressing the rights of local rights’ holders, perhaps denying the right of par-
ents to bequeath land to their offspring. At the same time, the prevailing sporadic tenure upgrading or 
titling system is susceptible to land grabbing by those with sharp elbows, dispossessing the poor and 
vulnerable members of the community. Further, when applications made according to the formal proce-
dures result in several years delay, applicants are tempted to find ways of jumping the queue. The pro-
cess then becomes overtaken by graft and corruption and the integrity of the system is undermined. The 
result is that statutory title may be no more secure than unrecorded customary grants.” Land Tenure 
Policy and Practice in Zambia, 2003, p.12 
“The benefits of CF/CA are long term in nature i.e. they take time to realize and consequently farmers 
require secure and accountable land tenure and institutional arrangements to invest in such technolo-
gies. There is scope for donors to support the development of dedicated monitoring and learning ca-
pacities in order to build an understanding of the key drivers of CA/CF adoption and how land tenure 
and traditional authority and practices facilitate or constraint the adoption of practices designed to im-
prove productivity and livelihoods in the SH sector.” Promotion of conservation farming and crop diversi-
fication for increased household food security: End of programme evaluation, 2008, p.25 
 Indicator 7.1.2: % increase of fertiliser consumption (public/private supply) 
From 1990, agricultural commodity and input prices were decontrolled while the state-owned marketing 
companies were privatised. The initial phase of liberalisation witnessed a reduction in productivity as 
well as market failures in the sector, especially for food crops such as maize. To address this deficiency, 
massive subsidies to small farmers through the Fertilizer Support Programme (FSP) were introduced in 
1997. Of the public funds actually allocated and spent in the agricultural sector the vast majority (over 
80% since 2004) was allocated to the FSP and to the operating costs of the Food Reserve Agency 
(FRA) for reinforcing food security. Despite a commitment to reduce and gradually phase out the FSP 
by 2009, actual budget allocations to FSP/FRA absorbed over half of total sector allocations and actual-
ly increased in real terms by 14 per cent between 2005 and 2006.  
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The consumption of fertilisers (in kg/ha of arable land) was verified (during field mission) to have in-
crease by trend during the reference period. The increase in fertiliser consumption was due to promot-
ing ‘fertiliser demanding’ crops such as hybrid maize. Some of the bumper harvests reported in several 
agriculture seasons over the reference period correlated however rather with good rainfall seasons than 
with the increase in fertiliser consumption. 
The FSP public scheme is perpetuating a culture of dependency of farmers on the State, through exten-
sion services preventing the rise of a monetarized and entrepreneurial approach of farming. By targeting 
the more capitalised farmers (one of the criteria used to identify recipients of the programme is eg. pos-
session of or access to at least 1-5 hectares of land and the capacity to produce maize) it also partly 
discourages agriculture’s input small-scale traders from contributing to bring about change in the rural 
economy 
The EU SADFS, though not using at first the FSP packages, contributed to the same rationale of assist-
ing farmers within hybrid maize oriented public policy.  
Conservation farming in Zambia emphasises that if inorganic fertiliser remains one of the necessary 
agricultural inputs for crop production, its use should be moderate to avoid the negative long-term im-
pact on soil fertility (acidification). Fertiliser increases yield in the short term but has negative conse-
quences on the land in the long term (Another way is to decrease inorganic fertiliser usage and promote 
organic fertiliser usage through agroforestry and conservation agricultural best practices and technolo-
gies. Increasing productivity of land can also be achieved through access to soil enhancing and income 
generating green manure crops. Green manure crops provide the capability of increasing yield in grain 
crops, decreasing demand for inorganic fertiliser applications and perpetuating productivity of land, 
thereby enabling sedentarisation of farming and reducing deforestation).  
The EU project promoting conservation farming and crop diversification (EDF9-ACP ZA-011) supported 
the use of fertilisers by the beneficiaries through a voucher system. On-going fertiliser subsidies through 
the Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM) and government input schemes competed with food security 
packs provided by the EU project in pilot provinces during its first year of operation. Some farmers felt 
that food security packs were expensive compared to the government scheme. This led to more reluc-
tance for repayments. In addition, the food security packs per unit (1 lima = ¼ of Ha) were considered 
too small to make a significant contribution to repayments and food security especially with yields of 
2.8t/ha (14 bags/lima). In the second year, the project acquired the food security packs through the 
government scheme for farmers to also benefit from the subsidy but this has its own challenges, and 
particularly timeliness of delivery of the inputs.  
The final evaluation of the conservation farming programme did not identify a significant momentum for 
adopting conservation farming techniques and no diffusion beyond the 4500 direct beneficiaries. Even 
lead farmers limited its use to 1/3 of their land. By the time of the field visit, conservation farming was 
included in extension services portfolios for some pilot crops.  
Data, figures: 
NB: During the field mission no other and no comprehensive figures on fertiliser consumption in 
Zambia could be made available by the authorities in charge.  
 
Extracts: 
“From 1990, agricultural commodity and input prices were decontrolled while the state-owned marketing 
companies were privatized. The initial phase of liberalisation witnessed a reduction in productivity as 
well as market failures in the sector, especially for food crops such as maize. To address this deficiency, 
subsidies such as the Fertilizer Support Programme (FSP) were introduced in 1997. Since 2001 the 
agricultural sector has shown signs of improvement particularly for cash crop production such as cotton, 
tobacco and wheat. This was driven by the increased role of the private sector through out-grower 
schemes.” Vision 2030, p.12  
“Of the public funds actually allocated and spent in the agricultural sector the vast majority (over 80% 
since 2004) has been allocated to the Fertilizer Support Programme, which provides subsidized fertilizer 
to small farmers, and to the operating costs of the Food Reserve Agency. Over-expenditures for maize 
imports and fertilizer subsidies under the FRA/FSP have resulted in under-funding of productivity-
enhancing expenses such as capital equipment, extension and research. For example, in 2003, out of a 
ZMK 499 billion for MACO, ZMK 240 billion was used for maize imports. Despite a commitment to re-
duce and gradually phase out the FSP by 2009, actual budget allocations to FSP/FRA absorbed over 
half of total allocations and actually increased in real terms by 14% between 2005 and 2006.” Formula-
tion of Agriculture Sector Performance Enhancement Programme for Zambia”, Final Report, May 2010, 
Page 10 
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“The voucher system, used by the GoZ does implement the direct input distribution through the FSP 
and Programme against Malnutrition’s FS Pack. NGOs and international organisations in Zambia and 
Malawi also use the voucher system. There are, however, substantial differences between the voucher 
values, addressing the same target groups, by different organisation (e.g. CELIM and FAO).” Food Fa-
cility, Country Assessment, 2011, p.22 
“Despite the limited project impact, the purpose and goal of the project were valid and addressed the 
critical needs of smallholder farmers in particular improved seed and fertilizer; and input credit facilities 
necessary for increasing productivity and income levels. On-going fertilizer subsidies through PAM and 
government input scheme presented competition for the market linked project FSP. Some farmers felt 
the FSP was expensive compared to the govt scheme and this would discourage repayments. In addi-
tion, the FSP enough for one lima was considered too small to make a significant contribution to repay-
ments and food security especially with yields of 14bags/lima (2,8t/ha). In the second year the project 
acquired the FSP through the govt scheme for farmers to also benefit from the subsidy but this has its 
own challenges for example timeliness of delivery of the inputs was a problem. Increasing productivity 
of land through access to soil enhancing and income generating green manure crops. Green manure 
crops provide the capability of increasing yield in grain crops, decreasing demand for fertilizer applica-
tions and perpetuating productivity of land, thereby enabling sedentarisation of farming and reducing 
deforestation.” Promotion of conservation farming and crop diversification for increased household food 
security: End of programme evaluation, 2008, pp. 7-18 
“There were questions raised around the low CF technology adoption rates and the lack of evidence of 
spontaneous adoption in areas that have not only benefited from the pilot project but that had been part 
of CF programme before and after the pilot project. For example some contact farmers interviewed 
clearly articulated benefits of CF but only practiced CF on less than 20% of their cropping land. Lead or 
contact farmers commanding an annual cropping area of 3-7ha mainly under maize, legumes and cot-
ton were only putting a ¼ to 1ha under CF practices. The ZNFU quantitative report shows no significant 
increase in area under CF between 2005 and 2008. Farmers were asked why they are not putting more 
of their land to CF practices given the benefits that they described. The main reason cited by farmers for 
not expanding their area under CF practices was labour demand for weeding and also for basin making. 
Under conventionally ploughed land farmers reported they were able to cope with weed pressure on as 
much as 7ha. Although farmers had been trained in the use of herbicides that would reduce weed pres-
sure this component of the pilot project had been suspended to reduce the repayment burden on the 
loan. Farmer and local extension staff participation in the design of the project was observed to be min-
imal as a result some farmers felt that the package being promoted had a “one size fits all approach” 
which was inappropriate. A little more time could have been spent on exploring what other interventions 
were going on and where would the pilot add value. For example some of the better off farmers felt they 
would have benefited from a more substantial package especially that they had regular support through 
visits from field officers. A menu approach that offers farmers a choice would have been more appropri-
ate in the circumstances where the pilot was targeting farmers with a good track record and potential to 
pay back. (The value of the package to the farmer determines how serious he or she takes the interven-
tion, the FSP was considered marginal relative to their overall cropping requirements by the better off 
farmers interviewed!)” Promotion of conservation farming and crop diversification for increased house-
hold food security: End of programme evaluation, 2009, pp. 17, 18 and 23 
“The project design was creative as it brought on board a commercial cotton company, already provid-
ing substantial inputs on credit to the smallholder cotton farmers, and a research institution with compe-
tencies in use and management of livestock to test the CF training and credit mechanism for inputs and 
oxen. The design however relied heavily on the experience of CFU and did not have direct inputs from 
the district and farmer levels where the project was going to take place. Although the project achieved 
its key result targets i.e. 4525 farmers reached with FSP and CF training and a further 240 farmers each 
receiving a pair of draught cattle; its “one size fits all” approach reduced its contribution to the overall 
objective. Despite the limited project impact, the purpose and goal of the project were valid and ad-
dressed the critical needs of smallholder farmers in particular improved seed and fertilizer; and input 
credit facilities necessary for increasing productivity and income levels.” Promotion of conservation 
farming and crop diversification for increased household food security: End of programme evaluation, 
p.7 
 Indicator 7.1.3: % of improved seeds (public/private supply) 
The approach used under the SADFSP project was analysed as out-dated by the mid-term review, with 
a lack of innovation and dynamism. Some of the seeds did not reach the intended beneficiaries on time 
and in good condition, the seeds quality was at best uneven. The project has mostly failed to demon-
strate the advantages of improved seeds, because most seeds procured were seed from commercial 
crops, or were infected with pests, or arrived late and without a proper fertiliser/pesticide package. The 
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sustainability is extremely unlikely.  
Zambia developed a regionally acknowledged seed production through certified producers. The market-
ing was left aside, leading to vast waste and unreliability for farmers.  
Another EU intervention for improving the provision of seeds to smallholders was launched in 2009 un-
der the Food Facility (DCI-FOOD/2009/223-797: Seed entrepreneurship for economic development and 
food security/ SEEDFS with €1.7m allocated). The project seeks to increase timely supply of good quali-
ty seeds and other agriculture inputs for poor small-scale farmers in 10 targeted districts and to improve 
seed production and vulgarisation of seed growing techniques even if not on the scale originally planned 
by the project. Although highlighting that the monitoring visit took place too early to assess the project 
results, the 2011 FF country assessment identified the seed production component as the one probably 
yielding the most tangible results and noted that while the seed production at local level is likely to con-
tinue after the project end, the initiatives at national level (National Seed Growers Association (NSGA)) 
are unlikely to be successful as this organisation is very dependent on the project for its recurrent cost. 
Extracts: 
“Promotion of seed/stock for multiplication – this is an aged approach that has been tried by many pro-
jects many times before with dismal results. No attempt was made to make it more innovative by say 
considering the capacity of farmers to undertake demonstrations with minimum project support and 
potential for commercialisation of the activities, while the inclusion of elite seed production facilities was 
not included in project design.” SADFSP - Mid Term Review - October 2008, p.33 
“Seed Entrepreneurs for Economic Development and Food Security (SEEDFS)”, implemented by Self 
Help Africa (Contract No. 213925), the targets set, both quantitatively and in terms of geographical 
scope/number of potential beneficiaries, are by far too extensive and needed to be revised in order to 
present more realistic outcomes. Activities, mainly preparatory in nature, have been implemented ac-
cording to the plan with minor delays in the tendering process. The baseline study, has been delayed 
and the Work plan (WP) has not been adjusted since the project start. The seed production component 
will probably yield the most tangible results. The vulgarisation of seed growing techniques will probably 
be the most tangible impact, even if not on the scale, originally planned by the project. While the seed 
production at local level is likely to continue after the project end, the initiatives at national level, Nation-
al Seed Growers Association (NSGA) are unlikely to be successful as this organisation is very depend-
ent on the project for its recurrent cost.” Food Facility, Country Assessment, 2011, p.20 
“Seeds were distributed late resulting in late planting and poor yields at harvest. The project failed to 
recognise the importance of necessary support to local seed producing stations, and so a continuous 
supply of elite seed is not available to farmers for on-growing, and the project also failed to consider the 
support necessary to seed inspectors in order to certify farmer grown seed for off farm sales of certified 
seed which could have been lucrative. No seed inspections for the quality declared seed production 
were done (Kasempa and Senanga) and the farmers were not trained prior to growing the crop let alone 
being registered with the Seed Control and Certification Institute (SCCI) as seed growers (all districts 
visited).” SADFSP - Mid Term Review - October 2008, pp. 15-16 
 Indicator 7.1.4: % of farmers that have knowledge, use advice & are satisfied with extension 
services 
The government proved unable during the early stage of the reference period to deliver quality services 
to the farmers in terms of extension services, research and market information, especially to small-scale 
farmers. The SADFSP project (€15m) starting in 2005, in particular with its component 2, intended to 
reinforce extension services and improve the access of small holders to these services. This component 
was however dependent on the component 1, in charge of developing a food security policy matrix with 
individual sector entries, for being efficiently run. Component 1 was contracted to the FAO, who dele-
gated it to an NGO. The Matrix proved to be unmanageable for MACO which lacked the required au-
thority over other line ministries. The dedicated task force, though co-chaired, was ineffective in imple-
menting the matrix. The induced lack of strategy led to the absence of directives for MACO extension 
services to achieve stated objectives under component 2. The late start of the project further limited its 
operational length from 5 to 3 years. Some issues are identified by MACO with the contractor in charge 
of the project (GFA), the first coordinator’s replacement introducing further delays (1.5 year). Lengthy 
approval of Programme Expenditures is also identified as contributing to lessening the interest and ex-
pectations of the Ministry in EU support.  
The SADFSP Component 2 objective in supporting MACO was to achieve improved performance of 
participatory extension services, through improving policy development, activity planning and budgeting 
as well as monitoring and evaluation of development initiatives at Provincial and District levels. The final 
evaluation (2011) of the project did not find strong evidences towards an improved farmers access and 
interest in extension services, at least through component 2. At best, the EU long waited Programme 
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Expenditures allowed an increase quantity of services but not an improvement of the quality of provided 
services. The extension officers did not elaborate need assessment to adjust to farmers’ expectations 
and went for “business as usual”. The component 3, based on NSA initiatives proved to be more suc-
cessful in reaching the target groups, but was kept to very local effects by the very nature of these initia-
tives and the proportion of the EU resource initially allocated to this component. The late start of this 
component limited its capacity to impact on rural economy but allowed for exploring on market side 
through calls of proposals.  
Under the “Food Facility EC-FAO II” (total volume of €74,5m), the EU supported Zambia with €7.5m in 
the frame of the “Farmer Input Support Response Initiative/FISRI”. The action running from May 2009-
June 2011, managed by the FAO, foresaw inter alia the strengthening of the capacity of the MACO’s 
extension staff to support conservation agriculture practices. The 2011 ROM report finds that the capac-
ity of MACO services to support farmers in the use of conservation farming methods was enhances 
through the undertaken activities, that included extension staff trainings (for camp, block, district and 
provincial staff), regular field visits and equipment supply. Although no aggregated statistics are availa-
ble, it can be estimated that those farmers (in particular the lead farmers) that benefitted from more 
frequent visits of trained extension officers in targeted provinces are satisfied with extension services 
which is indirectly reflected in an increase in yields as compared to traditional methods (2011 ROM Re-
port FF). The latter could also be confirmed by the evaluation team’s field visit in Kaoma (Western Prov-
ince) where farmers that seem to have embraced conservation agriculture expressed their satisfaction 
with the extension service from which they benefited and report anecdotic evidence of increased 
productivity. 
However, the overall situation of the extension services presented at the end of the evaluation period is 
similar to the situation at the beginning as far as regards the MACO’s inability to reach smallholders 
(due to lack of dynamism in the nature of extension methodologies and the inherent lack of flexibility of 
its organisations); a financial inability to cover extension staff training activities by the own national 
budget, a structural and financial inability to conduct relevant and responsive research activities, and 
insufficient resources to support the delivery of agricultural services and information at the block and 
camp levels. The lack of operational resources, especially at the district and local levels, is a major con-
straint.  
Extracts: 
“The SADFSP appraisal mission intended Component 2 of the programme to support MACO to achieve 
improved performance of participatory extension services, through improving policy development, activi-
ty planning and budgeting as well as monitoring and evaluation of development initiatives at Provincial 
and District levels. We could find no evidence of impact in these areas.” SADFSP final evaluation, 2011, 
p.22 
“Owing to the non-availability of resources many positions at district, block and camp levels are not 
filled.” Formulation of Agriculture Sector Performance Enhancement Programme for Zambia, 2010 , pp. 
6, 7 and 21 
“Lessons drawn from the implementation of the project and a 2008 Mid-Term Evaluation have shown 
that MACO was facing serious institutional limitations with regard to its ability to fully assume the lead-
ership of the sector as well as to deliver quality extension services to farmers. This was further investi-
gated through the holistic and participatory MACO’s performance self-assessment carried out in 2009 
with the support of the EU and which constitutes the basis of the Performance Enhancement Pro-
gramme.” Support to the Agricultural sector Performance Enhancement Programme (PEP) – Final, 
2010, p.5 
“Conclusions - The main features have been. 
i. It is evident that the selection of camps
85
 and individual households within the camps was not 
attempted using strict selection criteria.  
ii. Formation and operationalisation of food security task forces at national, provincial and district 
levels – National and provincial task forces have been formed with monitoring matrices formulated. 
No district food security task force has been formed in all the four pilot districts (two in each project 
province).  
iii. Formation of commodity/interest groups, if it took place, was poor– There are uniform groups in all 
the project areas (livestock, crops, and fish farming). This, to a larger extent, suggested that there 
was not enough sensitisation to enable farmers make informed decisions on what they wanted to 
do. These groups were formed in a rush in order to enable members to receive the kick start in-
vestments of the project as there are no farmers who have used own inputs to start production ac-
                                               
85 MTR found that this is very evident following discussions with field staff and MACO personnel. 
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tivities outside the promoted ones after being sensitized. 
iv. Promotion of seed/stock for multiplication – this is an aged approach that has been tried by many 
projects many times before with dismal results. No attempt was made to make it more innovative by 
say considering the capacity of farmers to undertake demonstrations with minimum project support 
and potential for commercialisation of the activities, while the inclusion of elite seed production facili-
ties was not included in project design. 
v. Late establishment of demonstrations using poor quality inputs. 
vi. Field days and exposure visits – these are very important methods for enhancing adoption of 
promoted innovations because they give an opportunity to participants to critically look at what they 
do and seek solutions on how best to overcome their won challenges. These should have been en-
couraged instead of only exposing 4 farmers from each province to a GART field day where wide 
arrays of food security interventions were on display. However, the innovations exposed to farmers 
should be those that are in their interest, their capacity to adopt and technically/economically feasi-
ble. 
vii. Capacity building for MACO staff through training, incentives and transport support – the MACO 
staff said that this has greatly improved their ability to effectively carry out extension services to 
farmers. Farmers confirmed that there was a marked improvement in visits that CEOs and district 
staff members were making to their areas. Several trainings have been carried out for the MACO 
staff but due to poor timing of a number of them and lack of monitored action plans resulting from 
trainings, it was difficult to assess how effective they were. 
viii. Capacity building of farmers through training and provision of seed/livestock as “kick start” in-
vestment – capacity building for farmers through training was hardly achieved because most train-
ing were conducted just to fulfil the plans and not to build the capacity of farmers in formation of as-
sociations etc.. Seed, goats and pigs were distributed to farmers before training them in the “kick 
start” investments.  
ix. Involvement of non-state actors (NSAs) in supporting food security initiatives – This component is 
not yet derailed since they are planned for a period of only 24 months. The component is not com-
plementary to Components 1 and 2 because projects were chosen entirely independent of the activ-
ities in these Components. Verification with the EC indicated that the objective of this component 
was not to be complementary but to identify other food security initiatives which are happening in 
the target provinces (hence selection of a project dealing in non-wood forest products, and a project 
on honey which are not in MACO’s domain). The NSAs are going to use different implementation 
methods whose effectiveness could only be assessed after being implemented.” SADFSP - Mid 
Term Review - October 2008, p.33 
“The capacity of the MACO services to provide support to farmers for the use of CA (Conservation Agri-
culture) has been enhanced through field visits and training conducted by GART, CFU and other local 
partners. 171 Camp / Block Extension staff (140 Camp Extension Officers ¿ CEO and 31 Block Exten-
sion Officers) and 45 District/Provincial extension staff have been trained in CA principles and practices. 
This resulted in more regular visits of the CEO to the OFF. The capacity of the farmers to practice CA 
has been strengthened: Preliminary results of the survey do indicate that productivity in the CA project 
areas has increased to 2.6 metric tonnes per hectare, a 44% yield increase from the baseline of 1.8 
Mt/Ha.” (Food Facility, EC-FAO II, FISRI, 2011 ROM report, p. 2) 
 Indicator 7.1.5: Rural population using financial services (formal & non-formal) 
The lack of title deeds for most farmers denies access to soft loans with the banking system. Even mi-
crocredit schemes, of which 50 or so initiatives are on-going, apply a 50% interest rate (and up to 300% 
in some cases), as their rates are based on commercial banks’ rates. Furthermore, farmers are unable 
to cope with the preparation of bankable dossiers by lack of education and dedicated trainings. 
The extent the SADFSP project intended to improve the access of the rural population in the pilot prov-
inces to financial services was assessed. However, it was not possible for rural communities to access 
financial services because of the collateral requirements which they were supposed to meet before get-
ting any loans. They were required to produce Title Deeds which they did not have. Other factors which 
made it impossible for rural communities to access financial services include the cost of financing (high 
interest rates), lack of business advisory services, administrative rigidities for farmers to prepare banka-
ble documents, lack of understanding of agriculture as a business venture, missing seasons due to de-
layed approval process, lack of trust by financial service providers who considered farmers as potential 
defaulters and lack of updated financial collateral requirements from colonial Zambian era. 
Extending access to financial services was not in the scope of the conservation farming project. Among 
the Food Facility projects a €1.07m project (Responding to Soaring Food Prices) that targeted two dis-
tricts contained increased access to financial resources (disbursement of microloans) and productive 
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inputs as one of the expected results. However, the final ROM report judged this part of the action as 
likely to fail and thus little sustainable. 
Extracts: 
“Linkages were created with financial institutions such as the National Savings and Credit Bank (NSCB), 
allowing farmers to access banking facilities or products that enabled payments.” SAFDFSP, End of 
programme evaluation, 2011, p.x 
“The crucial issue is that the design of the pilot did not sufficiently take into account the existing bottle-
necks in credit and input provision for example the market related FSP was to operate alongside the 
government subsidized input scheme. This would affect participant’s attitude towards repayment of the 
commercial package. The project also did not bring on board stakeholders with competencies in small-
holder micro-finance management for example ABF and Micro Banking Trust at the design stage. How-
ever the second year project participants were linked to the govt input scheme and will continue to ac-
cess inputs through this channel after the project. The government input scheme also has significant 
challenges of its own in particular timeliness and its limited coverage.” Promotion of conservation farm-
ing and crop diversification for increased household food security: End of programme evaluation, 2010, 
p. 17 
“Future sustainability of the intervention is uncertain. The project has failed so far to strengthen the fi-
nancial viability of agricultural activities…The micro-loans of E-MFI, one of the key elements in the sus-
tainability strategy, will be available to beneficiaries after the end of the project. However, E-MFI current 
portfolio shows high delinquency rates (30% in the 120-days bracket) notwithstanding the efforts of the 
organisation to carefully screen its customers. The high costs of operations coupled with the high prob-
ability of a significant number of defaults constitute a sizeable risk for E-MFI sustainability. E-MFI has 
not reached the break-even point and it is still dependent of subsidized capital from donors The 10-year 
support that CELIM provided to E-MFI helping them to raise capital and creating management and 
technical capacity is likely to end in the near future.” Responding to soaring food prices: a step towards 
sustainable agriculture, income generation and empowerment of small scale farmers, 2011 ROM report, 
p. 3. 
 
JC 7.1:  Access of smallholders to agricultural inputs improved in pilot provinces 
Agricultural performance in Zambia is vulnerable to erratic rainfall patterns and poor irrigation systems, 
lack of access to credit and infrastructural deficiencies which translates into very high transport costs, 
and lack of adequate marketing channels. Seasonal and regional production patterns result in large 
seasonal and regional price variability. Zambia’s poor remain extremely vulnerable to production 
shocks, not only because droughts reduce crop and livestock production and incomes, but also be-
cause market price increases greatly thereby diminish the purchasing power of poor households. 
The EU interventions in agriculture and food security were mainly focused on promoting an improved 
access to inputs, including extension services. The SADFSP (€15m) and the FAO managed Food Fa-
cility project “Farmer Input Support Response nitiative/FISRI” in Zambia (€7.5m) were the major finan-
cial vehicles for EU strategic response in the sector, comprehensively integrating improvement of the 
policy framework, reinforcing MACO extension services and supporting NSA initiatives. Some of the 
later focused on agriculture inputs but that was not their major objective. Other EU interventions were of 
far lesser financial weight, less integrated within MACO and with a much more local scope. The conser-
vation farming and crop diversity (€1.6m) was financed under EDF9. The Food Facility successfully 
supported several small and medium scale projects (eg the Project on Reduction of Nutritional Vulnera-
bility/PRUVEN with €0.67m for PRUVEN I and €0.40m for PRUVEN II) through calls of proposals. 
This sector portfolio had a limited contribution in improving the access of smallholders to agricultural 
inputs, countrywide as well as in pilot provinces. Land tenure (I-7.1.1) and agriculture machinery (I-
7.1.3) were left unattended by EU projects, the former being politically sensitive, and the latter out of 
reach of smallholders. The SADFS being one of the major EU contributions was expected to reinforce 
extension services provided by MACO’s decentralized departments in pilot provinces. While the SADFS 
faced implementation shortcoming with regard to MACO capacity enhancement the Ministries’ exten-
sion staff received additional training support under the Food Facility. Yet at the end of the reference 
period, against significant disbursements (through PEs), the services were still unable to reach small-
holders due to lack of dynamism in the nature of extension methodologies and the inherent lack of flexi-
bility of its organisations; a structural inability to conduct relevant and responsive research activities, and 
insufficient resources to support the delivery of agricultural services and information at the block and 
camp levels. An average of one extension officer for 600 farmers was also a limitation. (I-7.1.4) The 
SADFSP component 3 supporting NSA’s initiatives as well as the several NGO managed projects under 
the Food Facility €3m grant facility for NSAs were more efficient in responding to smallholders expecta-
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tions and needs. 
The extent the SADFSP project intended to improve the access of the rural population in the pilot prov-
inces to financial services was unable to cope with bank system’s requirement for title deeds, driving for 
unsustainable rates (commonly 50%, sometimes up to 300%) even for micro-credit schemes (I-7.1.5). 
Extending access to financial services was neither in the scope of the conservation farming project, nor 
in Food Facility calls for proposals projects. 
The EU projects promoting conservation farming and crop diversification supported the use of fertilizers 
by the beneficiaries through a voucher system. The fertilizer provision first competed with government 
(and PAM) schemes and then, after adopting the same channels, suffered from significant delays. (I-
7.1.2) The improvement was not to the expected scope.  
The SADFSP project had mostly failed to demonstrate the advantages of improved seeds, because 
most seeds procured were seed from commercial crops, or were infected with pests, or arrived late and 
without a proper fertiliser/pesticide package. The sustainability is extremely unlikely. Another EU inter-
vention for improving the provision of seeds to smallholders was launched under the Food Facility, al-
lowing seed production and vulgarisation of seed growing techniques even if not on the scale, originally 
planned by the project. The 2011 FF country assessment concluded that while the seed production at 
local level is likely to continue after the project end, the initiatives at national level, National Seed Grow-
ers Association (NSGA) are unlikely to be successful as this organisation was very dependent on the 
project for its recurrent costs. (I-7.1.3) 
 
JC 7.2: Production and productivity increased in pilot province and overall 
 Indicator 7.2.1: Food production index and land area under permanent crops 
In Zambia, food production and productivity is low, especially among the small-scale farmers. This can 
be attributed to various factors such as seasonal agricultural production and dependency on rain, low 
and inappropriate technology use, high production costs (largely high input costs), poor extension ser-
vices, labour constraints, livestock and crop pests and diseases, poor agricultural and fisheries resource 
management and inadequacies in land tenure and administration. Agricultural production has also been 
adversely affected by low investment in the sector; and/or lack and high cost of finance/credit. The per-
formance of the agricultural sector in general has been hampered by the poor state of feeder roads and 
other communication infrastructure, lack of adequate rural electrification, inadequate credit facilities, 
poor agricultural marketing systems and fluctuations in rainfall patterns. 
At country level, the food production index (Base 100 in 1999-2001) improved by trend during the refer-
ence period. After 4 years of production, slight decrease, better rainy seasons allowed a sharp increase 
of 2004 crop (rating 112), stabilized afterwards (115 in 2008). According to the UN World Food Pro-
gramme Zambia enjoyed a good harvest in 2009/2010 that resulted in a maize surplus, yet thousands of 
people still require food assistance because of exogenous factors like floods and drought as well as 
factors like increased food prices and stagnating poverty levels. Land area under permanent crop in-
creased by only 1 per cent during the reference period. 
No data for this indicator were available specifically for SADFSP. Other issues presented in JC 7.1 do 
not allow assessing any difference with the national trends. The other EU projects had no or indirect 
contribution to increasing food production index and land area under permanent crops. This issue was 
addressed during the field mission. Only expert findings confirmed that there was a slight increase in the 
production index and land under permanent crop production. 
Data, figures: 
 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 237 - 
 
Extracts: 
“The availability or supply of food largely hinges on agricultural production and productivity plus ex-
change/trade. (…) Various factors can be attributed to the insufficient food availability, among which are 
seasonal agricultural production (dependent on rain), low and inappropriate technology use, high pro-
duction costs (largely high input costs), poor extension services, labour constraints, livestock and crop 
pests and diseases, poor agricultural and fisheries resource management and utilisation and in general, 
land tenure and administration.” Cross-Sectorial Strategic Framework and Monitoring Matrix for Food 
Security within the context of Zambia’s Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP). Final Consolidated 
Report, p.5  
“The poor state of infrastructure has imposed serious constraints on the delivery of vital services to 
farmers, including that of technology, which has affected productivity. There has also been a gradual 
deterioration of the agricultural resource in some parts of the country due to overgrazing and over appli-
cation of fertilizers.” Vision 2030, p.18 
“Feedback from officials of the MACO, farmers, Agro dealers etc. was positive and initial results in the 
fields under Conservation Agriculture (CA) visited during the ROM mission clearly showed increased 
yields as compared to traditional methods.” Food Facility Country assessment, 2011, p.11 
 Indicator 7.2.2: Increase in production of high-value agriculture products (diversification) 
There is evidence of crop diversification from cotton and maize into legume crops that contributed to 
reducing food deficits during critical periods of the year. In addition there is also evidence among some 
participating farmers of production for example of cowpeas and velvet beans that were surplus to local 
consumption. Diversification in Zambian agriculture has not however been seriously embarked on; food 
production has highly been skewed to staple crop production at the expense of livestock and fisheries 
production. Even within the crops sub-sector, production has predominantly been for the major staple 
crop (maize); neglecting other food crops like cassava, millet, sweet potato, sorghum and rice. Diversifi-
cation is important for aggregate food supply security at national level, but it is also important at house-
hold level, where it can make an important contribution to food security when implemented properly. 
Availability of food (one of the components of food security), is also influenced by the “Zambian Taste” 
for food, meaning exclusively maize-oriented. This bias neglects other components of food security, 
namely food utilisation, food accessibility, asset creation.  
The main challenge in ensuring increased production of high value agricultural products is to come up 
with policies, strategies, implementation and monitoring mechanisms to eliminate or alleviate the con-
straints to improving household food security. In general, diversification is one key strategy in fighting 
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household food insecurity (i.e. diversification in food production, diversification in food utilisation and 
diversification in sources of income). In the context of the ideal food security concept, it is also important 
to regularly look at availability, consumption/utilisation and marketing aspects of other foods besides 
maize and the other staple crops such as beans, fruits, beef, poultry, fish and vegetables.  
Some new initiatives in cut flowers from foreign investors are noticeable.  
Specifically, EU’s interventions did not intend to contribute in increasing the production of high-value 
agriculture products in the pilot provinces or projects. Diversification in SADFS project was more target-
ed on food security of smallholders (specifically, promoting growing food crops like cassava, millet, 
sweet potato, sorghum and rice). 
Data, figures, tables: 
 
Extracts: 
“Domestic food production does matter in countries where importing food costs far more than growing it 
at home. Along with a number of other countries in Southern Africa, in Zambia imported food costs be-
tween 1.5 and two times as much as food produced locally (depending on whether imports are sourced 
regionally or internationally). Domestic food production matters even more in countries like Zambia 
where there are large numbers of poor people who struggle to buy food in the marketplace. Sadly, the 
only indicator where Zambia beats other countries in Southern Africa is poverty. For example, over 80% 
of the rural population is below the local poverty line – they don’t have enough money to buy their mini-
mum food needs. It is alarming to realise that, taking the world as a whole, most of the countries that 
are poorer than Zambia are at war.” JAR 2006, p. 24 
“The overall objective of the project is aimed at contributing to poverty reduction and increased food 
security with the project purpose of improving performance of rural smallholder farmers with respect of 
food security and agricultural diversification strategies. This notwithstanding, amongst the stakeholders 
there are serious differences of interpretation of the meaning of food security in the project. The inten-
tions of the components and the project purpose are also not fully understood.” SADFSP Mid Term Re-
view, 2008, pp. 25-26 
 Indicator 7.2.3: Yields of major crops/livestock; yield gap; yield per livestock unit; water use 
per unit of aquaculture production 
Some increase in production and productivity was achieved by the EU SADFSP project, though the 
limited sample of the 2010 households’ survey was not sufficient to make any other deductions apart 
from this vague assertion. The trend was confirmed with farmers by the final evaluation of the pro-
gramme a,d reaffirmed during the focus group. The Conservation farming and Food Facility projects 
were not targeting short term increase in productivity and did not significantly contribute to this indicator. 
At national level, the cereal yield did not show an even increase but rather evidence of the dependency 
of the agriculture production on seasonal rainfalls. 
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Data, figures, tables: 
 
 
Extracts: 
“The SADFSP Final Baseline Report and Household Survey Report have assessed changes in produc-
tion. The 2010 Household Survey was based on a small sample size, i.e. 15 households per district out 
of which 5 were for a control sample. The recommended minimum sample size for statistical signifi-
cance is 30. This causes a challenge in terms of the reliability of the data. Besides, the two surveys 
used different sampling frames, and hence are not supposed to be compared. The final evaluation team 
have included this information as an example of project data. However, it was agreed during the final 
evaluation verification workshop that no reliable conclusions could be drawn from this data. Community 
level Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) performed as part of the Final Evaluation generally confirmed 
the increased productivity of maize and cassava. Most FGDs scored production of the two at an aver-
age of 3 out of 10 before the project and 7 out of 10 after the project.” SADFSP final evaluation, 2011, 
p.x 
 Indicator 7.2.4: Tractors per 100sq of arable land; Farmers who are members of collective 
organisations 
At national level, the ratio of tractors per 100 km² of arable land was unchanged over the whole refer-
ence period. The EU projects did not target agricultural machinery. 
Data, figures: 
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JC 7.2:  Production and productivity increased in pilot province and overall 
The failure of the SADFSP component 2 in improving the performance of MACO’s extension services in 
pilot provinces implies that contributing to a significant increase in production and productivity stayed 
out of reach of the EU interventions. Some positive effects were identified by the 2010 households’ sur-
vey but the limited sample (i.e. 15 households per district), was insufficient to make any further conclu-
sions. The trend was however confirmed with farmers by the final evaluation of the programme. (I-7.2.3) 
EU interventions did not intend to contribute to increasing the production of high-value agriculture prod-
ucts in the targeted pilot projects. Diversification in SADFS project was more targeted on food security 
of smallholders, promoting growing food crops like cassava, millet, sweet potato, sorghum and rice. (I-
7.2.2).  
No data on food production index and land area under permanent crops were available specifically for 
SADFSP or any of the other EU funded projects falling in the reference period. Other issues presented 
in JC 7.1 do not allow assessing whether EU projects had any direct impact on national trends. (I-7.2.1, 
I-7.2.4) 
 
JC 7.3: Value chain/value addition was developed 
 Indicator 7.3.1: Percentage of farmers aware of key market information 
Agriculture in Zambia is still very much a subsistence activity, kept out from cash economy and individ-
ual initiatives by a strong dependency on extension services and government subsidized schemes in-
herited from the former socialist regime. Improving market information and raising awareness on key 
market information enables smallholder farmers to conduct agriculture as business and in this way also 
to contribute to economic development and poverty reduction in Zambia. However, most MACO ser-
vices are still passing out-dated messages, far from promoting income increase and entrepreneurship. 
The focus is often on increasing production of maize through an increased use of chemical fertilizers 
and hybrids. Most rural communities are lost in times, not monetized, hardly accessible and with limited 
education.  
EU’s major interventions (SADFS, CF, and some FF projects) did not specifically focus on making farm-
ers aware of the key market information, notably for winter crops. There was very little emphasis on 
improved marketing approaches and no incentive for farmers to overproduce for a cash income. This 
was due to various limitations with regard to how the information was to be communicated to farmers 
and some of the interventions did not promote sharing of key market information. In some cases, oppor-
tunities for strengthening market and credit facility linkages were not sufficiently explored and exploited. 
However, under the Food Facility a €2.04m project (Improving Productivity of the Small-Scale Agricul-
ture Sector in Zambia) specifically contained the increase of farmers’ access to inputs, market infor-
mation and other services as an objective. The strategic anchors of the project managed by the Zambia 
National Farmers Uniont (ZNFU) were the construction of Agriculture Service Centres in strategic plac-
es; development and operationalisation of e-extension and e-transport for farmers in target areas. Alt-
hough no data is made available on the increase of farmers ‘ market information in areas targeted by 
the project the strategic design is likely to achieve the desired outputs and positive impact prospects are 
high. Outside the frame of the EU funded project ZNFU also established a successful SMS market in-
formation system and a complementary website which provide current market prices and trad-
ers’ contact details through which smallholder farmers and traders easily assess business op-
portunities, evaluate bargaining positions and optimise transport and production.  
EU funded small-scale projects, notably those implemented by Self Help Africa or with its support by its 
partner KZF (in Kaoma, for example), promoted with some success market oriented agriculture with 
CBOs. Commodity groups of 20 farmers were introduced in considering managing their own resources, 
leading to sustainable and diffuse dissemination of market information, and means of capturing value in 
the value chains. 
Extracts: 
“The project has failed to recognise the additional income and nutritional benefits which could have 
been gained by helping to improve market conditions for cashews, pineapples, citrus and the abundant 
stone fruits. (…) The department (section) of cooperatives was not included in the mainstream activities 
(components) despite the fact that the project was also looking at farming as a business (availing of 
timely and relevant market information, legalisation and capacity strengthening of farmer/interest 
groups, linking farmer groups to other service providers). There has been very little emphasis on im-
proved marketing approaches, so there is no incentive for farmers to overproduce for a cash income. 
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The project (EC) is being blamed for certain poor quality inputs, while farmers could suffer losses by 
having no available markets for over production of winter crops. “ SADFSP Mid Term Review, 2008, pp. 
18, 21, 23, 27, 29, 36  
“Limited numbers of farmers were aware of key market information for legume crops. However, the pro-
ject design and execution did not deliberately promote market linkages for the legumes as its main fo-
cus was rotation benefits on soil improvement and increased yields for crops. (…) Furthermore, oppor-
tunities for strengthening market and credit facility linkages were not sufficiently explored and exploited, 
although these were central to what the pilot project was testing.” Promotion of conservation farming 
and crop diversification for increased household food security: End of programme evaluation, 2010, p. 
17 
“The project has an excellent design, based on longstanding experience of the ZNFU and its affiliates 
and a very well defined target group. If well coordinated, multi-partner projects with diverse interest 
groups can result into the desired outputs, as long as their different competencies are well synergised. 
The Study Circle Group approach is one of the methodologies for technology transfer that is yielding 
results. The outputs from the project are likely to be sustainable since the intended beneficiaries per-
ceive them to be great innovations such as the e-extension and e-transport, including the one-stop agri-
cultural Service Centres.” Improving Productivity of the Small-Scale Agricultural Sector in Zambia, 2011 
ROM report, p 3. 
 Indicator 7.3.2: % of value added kept with the producer 
A downwards trend of agriculture added value per worker occurred during the reference period. In areas 
supported by the EU, most of the increase of value added kept by the producer would have proceeded 
from a better access to market information (I-7.3.1 above), improved linkages with wholesalers and, to 
sell production at its higher price, to be able to store cereals (I-7.3.3 below). As this specific information 
was monitored by any of the EU projects, the assessment is of a limited impact on added value kept by 
producers, thus limited incentives for introducing new techniques and purchasing agriculture inputs.  
Small-scale projects, notably those implemented by Self Help Africa or with its support by its partner 
KZF (in Kaoma, for example), promoted with some success market oriented agriculture with CBOs. 
Commodity groups of 20 farmers were introduced in considering managing their own resources, leading 
to sustainable and diffuse dissemination of market information, and means of capturing value in the 
value chains. 
Data, Figures: 
 
Extracts: 
“A supervised “foundation package” is provided over a three year period that would chain out CF gradu-
ates that are able to manage their farms on a viable and sustainable basis and provide strong demon-
stration effect in the community. There are opportunities to draw experiences from high value crop out-
grower schemes.” Promotion of conservation farming and crop diversification for increased household 
food security: Final Report, pp. 9, 10 & 21  
“Farmer participation in agricultural and commercial shows, market days and exposure visits to other 
districts, provinces and to Malawi contributed to this change. As a result, farmers were able to learn 
lessons (from near and far) on farmer organisation and the cooperative concept, group dynamics, and 
how farmers planned and implemented activities in other areas of the country and neighbouring coun-
tries. As a result of training marketing, negotiation, leadership, conflict resolution and pricing methodol-
ogies, farmers became more innovative. For example the Solwezi DFA was contemplating creation of a 
revolving fund and market sourcing on behalf of affiliated farmers. This ensured that farmers could meet 
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large-scale market demand consistently and from the amount of orders received, the DFA realised the 
scale of market opportunities.” Promotion of conservation farming and crop diversification for increased 
household food security: End of programme evaluation, p.x) 
 Indicator 7.3.3: Number of local storage and commercialisation initiatives 
Post-harvest practices at house-hold level had always been a problem because farmers have to make 
choices on how much crop to store and how much to sell depending on the market price. In making that 
decision they also had to consider their own consumption requirements, storage facilities and their 
needs for immediate cash to cater for their daily needs as well as go into preparations for the next farm-
ing season. If the local distribution and marketing system was efficient, they could have relied on food 
being available for purchase all year round, but if their efforts were hampered at least part of the year 
due to bad roads and lack of transport, their food security would have been more at risk and home stor-
age was likely to receive higher priority. 
Two EU projects contributed to promoting smallholders’ commercialisation initiatives and increasing 
local storage capacity: the Food Facility’s “Improving Productivity of the Small-Scale Agricultural Sector 
in Zambia” project and “Responding to soaring food prices: a step towards sustainable agriculture, in-
come generation and empowerment of small scale farmers” (€1.07m). The construction of the grain 
storage facilities and the related services were tendered out by the executing agency, the ZNFU. The 
ZNFU had over 900 000 Members in 52 District Farmer Associations (DFA) and was an effective lobby 
and advocacy organisation.  
The main target group were small holder farmers, producing for the market, but it was reasonably ex-
pected that other farmers, in view of the proximity of the services offered and the economically interest-
ing prices, would gradually join. The prospects were good, and sustainability ensured by the interest of 
ZNFU strong interest in the private/commercial world; and the fact that the Project Partner also incorpo-
rated the end users.  
No data at country level were available but the financial volume of the EU support through the Food 
Facility called more for a pilot project than a massive change in rural producers’ commercial practises 
and capacity to get the better price for their products. 
Extracts: 
“The “Improving Productivity of the Small-Scale Agricultural Sector in Zambia” implemented by the 
ZNFU, (Contract No. 213361) is of a very different type of project: The ZNFU has over 900 000 Mem-
bers in 52 District Farmer Associations (DFA) and is an effective lobby and advocacy organisation, 
thereby offering a build-in sustainability and continuity factor. There is a very professionally prepared 
LFM. The OVIs are realistic and further detailed on the basis of a baseline study. The WP is tight but 
feasible in view of the professional set up of the ZNFU and the considerable influence they have in the 
public and private arena; A very pro-active Project Management Unit (PMU), integrated with the man-
agement level of the ZNFU; a strong interest of the private/commercial world; and the fact that the Pro-
ject Partner also incorporates the end users: Rural producers, members of the Agricultural Service Cen-
tres (ASC) also bode well for future sustainability. 
The main project axes have been defined, in close collaboration with the private sector and the EUD 
and on the basis of a feasibility study. A very proactive SC, including participants of the pri-
vate/commercial sector and the EUD, meets regularly. Tendering processes have started for the con-
struction of the grain storage facilities and the related services. 
Although it is early to realistically measure impact, the prospects are good. The main target group are 
small holder farmers, producing for the market, but it can be reasonably expected that other farmers, in 
view of the proximity of the services offered and the economically interesting prices, will gradually join. 
The ZNFU will gain in credibility and will expand, allowing reinforcing their lobbying force with MACO 
and its related services. Measures to mitigate eventual set backs are planned for in the risk manage-
ment table, together with corresponding strategies.” Food Facility, Country Assessment Report, 2011, 
p.22 
 
JC 7.3:  Value chain/value addition was developed 
EU’s interventions contributed only to a limited extent making farmers aware of the key market infor-
mation, notably for winter crops. There was limited emphasis on improved marketing approaches and 
no incentive for farmers to overproduce for a cash income in the main EU projects, those implemented 
with MACO extension services. This was due to various limitations with regard to how the information 
was to be communicated to farmers and some of the interventions did not promote sharing of key mar-
ket information. In some cases, opportunities for strengthening market and credit facility linkages were 
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not sufficiently explored and exploited. This reduced access of farmers to key market information meant 
low access of farmers to marketing opportunities. (I-7.3.1) Two Food Facility projects (Facility’s “Improv-
ing Productivity of the Small-Scale Agricultural Sector in Zambia” and “Responding to soaring food pric-
es: a step towards sustainable agriculture, income generation and empowerment of small scale farm-
ers), notably those implemented by Self Help Africa or with its support by its partner KZF (in Kaoma, for 
example), promoted with some success market oriented agriculture with CBOs. Commodity groups of 
20 farmers were introduced in considering managing their own resources, leading to sustainable and 
diffuse dissemination of market information, and means of capturing value in the value chains. They 
contributed to define innovative best practices suited to the Zambian rural context. (I-7.3.3) 
A downwards trend of agriculture added value per worker occurred during the reference period. In areas 
supported by the EU, most of the increase of value added kept by the producer would have proceeded 
from a better access to market information, improved linkages with wholesellers and, to sell production 
at its higher price, to be able to store cereals. As this specific information was not monitored by any of 
the EU projects, the assessment is of a limited impact on added value kept by producers, thus limited 
incentives for introducing new techniques and purchasing agriculture inputs. (I-7.3.2) 
 
JC 7.4: Food security increased in rural districts, and particularly in districts supported by EU 
Food Facility 
 Indicator 7.4.1: Prevalence (percentage) of stunted and/or wasted children under five years 
of age in rural districts 
High levels of stunting and malnutrition are still being reported in Zambia. Available data shows that the 
chronic nature of food deprivation is illustrated by the high levels of stunting which has remained static 
for the past decade. Overall, 50% of children aged 3–59 months are still being reported as being stunt-
ed. Urban children have better nutritional status than children in rural areas. 42% of children in urban 
areas were stunted, compared to 53% of children in rural areas. Malnutrition remains a serious problem 
in the country, especially in rural areas. 
None of the EU’s interventions in support to food security during the reference period could have an 
effect on such a global indicator as prevalence of stunted and/or wasted children under five years of age 
in rural districts, country-wise: the SADFSP failed to contribute to elaborating a dedicated strategy. 
Even in districts covered by SADFSP, the operational targets such as extension services performance, 
Community Action Plans (CAP), and CSO/NSA activities might have had an incidence on nutrition only 
if fully implemented, generalized and sustained, which is not the case. Difficulties encountered during 
implementation (MACO accounting, TA weaknesses) further limited the project’s impact at local level. 
However, the SADFSP final evaluation evidenced already a change in food intake, with 27% of house-
holds taking two meals a day for the beneficiary population, for 19% in the control group.  
Other EU projects, through EDF resources or Food Facility, are too limited in their (technical or spatial) 
scope and financial volume to have an effect on prevalence of stunted and/or wasted children under five 
years of age in rural districts, as confirmed by the various projects’ evaluations. 
Data, figures, tables: 
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Extracts: 
 “According to the Household Survey 2010, the increase in farmer productivity seems to have contribut-
ed to improved food intake (not dietary diversification, food use or utilisation). This is demonstrated by a 
smaller proportion of households in the beneficiary communities who had less than two meals during 
the lean period in 2010 compared to those in the control sample. The percentage values were 19% and 
27% respectively, suggesting that the intervention in the target communities did positively impact food 
intake at household level. FGDs in most of the sampled districts confirmed the improvement in house-
hold food availability after the project had come on board. Farmers gave it an average score of 7 out of 
10 compared to 3 out of 10 before the project. It is suggested that food availability has improved over 
the SADFSP time period.” SADFSP final evaluation, 2011, p.? 
“The Project has contributed to increased food security among rural households in Western and North 
Western Provinces. This contribution has been largely in terms of improving food availability and ac-
cess. The majority of NSA implemented projects and have helped contribute to reduce poverty by in-
creasing small holder income. MACO distributions of seeds, livestock and fish under Component 2 have 
addressed the availability of animal proteins, cereals and fats at least in the short term. However, the 
number of households receiving these distributions was low. We have found no evidence that SADFSP 
has achieved any impact on the percentage of children under five suffering from chronic and/or acute 
malnutrition in target provinces.” Promotion of conservation farming and crop diversification for in-
creased household food security: End of programme evaluation – page 20 
 Indicator 7.4.2: Decrease % of women with a too low Body Mass Index in rural districts 
See 7.4.1 
 Indicator 7.4.3: Degree of integration of food aid into food security and agriculture devel-
opment 
Food aid in Zambia has continued to be provided during deficit and bumper harvest years, with less 
provided during period of better yields. During better harvest, more crop yields have been sold to re-
gional markets. However, this integration of food aid into food security and agricultural development 
does not have long lasting effect because it only occurs during the agricultural seasons when there is 
surplus food production. In most cases, especially in rural Zambia, food aid has led to a dependency 
syndrome where households expect to receive food aid every year and may not put more effort to grow 
enough food.  
During EU’s interventions, little has changed to integrate food aid into food security and agricultural 
development for rural households but appreciable change has been achieved for urban commercial 
farmers that produce higher yields. 
Extracts: 
 “In-kind food aid has become a political sticking point under the current Doha Round of World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) negotiations. European and developing countries complain that U.S. food aid 
shipments constitute dumping of subsidized surplus commodities (Clay and Riley 2005). African farmer 
and traders note that food aid imports displace commercial trade and dampen prices and therefore 
farmer production incentives. Local procurement of food aid would do the opposite, stimulating African 
farm production. During low-rainfall years, smallholder production fluctuates substantially while com-
mercial farm production remains roughly constant. This leads to wide swings in subsistence production 
as well as in smallholder marketing’s, which range between 20% and 30% of smallholder production but 
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remain highly concentrated among the top 10% of smallholder maize growers. Commercial imports and 
food aid increase in deficit years, partially offsetting the production shortfalls. Total consumption proba-
bly ranges between about 1 million tons in low-rainfall years and 1.2 million tons in good seasons. Ex-
ports plus consumer substitution for other foods moderate these roughly 20% swings in annual maize 
consumption. Food aid donors, like private traders and the FRA, likewise import food, primarily in deficit 
years. Since the 2002 drought, many food aid distribution programs have remained active, even in good 
harvest years, as part of a series of post-drought recovery and vulnerable group feeding programs. In 
2005, food aid agencies imported roughly 70,000 tons of maize. Recognizing Zambia’s potential as a 
surplus maize producer in good rainfall years, the World Food Programme has begun procuring signifi-
cant quantities of maize, particularly during good harvest years. During the past five years, Zambia has 
been the number five food aid supplier to WFP in the Africa region (Tables 3, 4 and 5). Maize and maize 
meal account for roughly 80% of the value of local procurement, while high protein foods such as the 
maize soya blend (MSB) of high-energy protein supplements (HEPS) and pulses account for the re-
mainder In years of bumper harvest, such as 2006, when local prices are low, Zambia becomes attrac-
tive as a low-cost supplier of maize for local and regional food aid needs. Even in moderate and low 
production years, Zambia may be a competitive supplier, particularly if other countries in the region are 
hard hit. In January and February of 2004, for example, Lusaka suppliers won a series of regional ten-
ders to supply maize, including 10,000 tons delivered to Lusaka and 7,000 delivered to Harare. Most 
years, in fact, local or regional procurement will generate significant cost savings over import from over-
seas. In four of the last five years, when the Zambian maize harvest was in its normal range, local pro-
curement would have enabled cost savings of between 30% and 80% compared to importing from the 
U.S.A. (Table 7). During the 2002/3 marketing season, however, at the end of Zambia’s second succes-
sive bad harvest, when domestic prices averaged $244 per ton and reached a peak of $350 per ton in 
January of 2003, import from overseas proved cheaper during the January to March lean season (Fig-
ure 5). Delivery times, however, are longer when procuring from overseas. Where local and regional 
procurement requires six to twelve weeks, overseas procurement may require lead times of as long as 
four to five months.” Local And Regional Food Aid Procurement In Zambia (A Study For USAID’s Office 
Of Food For Peace). Working Paper No. 28: Food Security Research Project - Lusaka, Zambia. Date 
November 2007: (Downloadable At: Http://Www.Aec.Msu.Edu/Agecon/Fs2/Zambia/Index.Htm) 
 
JC 7.4:  Food security increased in rural districts, and particularly in districts supported by EU 
Food Facility 
Indeed Zambia’s poor remain extremely vulnerable to production shocks. In fact, climatic events have 
occurred with such frequency that people have no time to recover before another flood or drought hits, 
resulting in increasing poverty and food insecurity. The long term effects of this situation are reflected in 
the high rates of malnutrition. According to FAO 47% of the population in Zambia is affected by chronic 
malnutrition. This is the 10th highest rate in the world. According to the 2006 Living Conditions Monitor-
ing Survey, 54.2% of Zambian children under the age of five are stunted, 19.7% are underweight and 5 
.9% are wasted. (I-7.4.1, 7.4.2) 
The main EU project targeted on increasing food security in rural districts was the €15m “Support to 
Agricultural Diversification and Food Security Project” (SADFSP, 2006 to 2010) under EDF9. In terms of 
food security the project’s approach was to combine the implementation of the food security objectives 
and components in the National Agricultural Policy (NAP) at national level with concrete action plans at 
local level (province, district, block, camp and household). SADFSP was designed with three result are-
as: (i) Food security components of the NAP operationalized and action plans implemented in Western 
and North Western Provinces; (ii) Performance of MACO’s extension services in targeted districts im-
proved; and (iii) Grant facilities efficiently utilised by Non State Actors to support the Provincial food 
security action plans. 
The 2011 final evaluation concluded that the project has failed to achieve its aim of developing a gov-
ernment-owned food security strategy. This implies that the EU did not contribute to increase food secu-
rity in rural districts country-wise. It is therefore of no use to trace back EU contribution in national statis-
tics, as initially considered by this judgement criterion.  
EU contribution in pilot districts covered by the SADFSP was also limited by the component 1 failure to 
develop a task force and strategy as component 2 and 3 were linked by project’s design to the release 
of the food security strategy. It’s only at a late stage that the activities in support to MACO’s extension 
services and NSAs were implemented, the former with only limited benefits for smallholders. Other EU 
projects, through EDF resources or Food Facility, are too limited in their (technical or spatial) scope and 
financial volume to have an effect on outcomes indicators of food security in rural areas. (I-7-4.3) 
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JC 7.5: The improvement of urban markets infrastructure supported smallholders’ production 
 Indicator 7.5.1: Number of markets and shops built or renovated 
EU successfully designed and constructed or rehabilitated eleven selected urban markets in the cities of 
Lusaka, Kitwe and Ndola. This significantly increased the number of shops and markets in those cities.. 
One of the commendable works of EU is the enactment of the new Market and Bus Stations Act, which 
became effective on 19
th
 October, 2007 when it was gazetted. This Act makes the formation of market 
boards possible, which are responsible of management of the markets but answerable to the local au-
thority. The Boards include representatives of different stakeholders, including marketers and custom-
ers. This was expected to ensure that the renovated markets will be sustainably maintained and im-
proved. The documentation does not provide an assessment of the extent of implementation of this new 
organisation and the efficiency demonstrated in managing renovated markets.  
Extracts: 
“A three million Euro Rider No.1 to the Urban Markets Development Programme has been approved on 
16 June 2006. (EAMR 2007) A Rider N).2 to the Urban Markets Rehabilitation project (UMDP) increas-
ing the total amount of the FA by €1.7m from €19,5m to €21.2m was approved by HQ in August 07. 
(EAMR 2008/1) A tender for the remaining markets in Ndola subject to Rider No.2 to the Urban Markets 
Rehabilitation project (UMDP) was launched in the second quarter 08 with tender opening in July 2008. 
The 6 markets presently under implementation in Lusaka and Kitwe are all suffering from poor perfor-
mance of local contractors leading to considerable delays in finalisation. The biggest and most im-
portant market in Zambia, the Soweto Market is scheduled for commissioning in Sept, 08. (EAMR 
2008/2) A tender for the remaining markets in Ndola subject to Rider No.2 was launched in the first 
quarter 08 with tender opening in July 2008. Implementation of works is due to commence in Jan 09. 
The two Kitwe markets as well as the Soweto market in Lusaka were successfully completed by the end 
of 2008. The 6 markets under implementation in Lusaka and Kitwe have all been suffering from poor 
performance of local contractors leading to considerable delays in finalisation. contractual difficulties 
regarding the TA services to the MLGH leading to an end of services in August 08, poor performance of 
local contractors for the Chilenje and Chelstone markets leading to severe delays in project completion 
and difficult procedural situations for the NAO. The biggest and most important market in Zambia, the 
Soweto Market is scheduled for commissioning in March 2009 with Commissioner Michel and President 
Banda, Kitwe is planned for commissioning in Feb 09. Modern Market infrastructure provided for the 
biggest market in Lusaka (Soweto) allowing trading space for some 3,000 marketers.(‘EAMR 2009/1) 
The civil works for Ndola are on schedule. The two Kitwe markets as well as the Soweto market in Lu-
saka were successfully completed. However, implementation suffered poor performance of local con-
tractors leading to considerable delays in finalisation. Phase 2 of both Chelstone and Chilenje Markets 
are expected to commence in 3rd quarter 2009. Political interference in the implementation process. 
There is also a high risk that the outstanding works for the Chelstone and Chilenje Market in Lusaka 
cannot be completed with the validity period of the FA (Expiry: 31 March 2010). Delays are arising from 
continued poor contractor performance and delays in allocation stalls to marketers to free the construc-
tion site needed to commence outstanding works in Chelstone. Delays in stall allocations also hamper 
the commissioning of the Soweto market in Lusaka and the Kitwe markets. Delegation / beneficiary / 
NAO to review ROM findings and recommendations for corrective action where necessary. Delegation 
to continue impressing on the Ministry of Local Government and Housing and the NAO to concentrate 
efforts on (i) solving the allocation problems encountered and (ii) pushing the contractors to complete 
the works. Exit strategy to be prepared. (EAMR 2009/2) The Financing Agreement expired on 31 March 
2010. All 8 markets in Kitwe, Ndola and Lusaka, apart from the Chelstone market in Lusaka were suc-
cessfully completed. The completion of the Chelstone market under provisional acceptance occurred in 
April 2010. PEs are completed and audits of PE III and PE IV were carried out. Commissioning of the 
markets is still outstanding. Request for commissioning reiterated many times at highest level up to the 
President, but remains without response. (EAMR 2010/2) 
“The second phase of the Urban Markets Development Programme (UMDP II) started in December 
2003 with the design of eleven markets to be rehabilitated in Lusaka, Kitwe and Ndola. Originally, the 
programme was to end in June 2009, but extended until 31
st
 March 2010 due to its complexity in imple-
mentation. The number of markets to be renewed was reduced to eight namely: Soweto, Chelston, and 
Chilenje markets in Lusaka; Nakadoli, Buchi-Kamitondo and Ndeke markets in Kitwe; and in Ndola, 
Chisokone and Ndeke markets. An important goal of the Programme is to improve the management of 
urban markets, financially but with regards to a cleaner, healthier environment for both marketers and 
consumers. Therefore the institution of new market management in the form of Market Boards, who are 
formed by representatives of all stakeholders but answerable to the Local City Councils, is a major 
component of the UMDP. The New Market and Bus Stations Act of October 2007, the actual prepara-
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tion of which took place in the first two years of UMDP II make this possible.” Final Report For Consul-
tancy Services And Support To The Department Of Housing And Infrastructure Development In The 
Ministry Of Local Government And Housing For The Urban Markets Rehabilitation Works In Lusaka, 
Kitwe And Ndola, p.2, 20, 23 
 Indicator 7.5.2: Improvement in sanitary conditions in urban markets 
The EU project improved significantly the initial sanitary conditions of the targeted markets. Some short-
comings were identified by the TA at the end of redevelopment, affecting the extent of improvement or 
compromising their sustainability: garbage management, access to water in particular. The water and 
sanitation issues were poorly handled at all the affected markets especially the operation of installed 
water facilities. The trained operators at provisional acceptance were changed without passing on the 
knowledge to the assigned new ones and the liability of the contractor with his sub-contractors and sup-
pliers were not effectively utilized. Chilenje and Chisokone Markets were found without adequate water 
as planned without making the contractors accountable.  
Those shortcomings have not found solutions though they are more related to management weakness-
es than project’s defaults. The contractors resist addressing maintenance issues such as blocked 
drains, missing taps, etc. The legislation is in place but not implemented, with fights between the Board 
and political spheres. Overall, the project was a burden for the EUdel with limited advantages for the 
final users.  
Extracts: 
“Garbage collection is not systematic and still not under direct control of market management. The new 
markets’ hygiene is highly compromised with the huge amount of accumulated garbage before it is col-
lected. The situation is serious at Soweto Market where the refuse slabs meant for placing the refuse 
skips have been turned into shops while the rotting garbage is being thrown along the access road and 
under the high tension power line in front of the new market on the side of the prevailing winds. The 
process of making good the defects after the completion of maintenance period on 31/03/11 was pro-
longed because the contractors were not strictly made accountable during the affected period as also 
recommended by the original consultant in their final report. The defects on critical services like water 
were left unattended to for a long time during the maintenance period until a new consultant was re-
cruited thereby compromising the water and sanitation of the markets which was one of the main objec-
tives of UMDP II. 
(…) The refuse disposal area including the built slabs have been converted into shops by the local au-
thority and therefore, a suitable alternative has to be found to avoid throwing garbage along the access 
roads and under the ZESCO high tension cables. This is a very serious situation and undermines the 
sanitation of the market as previously foreseen 
The local authority must look after the market properly as the water booster pump and other items went 
missing during the maintenance period which has to be replaced by them to maintain high level of water 
and sanitation in the market as planned. The water system has to be maintained properly to continuous 
supply water to the market to enhance good sanitation as planned. The original budgets for the markets 
were based on simple rehabilitation works and unit rates per square meter of space but when detailed 
surveys were conducted by the design consultant the results revealed that complex situations prevailed 
in most assigned markets and simple rehabilitation works would not even improve the water and sanita-
tion of the markets – one of the priorities as per ToR. The markets were found to be overcrowded and in 
most cases with no basic infrastructure and where they existed, they were constructed poorly with min-
imum technical consideration. The consultant concluded in the inception report that “Unless specifically 
justified, the utilisation of existing structures for rehabilitation works shall be generally avoided “which 
affected the foreseen budgets at each market resulting in the reduction of scope.” Final Report For 
Consultancy Services And Support To The Department Of Housing And Infrastructure Development In 
The Ministry Of Local Government And Housing For The Urban Markets Rehabilitation Works In Lusa-
ka, Kitwe And Ndola, pp.30-32 & 37 
 Indicator 7.5.3: Increase in traded volumes in urban markets 
There is no evidence of increased traded volumes in urban markets, as the EU project was far more on 
building infrastructure and support their improved management than the realisation of their potential 
impact on surrounding rural areas.  
The EDF10 Urban food vouchers project (€4.6m) might have impacted traded volumes but this is not 
specifically monitored. 
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 Indicator 7.5.4: Increased number of food vouchers 
In the frame of the EDF10 Urban Food Voucher project 23,200 households (139,200 beneficiaries ap-
proximately 76,560 females and 62,640 Males) were targeted in 4 provinces under use of existing 
community and government structures to identify the most vulnerable ones. While the 2010 ROM report 
does not provided any quantitative findings but appreciates the innovated approach for food delivery (e-
vouchers) the evaluators found during their field visit from interviews with World Vision (on 14/12/2011) 
that way more households were actually reached by the (small-scale) project and more food vouchers 
were thus distributed in targeted districts. However, the element of sustainability was highlighted as a 
big challenge for both beneficiaries and project implementation authorities (eg no money was set aside 
for seeds in order to continue guaranteeing the access to food.  
Extracts: 
“It is not clear that funds to continue the flow of benefits and services delivered through this project will 
come from GoZ. However, WFP is taking action to help ensure that the National Social Protection Strat-
egy is revised to include food safety nets using food vouchers to complement cash voucher pro-
grammes and to budget for this intervention…the Project is using an innovative approach for food deliv-
ery (e-voucher system) with significant potential for cost effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The 
innovative nature of the e-voucher system poses implementation challenges, but, the implementing 
partners, led by WFP, are highly motivated and committed to addressing them.” EDF10 Urban Food 
Vouchers Project, 2010 ROM report, p. 3-4. 
 
JC 7.5:  The improvement of urban markets infrastructure supported smallholders production 
EU successfully designed and constructed or rehabilitated eleven selected urban markets in the cities of 
Lusaka, Kitwe and Ndola. This significantly increased the number of shops and markets in those cities.  
One of the commendable works of EU is the enactment of the new Market and Bus Stations Act, which 
became effective on 19th October, 2007 when it was gazetted. This Act makes the formation of market 
boards possible, which are responsible of management of the markets but answerable to the local au-
thority. The Boards include representatives of different stakeholders, including marketers and custom-
ers. This was expected to ensure that the renovated markets will be sustainably maintained and im-
proved. The documentation does not provide an assessment of the extent of implementation of this new 
organisation and the efficiency demonstrated in managing renovated markets. The field mission found 
that works completion was delayed in most cases and difficulties faced with contractors. (I-7.5.1) 
The EU project improved significantly the initial sanitary conditions of the targeted markets. Some short-
comings were identified by the TA at the end of redevelopment, affecting the extent of improvement or 
compromising their sustainability: garbage management, access to water in particular. The water and 
sanitation issues were poorly handled at all the affected markets especially the operation of installed 
water facilities. The trained operators at provisional acceptance were changed without passing on the 
knowledge to the assigned new ones and the liability of the contractor with his sub-contractors and sup-
pliers were not effectively utilized. (I-7.5.2) Shortcomings have not find solutions though they are more 
related to management weaknesses than project’s defaults. The contractors resist addressing mainte-
nance issues such as blocked drains, missing taps, etc. The legislation is in place but not implemented, 
with fights between the Board and political spheres. 
There is no evidence of increased traded volumes in urban markets, as the EU project was far more on 
building infrastructure and support their improved management than the realisation of their potential 
impact on surrounding rural areas. (I-7.5.3) The impact of Food Voucher initiative on local production 
was not followed, besides the 23,000 households supported.  
 
JC 7.6: The food security policy and programming framework has improved 
 Indicator 7.6.1: Policy and programming documents cover major shortcomings of food 
security strategy with related realistic action plans 
The sector in Zambia comprises over 1.1 million small and medium scale households, providing liveli-
hood for more than 50% of the population. Production concentrates on rain fed maize (the main staple 
crop). The sector absorbs approximately 67% of the labour force and remains the main source of in-
come and employment for the rural population. Maize harvests have varied between 1.4 million metric 
tonnes in the 2006/07 season, to a mere 1.2 million during the 2007/08 season, and up again to 1.8 
million for the 2008/09 season. Given Zambian abundant natural endowment with land and water, agri-
culture has the potential to become the key for rural growth and poverty reduction. 
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At the beginning of the reference period, extreme poverty was manifested in widespread food insecurity. 
The Government Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS 2004) suggests that 53% of the people 
cannot meet basic food needs in any year. These are the chronically food insecurities. A number of 
factors have contributed to continuous food shortages in Zambia. The list includes poverty resulting in 
low-risk investments with lower yields, recurrent droughts, lack of infrastructure and deficient invest-
ments in agriculture, little or no attention paid to smallholder agriculture, policies that favour urban busi-
nesses over farmers, policies that distort and interfere with markets, etc. The chronically food insecure 
have grown over time as shocks such as drought cause formerly food secure households to sell the 
assets needed for future productivity.  
The policy framework in the agricultural sector has been significantly improved over the last years with 
the adoption in the mid-2000s of the NAP and of the Private Sector Development (PSD) agenda. Past 
interventions mainly focused on production improvements while ignoring the role of markets. The new 
framework resulted in more attention being paid to the whole agricultural value chain, acknowledging 
the key role played by input suppliers and agribusiness firms.  
Some inconsistencies remain, however, between policy statements and actual implementation. Agricul-
tural diversification and the development of private-led marketing systems are major objectives in the 
ZNDP, the National Action Plan (NAP) and its implementing strategies. At the same time, the biggest 
share of MACO’s budget finances the provision of subsidised fertiliser and buying of maize from farm-
ers, while spending on research and extension services is inadequate. 
The EU intervention intended to improve the food security policy framework was the SADFSP, and par-
ticularly its component 1. This project was designed to be fully implemented through the Ministry's struc-
ture and was paving the way for a future sector support programme under EDF10 (€30 m have been 
allocated to the Agricultural sector in the National Indicative Programme (NIP) 
Task forces were to be established at decentralised levels while TA was positioned with MACO’s central 
services, and notably the Policy and Planning department. The project failed to contribute to elaborating 
a renewed policy framework, mainly due mainly to the inadequate interpersonal skills of the first TA 
team leader, and also by the lack of clarity in the responsibility distribution in the FA. Component 1 was 
implemented by the FAO through a NGO, and against a strong resistance of other ministries implied in 
the Food Security Matrix. It can be inferred from the overall administrative context that the MACO de-
partments at all levels were not responsive and did not support the EU initiative. 
Extracts: 
“During the EDF9 Country Strategy Paper (CSP) Mid-Term Review, the Government and the EU agreed 
to extend EU support to the Agricultural sector. The project "Support to Agricultural Diversification and 
Food Security in Western and North Western Zambia" was supposed to make resources available to 
MACO so it could design and implement a National Food Security Strategy as well as deliver extension 
services to the farming community.” Support to the Agricultural sector Performance Enhancement Pro-
gramme (PEP) – Final, 2010, p.5 
“The adoption of the NAP and of the Private Sector Development (PSD) agenda favoured the approval 
of a new breed of projects. Inadequacies observed in past interventions, which mainly focused on pro-
duction improvements while ignoring the role of markets, convinced many donors to adopt different ap-
proaches. This resulted in more attention being paid to the whole agricultural value chain, acknowledg-
ing the key role played by input suppliers and agribusiness firms.” Formulation of Agriculture Sector 
Performance Enhancement Programme for Zambia, 2010., pp.7,11 
“Formation and operationalisation of food security task forces at national, provincial and district levels – 
National and provincial task forces have been formed with monitoring matrices formulated. No district 
food security task force has been formed in all the four pilot districts (two in each project province).” 
SADFSP - Mid Term Review - October 2008, p.33 
“The interpersonal and team building skills of the first Technical Team Leader alienated staff, colleagues 
and partners instead of involving them. There was insufficient pro-active engagement between MACO 
departments. Directors felt excluded. Some departments were not included (i.e. Seeds and Research) 
which slowed implementation. Directors and national level technical experts (i.e. Chief Veterinary Of-
ficer) were not sufficiently involved in initial project planning processes. 
No ‘stepping in’ by GRZ to fund project activities was found during this study. GRZ funding was reduced 
to both target provinces at the beginning of SADFSP implementation. It is normal for provinces in Zam-
bia to experience reduced GRZ funding when project implementation begins. In some districts District 
Agricultural Coordinators (DACOs) reported that GRZ funding remains at below pre-SADFSP levels. 
NSAs have shown that they can efficiently and effectively introduce innovative approaches. In particular 
Keepers Zambia Foundation (KZF) micro projects introduced successful market linkage and farmer 
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input procurement approaches. Micro Bankers Trust (MBT) have also introduced group saving and milk 
bulking methodologies. Better results were achieved with increased ‘backstopping’ either by NSAs or 
TA visits. NSAs have largely complemented CEO activities. NSAs with established district level pres-
ence have achieved better results.” SADFSP, final evaluation, pp.1-2 
“The actual targets and indicators are not clear and defined, and unless corrective action is taken the 
results will be ambiguous and mostly unusable. There is no clear statement of what the national food 
strategy should consist of, and since no meaningful sentinel data is identified or collected, there will be 
no reliable food security early warning system available as has been developed in other countries. This 
should be clearly stated objective of any food security strategy”. SADFSP Mid Term Review, October 
2008, p.24 
“The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperative (MACO) is responsible of providing sufficient support to the 
food security policy. The Ministry has not assumed full ownership of the project and grasped its policy 
implications. There is no a clear understanding of the OO and PP by the members of the Planning De-
partment of the MACO. On the other hand, the NSAs have been far more involved and willing to coop-
erate with the programme as their participation was more demand driven, through a call for proposals. 
The programme is not capable of adhering to a steady and comprehensive timetable, due to the number 
of revisions, which indicates managerial weaknesses. Conservation farming is the most positive ele-
ment concerning environment, while other crosscutting issues are not considered to a sufficient extent. 
TA has taken a low profile, while trying not to influence MACO staff.” ROM report 2010. 
“Due to lack of clear lines of responsibilities at the outset between the TA team and the MACO head-
quarters no work was done by the TA on this component until September 2007 when the first service 
contract was signed between MACO and ACF. (…) SADFSP had little or no impact with regard to im-
proving food security policy and programming framework. It did not contribute to wider policy or sector 
objectives. Reasons for this failure include: (i) Under estimation of the challenges involved in facilitating 
multi-actor inter-ministerial working groups, and (ii) Incorrect selection of an institutional home and facili-
tator of the Food Security Task Force and Strategy and (iii) lack of prioritisation of Component 1 by the 
Project Management Team.” Mid Term Review - October 2008 (Page 6, 9) 
 Indicator 7.6.2: Improving coverage of chronic food security needs by budget allocations 
and other resources 
As far as the EU intervention failed to contribute in improving the policy framework, it can hardly be 
inferred that it has an effect on budget allocations of GRZ. M&E reports are unanimous to assess that 
extension services in pilot provinces were left to EU financial resources, with even decreasing budget 
allocations. In the same time, it seems common (and has been confirmed in field visit interviews) that 
when a province is externally supported, GRZ passes budgetary resources to other provinces.  
Extracts: 
“Even if relations with the institutions are quite good for the moment, no step has been taken to en-
sure the future of the activities developed so far. Very little improvement has been noticed on the po-
tential sustainability of all elements of the programme since the last monitoring mission. The support 
from MACO is very limited concerning policy inputs and absent concerning the financial aspect. The 
concept of food security is not the main priority of the ministry. For component 1 and 2 MACO relies 
totally on funds allocated by the programme through the PEs for its performance. All the efforts and 
training provided to MACO staff and farmers may thus not have a lasting positive effect, even if hu-
man resources are available. As no exit strategy is been clearly identified, the future of these two 
components is uncertain. The programme pays for the costs of the extension services, taking over the 
financial responsibility of MACO. This is pure substitution, and is not recommendable for any project 
or programme. The profitability of the alternative proposals by NSA has not yet been sufficiently 
demonstrated. The needs of NSA were clearly identified from the start and they took part in each step 
of the decision process. The present situation will continue for both component 1 and 2 after the end 
of the programme. No exit strategy is proposed and adapted by the TA.” ROM Report 2010.  
“Very little was done by the programme to address the delays in implementing the various activities. 
The absence of a clear work programme with tight supervision from the Project Support Unit and due 
respect for the time table did not allow the programme to perform as well as expected. Some budget 
allocations of funds have been revised at the last moment before presenting the elements to the moni-
toring team and the Delegation of the European Union (EU DEL), showing once more the deficiencies 
in establishing reliable accounting reports on the prevailing financial situation. The MACO staff, and 
particularly the Planning Department, does not demonstrate major interest in diversification and food 
security planning. The capacity of MACO staff in taking the lead of the programme is still questionable 
for component 2. The NSA involvement in the third component is satisfactory. As already highlighted 
in previous reports (ROM and Mid-Term review), the logframe (LF) is too unfocused. It is not utilised 
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as a management tool because of the lack of baseline data at the start of the programme, weakness-
es in the collection of information in the provinces and at headquarters. The baseline study had to be 
repeated. The work plan is not accurate, nor has it been adapted to present the current actual situa-
tion. No corrective measures are proposed in the last bi-annual report. 
(…) It is difficult to get a clear picture of quality and the degree of ownership by farmers regarding the 
new techniques presented by the programme. TA limits its work to an advisory role and does not want 
to exert any kind of influence on MACO and on the progress of the programme to avoid substitution. 
(…) Effectiveness of the programme is in general not properly monitored. MACO does not accept full 
ownership over the Food Security Unit (FSU). Component 2 is successful in delivering training and 
capacity building to partners. Component 3 brings alternative production practices in the two provinc-
es. However, results will remain much localised. The separation of the various activities between dif-
ferent ministries and departments has created additional coordination and ownership problems. (…) 
Impacts are currently considered to be well behind schedule for all three components. In absence of 
comprehensive support from MACO and full ownership of the programme it is difficult to believe in 
that a coherent policy can be developed. Very little additional impact has been registered since the 
previous monitoring. This is partly due to the conception of the programme, where food security has to 
be put in place through the improvement of the extension services. For the NSA component, the activ-
ities have started to show some positive results, but it remains to be proved if the activities will have 
long-term potential impact on food security.” ROM report 2010 
“Since average household calorie consumption is very low, and the poor allocate over 70 per cent of 
their budget to food, real income growth of the poor is crucial to reducing food insecurity in Zambia.” 
Country Technical Document: Zambia Framing for the NGO programmes (Budget 2006) – Page 1) 
 Indicator 7.6.3: Existence of a dedicated needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation 
system, taken into account by the policy and programming frameworks 
The EU TA support to MACO encompassed reinforcing the M&E system, and improving indirectly its 
integration in the policy and programming processes. The ROM reports observed repeatedly some 
weaknesses in baseline data and monitoring instruments. 
The low record of the TA under the SADFSP with the central services of MACO strongly limited the 
improvement of M&E systems. Rather than strengthening MACO’s M&E system the SADFSP has de-
signed its own system. Although Policy and Planning Department (PPD) has the overall responsibility 
for MACO’s M&E system, to date PPD has taken no ownership of the project’s M&E system. The re-
sponsibility of monitoring and evaluating higher level indicators (outcome and impact) lies with PPD 
while the individual departments within MACO are expected to focus on monitoring lower level indica-
tors (results/outputs and activities). 
These limits are also linked to the inability of the project to contribute to elaborate a food security strat-
egy, the lack of ownership of MACO staff and insufficient budget allocation for M&E. The baseline study 
itself was hardly completed, providing further impediment for developing a reliable M&E system. 
Data, sources, extracts: 
“No reliable baseline data were collected and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) was only seriously ad-
dressed after the MTR. The final M&E system established by the project is activity based. While this 
system provides valuable information, there is insufficient assessment of results and objectives. Im-
portantly, the project failed to monitor its critical assumptions; particularly (i) the continued commitment 
of MACO to ensure close collaboration with other food security stakeholders; (ii) the commitment to the 
decentralisation process; and (iii) the trend of GRZ allocations and disbursements for operational costs 
of MACO’s extension services at provincial and district level. It is suggested that SADFSP could have 
monitored these assumptions are responded sooner (i.e. within 12 months assumption failure).” SAD-
FSP, Final evaluation, February 2011, pp.1-2 
“The M&E system developed by SADFSP is activity based covering only project supported initiatives. 
While it used provincial, district and community level MACO staff, the SADFSP M&E system was sepa-
rate from Ministry M&E. The SADFSP MTR identified M&E as an area for urgent attention. As a result 
the project’s M&E Officer changed and significant short term international consultancy input was used 
in 2009 and 2010 to improve the situation. The new M&E Officer and short-term TA have been able to 
establish an activity based M&E system linked to SADFSP budgets. This system is not able to provide 
insight into what happened as a result of the various project activities. For example, the M&E system is 
not able to inform users of the results of the SADFSP training program. Similarly the system does not 
provide information regarding the influence of results on objectives. Importantly, no reliable baseline 
information was collected for SADFSP. A ‘benchmark’ study was performed but this provides broad 
information, not tailored to SADFSP indicators. As a result SADFSP M&E does not offer support to 
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conclusions on project efficiency, effectiveness or impact. 
6.20 To address the lack of M&E information, particularly at the objective level, SADFSP performed two 
studies. These were a Tracer Study (September 2010) and a Household Survey Report (August 2010). 
The Tracer Study aimed to assess training results including farmer utilisation and adoption of promoted 
skills. This study showed exceptionally good results with farmers finding the training both useful and 
effective. However, the Tracer Study methodology is unclear as the questionnaire used with farmers is 
not presented in the report. It is suggested that farmers were asked if training was useful as opposed to 
interviewers visiting farms and exploring how farming practices changed as a result of training. In con-
trast to Tracer Study findings, a high level of training message adoption by farmers was not found dur-
ing this final evaluations fieldwork. During this final evaluation, farmers rarely identified Component 2 
training as beneficial (CAP training was an exception). The Household Survey aimed to evaluate SAD-
FSP impact. The study found that ‘beneficiary households were more likely to have more income than 
non-beneficiary households. Fieldwork observation suggested that Component 2 supported extension 
services tended to work more with better off households. The Household Survey also found that im-
proved food intake was higher in non-beneficiary households compared to beneficiary households38. 
The Household Survey results are recognised as illustrative as opposed to rigorous due to low sample 
size39. In addition, the lack of appropriate baseline data compromises Household Survey results.  
6.21 Reasons for poor SADFSP M&E include:  
• M&E has not been prioritised by the Project Management Team, 
• Initial M&E capacity shortfall in the initial TA team (tertiary level expertise should have been recruited 
to perform the baseline study and establish an M&E system with MACO. This may have required sub-
sequent short term international TA visits), and  
• Non-functioning working relationship between the TA Team and the MACO M&E focal point in the 
Department of Policy and Planning due to a remuneration dispute. The MACO focal point expected 
remuneration quoting formal agreements between the parties involved (MACO and SADFSP). The 
MACO focal point felt this remuneration was stopped by the TA Team Leader.” Final Evaluation of Sup-
port to Agricultural Diversification and Food Security in Western and North Western Zambia. Final Re-
port, February 2011 (Pages 29-31) 
“GRZ fully recognises this and has made agriculture a priority in the FNDP strategy, as an engine for 
rural growth and poverty reduction. Policy orientations and priority actions are defined in the 2004 Na-
tional Agriculture Policy (NAP), as well as in the FNDP itself. A broader regional framework under 
NEPAD is provided by the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP). 
These strong policy orientations however have not fully translated in the past into conducive policies 
and adequate budgetary allocations (on average around 7% of total expenditure between 2007 and 
2009). In spite of a large Fertiliser Support Programme (FSP) introduced in 2001, which is crowding out 
many other investment needs, production is characterised by poor yields and poor marketing condi-
tions. More recently, the Government has recognised these weaknesses and has embarked on a re-
form process of the FSP, notably with the intention of introducing an input voucher system that will 
strengthen the role of the agri-business sector.” Action Fiche Zambia, Food Facility GBS, 2009, pp. 4-5 
 
JC 7.6:  The food security policy and programming framework has improved 
The sector in Zambia comprises over 1.1 million small and medium scale households, providing liveli-
hood for more than 50% of the population. Production concentrates on rain fed maize (the main staple 
crop). The sector absorbs approximately 67% of the labour force and remains the main source of in-
come and employment for the rural population. Maize harvests have varied between 1.4 million metric 
tonnes in the 2006/07 season, to a mere 1.2 million during the 2007/08 season, and up again to 1.8 
million for the 2008/09 season. Given Zambian abundant natural endowment with land and water, agri-
culture has the potential to become the key for rural growth and poverty reduction. 
The policy framework in the agricultural sector has been significantly improved over the last years with 
the adoption in the mid-2000s of the NAP and of the Private Sector Development (PSD) agenda Past 
interventions mainly focused on production improvements while ignoring the role of markets. The new 
framework resulted in more attention being paid to the whole agricultural value chain, acknowledging 
the key role played by input suppliers and agribusiness firms.  
The EU intervention intended to improve the food security policy framework was the SADFSP, and 
particularly its component 1. This project was designed to be fully implemented through the Ministry's 
structure and was paving the way for a future sector support programme under EDF10 (€30 m have 
been allocated to the Agricultural sector in the National Indicative Programme (NIP). Task forces were 
to be established at decentralised levels while TA was positioned with MACO’s central services, and 
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notably the Policy and Planning department. The project failed to contribute to elaborating a renewed 
policy framework, mainly due mainly to the inadequate interpersonal skills of the first TA team leader, 
and also by the lack of clarity in the responsibility distribution in the FA. It can be inferred from the over-
all administrative context that the MACO departments at all levels were not responsive and did not sup-
port the EU initiative. (I-7.6.1) 
The EU TA support to MACO encompassed reinforcing the M&E system, and improving indirectly its 
integration in the policy and programming processes. The ROM reports observed repeatedly some 
weaknesses in baseline data and monitoring instruments. 
The low record of the TA under the SADFSP with the central services of MACO strongly limited the 
improvement of M&E systems. Rather than strengthening MACO’s M&E system the SADFSP has de-
signed its own system. Although Policy and Planning Department (PPD) has the overall responsibility 
for MACO’s M&E system, to date PPD has taken no ownership of the project’s M&E system. The re-
sponsibility of monitoring and evaluating higher level indicators (outcome and impact) lies with PPD 
while the individual departments within MACO are expected to focus on monitoring lower level indica-
tors (results/outputs and activities). These limits are also linked to the inability of the project to contrib-
ute to elaborate a food security strategy, the lack of ownership of MACO staff and insufficient budget 
allocation for M&E. The baseline study itself was hardly completed, providing further impediment for 
developing a reliable M&E system. (I-7.6.3) 
As far as the EU intervention failed to contribute in improving the policy framework, it can hardly be 
inferred that it has an effect on budget allocations of GRZ. M&E reports are unanimous to assess that 
extension services in pilot provinces were left to EU financial resources, with even decreasing budget 
allocations. In the same time, it seems common that when a province is externally supported, GRZ 
passes budgetary resources to other provinces. (I-7.6.2) 
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EQ8: To what extent was the EU aid modality combination appropriate to the 
national context and the EU development strategy? 
 
JC 8.1:  Several options of aid modalities have been discussed for aid activities by sector 
JC 8.2:  Emerging issues were incorporated quickly and effectively into EU programming and policy 
dialogue 
JC 8.3:  The synergy between aid modalities has been discussed both within each focal sector and 
overall 
JC 8.4:  Combinations of instruments and approaches were defined to suit partners’ capacity more 
than regulations of each financing modality 
JC 8.5:  Combining EU aid modalities was an inclusive internal strategic process 
JC 8.6:  Aid modality combinations were the result of complementarity with other donors 
Support Aid Modalities Differentiated Portfolio Analysis of EDF Funding to Zambia 2001-2010 
 
 
JC 8.1:  Several options of aid modalities have been discussed for aid activities by sector 
 Indicator 8.1.1: Reports and notes issued by EU defining comparative advantages of the 
various instruments and approaches in the context 
Based on the guidance note to the Green Paper on the Future of EU Budget Support made available in 
October 2010, the EUD Lusaka organised country-level consultations involving Cooperating Partners 
(including EU Member States) and Non-State Actors at the end of the year 2010. A structured dialogue 
with the Government has not taken place, despite the fact that copies of the Green Paper had been 
made available and the NAO (Secretary to the Treasury) has been invited to share comments. In gen-
eral, the mood surrounding the discussions was one of broad fatigue on issues pertaining to Budget 
Support.
 86
 The specific Zambian context reportedly was one of difficult discussions taking place on the 
relevance and impact of budget support as aid modality and also with donors having challenged the 
Government on its commitment to Public Finance Management (PFM) and good governance. This 
seems to have affected the degree of participation and interest in the consultation process on the desir-
ability and priority of budget support as aid modality. Though the scope of the consultation was repeat-
edly explained, it proved not possible to delink the discussions from the situation experienced locally. It 
should also be noted that a number of questions listed in the Paper required clarification as they did not 
come across too clearly. In addition to the internal discussion on the Green Paper within the Delegation, 
three formal consultation sessions were organised by the EUD with respectively the Member States 
(Heads of Cooperation), Civil Society Organisations, and CP Economists. A special PowerPoint presen-
tation was used to explain the essentials of budget support. In the EAMR of January 2011 it was men-
tioned that the permanent problem of late arrival of procedures and manuals in English is a matter of 
great concern. As reported, this delay has implied an important ‘decalage’ for the NAO and RAO offices 
in the implementation of the new rules.  
The MTR of the EDF10 CSP made explicit references to the then ongoing General Budget Support 
(GBS) evaluation carried out in Zambia which is expected to assess the effectiveness of this instrument 
in supporting policy changes, development results, and domestic accountability, through enhanced 
dialogue with the government. The exercise therefore is considered a precious input into the Mid-
Contract Review of the MDG-Contract. The MoFNP country evaluation on the implementation of the 
Paris Declaration in Zambia, Phase II refers back to the early ASIP (Agriculture Sector Investment Plan) 
and its documented methodology as an exemplary single planning, management, monitoring and re-
porting framework. The EDF10 CSP-NIP document makes explicit reference to the seven key areas 
according to the model approach of the relevant EC guidelines regarding Sector Policy Support Pro-
grammes (SPSPs) to guide the review of the road transport sector budget support programme. In the 
Access to Justice Project, the three possible Modes of Delivery (Financing Agreement, Local Subsidy 
Agreement and Direct Procurement), were explained to the representatives of the various AtoJ (Access 
to Justice) institutions. Formats were made available. The “Tools and Methods Series” launched by 
EuropeAid (now DEVCO) in 2007 aims to structure the presentation of the methodological documents 
produced by the Directorate on the “Quality of Operations” and consists of three sub-collections: Guide-
                                               
86
  EUD Lusaka; Note on the Local Consultation on the Budget Support Green Paper; 31 December 2010. 
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lines, Reference Documents and Concept papers. From the different interviews with key stakeholders 
during the evaluation field visit it transpired that these EU guides and notes to define / explain the com-
parative advantages of the various instruments and approaches in the specific Zambian context actually 
have been used by these key stakeholders to a varying degree. 
With regard to the earlier EDF9 CSP/NIP, the rationale for the option of general budget support was 
linked to the considerable amounts of macro-economic support provided earlier in the 1990s to Zambia 
in the framework of consecutive Sysmin and Structural Adjustment Support programmes, which in a 
way where budget support systems “avant-la-lettre”. It was assessed that by means of these pro-
grammes the EC had significantly contributed to the macro-economic stabilisation of the country, par-
ticularly through budget reduction and budget financing. For the subsequent EDF9 CSP/NIP, this mac-
ro-economic budget support would be closely linked to the support of the Government’s Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Paper (PRSP) under preparation, to which the Commission had committed itself. 
Data, figures, tables: 
EAMR, Jan 2009, Annex A: Evaluations in 2008 – Excerpt:  
 
 
Extracts: 
EC – DG DEV (2010): Aid Delivery Methods – Guidelines on the Programming, Design & Manage-
ment of General Budget Support; June 2009 
 
EC – DG DEV (2010) p6; Green Paper on the Future of EU Budget Support: Budget support as part 
of a package: Budget support must be more than a financial transfer – it is part of a package including 
policy dialogue, performance assessment, capacity-building and other supporting interventions. 
 
EC – DG DEV (2010) p5; Green Paper on the Future of EU Budget Support; Box 3: Evolution of EU 
Budget Support: Early experience with budget support in the 1990s showed the limits of conditionality 
as an effective means of promoting reforms; the importance of partner countries owing policies; and 
the limited effect of targeting funds to specific budget lines. Building on this experience, the Commis-
sion adopted a Communication (2000) on “Community support for economic reform programmes and 
structural adjustment: review and prospects which introduced poverty reduction budget support 
(PRBS) and an innovative approach to conditionality. This Communication set objectives for budget 
support that later became part of the aid effectiveness principles. EU budget support programmes 
were increasingly provided over three-year periods with annual fixed tranches subject to compliance 
with eligibility criteria and variable tranches linked also to performance against agreed targets on se-
lected outcome indicators, mainly in social sectors. Regarding eligibility criteria for budget support, the 
Commission (along with most other providers) applies a dynamic approach by requiring relevant, 
credible commitment to reform and evidence of progress rather than compliance with minimum stand-
ards. This approach has allowed the Commission to operate in very diverse contexts, including in 
countries in situation of fragility, where budget support can underpin stabilisation and avoid deteriora-
tion of the economic and political situation. In 2008, the Commission also launched “MDG Contracts” 
for countries with a tract record of successfully managing budget support and demonstrating commit-
ment to making progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). MDG Contracts pro-
vide six-year commitments that enable governments to plan longer-term strategies and budgets with 
greater certainty about future resource inflows. 
  
EUD Lusaka (2010) ; Note on the Local Consultation on the Budget Support Green Paper; “The EU 
Delegation in Lusaka, based on the guidance note made available in October, organised country-level 
consultations involving Cooperating Partners (including EU Member States) and Non-State Actors. A 
structured dialogue with the Government has unfortunately not been possible. Copies of the Green 
Paper have however been made available and the National Authorising Officer (Secretary to the 
Treasury) has been invited to share comments; these are yet to be received. In general, the mood 
surrounding the discussions was one of broad fatigue on issues pertaining to Budget Support. The 
specific Zambian context, where difficult discussions are taking place on the pertinence and impact of 
the modality and where Government is challenged on its commitment to PFM (Public Finance Man-
agement) and good governance, seems to have affected the degree of participation and interest in the 
consultation process. Though the scope of the consultation was repeatedly explained, it has proved 
impossible to delink the discussions from the situation experienced locally. It should also be noted that 
a number of questions listed in the Paper required clarification as they did not come across too clear-
 RISP 
To assess the performance of the RISP contribution agreements and get 
recommendation for improvement of implementation and 10 EDF formulation 01.09.08 31.12.08
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ly.” 
In addition to the internal discussion on the Green Paper within the Delegation, three formal consulta-
tion sessions were organised by the EUD as follows:  
1. Meeting with Member States (Heads of Cooperation) – 24 November 2010 with main focus on 
BS underlying principles (UPs) and eligibility criteria (7 Heads of Cooperation participated) 
2. Meeting with Civil Society Organisations - 08 December 2010 (3 of the 10 invited organisations 
attended) 
3. Meeting with CP Economists – 15 December 2010 (7 participants – consultation took place dur-
ing the December 2010 Macroeconomic Group meeting (MEG) (e.g. “benchmarks” to replace 
the word “conditionalities”) 
Green Paper discussions within the Delegation focused on political governance issues, in particular 
on the CPs response to any deterioration in the Ups. Main issues / outcomes from the discussions:  
 
EC – DG DEV (2010); Green Paper on the Future of EU Budget Support – Summary PP Presentation 
Slides 11&12 - 4.4 Programming Budget Support 
 Programming decision (whether and how much budget support) requires careful analysis of 
country context and alternative modalities: Political economy analysis, financing needs, absorp-
tive capacity, risks and expected benefits 
 Need to clarify when/whether to provide both GBS and SBS to same country at same time: 
GBS can address wider cross cutting issues; SBS can address sector issues more deeply 
o Q11: What criteria should the Commission use to inform decisions on how much if any 
budget support to provide to eligible countries?  
o Q12: What are the advantages and disadvantages of providing both general and sector 
budget support within the same country, or having one single budget support instrument? 
In which context would SBS be considered a more effective type of budget support? 
o Q13: What are the advantages and disadvantages, as well as the practical arrangements 
to ensure consistency and efficient coordination, of using a broad palette of aid instru-
ments alongside GBS/SBS? 
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p. xii Country Evaluation of the Implementation 
of the Paris Declaration in Zambia, Phase II - Has the implementation of the Paris Declaration 
strengthened the contribution of aid to sustainable development results (development outcomes)? 
How? – Core Question 3. The continued fragmentation of aid modalities places a huge administrative 
burden on sector capacity and is a reflection of the waning trust and confidence of development part-
ners in national systems. 
 
EAMR Jan 2011, p1: The permanent problem of late arrival of procedures and manuals in English is 
a matter of great concern. This delay has implied an important “decalage” for the NAO and RAO offic-
es in the implementation of the new rules. Several meetings were held by the Delegation with the lo-
cal counterparts to explain and discuss the new rules. The Delegation has formally asked HQ to be 
one of the host countries for the seminars in EDF procedures. 
 
EAMR Jan 2011, p6: In line with the Division of Labour principles, the Delegation continued to play a 
very active role in the Cooperating Partners Group whilst at the same time ensuring adequate local 
EU coordination (also in relation to the Fast Track Initiative on DOL and substantive discussions 
around notably the Green Paper on Budget Support) 
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p8: The initial response strategy of the Community as expressed in 
the CSP 2008-2013 under the EDF10 remains relevant since it supports the main objectives of the 
National Development Strategy. The strategy has provided also an appropriate framework to absorb 
additional funds allocated to address the effects of the global financial crisis and the food prices crisis. 
The EU remains convinced that the budget support modality provides the levels of ownership of de-
velopment and permits the GRZ to allocate resources in accordance with national priorities. Recent 
concerns on the effectiveness of Public Financial Management (PFM) systems, which could challenge 
GRZ eligibility to budget support have been identified and are being addressed by GRZ through a de-
tailed roadmap with support from the CPs. The on-going GBS evaluation carried out in Zambia will 
assess the effectiveness of this instrument in supporting policy changes, development results, and 
domestic accountability, through enhanced dialogue with the government. Such exercise will be a 
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precious input into the Mid-Contract Review of the MDG-Contract that is planned for 2011, when the 
MDG-eligibility criteria will be re-assessed and a decision will be taken on the final amount of the 
MDG-Tranche for the period 2012-2014.  
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p. xii - Country Evaluation of the Implementation 
of the Paris Declaration in Zambia, Phase II. Has the implementation of the Paris Declaration 
strengthened the contribution of aid to sustainable development results (development outcomes)? 
How? – Core Question 3. The GRZ insisted on an end to all area based programmes and asked do-
nors to support agriculture only through a single planning framework of ASIP (Agriculture Sector In-
vestment Programme). Management for results was far much more vigorous then with a clear results 
based M&E framework and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) at sectoral level that fed into the over-
all macro level indicators. An external institution – the University of Zambia (UNZA) – was contracted 
to undertake Annual Sector Performance Analysis (ASPA). The ASPA fed into the GRZ/CP Annual 
Reviews where performance in the previous year was reviewed. This was the basis for the Annual 
Work Plan and Budget (AWPB) preparation for the following year (Agricultural Statistics, Policy and 
Planning Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 
1997; ASIP Mid-Term Review Summary Report, 1998 pages 52 to 58; INESOR, ASPA Reports 1999 
and 2000). 
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p26 : The Division of Labour (DOL) has argua-
bly been the most visible instrument for implementing the JASZ and the Paris Declaration in Zambia. 
Despite the prolonged period of negotiation between GRZ and CP, the final outcome was more a re-
flection of the current or proposed commitments of CPs, rather than a restructuring of CP engagement 
to support the implementation of the Fifth National Development Plan – FNDP. 
 
EDF10, CSP-NIP 2008-2013 Annex 12 Road transport 2.4) Lessons learnt pp. xcii-xciv; Based on 
the anticipated further success of the SPSP, the EDF10 programme is designed to continue with the 
support to the sector mainly through SBS. In that context, it will however be important to carry out an 
assessment of the seven key areas according to the model approach of the relevant EC guidelines. 
This will be done in the framework of the Mid-Term Review of the SPSP which is scheduled for the 
end of the 2
nd
 semester 2007. A close collaboration between the economic section and the infrastruc-
ture section would then be required. The issue of sector financing will have to be critically looked at. 
 
EDF9, CSP-NIP 2001-2007; p20: Chapter 5.1.4: Macro-economic support and capacity building for 
economic governance: Provided that this effort is deployed, macro-economic support by the EC will 
continue to be disbursed in the form of budgetary aid, either channelled directly through the Treasury 
or through special arrangements under discussion with GRZ and donors. Under the EDF9 macro-
economic support will take preferably the form of three-year programmes (with annual tranches re-
leased on the basis of performance indicators) in order to align this support with the PRSP’s time 
horizon and with the support instruments by the Bretton Woods institutions (PRGF and PRSC). 
 
Access to Justice Project (2011) - Internal Docs: Meeting Report GIZ 14 Feb 2011 - On Subject: 
Modes of Delivery: Three possible modes of Delivery – Financing Agreement, Local Subsidy Agree-
ment and Direct Procurement, which are standardise approaches and follow contractual, financial and 
procurement procedures of GIZ – were explained to the representatives of the various AtoJ (Access 
to Justice) institutions. Formats were made available. The items of the work plan and budget 2011 
were broken down according to agreed upon outputs, institutions and budget items. 
Reactions from institutions: Altogether all AtoJ institutions welcomed GIZ’s proposals for direct en-
gagement and procurement of vehicle and IT equipment in particular since this would result in efficient 
use of funds, i.e. lower prices. The institutions acknowledged GIZ’s efforts to encourage a speedy 
budget execution and expressed consent that the EC funds need to be effected within the tight 
schedule of the EC-GIZ agreement of December 2010. The proposed procedures underscore the will-
ingness and capacity of the AtoJ institutions to perform under the agreed upon decentralised ap-
proach. 
In conclusion, it is clear that for Zambia and other aid-dependent countries the time has come to 
change how aide programmes are designed, how aid is delivered, how the incentives of donor agents 
and recipient-government officials are arrayed, and how aid-financed projects are evaluated. For the 
variety of reasons described above aid continues to fail to produce its expected and necessary im-
pact. The challenge of aid dependency is systemic, and involves donors and recipient countries alike. 
Perverse and conflicting incentives, a pervasive focus on instrumental goals over ultimate outcomes, 
inaccurate assumptions and distorted expectations, and administrative mechanisms that resist benefi-
cial change all serve to undermine the fundamental purposes of aid. Addressing these challenges will 
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not be easy, but as the saying goes, nothing worthwhile ever is. 
 
Mutesa, Fred & Ngoma Isaac (2010): Review of the Combi-Financing Instrument – Innovative Mode 
of Delivery;  
 
EC –EuropeAid (2011); Engaging Non-State Actors in New Aid Modalities – for better development 
outcomes and governance; Reference Document N° 12; January 2011 
 
“Too s a   Me  o s  eries”  a  c e  b  E ro e i    ow  EVC   i     7. This collection aims 
to structure the presentation of the methodological documents produced by Directorate on “Quality of 
Operations”. The collection includes three sub-collections: Guidelines, Reference Documents and 
Concept papers. Some relevant titles in relation to the evaluation indicator 1.1 on reports and notes by 
EU defining comparative advantages of the various instruments and approaches in the context:  
Guidelines 
•  Guidelines (n°1) – “The Programming, Design and Management of General Budget Support” 
•  Guidelines (n°2) – “EC Support to sector programmes: covering the three financing modalities: 
Sector budget support, Pool funding and EC procurement and EC project procedures” – 2007 
•  Guidelines (n°3) – “Making technical cooperation more effective” – 2009 
•  Guidelines (n°4) – “Guidelines on the Integration of Environment and Climate Change in Devel-
opment Cooperation” – 2009 
Reference documents 
•  Reference document (n°5) – “Sector Approaches in Agriculture and Rural Development” – 2009 
•  Reference document (n°6) – “Toolkit for Capacity Development” – 2009 
•  Reference document (n°7) – “Water Sector Development and Governance: Complementarities 
and synergies between Sector-wide Approach and Integrated Water Resource Management” – 
2009 
 Indicator 8.1.2: Lessons learned from previous or other aid modalities documented and 
integrated in strategic programming documents 
The available documentation and the direct feedback from the interviews with the main stakeholders 
concerned during the field phase provide evidence of lessons learned from previous or other aid modal-
ities documented and integrated in strategic programming documents. Some illustrations from different 
sectors and/or actors are reflected in the below compilation of extracts (obviously not pretending to be 
exhaustive neither implying that discussion and duly taking into consideration of lessons learned are the 
common modus operandi when preparing strategic programming document): (i) The lessons learnt 
under chapter 4.1.2 of the EDF9 CSP-NIP 2001-2007 for example refer to main lessons learnt from the 
Structural Adjustment Fund (SAF) programmes with regard to strengthening of financial management, 
institutional reforms and manpower development in order to continue the implementation of budget 
support programmes; (ii) The lessons learnt section under Annex 12 of the EDF10 CSP-NIP 2008-2013 
on the road transport sector consists of more than two and a half pages focusing on lessons learned 
from other sector budget support programmes and “project mode” operations; (iii) The ETR of the re-
gional integration / infrastructure programme SPSP I explicitly focused on lesson learnt and the latest 
sector developments to review the SPSP II Financing Agreement especially with regard to the sector 
budget support features and modalities; (iv) The lessons learnt from the cancelled EDF9 project de-
signed to support Non State Actors where taken in for the design of a new project under EDF10 no 
longer implemented through the NAO (since no longer considered feasible), with now direct manage-
ment by the Delegation (with appropriate TA support) being considered as an option, possibly using 
joint financing systems (pool funding arrangements) in line with the Paris declaration like the Founda-
tion for Civil Society in Tanzania, the Civil Society Support mechanism in Mozambique, or the Inde-
pendent Development Fund in Uganda.  
On the other hand, one of the main findings of the 2011 evaluation study of budget support to Zambia is 
that joint knowledge management has been weak. This particularly relates to the different interpreta-
tions among Cooperating Partners about how to craft and implement conditionality and disbursement 
mechanisms, and how to design and implement joint monitoring, amongst others. Relevant information 
such as budget analyses, sector assessments, disbursement activities have been mostly made on an 
ad hoc basis and were widely dispersed among Cooperating Partners. This situation has caused a 
huge duplication of work by individual Cooperating Partners and GRZ and obstructs a more efficient 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 259 - 
use of invested human capital. The absence of a permanent PRBS secretariat responsible for joint 
knowledge management has been a heavy burden for establishing a more solid, fact-based dialogue 
process and ensuring actual use of lessons learned in strategic programming documents. 
Reportedly and as transpired from the field interviews, difficulties arose and keep arising in finding the 
right balance between really looking at macro-issues (in the case of GBS) or at the sector as a whole 
(in the case of SBS) on the one hand and the risk of sliding back in the “project mode” with regard to 
the physical interventions and their execution financed under the GBS and SBS tranches on the other. 
Major area of dispute however has shown to be the ultimate rationale of budget support which by some 
is promoted as effective mechanism for bringing about sustainable development and poverty alleviation 
mainstreamed in national strategies and systems (the developmental perspective), while for others the 
accountability and transparency of public sector development management are the ultimate rationale 
for opting for this aid modality (the governance and accountability perspective). From interviews with 
different key stakeholders it is learned that harmonizing and synchronizing both views remains a major 
challenge to effectively realize the full potentials and added value of the instrument. This also confirms 
the conclusions of the recent 2011 budget support evaluation entitled “Between High Expectations and 
Reality: An Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia” summarizing that overall the Zambian experience 
confirms that budget support cannot simply ‘buy’ fundamental institutional reform, nor can it reduce 
poverty in a matter of a couple of years. Aid agencies can only expect to push through sustainable re-
form when there is a critical level of government ownership. But on the other hand, this cannot be used 
as an ex-post reason to argue that budget support is an ineffective instrument. 
Data, figures, tables: 
JAR 2003, p29; 4.6.4 SYSMIN - All SYSMIN funds have been disbursed in terms of Balance of Pay-
ments support that is €50m by 12 December 2002. It is worth noting that the new PRBS will be dis-
bursed through direct budget support, i.e. not through earmarking or double signature accounts as 
was the case with the SYSMIN transfers. 
Extracts: 
EDF9, CSP-NIP 2001-2007; p.20: Chapter 5.1.4: Macro-economic support and capacity building for 
economic governance: During the 1990s, Zambia has received considerable amounts of macro-
economic support in the framework of consecutive Sysmin and Structural Adjustment Support pro-
grammes. In this manner, the EC has significantly contributed to macro-economic stabilisation of the 
country, particularly through debt reduction and budget financing. Zambia has acceded to HIPC debt 
relief and recently passed the test of the second year of the economic reform programme (supported 
through an IMF-PRGF-arrangement). A full-PRSP is expected to be agreed in the course of 2001/02. 
Economic reform will thus continue to feature as a top priority on the government’s agenda for the 
next years. The EU already committed itself to support the PRSP process. In its policy dialogue with 
the Government, the Commission and other donors emphasised the need: (i) for a more comprehen-
sive and participatory analysis of poverty in Zambia, adding to the economic dimension also the ca-
pability and security dimensions of poverty; (ii) to pursue public finance management reforms towards 
more effectiveness and accountability; and (iii) to monitor outcome indicators as a way of measuring 
progress in the access and quality of social services, as well as in the efficiency/effectiveness of pub-
lic expenditure…  
 
EDF10, CSP-NIP 2008-2013; Annex 12 Road transport 2.4) Lessons learnt pp xcii-xciv; The Lessons 
Learnt section in Annex 12 on the road transport to the CSP-NIP consists of 2 and a half pages. Les-
sons learnt focus on sector dialogues, monitoring and assessment of sector performance, launching 
of sector studies, transparency of procurement procedures, etc. Some quotes|: “Certainly, the utilisa-
tion of sector budget support can certainly not overcome the problems in sector financing, but it gives 
the EC the means to make it a top priority of the future sector dialogue between the CPs and the GRZ 
and to jointly discuss the way forward on sector financing enhancement agreed upon by all parties. 
Difficulties arise to find the right balance between really looking at the sector as a whole in the spirit of 
sector budget support and the risk of sliding back in the “project mode” with regard to the physical in-
terventions and their execution financed under the SBS tranches. To find a right balance is sometimes 
difficult… The EC is the only CP using sector budget support in that magnitude in Zambia. Other CPs 
are mainly operating in the project mode but within the framework of a sector approach in support of 
ROADSIP II. Based on the anticipated further success of the SPSP, the EDF10 programme is de-
signed to continue with the support to the sector mainly through SBS. In that context, it will however 
be important to carry out an assessment of the seven key areas according to the model approach of 
the relevant EC guidelines. This will be done in the framework of the Mid-Term Review of the SPSP 
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which is scheduled for the end of the 2
nd
 semester 2007. A close collaboration between the economic 
section and the infrastructure section would then be required. The issue of sector financing will have 
to be critically looked at.  
 
Sofreco (2006); Evaluation of the Commission’s Support to Zambia – Country Level Evaluation; Final 
Report; June 2006: Conclusion on “Efficiency”: “It is too early to appreciate the efficiency of general 
budget support. However, some positive aspects are already visible: clear procedures for the transfer 
of funds; mutually agreed indicators for the assessment of GBS; multi-donor cooperation in GBS. In 
the Transport Sector, the move towards sector support has improved efficiency. However, efficiency 
of EC project support is limited, due to: slow project identification, design and contracting; bureaucrat-
ic procedures; EC tender procedures not conducive to project implementation; high turnover of Zam-
bia EU Delegation staff; limited institutional and sectoral capacity at the EU Delegation; in particular, 
the absence of a macroeconomist for the last six months is a serious handicap. 
 
EAMR Jan 2011, p12: GRZ to implement [regional integration –infrastructure] sector corrective ac-
tions agreed with CPs. EUD to consider extension of 2 short-term TA assignments (engineering and 
financial specialist) to support RDA. GRZ and CPs to agree in January 2011 medium and long-term 
corrective actions to be included in a "road sector management plan" that will guide the future sector 
dialogue. Office of the Auditor General to assess adherence to these measures. EUD/NAO to facili-
tate an ETR of the SPSP I. This assignment will also use the "lessons learnt" and the latest sector de-
velopments to review the FA SPSP II EDF10 if necessary and reformulate a meaningful capacity 
building programme to be later financed under EDF10 SPSP II. Such a programme would holistically 
look at the sector including issues of tertiary education and sector governance issues. Following the 
implementation by GRZ of the proposed remedial actions and completion of the revision of ROADSIP 
II, a 7 key areas assessment study could be carried out in the 2nd quarter 2011 before releasing any 
tranches under SPSP I and II. EUD/DEVCO to discuss feasibility / opportunity of carrying over of SBS 
tranches not disbursed to date. 
 
JAR 2010, p13: In 2010, and notably as a result of protracted discussions with the Government on 
the scope of the programme, the EU was compelled to cancel the EDF9 project designed to support 
Non State Actors (EU: €5m). Lessons from this disappointing experience have been reflected upon 
and taken into account for the design of the EDF10 programme (EU: €5.5m) which will be committed 
in 2011. 
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p8: Under the EDF10, Zambia is benefiting from an enhanced and 
more predictable form of budget support, the MDG-Contract (€225m over six years). 
 
JAR 2007, p22: The FNDP is a results-based plan that focuses on agreed targets and results, there-
fore a sound National Statistics Strategy becomes a necessary precondition for FNDP monitoring, 
evaluation, and informed decision-making. There are concerns about the co-ordination of the data col-
lection process; this relates to the disparate nature of data collection, which is often directly carried 
out by the line ministries without the engagement of the Central Statistical Office (CSO). Consequent-
ly the CSO is not in a position to disseminate these data. Secondly, it makes a co-ordinated or inte-
grated approach to data collection difficult; correspondingly there is inadequate effort to ensure that 
the data collected permit the calculation of the indicators agreed for FNDP monitoring. There are also 
concerns on the quality/reliability of data collected more generally. In 2007, the long-standing informal 
FNDP M&E Group was formalised under the JASZ, and has been mandated to coordinate CPs' inputs 
to monitoring at sectoral, central (through the CSO) and decentralised levels. It also ensures a coordi-
nated approach to CPs support to NSS. The Group meets at least once a quarter under the co-
chairmanship of GTZ, DFID and EC. 
 
JAR 2007, p31: The 2007 national budget execution showed some limitations on the expenditure 
side. Of the total amount released by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MoFNP), only 
89.7% was spent, because ministries and agencies were unable to absorb all the funds, particularly 
on capital projects. The partial execution of the budget reflects delays in public procurement (though 
not always at the central level), capacity constraints in planning, and overall low absorption capacity in 
the MPSAs. The government has taken steps to prevent a repeat of these difficulties in the 2008 
budget execution (in particular, in relation to the public procurement process. On the revenue side, 
outcomes rebounded to outperform projections, reflecting also higher income tax payments from min-
ing companies. A new fiscal regime for the mining sector is expected to generate substantial addition-
al government revenue. In implementing the new regime, it is important to ensure that private in-
vestor's confidence is maintained and that the additional resources are used transparently and effec-
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tively. 
 
JAR 2003, pp 25-26; 4.3.2 Developments in the Education Sector: The Government has implemented 
an Education Strategic Plan (ESP) which was presented to the donor community in February 2003. A 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed at the same occasion, providing the legal and sector dia-
logue framework for sector support. Several EU-Member States (Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Finland, and the United Kingdom) already signed the MoU. The EC plans to sign the MoU after ap-
proval of its financing proposal. The strategic plan outlines important funding gaps, exacerbated in 
2003 by tight budgetary discipline that froze the payroll, thus preventing recruitment of teachers nec-
essary in consideration of the Free Basic Education policy launched in 2002… The ESP is also articu-
lated in an Annual Work Plan that follows a National Implementation Framework. In 2003 these de-
velopments still overlapped with the previous pool-supported modality (of which the EC was not part), 
BESSIP (Basic Education Sub Sector Investment Programme). It was the first attempt of a swap in 
the education sector in Zambia and much has been learned from the experience, both at Government 
and donor levels. However, its systems must now be internalised in the Ministry of Education. For this 
reason, 2003 has been essentially a year of transition. Decentralisation is going on, with many educa-
tion boards already being established. Procurement of educational materials should also be decentral-
ised from 2004 onwards. 
 
DIE – IOB (2011), pp ii-iii; Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia – Synthesis Report, Main Find-
ings of the Evaluation: Regarding policy and governance reforms, budget support has performed be-
low its potential. While achievements in PFM reforms and the strengthening of the Auditor General 
can be related to the budget support process, the instrument was not effective in realising broader ob-
jectives. The PRBS group was not able to set up a coherence incentive system through conditionality 
and alignment that could have compensated weaknesses of GRZ. Beyond some improvements, the 
PRBS group did not harmonise disbursements and conditionality to a satisfactory level, nor was it 
able to set up a joint knowledge management system that would have contributed to strategic con-
sistency in the group’s relation with GRZ. The root causes of this lack of harmonisation relate to the 
disagreement among Cooperating Partners about the hierarchy of objectives of budget support: Some 
Cooperating Partners perceive the financing function related to poverty alleviation as the main objec-
tive of budget support, while others give priority to institutional / governance reforms. Thus, Cooperat-
ing Partners were often unable to signal joint and consistent priorities to the GRZ through dialogue 
and incentives. Interfering headquarters, who responded more to domestic political constellation than 
to requirements in Zambia, hindered the harmonisation and alignment attempts of aid managers in 
Lusaka. 
 
DIE – IOB (2011), p. vii; Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia – Synthesis Report, Main Findings 
of the Evaluation regarding Joint Knowledge Management: “Joint Knowledge Management: Related to 
different interpretations among Cooperating Partners about how to craft and implement conditionality 
and disbursement mechanisms, the potential for joint knowledge management including joint monitor-
ing and learning has been underexplored. Joint knowledge management has been weak. Relevant 
information such as budget analyses, sector assessments, disbursement activities have been mostly 
made on an ad hoc basis and were widely dispersed among Cooperating Partners. This situation has 
caused a huge duplication of work by individual Cooperating Partners and GRZ and obstructs a more 
efficient use of invested human capital. The absence of a permanent PRBS secretariat responsible for 
joint knowledge management has been a heavy burden for establishing a more solid, fact-based dia-
logue process. It is also worthwhile mentioning, that the present endeavour of jointly evaluating the 
instrument’s effectiveness in recent years was paralleled by several uncoordinated ad hoc evaluations 
and assessments by individual Cooperating Partners. These parallel evaluations and assessments 
created an additional administrative burden for GRZ.” 
 
EU    saka; “Ra io a e  or EDF10 N  s ca aci   b i  i    rojec  i  Zambia”;    er a  No e; 
2011: p3; Point(14) lesson learned: Finding effective and agreeable implementation modalities will be 
challenging. At this point implementation through the NAO may not be feasible and direct manage-
ment by the Delegation – with appropriate TA-support – needs being considered as an option. Using 
joint financing systems (pool funding arrangements) in line with the Paris declaration like the Founda-
tion for Civil Society in Tanzania, The Civil Society Support mechanism in Mozambique, the Inde-
pendent Development Fund in Uganda, may be another option that would enable more secure fund-
ing arrangements which are independent of day to day management by donors. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information I-8.1.2:  
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DIE & IOB (2011), pp 14-15: In Zambia, budget support has developed into a highly visible and rele-
vant instrument of development cooperation. GRZ and PRBS partners have set up an institutionalised 
dialogue process. This mechanism served as the platform for discussing all relevant issues, including 
funding and disbursement procedures, conditionality, capacity building and institutional reform. The 
share of budget support as a percentage of OECD external assistance has increased. The resources 
represented a highly important share of the government’s fiscal space. Budget allocations in most 
poverty-relevant sectors have increased absolutely as well as relatively. Overall, increases in these 
sectors were higher than the budget support inflows… 
 
Overall, the results of this evaluation contribute to the debate on the potential of budget support. On 
the one hand, the Zambian experience confirms that budget support cannot simply ‘buy’ fundamental 
institutional reform, nor can it reduce poverty in a matter of a couple of years. Aid agencies can only 
expect to push through sustainable reform when there is a critical level of government ownership. On 
the other hand, this cannot be used as an ex-post reason to argue that budget support is an ineffec-
tive instrument. 
 Indicator 8.1.3: Monitoring and evaluation focused on instrument and approach efficiency 
and ability to achieve EU assistance’s goals 
From the available documentation, including ROMs, CRIS files, review and evaluation reports, and as 
confirmed during the field interviews, there is no evidence that monitoring and evaluation (systematically) 
focused on instrument and approach efficiency. There are no specific indicators or database filter criteria 
related to aid modality, method of implementation, or financing modality, which are explicitly and/or sys-
tematically used for project and/or portfolio monitoring. By way of illustration, the standard excerpt of 
EAMR Reporting Item 3 “Implementation” is formulated as: Indicate the status of implementation of on-
going programmes (including thematic) by making reference to corresponding Implementation Reports in 
CRIS: identify major results (measured by indicators on project/programme level in July and January 
report and measured by CSP-level indicators in January report) and identify major obstacles and any 
remedial actions. The project and portfolio performance M&E systems challenges are more fundamental 
as illustrated in the country evaluation report of the implementation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia: “A 
significant proportion of investments do not have adequate monitoring frameworks and systems in place 
to enable results-oriented decision making and reporting. It is difficult to trace whether the Paris Declara-
tion (PD) has been an influencing factor in managing for results at sector level. Similarly, there is no evi-
dence that he PD has been a determinant factor in influencing mutual accountability due to the asym-
metric accountability relationships between government and the development partners.”  
A crucial fundamental issue is that general budget support monitoring and evaluation basically covers 
the higher results levels (especially the outcomes and impact levels therein) and the inputs level (espe-
cially PFM aspects) but not the operational level of activities and direct outputs. It as such only covers 
the lower and upper levels of the results chain (for projects, programmes and strategies alike). It thus 
possibly misses out on the efficiency dimension of integrated performance monitoring and evaluation
87
 
as only the economy and effectiveness dimensions of the so-called “3Es” of performance management 
are covered.  
This was one of the main issues brought to the attention of the evaluators by the NAO Support Office on 
the occasion of the evaluation preparatory meeting early September 2011 and confirmed during the 
evaluation field mission of December 2011 by the main stakeholder parties concerned (GRZ and CPs 
alike).  
Strengthening M&E “tout court” of projects and portfolio remains a / the major challenge for enhanced 
portfolio performance. This was (indirectly and partially) recognised as such in the EDF10 CSP-NIP doc-
ument as a conditio sine qua non towards attaining MDGs: “The use of responsive monitoring and eval-
uation of services delivery in both the education and health sectors, focusing primarily on the assess-
ment of outcomes and impact, needs to be promoted. Capacity strengthening in monitoring services 
delivery in thus expected to be among the priority Government interventions.” The Country evaluation of 
the implementation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia however sees improvements over time: “Capaci-
ties for results-driven strategies are getting stronger. The Fifth National Development Plan has provided 
a framework for that through the Key Performance Indicators consultatively developed by all major 
stakeholders. These are used as basis to measure implementation progress at sector as well as national 
                                               
87
  A practical illustration in relation to the health sector is included in the information matrix under Annex XI, in relation to indi-
cator 8.1.3 (Secton “Field interviews and additional information” 
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level. The Ministry of Finance has established a Department in the last two years mandated with moni-
toring and evaluation of development initiatives. However, there is still a long way to go as frameworks 
are still weak due to poor staffing. Nevertheless, the MFNP has continued to produce an annual report of 
the NDP to show progress made. Perhaps what is missing is a forum for a robust discussion of the report 
by all the key stakeholders such as the Annual Poverty Conference during the PRSP implementation.” 
The further strengthening of Fifth NDP and upcoming Sixth NDP performance monitoring and evaluation 
and the required capacity strengthening of the MoFNP’s Department of Monitoring and Evaluation there-
to where amongst the main issues brought to the attention of the EU country strategy evaluation team by 
the different stakeholders concerned (both GRZ and CPs) during the December field visit. It was also 
emphasised that this requires a necessary strengthening of such performance M&E systems at the sec-
toral / thematic level (in the sectoral / thematic ministries and agencies) and at the level of the local gov-
ernment units (particularly Districts) with the Provinces as intermediate level. At each level, civil society 
needs to be duly involved in M&E to ensure ownership, transparency and accountability. The consulta-
tions furthermore indicated that the MoFNP M&E Department at the helm of this umbrella M&E system 
would be needing to steer, coordinate and integrate those system components at national level.  
Robust monitoring and prompt decision making based on the monitoring early warning information as 
essential performance management tools and practices do not appear to be in place yet. The need for 
such effective holistic M&E system to track the implementation of activities and monitor results was 
stressed already in the FNDP progress reports as early as 2007, amongst others by the Governance 
Secretariat and was repeated ever since.
88
 However, no concerted action appears to have been taken. 
Such holistic M&E system requires the necessary complementarity, in not integration, of both the GBS 
and SBS monitoring systems in sectors covered by both budget support modalities, which is still some-
thing to be aspired for. This for example is explicitly envisioned by the Health Sector Performance Moni-
toring Framework (HPMF) under the EDF10 “Supporting Public Health Service Delivery in Zambia” Sec-
tor Policy Support Programme (SPSP) which covers direct output indicators performance monitoring 
complementary to the inputs and outcome & impact performance monitoring under the General Budget 
Support, thus ensuring integrated performance monitoring of the entire programme vertical logic from 
inputs to impact.
89
 By way of illustration, at the end of this section on indicator 8.1.3 a special assess-
ment is included on the monitoring of general and sector budget support and disbursement criteria with 
health sector as case. 
Data, figures, tables: 
EAMR, Jan 2007, Annex A: Evaluation Plan 
Review  Education Stretegic 
Plan
Education pool funding is done through joint agreed modalities. This review  
corresponds to an end of project evaluation as the EC support w ill end in 2007
Q1 2007 Q1 2007
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p11. 
Different EAMRs: Standard Excerpt of EAMR Reporting Item 3 “Implementation” is formulated as: In-
dicate the status of implementation of ongoing programmes (including thematic) by making reference to 
corresponding Implementation Reports in CRIS: identify major results (measured by indicators on pro-
ject/programme level in July and January report and measured by CSP-level indicators in January re-
port) and identify major obstacles and any remedial actions.  
 
DIE – IOB (2011) – p158; Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia – Synthesis Report; Annex VII 
Budgets and expenditure by function 2005-2009. 
 
FA 10-ACP-2A-005 - Annex II; p9: SPSP Supporting Public Health Service Delivery in Zambia; Annex 
1: Technical and Administrative Provisions for Implementation - Table D: Performance Indicators and 
Targets for Variable Tranches 2009 and 2010: “The selected indicators / targets are defined in the cur-
rent PAF 2007-2009 in the following terms: …” 
 
FA 10-ACP-2A-005 - Annex II; p10; SPSP Supporting Public Health Service Delivery in Zambia; An-
nex 1: Technical and Administrative Provisions for Implementation; Chap. 5.4 Performance indicators 
variable tranches in 2011: The selected indicators / targets are defined in the HPMF in the following 
terms: - Table F: Health Performance Indicators with Baseline and Targets for 2010 
                                               
88
  See the summary table on SNDP governance annual reporting on lessons learnt and recommendations in the Annex Xi 
information matrix related to JC 6.6. 
89
  This is further illustrated in the section at the end of the discussion of this indicator 8.1.3 under the title “On the Monitoring of 
General and Sector Budget Support and Disbursement Criteria: The Health Sector as Case”.  
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Extracts: 
EDF9, CSP-NIP 2001-2007; p.20 – Chapter 5.1.4: Macro-economic support and capacity building for 
economic governance: Provided that this effort is deployed, macro-economic support by the EC will 
continue to be disbursed in the form of budgetary aid, either channelled directly through the treasury or 
through special arrangements under discussion with GRZ and donors… The EU will adopt assessment 
and disbursement mechanisms that avoid the past stop/go situation and that will allow more/less fi-
nancing on the basis of results measured through performance indicators… Though in principle the 
budgetary assistance will not be targeting a specific sector or expenditure category, the importance of 
social sectors for poverty reduction and EC prior involvement will justify to measure in particular the 
impact of budgetary aid on social sector policies. 
 
EDF10 CSP-NIP 2008-2013 p41: In order to support the significant efforts towards attaining MDGs un-
dertaken under the FNDP 2006-2010, the fulfilment of specific commitments by the government is as-
sumed in relation to public expenditure and service delivery in social sectors. As 4
th
 element (d) is 
listed: “the use of responsive monitoring and evaluation of services delivery in both the education and 
health sectors, focusing primarily on the assessment of outcomes and impact, needs to be promoted. 
Capacity strengthening in monitoring services delivery in thus expected to be among the priority Gov-
ernment interventions. FNDP indicators are expected to be used. 
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p23: The GRZ has explicitly stated in its National 
Aid Policy that its preferred modality of aid is Direct Budget Support… Projections made in the current 
MTEF for future support to the health and education sectors indicate that financing through SWAps will 
drop in the coming years… The JASZ evaluation found that the objective of replacing separate CP 
country strategies with the JASZ was not realised. 
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p. xii - Country Evaluation of the Implementation 
of the Paris Declaration in Zambia, Phase II. Has the implementation of the Paris Declaration strength-
ened the contribution of aid to sustainable development results (development outcomes)? How? – Core 
Question 3. A significant proportion of investments do not have adequate monitoring frameworks and 
systems in place to enable results-oriented decision making and reporting. It is difficult to trace whether 
the PD has been an influencing factor in managing for results at sector level. Similarly, there is no evi-
dence that he PD has been a determinant factor in influencing mutual accountability due to the asym-
Amount
of which 
SBS
Amount
Of which 
SBS
Amount
of which 
SBS
(in M€) (in M€) (in M€) (in M€) (in M€) (in M€)
A envelope 475 100% 475 100% 475) 100%
- GBS 232 49% 232 49% 232 49%
- focal area 1 Regional Integrat-
   ion/Transport infrastructure 
117 69.3 25% 118 25% 128 27%
- focal area 2 Health 59 59 12% 59 59 12% 59 59 12%
- non-focal areas:
   - Food security and 
     agriculture diversification
30 6% 30 6% 20 4%
   - Support to Governance 25 5% 25 5% 25 5%
   - Support for NSAs 5.5 1.10% 5.5 1.10% 5.5 1.10%
   - Support for EPA/TRA 2 0.40% 2 0.40% 2 0.40%
   - TCF 3 0.60% 3 0.60% 3 0.60%
   - Reserve 1.5 0.30% 0.5 0.30% 0.5 0.30%
B envelope** 14.8 100% 49.43 100% 37.33(b') 100%
 - AIDCO implementation 11.1 75% 45.73 34.63
 - ECHO implementation 3.7 25% 3.7 2.7
Total 489.8 100% 100% 478.7 100%
Change in country allocation
 - A-envelope 0
 - B-envelope -12.1
* After taking into account adjustments resulting from ad hoc reviews
** Increased by €4.63 m (special B-envelope) and by €30 m (V-FLEX,)
10th EDF
CSP - NIP 
EDF 10 Mid-Term Review: Synthesis of Recommendations regarding NIP Reallocations (Oct 2009)
Initial NIP Current NIP* MTR proposal
amount as 
% sub-total 
amount as 
% A-env
amount 
as % A-
env
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metric accountability relationships between government and the development partners.  
 
EAMR Jan 2011, p23: Budget support: EUD was actively involved in the two yearly PRBS reviews 
which are critical milestones in the Budget Support life cycle, notably when reviewing the PAF. Based 
on a the Joint Annual Review in the Health Sector and the assessment of the PAF indicators, the Dele-
gation decided to propose for the 2010 tranche of the SBS, that the fixed tranche of €8.5m is disbursed 
and variable tranche is withheld due to poor progress on the relevant indicators. Sector dialogue in the 
health and in the road sectors focussed on the follow-up of the 2009 mismanagements in the Ministry 
of Health and financial over commitments in roads. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JAR 2010, p9; Regarding Sector Budget Support – Public Expenditure Management & Financial Ac-
countability (PEMFA): “…, a comprehensive evaluation of PEMFA conducted in 2010 recognised that 
some components scored successes; among others, the setting up of the new Public Procurement 
Agency and the strengthening the Institute of Chartered Accountants, and the Zambia Macroeconomic 
Model. The evaluation also states that "over the PEMFA period there appears to have been demon-
strable improvement in key PFM areas as measured by the high level PEFA indicator set". 
 
JAR 2010, p10; Regarding Sector Budget Support – Health Sector: In 2010 the sector was still marred 
by the 2009 crisis that saw its origin in the misappropriation of funds by a few public servants in the line 
Ministry. The Netherlands and Sweden which were contributing to a basket fund arrangement inter-
rupted their disbursements, and the Ministry had to embark on a range of corrective actions, which fo-
cused a large part of its administrative capacity on addressing Governance issues…Though progress 
on implementing corrective actions was acknowledged in the latter part of the year, the Government's 
request for the EU Sector Budget Support tranche (fixed tranche of €8.5m and variable tranche of 
€1.5m) was only received in December 2010 making it impossible for the Commission to process the 
disbursement in-year (only the fixed tranche would have been disbursed in any case). The situation 
certainly contributed to the very limited progress on certain health indicators in 2010, and this in spite of 
the overall positive economic development. As a result, Zambia's road to attaining the MDG goals 4 
and 5 was further complicated. In spite of the smooth implementation of HIV/AIDS- programmes, 
prevalence remains high with 14.3% of the population infected with the virus. The persistently poor 
health status of the population, which particularly affects the rural poor, presents a significant obstacle 
towards accelerated poverty reduction. It should be noted however that the Budget Support Evaluation 
conducted in 2010 concluded that Government and Cooperating Partners had contributed to an im-
proved service delivery and reduction in the incidence prevalence of diseases as tuberculosis and ma-
laria. The impact analysis did find positive impacts on child mortality, maternal death, malaria, and diar-
rhoea. 
 
JAR 2010, p11; Zimba – Livingstone road (also part of the Trans-Africa Highway System / North-South 
corridor). The project contributed to the establishment of a safe and sustainable national road network 
through the rehabilitation of 42.8 km of the main road link to Zimbabwe/Botswana/South Africa. This 
will result in lower vehicle operation costs estimated to a reduction of 10% for heavy goods, large bus-
es and trucks over 7,5t, vehicle operating speeds increased by 45% and a safer travelling environment.  
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MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p8: The EU remains convinced that the budget support modality pro-
vides the levels of ownership of development and permits the GRZ to allocate resources in accordance 
with national priorities… The use of the SBS modality in both [= health and infrastructure] sectors ap-
pears to have made it possible for the GRZ to implement defined strategies which have in turn contrib-
uted to attracting FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] as well as local economic growth initiatives. 
 
JAR 2007, p22: Unlike PRBS 1 (where a separate set of indicators was used), the set of indicators for 
the VT was extracted from the common Performance Assessment Framework (PAF), jointly agreed be-
tween GRZ and CPs in November 2006, and covering three years (2006-2008). A sub-set of 12 indica-
tors had been selected, and the PAF was jointly assessed in June 2007. Overall, the PAF scored at 
70%, while the EC indicators scored at 71%, remarkably close to the overall PAF. 
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p. x - Country Evaluation of the Implementation of 
the Paris Declaration in Zambia, Phase II - To what extent and how has the implementation of the Paris 
Declaration led to an improvement in the efficiency of aid delivery, the management and use of aid and 
better partnerships (process and intermediate outcomes) – Core Question 2. Capacities for results-
driven strategies are getting stronger. The Fifth National Development Plan has provided a framework 
for that through the Key Performance Indicators consultatively developed by all major stakeholders. 
These are used as basis to measure implementation progress at sector as well as national level. The 
ministry of finance has established a department in the last two years mandated with monitoring and 
evaluation of development initiatives. However, there is still a long way to go as frameworks are still 
weak due to poor staffing. Nevertheless, the MFNP has continued to produce an annual report of the 
NDP to show progress made. Perhaps what is missing is a forum for a robust discussion of the report 
by all the key stakeholders such as the Annual Poverty Conference during the PRSP implementation. 
 
DIE – IOB (2011); Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia – Synthesis Report; Annex IV on Reasons 
for delayed budget support disbursements: Main reason given by EC as Cooperating Partner for de-
layed budget support disbursement (GB Commitment equal to 37.14m USD): “Delays were mainly of 
administrative nature, with a number of additional supporting documents requested by EC HQ”. 
 
FA 10-ACP-2A-005 - Annex 1; p6; SPSP Supporting Public Health Service Delivery in Zambia; Annex 
1: Technical and Administrative Provisions for Implementation Complementarity GBS / SBS:  
In a sector support that complements GBS (MDG Contract), it is necessary to focus on input/output in-
dicators as well as outcomes(specific of the PRBS PAF), in order to create incentives for the implemen-
tation of measures which constitute the prerequisites for the attainment of outcomes. This SBS pro-
gramme will combine input performance(timely releases to the health sector, specific releases to the 
district level), with a) in 2009 and 2010, outcome indicators selected from the PAF-Health/HIV that are 
complementary to the Health/HIV selected indicators under the GBS (MDG Contract) and b) in 2011, 
outcomes indicators selected from the specific sector performance framework(HPMF). In fact, it is ex-
pected that the recently available HPMF will inform and adapt the PAF-Health/HIV in the coming re-
views. (page 6) 
Measuring performance: The development of the FNDP coincided with the start of the Poverty Reduc-
tion Budgetary Support (PRBS), a joint general budget support programme, with a Performance As-
sessment Framework (PAF). These initiatives have stimulated open discussions on the definition of 
outcome indicators and targets. The Health Management Information System (HMIS) is being revised 
and significant work has gone into the definition of indicators ensuring that the national priorities includ-
ing the MDGs and the selected OECD DAC health indicator selected by EU Member States are includ-
ed in the datasets. In order to contribute towards health sector monitoring and evaluation in Zambia 
through results-oriented planning, budgeting and aid modalities, which are all focused on accountability 
for results, the Ministry of Health has developed a Health Sector Performance Monitoring Framework 
(HPMF). The aim is to compile a detailed logical framework that reconciles the higher level indicators 
and targets of strategic documents with the input (resources and process benchmarks) and output level 
indicators especially found in operational documents, like the Annual Action Plan of the Ministry of 
Health (MoH). The framework should show a clear enchainment, through a sequencing of inputs mov-
ing towards output (short-term) and eventually outcome and impact levels (long-term). (p.6) 
Road Sector SPSP2 Action Fiche: “Concerning sector performance monitoring, the present central 
statistical system providing data to monitor the sector is weak. Limited data for road sector monitoring 
are provided by the three road agencies Road Development Agency (RDA), National Road Fund 
Agency (NRFA) and the Road Traffic and Safety Agency (RTSA) as well as the National Construction 
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Council. There is no aggregation of transport sector performance data at the Ministry of Transport and 
Communication (MCT) in response to its mandate. The Mid Term Review of ROADSIP II is to develop 
a revised M&E framework for the road sector including input, output and outcome indicators.”  
 
Field Visit Additional Information on I-8.1.3:  
 
Special Assessment on the Monitoring of General and Sector Budget Support and Disburse-
ment Criteria: The Health Sector as Case 
 
FA 10-ACP-2A-005 - Annex II; pp.6-11; “Supporting Public Health Service Delivery in Zambia” – An-
nex II Technical and Administrative Provisions (TAPS); pp. 4-11. Under chapter 2.3 Performance moni-
toring and disbursement criteria: Performance monitoring is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health, 
while the Ministry of Finance and National Planning coordinates monitoring the implementation of the 
FNDP. In the health sector dialogue the progress in implementing the National Health Strategic Plan is 
reported on through the routine Health Management Information System (HMIS). The Health compo-
nents of the PAF (Performance Assessment Framework under the PRBS) and the Health sector Per-
formance Monitoring Framework (HPMF) will be in the coming years the main tools for performance 
assessment. They provide a synthetic picture - derived from the existing strategic policy frameworks 
and annual work plans - of the sector commitments, in terms of inputs, output and outcomes. The 
broad HPMF includes the DAC selected standard indicators.”  
PAF indicators for health 
The overall budget support criteria for the health sector basically concern common, standard input indi-
cators, notably financial management criteria and indicators formulated in the broader context of the 
PAF (Performance Assessment Framework) plus one single impact indicator for the health sector. 
From the above FA-TAPS excerpt it is clear that the HPMF data generated under the health sector 
budget support programme are expected to supplement the monitoring data generated through the 
overall budget support component related to the health sector, thus filling the performance assessment 
gap at the activities – outputs level of the results chain, which is the level of operational performance 
concerning the efficiency dimension in the “3Es” framework of performance management (Economy 
basically concerning the inputs level (both quantity and quality); Efficiency concerning the activities and 
outputs levels of the results chain, and; Effectiveness concerning the higher results levels of outcomes 
and impact. Further evidence hereto is provided in the same 10-ACP-2A-005 FA-TAPS on the health 
SPSP under EDF10 when providing summary information on the disbursement criteria for both the 
fixed annual and the variable tranches as follows:  
“The general conditions for the disbursement of all tranches are: (1) Satisfactory progress in maintain-
ing a policy of macroeconomic stability as evidenced by continued implementation of an IMF-backed 
macroeconomic programme; (2) Satisfactory progress on implementation of the programme to improve 
and reform public finance management assessed, and; (3) Satisfactory progress in the implementation 
of the sector policy as assessed through the Joint Annual Reviews and the HPMF. A specific condition 
for all fixed tranches will be the verification that releases - in the budget year prior to assessment - from 
Treasury to MoH respect the agreed cash allocation profiles.  
Performance conditions for variable tranches: (1) Variable tranches 2009 and 2010: PAF (Current 
2007-2009) Health/HIV indicators: HEA 3 Utilisation rate of PHC facilities; HEA 4 Percentage Ministry 
of Health releases to district level, and; HIV 2. Percentage of HIV positive eligible clients accessing 
ARVs. The PAF Health/HIV indicators included above are selected from the current 2008-2010 PRBS 
PAF. (2) Variable tranche 2011: average percentage scoring in 2010 of the selected outcome indica-
tors of the HPMF.” (Op Cit.; p.4) 
The HPMF indicators information generated and processed under the health SPSP thus complements / 
fills the gap left by the General Budget Support monitoring at operational level namely in relation to de-
cision making on the fixed annual tranches: the progress in the implementation of the sector policy. It 
also complements the PRBS-MDG indicators at the outcome level to support decision making on the 
variable tranche from 2011 onwards. This is further substantiated by the summary tables on perfor-
mance indicators used for disbursements under annex I which explicitly mentions this complementarity 
between GBS / SBS as follows both with regard to input-output operational indicators and selective ad-
ditional outcome indictors:  
“Complementarity GBS / SBS: In a sector support that complements GBS (MDG Contract), it is neces-
sary to focus on input/output indicators as well as outcomes(specific of the PRBS PAF), in order to cre-
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ate incentives for the implementation of measures which constitute the prerequisites for the attainment 
of outcomes. This SBS programme will combine input performance(timely releases to the health sector, 
specific releases to the district level), with a) in 2009 and 2010, outcome indicators selected from the 
PAF-Health/HIV that are complementary to the Health/HIV selected indicators under the GBS (MDG 
Contract) and b) in 2011, outcomes indicators selected from the specific sector performance frame-
work(HPMF). In fact, it is expected that the recently available HPMF will inform and adapt the PAF-
Health/HIV in the coming reviews.” (Op. Cit.; p.6) 
This complementarity is further detailed in the two tables B and C under Annex 1, chapters 3 and 4 on 
respectively the general and the specific conditions for the disbursement of each tranche as follows: 
 Table B: General conditions for the release of tranches 
Area  Conditions  Verification source  
Macro-economic 
stability  
Satisfactory progress in maintaining a policy of mac-
roeconomic stability  
IMF PRGF reviews  
MTEF and budget documentation  
Public finance 
management  
Satisfactory progress in the implementation of the 
PFM reform strategy  
PEMFA reports  
PEFA reviews  
Delegation annual PFM report  
Progress in sec-
tor strategic plan  
Progress implementing the National Health Strategic 
Plan 2006-2011(NHSP)  
Progress in meeting HPMF input/output indicators for 
the year n-1 as reviewed in the JAR and assessed at 
the Sector Advisory Group meeting held in April of 
the year n.  
MoH submission through joint con-
sultative mechanisms (JAR report 
and SAG adopted conclusions)  
 
Table C: Specific conditions for the release of tranches  
Tranche Amount  Indicative 
date of dis-
bursement 
request  
Indicative 
disbursement 
date  
Conditions/criteria/ activities for 
disbursement  
Verification 
source  
1st  
fixed 
tranche  
€8.5 M  April 2009  June 2009  a. General conditions as given in 
Table 4.4.1  
b. PFM: releases from Treasury to 
MoH in 2008  
 
a. see table 
4.4.1  
b. Accountant 
General  
1st vari-
able 
tranche  
€3 M  April 2009  June 2009  a. General conditions as given in 
Table 4.4.1  
b. PAF Health/HIV indicators in 
2008:  
HEA 3. Utilisation rate of PHC facili-
ties  
HEA 4. Percentage Ministry of 
Health releases to district level  
HIV 2. Percentage of HIV positive 
eligible clients accessing ARVs  
a. see table 
4.4.1  
b. MoH sub-
mission  
after JAR and 
SAG  
2nd  
fixed 
tranche  
€8.5 M  April201  June 2010  a. General conditions as given in 
Table 4.4.1  
b. PFM: releases from Treasury to 
MoH in 2009  
a. see table 
4.4.1  
b. Accountant 
General  
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2nd 
variable 
tranche  
€3 M  April 2010  June 2010  a. General conditions as given in 
Table 4.4.1  
b. PAF Health/HIV indicators in 
2009:  
HEA 3. Utilisation rate of PHC facili-
ties  
HEA 4. Percentage Ministry of 
Health releases to district level  
HIV 2. Percentage of HIV positive 
eligible clients accessing ARVs  
a. see table 
4.4.1  
b. MoH sub-
mission after 
JAR and SAG  
3rd fixed 
tranche  
€7.5 M  April 2011  June 2011  a. General conditions as given in 
Table 4.4.1  
b. PFM: releases from Treasury to 
MoH in 2010  
a. see table 
4.4.1  
b. Accountant 
General  
3rd  
variable 
tranche  
€4.5 m  April 2011  June 2011  HPMF: average percentage scoring 
in 2010 of the selected outcome 
indicators of the HPMF  
MoH submis-
sion after 
JAR and SAG  
 
The specific PFM conditions for fixed tranches and performance evaluation arrangements for variable 
tranches are reiterated and made more explicit under Chapter 5 of Annex 2 on disbursement arrange-
ments and timetable as follows: (1) As specific PFM condition for fixed tranches 2009, 2010 and 2011 
is taken the single condition of “The amount of Treasury releases to the Ministry of Health (Budget 
Head 46) for the year preceding the assessment/disbursement (which) must attain a minimum of 90% 
of the agreed cash allocation profiles for the Ministry of Health, and: (2) As performance indicators for 
the variable tranches in 2009 and 2010 are taken the selected indicators/targets defined in the PAF 
2007-2009 as per the below Table D: 
 
Table D: Indicators and Targets for Variable Tranches 2009 and 2010 
PAF Refer-
ence 
Indicator construction / 
calculation 
Baseline 
2006 
Target 
2007 
Target 
2008 
Target 
2009 
Sources of 
Verification 
Indicator HEA 
3. Utilisation 
rate of PHC 
facilities  
Numerator: Number of 
first attendances and ad-
missions at PHC facilities  
Denominator: Total popu-
lation.  
1.2  1.3  1.3  1.3  Revised 
HMIS and 
JAR  
Indicator HEA 
4.  
Percentage 
Ministry of 
Health releas-
es to district 
level  
Numerator: Releases of 
grants to district boards  
Denominator: Non PEs 
MoH domestic budget  
8%  13%  13%  13%  MOH, re-
vised HMIS 
and JAR  
Indicator HIV 
2.  
Percentage of 
HIV positive 
eligible clients 
accessing 
ARVs  
Numerator: Number of 
people with advanced 
HIV/Aids who receive anti 
retro viral drugs.  
Denominator: Number of 
eligible HIV positive clients  
Note: Denominator values 
to be determined (TBD)  
80,030 / 
243,542  
32.9%  
156,229 
/ 
295,540 
(52.9%) 
60% 
197,129 
/ 
328,548  
70% 
250,068 
/ 
357,240  
NAC, re-
vised HMIS 
and JAR  
 
FA 10-ACP ZA-004 – Annex II TAPS; pp 3-10; PRBS-3 – MDG-C Poverty Reduction Budget Support 
3 – Millennium Development Goals Contract for Zambia 2009 – 2014 
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For the sake of completeness in illustrating the indicators utilisation by both the GBS and SBS pro-
grammes for the health under EDF10, below are the excerpts related to performance monitoring and 
disbursement criteria of the EDF10 umbrella General Budget Support programme “Poverty Reduction 
Budget Support 3 – Millennium Development Goals Contract for Zambia 2009 – 2014 (abbreviated as 
PRBS-3 – MDG-C) as far as the health sector is concerned. 
 
Chapter 2.3. on Performance Monitoring and Disbursement Criteria of the FA TAPS of this GBS pro-
gramme summarizes the general conditions for the disbursement of all tranches (both fixed annual and 
variable tranches) and the specific conditions for disbursement of the variable component as follows: 
“General conditions for the disbursement of all tranches: These are: (i) Satisfactory progress in the im-
plementation of the FNDP (Fifth National Development Plan) and its successor plan; (ii) Satisfactory 
progress in the maintenance of a stability-oriented macroeconomic policy; (iii) Satisfactory progress in 
the implementation of Zambia’s PFM reform strategy. Specific conditions for disbursement of the varia-
ble component: The variable component consists of two elements, the Annual Performance Tranche 
(APT) and the MDG Tranche (MDGT). Both types of tranches will depend on an assessment of a sub-
set of PAF indicators. While the areas of PAF focus identified below remain the same until the MCR, 
the sub-set of PAF indicators used to assess performance is indicative, as both targets and indicators 
could change over time, in line with the three-year rolling nature of the PAF.”  
 
These sets and sub-sets of indicators are summarised in tables for both the general and specific condi-
tions for tranche release, with for the specific conditions in accordance with the above two tables for 
respectively the annual performance tranches and the MDG based tranches. 
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The below table 6 shows the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the MDG-based tranche (2008-
2010 PAF). PAF indicators HEA1 (institutional deliveries), HEA2 (child immunisation) and HIV3 (HIV 
pregnant women receiving ARV) which are specific for the health sector. They are complementary to 
the HEA3, HEA4 and HIV2 indicators forming the basis for decision-making on variable tranches dis-
bursement under the health sector budget support programme. The detailed performance assessment 
framework (PAF) for Poverty Reduction Budget Support 2008-2010 for the health sector integrating all 
four above HEA indicators in the summary table right after table 6 on the next page to further complete 
the health sector budget support picture as far as indicators used for decision-making on variable 
tranche releases are concerned. 
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Field Visit Additional Information on JC 8.1: 
 
DIE & IOB (2011) p16; Evaluation Summary and Conclusions: The financing function of budget sup-
port in Zambia has performed fairly well, although aid predictability has not improved substantially. 
The share of budget support has increased over time and represents the lion’s share of the govern-
ment’s fiscal space. In addition, the poverty orientation of the budget has gained weight. Relative f i-
nancial weight: Two trends have to be considered. First, budget support has become more important 
as a percentage of total aid. In 2009, budget support accounted for about 20% of total aid and 32% of 
the grants to GRZ. Second, the total share of external support has decreased rapidly from around 
30% at the beginning of the last decade to less than 20% in 2010 as a result of an increase in domes-
tic revenue. Nevertheless, the funding dimension of PRBS in Zambia was still considerable and has 
therefore been politically important. Budget support disbursements represented the lion’s share of the 
government’s fiscal space. Thus, the financial component of budget support – if combined properly 
with the instrument’s non-financial components – has had the potential to promote policy and institu-
tional reforms beyond the mere financing of poverty reduction. 
 
DIE & IOB (2011) p16; Evaluation Summary and Conclusions: Budget Support and Harmonisation: A 
Political Economy Perspective – Conditionality and Disbursement Procedures: Overall, the PRBS 
process in Zambia has not set up a harmonised incentive system that has linked financial and non-
financial components of budget support in a coherent manner. The Performance Assessment Frame-
work (PAF) covered too many indicators from different sectors and was not helpful in measuring pro-
gress. Both of these elements reflected the fact that there was no common priority framework shared 
by cooperating partners. There are different interpretations among cooperating partners as to what 
the focus of the PAF should be. Closely related to the inconsistency of the PAF is the failure of coop-
erating partners to harmonize their disbursement mechanisms. This leads to differences in the appli-
cation of fixed and variable tranches and their links to the PAF. These diverse disbursement mecha-
nisms make it more difficult to send out a coherent signal to the GRZ about the relative priorities of 
cooperating partners. 
 
MoFNP – 2011 Budget Address Minister of Finance and National Planning to Parliament; As-
sessment of the Fifth National Development Plan :  
Par. 61. Sir, the implementation of this plan did not come without challenges. One of the lessons we 
have learned is that we need to better link resource allocations in the Budget to the Plan. There is al-
so greater need for our planning process to be more results oriented, with well-defined measures of 
success. Most importantly, stronger monitoring tools are needed from the grass roots level up to en-
sure that results can be measured and feed back to the national planning and budgeting processes.  
Par. 62. Mr. Speaker, as we prepare to launch the Sixth National Development Plan, we draw on 
these experiences, and employ more effective strategies to ensure that it will be an even bigger suc-
cess. One of the main instruments to achieve more effective linkages between planning and budget-
ing will be the Planning and Budgeting Bill, which will be presented to this House next year. This Bill 
will also provide a framework for stronger monitoring and evaluation systems to ensure a more results 
oriented planning and annual budgeting process. 
 
MoFNP – 2011 Budget Address Minister of Finance and National Planning to Parliament; Part III 
Economic Objectives and Policies for the 2011 Budget: Monitoring and Evaluation; Par. 97-98.  
Par. 97. Mr. Speaker, nationwide monitoring of projects requires active participation of all stakehold-
ers, including local communities. This is to ensure that projects are completed in a timely manner and 
to the required standard. To this effect, all Sector Advisory Groups, and Provincial and District Devel-
opment Coordinating Committees are encouraged to form monitoring and evaluation sub-committees. 
These committees are, in turn, encouraged to partner with my Ministry to monitor various develop-
ment projects in their areas. This will promote local ownership and enhance transparency and ac-
countability in the use of public resources.  
Par.98. Sir, one of the lessons learned from the implementation of the Fifth National Development 
Plan was the need for a more effective, results-driven, monitoring and evaluation framework. As we 
launch the SNDP, public institutions will be required to be more accountable to their beneficiaries on 
the expected deliverables of the projects they undertake. In the 2011 Budget, and over the course of 
the SNDP, the Government will ensure that each public institution is held accountable for delivering its 
development outputs. 
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JC 8.1:  Several options of aid modalities have been discussed for aid activities by sector 
Zambia has been one of the first countries to pilot General Budget Support and Sector Policy Support 
Programmes (SPSPs – or Sector Budget Support) on a substantive basis. There is evidence that differ-
ent options of aid modalities have been discussed for aid activities when designing strategies and pro-
gramming concrete interventions, but this cannot be generalised as a standard procedure for all inter-
ventions in all sectors. Rather than a rational decision making process weighting all pro’s and con’s to 
decide on the final choice of the aid modality for an intervention, decision making allegedly depended 
on the drive to go for the novel modality and/or the level of shared enthusiasm and success in consen-
sus building with cooperating partners. This particularly pertains to the aid modality decision making 
processes in the earlier days of EDF9 programming when procedures and instruments were not so well 
elaborated and established yet. The choice for General Budget Support stemmed from a continuation of 
macro-economic support in the framework of the consecutive Sysmin and Structural Adjustment Sup-
port programmes, but now aligned with the Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). 
The choice of aid modality decision making for EDF10 was more rational and along the meanwhile 
more firmly established procedures. Just by way of example, the Green Paper on the Future of EU 
Budget Support for example was extensively discussed in-house in the Delegation and also with selec-
tive external stakeholders. A special presentation to facilitate the aid modalities dialogue was prepared 
for that purpose. In general, the mood surrounding the discussions was one of broad fatigue on issues 
pertaining to Budget Support.
90
 The specific Zambian context reportedly was one of difficult discussions 
taking place on the relevance and impact of budget support as aid modality and also with donors having 
challenged the Government on its commitment to Public Finance Management (PFM) and good gov-
ernance. Though the scope of the consultation was repeatedly explained, it proved not possible to de-
link the discussions from the situation experienced locally.  
Further evidence of discussions on aid modalities in the context of programming and project prepara-
tion processes were found, amongst others, in the MTR of the EDF10 CSP, the MoFNP commissioned 
country evaluation on the implementation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia, Phase II, the EDF10 CSP-
NIP document and individual project files as the Access to Justice project. The “Tools and Methods 
Series” launched by EuropeAid (now DEVCO) in 2007 aimed at structuring the presentation of the 
methodological documents produced by the EC on the “Quality of Operations”. From the field interviews 
with key stakeholders concerned during the evaluation field visit it was learned that these EU guides 
and notes to define / explain the comparative advantages of the various instruments and approaches in 
the specific Zambian context actually have been actually used by these key stakeholders to a varying 
degree. (I-6.1.1)  
In the same way, the available documentation and the direct feedback from the interviews with the main 
stakeholders during the field phase provide evidence of lessons learned from previous or other aid mo-
dalities documented and integrated in strategic programming documents. Some illustrations from differ-
ent sectors and/or actors are reflected in the compilation of extracts presented in relation to the lessons 
learned under indicator I-6.1.2 concerned. On the other hand, one of the main findings of the 2011 
evaluation study of budget support to Zambia is that joint knowledge management has been weak. This 
particularly relates to the different interpretations among Cooperating Partners about how to craft and 
implement conditionality and disbursement mechanisms, and how to design and implement joint moni-
toring, amongst others. Relevant information such as budget analyses, sector assessments, disburse-
ment activities have been mostly made on an ad hoc basis and were widely dispersed among Cooper-
ating Partners. This situation has caused a huge duplication of work by individual Cooperating Partners 
and GRZ and obstructs a more efficient use of invested human capital. The absence of a permanent 
PRBS secretariat responsible for joint knowledge management has been a heavy burden on GRZ and 
CPs alike for establishing a more solid, fact-based dialogue process and ensuring actual use of lessons 
learned in strategic programming documents. 
Reportedly and as transpired from the field interviews, difficulties arose and keep arising in finding the 
right balance between systematically focusing on macro-issues (in the case of GBS) or at the sector as 
a whole (in the case of SBS) on the one hand and the risk of sliding back in the “project mode” with 
regard to the physical interventions and their execution financed under the GBS and SBS tranches on 
the other. Major area of dispute however has shown to be the ultimate rationale of budget support 
which by some is promoted as effective mechanism for bringing about sustainable development and 
poverty alleviation mainstreamed in national strategies and systems (the developmental perspective), 
while for others the accountability and transparency of public sector development management are the 
ultimate rationale for opting for this aid modality (the governance and accountability perspective). From 
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interviews with different key stakeholders it is learned that harmonizing and synchronizing both views 
remains a major challenge to effectively realize the full potentials and added value of the instrument. 
This also validates the conclusions of the recent 2011 budget support evaluation entitled “Between High 
Expectations and Reality: An Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia” summarizing that overall the 
Zambian experience confirms that budget support cannot simply ‘buy’ fundamental institutional reform, 
nor can it reduce poverty in a matter of a couple of years. Aid agencies can only expect to push through 
sustainable reform when there is a critical level of government ownership. But on the other hand, this 
cannot be used as an ex-post reason to argue that budget support is an ineffective instrument. (I-6.1.2)  
From the available documentation, including ROMs, CRIS files, review and evaluation reports, and as 
confirmed during the field interviews, it was learned that there is no evidence that monitoring and eval-
uation (systematically) focused on instrument and approach efficiency. There are no specific indicators 
or database filter criteria related to aid modality, method of implementation, or financing modality which 
are explicitly and/or systematically used for project and/or portfolio monitoring. The project and portfolio 
performance M&E systems challenges are more fundamental as illustrated in the country evaluation 
report of the implementation of the Paris Declaration (PD) in Zambia: “A significant proportion of in-
vestments do not have adequate monitoring frameworks and systems in place to enable results-
oriented decision making and reporting. It is difficult to trace whether the PD has been an influencing 
factor in managing for results at sector level. Similarly, there is no evidence that he PD has been a de-
terminant factor in influencing mutual accountability due to the asymmetric accountability relationships 
between government and the development partners”.  
A crucial fundamental issue is that general budget support monitoring and evaluation basically covers 
the higher results levels (especially the outcomes and impact levels therein) and the inputs level (espe-
cially PFM aspects) but not the operational level of activities and direct outputs. It as such only covers 
the lower and upper levels of the results chain (for projects, programmes and strategies alike). It thus 
possibly misses out on the efficiency dimension of integrated performance monitoring and evaluation
91
 
as only the economy and effectiveness dimensions of the so-called “3Es” of performance management 
are covered. This was one of the main issues brought to the attention of the evaluators by the NAO 
Support Office on the occasion of the evaluation preparatory meeting early September 2011 and was 
further confirmed during the evaluation field mission of December 2011 by the interviewed stakeholder 
parties (GRZ and CPs alike).  
Strengthening M&E “tout court” of projects and portfolio remains a / the major challenge for enhanced 
portfolio performance. This was (indirectly and partially) recognised as such in the EDF10 CSP-NIP 
document as a conditio sine qua non towards attaining MDGs: “The use of responsive monitoring and 
evaluation of services delivery in both the education and health sectors, focusing primarily on the as-
sessment of outcomes and impact, needs to be promoted. Capacity strengthening in monitoring ser-
vices delivery in thus expected to be among the priority Government interventions.” The Country evalu-
ation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia however sees improvements over time: 
“Capacities for results-driven strategies are getting stronger. The Fifth National Development Plan has 
provided a framework for that through the Key Performance Indicators consultatively developed by all 
major stakeholders. These are used as basis to measure implementation progress at sector as well as 
national level. The Ministry of Finance has established a Department in the last two years mandated 
with monitoring and evaluation of development initiatives. However, there is still a long way to go as 
frameworks are still weak due to poor staffing. Nevertheless, the MFNP has continued to produce an 
annual report of the NDP to show progress made. Perhaps what is missing is a forum for a robust dis-
cussion of the report by all the key stakeholders such as the Annual Poverty Conference during the 
PRSP implementation.”  
The further strengthening of Fifth NDP and upcoming Sixth NDP performance monitoring and evalua-
tion and the required capacity strengthening of the MoFNP’s Department of Monitoring and Evaluation 
thereto where amongst the main issues brought to the attention of the EU country strategy evaluation 
team by the different stakeholders concerned (both GRZ and CPs) during the December field visit. It 
was also emphasised that this requires a necessary strengthening of such performance M&E systems 
at the sectoral / thematic level (in the sectoral / thematic ministries and agencies) and at the level of the 
local government units (particularly Districts, with the Provinces as intermediate level). At each level, 
civil society needs to be duly involved in M&E to ensure ownership, transparency and accountability. 
The consultations furthermore indicated that the MoFNP M&E Department at the helm of this umbrella 
M&E system would be needing to steer, coordinate and integrate those system components at national 
                                               
91
  A practical illustration in relation to the health sector is included in the information matrix under Annex XI, in relation to indi-
cator 8.1.3 (Secton “Field interviews and additional information” 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 276 - 
level.  
In summary, robust monitoring and prompt decision making based on the monitoring early warning 
information as essential performance management tools and practices do not appear to be in place yet. 
The need for such effective holistic M&E system to track the implementation of activities and monitor 
results was stressed already in the FNDP progress reports as early as 2007, amongst others by the 
Governance Secretariat and was repeated ever since. However, no concerted action appears to have 
been taken. Such holistic M&E system requires the necessary complementarity, in not integration, of 
both the GBS and SBS monitoring systems in sectors covered by both budget support modalities, 
which is still something to be aspired for. This for example is explicitly envisioned by the Health Sector 
Performance Monitoring Framework (HPMF) under the EDF10 “Supporting Public Health Service De-
livery in Zambia” Sector Policy Support Programme (SPSP) which covers direct output indicators per-
formance monitoring complementary to the inputs and outcome & impact performance monitoring under 
the General Budget Support, thus ensuring integrated performance monitoring of the entire programme 
vertical logic from inputs to impact.
92
 By way of illustration, at the end of this section on indicator 8.1.3 a 
special assessment is included on the monitoring of general and sector budget support and disburse-
ment criteria with health sector as case. (I-6.1.3) 
 
JC 8.2: Emerging issues were incorporated quickly and effectively into EU programming and 
policy dialogue 
Background data: 
EAMR Jan 2011, p.3: In response to the mismanagement discovered in the Health and Road sec-
tors, and possibly in preparation of investments into the same sectors before the elections, new 
Permanent Secretaries were appointed. Some positive developments have been witnessed notably 
in relation to the implementation of corrective action plans but CPs continued to express concern on 
the pace of measures taken to address sector shortcomings. 
 
Oden, B. & Wohlgemuth, L. (2011), p16: Aid Dependence: Quantitatively Zambia’s aid dependence 
has decreased in recent years. Wohlgemuth and Saasa report that while aid accounted on average 
for 43 per cent of the total state budget in the period 2000-2005, this share dropped to around 25 per 
cent in 2006 and 2007. The share of GBS increased rapidly from 2006 to 2007 and increased slightly 
in 2008. It should be noted that programme aid, and in particular GBS, creates a different type of de-
pendence for the receiving government than project aid. The obvious advantage of GBS for the gov-
ernment is the increased ownership and the need for alignment into the national budget system. The 
potential disadvantage is increased short term vulnerability, should one or more major donors 
change their mind and freeze already committed GBS funds due to political issues that the donor 
government finds difficult to handle vis-à-vis its own citizens and tax payers. The corruption affair in 
the Ministry of Health has already been mentioned. The effects for the Zambian government of this 
case were however limited, as only a few donors (Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada and the Global 
Fund) suspended their disbursements. Should instead the UK and the EU Commission freeze their 
disbursements, the GBS inflow would have been reduced by half. The Zambian government would 
then face a sudden and significant liquidity shortage. Should the disbursement of a similar amount 
be delayed in a major infrastructure project or other parallel development intervention, then this 
would create a development obstacle, but not a dilemma for budget liquidity and need for immediate 
funding from other sources.  
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p. x To what extent and how has the imple-
mentation of the Paris Declaration led to an improvement in the efficiency of aid delivery, the man-
agement and use of aid and better partnerships (process and intermediate outcomes) – Core Ques-
tion 2. Increased leadership and ownership by the government is reflected in the collaborative devel-
opment planning processes, national strategies and operational frameworks which have been 
strengthened since the advent of the Paris Declaration. However, there has been a lost opportunity 
to maximise the benefits of the return to national development planning, This has been primarily as a 
result of weak linkage between national development planning on the one hand and budgeting, in-
cluding prioritisation of funding, on the other. This poor link is largely due to low staffing levels in the 
critical departments.  
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 Indicator 8.2.1: Mix of instruments, approaches and financing modalities different accord-
ing to sector specific factors 
The Zambia projects portfolio and the sectoral and PCM documentation generally attest to it that the 
mix of instruments, approaches and financing modalities tends to be different according to sector spe-
cific factors. Sectoral analyses are amongst the determining factors for decision making on the appro-
priate aid modality although that the available documentation does not allow for overall generalisation 
across the board. The July 2007 EAMR stressed for example that ongoing and forthcoming sector pro-
jects and programmes are and will be embedded in the existing dialogue mechanisms. The go for sec-
tor budget support (SPSP) in the health sector under the EDF9 was based on the assessed higher than 
average capacity at the MoH compared to other government departments, with a core of committed 
staff, and with a strategic plan and sector dialogue in place, aimed at greater transparency and a more 
results oriented process (JAR 2003). For education, the assessments (JAR 2007) by the CPs have 
been somehow varied leading different CPs opting for different aid modalities. Several CPs, including 
the EC Norway and UK moving to general budget support, and Ireland and Denmark remaining a pool 
funding support in place, and the Netherlands possibly adopting a mixed (pool/budget support) ap-
proach. This JAR 2007 assessment in the end was substantially altered with the EC moving out of edu-
cation as a focal sector. General Budget Support (GBS) basically benefits the social sectors, as it in first 
instance is geared to poverty reduction (1st generation GBS with PRSP link – under EDF9) and the 
attainment of the MDGs (2nd generation GBS under EDF10).  
The 2011 Paris Declaration Effectiveness report on Zambia established a clear link between ministries / 
sectors with a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) and interest on aid effectiveness. The 2011 Budget Sup-
port Evaluation in Zambia concluded that two factors are important for budget support being effective. 
First of all, sectors of interest must be supported by strong Government ownership. This was missing 
for the rural water and sanitation supply, where NGOs remained the main providers. Second, budget 
support can only work if policies of Government and objectives of Cooperating Partners are aligned. 
This has been the case for the health and education sectors, and less the case for the agricultural sec-
tor where “an inherent contradiction between ownership and donor influence became apparent.” The 
support modalities through which funding to CSOs is channelled shows a high degree of diversity (ca-
pacity development and financial support) and are basically provided to annual work programmes and 
budgets of CSOs (project support and direct support), whereas core funding for multiannual plan im-
plementation (sort of budget support) is a rather rare modality. The combi-financing approach is just 
one of the several support modalities through which CPs channel funding to CSOs in Zambia. Under 
the EDF9, SPSP support was provided to three sectors: transport, education and health, whereas un-
der the EDF10 sector budget support covered the transport and health sectors, whereas possibly the 
support to the electoral system also can be considered as a sort of (sub-)sector budget support (trust 
fund setting). The 2011 MTR of the EU-SADEC co-operation under the EDF10 considers the large Pub-
lic Finance Management (PFM) programme – PEMFA – managed as a basket fund by several CPs 
working closely together to support the agreed strategy, whereas for the EU strictly speaking it is a 
general budget support intervention. 
Data, figures, tables:  
GBS
438,200,000 €
39.2%
SBS
233,973,693 €
20.9% Projects
445,898,983 €
39.9%
Figure  PF-1 :  Breakdown of Total EDF Resources Allocation to 
Zambia in the Period 2001 - 2010 by Aid Method / Modality
Source:  EU CRIS database  
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The overview table on page 13 of this EQ8 information matrix 
JAR 2007, p26; 2.6.1 Budget lines: The current budget lines project portfolio managed by the Delega-
tion comprises 30 NGO projects for a total grant amount of €€25m in the following sectors: Food 
aid/Food Security, Water Supply and Sanitation, Basic Health, Social Services, Environment and Ru-
ral Development. 
 
Extracts: 
EAMR Jul 2007, p2: Quality. The ongoing and forthcoming sector projects and programmes are and 
will be embedded in the existing sector dialogue mechanisms, i.e. joint broad ownership through the 
use of existing coordinating fora, and through the full use monitoring and reporting modalities in place 
for sector support (e.g. frame monitoring activities within existing joint sector reviews when possible). 
This will enhance sustainability, increased pertinence and provide early warning signals through en-
hanced ownership and broadened monitoring. Transaction costs will be minimised with the focusing 
on the NAO office of most EDFrelated operations. The use of centralised, long term technical assis-
tance-staffed implementation units will be avoided and use of local expertise maximised. Ownership 
of the EDF portfolio of project will be enhanced through increased focus on capacity building of the 
NAO functions within the Economic and Technical Co-operation department of Ministry of Finance. A 
new EDF training cycle is planned for November 2007. 
 
JAR 2007, p24: 2.3.2 Education: The EDF9 pool funding mechanism, supported through a €10m pro-
gramme came to an end in 2007. Several Co-operating Partners, including the EC, will move to gen-
eral budget support (Norway, UK). Only Ireland and possibly Denmark are likely to maintain a pool 
funding support in place, with the Netherlands possibly adopting a mixed (pool/budget support) ap-
proach. The need to preserve a strong sector dialogue in spite of this shift of funding modalities re-
mains a very high priority for all the current education donors. 
 
JAR 2003, pp 24-25: Capacity at the MoH and at CBoH is higher than the average government de-
partment in Zambia. There is a core of committed staff. The National Health Strategic Plan and a sec-
tor dialogue that is very open have led to increased public spending pro capita on health, mostly 
through increased external funding. Dialogue is articulated in quarterly Health Steering Committees, 
six-monthly Consultative meetings, and weekly Resources Allocation Sub-Committees. The Ministry 
of Health is embarking in an overhaul of sector dialogue mechanisms, aiming at greater transparency 
and at a more results oriented process. 
 
JAR 2003, p30: 5.1 Programming: iii) Macroeconomic support: The EC-Poverty Reduction Budget 
Support under the EDF9 was approved by the end of 2003 (see section 4.1.3). The implementation of 
the PRBS will dominate the agenda in 2004 regarding this focal area of the EC intervention. Though 
in principle the budgetary assistance will not be targeting a specific sector or expenditure category, 
the importance of social sectors as well as sound economic and public financial management for pov-
erty reduction and EC prior involvement in those areas will justify a close and structured policy dia-
logue with the Government to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the EC support and prevent 
the past stop/go situation. 
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p. ix: Regarding the GRZ, commitment to aid 
effectiveness principles varies between ministries and departments. Within the Ministry of Finance 
and National Planning, for example, those closest to the management of the aid cooperation agenda 
such as the ETC continue to be interested. Others are less concerned and show little interest in this 
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agenda. Perhaps this is a natural occurrence. Natural as well is that ministries with SWAps have sus-
tained their interest and continued engagement. Less interest on the aid effectiveness is being dis-
played by those without SWAps. An example is that the level of seniority of civil servant representa-
tives from sector ministries seems to be declining at the High Level Policy Dialogue meetings.  
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p. x: To what extent and how has the implemen-
tation of the Paris Declaration led to an improvement in the efficiency of aid delivery, the management 
and use of aid and better partnerships (process and intermediate outcomes) – Core Question 2. Har-
monisation is well accepted by development partners particularly with respect to programme based 
approaches but standardised performance indicators and reporting still need to be harmonised. In 
terms of alignment, development partners have aligned most of their policies and programmes to the 
national development plan but have not linked most of their project or programme implementation 
processes to country systems. Managing for development results is being done mostly at project lev-
el. Zambia has recently conducted a Review of Mutual Accountability to investigate further outcomes. 
Despite recognizing the need for harmonisation and alignment of donor systems and processes to lo-
cal ones, many CPs were still relying on their own systems and processes, mainly due to difficulties 
arising from their headquarters or foreign policy requirements. As a result, many of the expected ben-
efits from greater transparency and oversight have not yet materialised.  
 
DIE – IOB (2011), p. iv; Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia – Synthesis Report, Main Findings 
of the Evaluation regarding budget support and sector results: “The convergence of fundamental sec-
tor interests and strategies between GRZ and Cooperating Partners has been conducive for the effec-
tiveness of budget support. When these interests and strategies diverged, budget support was not ef-
fective in realising objectives of Cooperating Partners.”The findings show that two factors are im-
portant for budget support being effective. First of all, sectors of interest must be supported by strong 
Government ownership. This was missing for the rural water and sanitation supply, where NGOs re-
mained the main providers. Second, budget support can only work if policies of Government and ob-
jectives of Cooperating Partners are aligned. Health and education sectors were not only highly im-
portant for most members of the PRBS group, but their policy interests converged with a relatively 
similar perspective of the GRZ on sector objectives and strategies. This convergence provided a rela-
tively high potential for making budget support effective in channelling increasing financial resources 
to the sectors and to promote policy improvements through a harmonised and aligned dialogue. In 
contracts, when the objectives between Cooperating Partners and GRZ diverged as in the agricultural 
sector, an inherent contradiction between ownership and donor influence became apparent. While 
there was agreement on the objectives, GRZ and Cooperating Partners disagreed on the strategy. As 
a result, PRBS funds were used for instruments that were deemed ineffective by Cooperating Part-
ners. 
 
Democratisation, State and Civil Society – Good Governance Programme (2011), p4 – Aid mo-
dalities in the governance cross-cutting thematic area CSOs: The support modalities through which 
CPs channel funding to CSOs in Zambia show a high degree of diversity and reflect interests of fund-
ing organisations and their financial capacity as well as the ability of CSOs to present their cases. Aid 
modalities include capacity development across a broad range of interventions such as support for 
sensitisation and planning workshops and seminars, public events, training and networking, etc. Fi-
nancial support comes as direct and in certain situations such as activities within annual or strategic 
plans and also as ad hoc funding of emerging topics. Financial support is predominantly provided for 
annual work programmes and budgets of CSOs. Core funding for multiannual plan implementation, 
though a preferred option from the point of view of CSOs is a rather rare modality. The prevailing sup-
port modalities can be broadly classified into three main categories: (i) project versus core/programme 
support; (ii) direct versus indirect support, and (iii) unilateral versus joint support. Donors and devel-
opment agencies have been providing direct support to civil society organisations as some kind of 
matching support to state institutions. Direct funding of activities and specific thematic priorities within 
annual plans and medium term strategic plans is the most common form. Funding in the form of core 
or unspecified contributions to annual budgets is the exemption. 
 
Mutesa, Fred & Ngoma Isaac (2010); Review of the Combi-Financing Instrument – Innovative Mode 
of Delivery; 2010: Contextually, the combi-financing approach is just one of the several support mo-
dalities through which CPs channel funding to CSOs in Zambia. These can be broadly classified into 
three main categories, namely: project versus core / programme support, direct versus indirect sup-
port, and unilateral versus joint support. 4.2. Recommendations: Finally, this review would lie to con-
clude by reiterating some salient points which we consider to be cardinal to the improved performance 
of the combi-financing modality. (i) Development of adequate absorptive capacities: This review has 
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identified that care must be taken to ensure that partner institutions have adequate institutional ab-
sorptive capacities before large amounts of money are disbursed to them. Failure to do so would con-
demn many well-meaning organisations to unnecessary failure. (ii) Structured dialogue and feedback 
reporting mechanisms: Whereas this review has confirmed that capacity support, dialogue and net-
working are some of the unique advantages of the combi-financing modality over other donor support 
models to CSOs, the mechanics of these still remain unsatisfactory to all partners. It is important 
therefore to develop clearer and more predictable mechanisms to address some of the observed in-
consistencies.  
 
EUD Lusaka; MTR of EU-SADC Co-Operation under the EDF10 (2011) - Evaluation of Regional 
(RSP/RIP) – National (CSP/NIP) Coherence, Zambia Delegation Contribution; 30 Aug 2011 - Are 
there joint-funded programmes in the country? A large PFM programme – PEMFA – is managed as a 
basket fund (although for EU it is strictly speaking budget support), by several CPs working closely 
together to support the agreed strategy. There are SBS in health and roads, where several CPs jointly 
support sector strategy. A basket fund also exists in the field of electoral support. 
 
 Indicator 8.2.2: Mix of instruments, approaches and financing modalities changed over the 
period along with the context 
At the end of this information matrix on EQ8 on aid modalities synergies and efficiency, a portfolio anal-
ysis of the European Development Fund (EDF) support to Zambia in the period 2001-2010 is presented, 
including breakdowns by aid modality and by management mode
93
. Statistical overviews are provided of 
the evolution of the Zambia CSP-NIP portfolio under the EDF8, 9 and 10 for the period 2001-2010 bro-
ken down by aid methodology / modality for the respective EDFs, including financial figures (allocations, 
contracted amounts and paid amounts). In the ten year period 2001-2011 a total of 64 interventions 
have been financed by the European Union (as assigned a special CRIS code). Of these, by far the 
majority (54 or 84.4% of the total) are of the project approach (PA) type, 6 (or 9.4%) are Sector Policy 
Support Programmes (SPSPs) and 4 (6.3%) are General Budget Support (GBS). A more balanced pic-
ture of the relative importance of the three main aid modalities emerges when comparing the amounts 
involved (allocated/committed, contracted, and paid) in each of the three. Of the about 1.1 billion Euro 
country strategy financing in the 2001 – 2010 period, an about equal amount has been allocated to 
general budget support (39.2%) and project approach (39.9%). Sector Budget Support has been allo-
cated about one fifth of the total resources (20.9%). However, and in directly reply to the present indica-
tor query, there are important evolutions in aid modality over time in the mix of instruments, approaches 
and financing modalities along with the subsequent EDF cycles. The EDF8 portfolio solely consisted of 
project approaches (all 23 interventions). The three General Budget Support (GBS) interventions under 
EDF9 represented almost half of the total allocated resources (47.0%) which further increased to 55.3% 
under the EDF10. Sector Budget Support (3 SPSPs in resp. transport, education and health) took up 
29.4% of the EDF9 resources, to be slightly reduced to 25.9% of the EDF10 resources (3 SPSPs in 
transport, health and electoral systems). Overall the share of project approach (PA) financing has been 
reduced from 100% under the EDF8, over 23.5% under the EDF9 to 18.8% under the EDF10. 
In as much as actual payments in relation to the allocated/committed amounts are considered a proxy 
indicator for efficiency of aid delivery (e.g. in relation to absorptive capacity), as far as the EDF9 financ-
ing is concerned of the GBS budgetary resources 94.4% have been paid, 87.5% of the SPSP resources 
and 66.1% of the project approach resources. Unfortunately no data are available on actual expendi-
tures in relation to the intended uses / for the intended results (performance budgeting and expenditures 
monitoring). Broken down by EDF strategy / programme cycle, a total of 95.2% of the (pre 2001-2010 
period) EDF8 resources committed still in the 2001-2010 period have been contracted and paid out as 
of the end of this period (thus 4.8% not yet paid out as of 2010). For the EDF9 covering the period 
2001-2007, this amounts to 85.7%, implying that 14.3% of the committed EDF9 resources have not 
been paid yet (with 5.6% of the total committed EDF9 resources not having been contracted yet). In the 
first half period 2008-2010 of the total EDF10 six year period (2008-2013), about one fourth (25.5%) of 
the committed / allocated resources have been paid (68.0% of the committed EDF10 resources have 
been contracted). The portfolio efficiency analysis by aid method / modality expressed as per cent 
amount paid of total allocated / committed resources shows that 72.8% of the committed project ap-
proach resources in the ten year period 2001-2010 have been actually paid, against 60.7% for the GBS 
                                               
93
  In the context of the discussion of this indicator 8.2.2. only the portfolio analysis by aid modality is discussed. For further 
details on the management mode, kindly refer to the analysis at the end of the EQ8 information matrix. The management 
modes covered in the analysis are the categories used in the CRIS project summary sheets (decentralised, partially decen-
tralised and centralized management, the latter further sub-divided in three sub-categories). 
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modality and 49.4% for the SPS modality. For EDF9 which covers the completed CSP-NIP cycle 2001-
2007, the total paid amounts in percentage of the total allocated/committed resources amount to re-
spectively 66.1% for the Project Approach, 94.4% for General Budget Support and 87.5% for Sector 
Budget Support.  
The scope of the pooled support from Cooperating Partners in the health sector was originally restricted 
to recurrent expenditures at district level but gradually the “basket” expanded both vertically (e.g. higher 
level hospitals) and horizontally to include more cost items (capital expenditure, technical assistance) as 
such gradually paving the way for sectoral budget support (JAR 2003). Whereas education was a focal 
sector under the EDF9 benefiting from sector budget support, it no longer figured as priority focal sector 
under the EDF10. The MTR of the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) reported in this connection 
on the education sector pool performance “…documented major inefficiencies with the current sector 
pool by having a dual planning, accounting and reporting system for domestic and donor funding from 
Ministry of Education headquarters down to the school level. Based on the findings of the PETS, the 
local donor group undertook a Fiduciary Risk Assessment (FRA) in August 2008 to explore ways to 
improve the sector pool and propose a more efficient channel for donor funding, including those from 
the FTI. The main recommendation of the FRA is to move the sector pool to targeted sector budget 
support. In essence, this modality entails that donors would continue to provide an earmarked financial 
contribution in support of MoE instead of full-fledged general budget support. However, rather than dis-
bursing to an MoE managed account with specific accounting and reporting requirements, as in the past 
sector pool, donor funds would be mingled with GRZ funding to finance any activity in the mutually 
agreed MoE’s annual work plan and budget. This funding modality attempts to address both the identi-
fied weaknesses in the past pool and to reap the efficiency gains from closer alignment of donor support 
to national systems, as outlined in Zambia’s Aid Policy and Strategy an in line with the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness.  
Over time, the budget support financing instruments got more refined and more performance based. 
This particularly relates to the tools to assess progress and results as basis for decision making on the 
release of the variable tranches. Whereas under EDF9 these variable tranches for general budget sup-
port were related to / based on PFM and PRSP indicators performance, under the EDF these were ad-
ditionally determined by achievements in relation to the attainment of the MDGs. The Sector Budget 
Support modality in relation to the Sector Policy Support Programmes (SPSPs) initially only had fixed 
annual tranches, but in the process under EDFX also variable tranches were introduced based on 
achievements on Key Performance Indicators. As far as General Budget Support (GBS) is concerned, 
in reaction to the international economic and financial crisis, the Commission decided to create an ad-
hoc Vulnerability FLEX mechanism to be financed under the reserves of the national and regional indic-
ative programmes of the EDF10. In 2009 Zambia was considered eligible under V-FLEX on the basis of 
economic and social vulnerability criteria, the nature of the residual financing gap and the capacity of 
the EC to quickly provide meaningful support. The €30m V/Flex allocated to Zambia which was dis-
bursed end 2009 contributed to close the financing gap, thus maintaining priority expenditure, especially 
in the social sectors and infrastructures. The EDF portfolio analysis at the end of this evaluation matrix 
section on EQ9 includes a more detailed analysis of the technical evolution of the EU budget support 
tools applied in Zambia. 
Delegated cooperation arrangements, sometimes referred to as combi-financing agreements, has be-
come a preferential specific instrument by the EU (an arrangement where one donor remains a “silent 
partner” and channels funding to an “active partner” who then channels the funds to the intended part-
ner CSOs of need. Of the total EDF resources allocation to Zambia in the period 2001-2010, a total of 
56.9% (or €63m) were under decentralised management (DM), whereas 40.6% (or €454m) under Cen-
tralised Management (basically CM, but also CM-IO or ICM-DA) and 2.5% under Partially Decentralised 
Management as main management mode / modality. A more detailed portfolio analysis by method of 
implementation / management mode is provided at the end of this EQ-9 information matrix. 
Data, figures, tables: 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 282 - 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
EDF 8 EDF 9 EDF 10 Total EDF 8-10
100.0%
23.5%
18.8%
39.9%
0.0%
29.4%
25.9%
20.9%
47.0%
55.3%
39.2%
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The different EU response strategy portfolio tables and figures at the end of this section on 
EQ-8 especially prepared for this evaluation. 
  
Evaluation Summary Table: The Zambia CSP-NIP portfolio summary table of EDF8, 9 and 10 bilat-
eral funding (period 2001-2010 by aid method / modality: Summary table compiled for this evaluation 
based on the summary project data from the EU CRIS database system. 
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JAR 2010, p4: The MDG-C and PEMFA budget support disbursements (€40.3m) were authorised in 
December. However, in spite of progress in the implementation of the Road Sector corrective action 
plan, the delayed formalisation of the ROADSIP II bankable document prevented the EU from disburs-
ing SBS to that sector. Also, the Health Sector Budget Support request could not be disbursed as 
planned in 2010. Zambia missed out €32.5m (€8.5m for health and €24m for roads) as a conse-
quence. 
 
JAR 2010, p4: In 2009, the funding for Zambia was topped-up by a €30m allocation under the V-FLEX 
programme (General Budget Support) bringing the EDF total to €505m. Finally, Zambia also benefits 
from financial support through other EU funding sources (such as the Water and Energy Facilities, 
Thematic budget lines, Food Facility and the accompanying measures for sugar producing countries) 
which complement the interventions financed under the EDF. 
 
JAR 2010, p6: In 2010, Zambia also continued benefiting from programmes funded under the 8th and 
EDF9 and the levels of commitments and payments in the last three years is as indicated in the below 
table. Disbursements were also lower in 2010 as both the Road (€24m) and Health Sector (€8.5m) 
budget support transfers could not be authorised by year-end. 
8
th
, 9
th
 and EDF10 financial performance 2008-2010: 
8
th
, 9
th
 & EDF10 
2008 
 M€  
2009 
 M€  
2010 
 M€  
Global commitment 346 35 55.9 
Individual commitments 68.6 261 9.3 
Payments 101.5 80.8 70.4 
 
JAR 2010, p8; Reporting on General and Sector Budget Support: Zambia has been eligible to Budget 
Support since 2004, when a first tranche of General Budget Support was disbursed under the EDF9. 
Since then, and combining all the EDF Budget Support operations, a total of €361m has been trans-
ferred to Zambia (an average of €51.7m per year). Following issues in the road sector which prevent-
ed the disbursement of the corresponding Sector Budget Support, 'only' €40.3m was disbursed in 
2010. 
Overview of EDF Budget Support Disbursements in the Period 2004-2010: 
Modality 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GBS / MDG-C
94
 
39.50000
 
26.500.000 35.200.000 27.083.000 24.167.450 30.000.000 32.812.500 
GBS / V-F 0 0 0 0 0 30.000.000 0 
SBS Health 0 0 0 5.000.000 3.570.000 11.500.000 0 
SBS Roads 0 25.400.000 21.000.000 0 29.400.000 0 0 
SBS PEMFA 0 2.500.000 0 1.500.000 0 4.000.000 7.500.000 
Total: 39.500.000 54.400.000 56.200.000 33.583.000 57.137.450 75.500.000 40.312.500 
                                               
94
 The MDG-Contract Budget Support modality was introduced by the Commission under the EDF10; in the case of Zambia the 
Financing Agreement was signed in 2009 and the first disbursement authorised that same year. 
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DIE – IOB (2011), p 160; Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia – Synthesis Report – Annex VIII: 
Sector Budgets and expenditures 
 
EAMR, Jan 2011, p7: Out of the €475m allocated to Zambia under the EDF10, €406,9m (85%) had 
been committed and €78,7m (16.5%) disbursed by end 2010. 
Extracts: 
JAR 2003, p25: The scope of the pooled support from Co-operating Partners (CPs) was originally re-
stricted to recurrent expenditure at district level (health centres and first level hospitals). In 2002 the 
Government and the Co-operating Partners discussed and eventually agreed to move towards an ex-
pansion of the basket, both “vertically” to include more cost centres (higher level hospitals, Central 
Board of Health, other autonomous boards) and “horizontally” to include more cost items (capital ex-
penditure, technical assistance etc). This started being implemented from mid-2003 with the inclusion 
of general hospitals, after capacity building assessments looking at financial management and com-
patibility of MISs. [= moving towards sector budget support] 
 
JAR 2010, p10: “On Sector Budget Support – Roads: “On the basis of a special audit by the Office of 
the Auditor General, submitted in May to the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament, an intensified 
CP/GRZ sector dialogue was launched and corresponding remedial actions agreed to. In support to 
the Government measures, the EU funded the secondment to the Road Development Agency of engi-
neering and financial management experts. The implementation of immediate corrective actions even-
tually made it possible for donors' financial re-engagement in the sector. However, in the absence of 
progress on the revision of the ROADSIP II policy framework, EDF Sector Budget Support could not 
be disbursed in 2010 which resulted in Zambia losing out €23.95m (4th & 5th variable tranches float-
ing from 2009 - €8.5m & €3.15m - and release of the 1st fixed tranche floating from 2009 - €12.3m).” 
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p8: In reaction to the international economic and financial crisis, the 
Commission decided to create an ad-hoc Vulnerability FLEX mechanism to be financed under the re-
serves of the national and regional indicative programmes of the EDF10. In 2009 Zambia was consid-
ered eligible under V-FLEX on the basis of economic and social vulnerability criteria, the nature of the 
residual financing gap and the capacity of the EC to quickly provide meaningful support. The €30m 
V/Flex allocated to Zambia which was disbursed end 2009 contributed to close the financing gap, thus 
maintaining priority expenditure, especially in the social sectors and infrastructures. 
 
EAMR, Sep 2004, p2: The Mid-Term Review was successfully concluded and the conclusions jointly 
reached by the Commission and the NAO are waiting for approval of the EDF Committee in October 
2004. The main conclusion is that Zambia’s B-Envelope (€110 M) will be integrated, almost complete-
ly, in the A-Envelope, allowing for an increase of the Poverty Reduction Budget Support of €65M in the 
years to come. It will also allow us to step up our co-operation programme in the area of food security, 
including co-operation with Non-State Actors by approximately €22M. 
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Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p. xii: Has the implementation of the Paris Dec-
laration strengthened the contribution of aid to sustainable development results (development out-
comes)? How? – Core Question 3. The agriculture sector may have benefited from enhanced dialogue 
structures that have emerged since the adoption of the PD. However, the same contentious issues 
under ASIP still poison the CP/GRZ relationship – fertilizer subsidies and maize marketing – such that 
the aid relationship in agriculture is not as amicable as in health (save for differences resulting from 
the alleged theft of funds in 2009) and indeed education for that matter. This seems to show that PD 
principles could not be expected to work in the same way in all sectors. 
 
FNDP – MTR p78; Chapter 6.3.7. Education Sector Pool Performance - Effects on financing modali-
ties / EU approaches: The recent education PETS and an earlier tracking exercise from 2007 docu-
mented major inefficiencies with the current sector pool by having a dual planning, accounting and re-
porting system for domestic and donor funding from Ministry of Education headquarters down to the 
school level. Based on the findings of the PETS, the local donor group undertook a Fiduciary Risk As-
sessment (FRA) in August 2008 to explore ways to improve the sector pool and propose a more effi-
cient channel for donor funding, including those from the FTI. The main recommendation of the FRA is 
to move the sector pool to targete4d sector budget support. In essence, this modality entails that do-
nors would continue to provide an earmarked financial contribution in support of MoE instead of full-
fledged general budget support. However, rather than disbursing to an MoE managed account with 
specific accounting and reporting requirements, as in the current sector pool, donor funds would be 
mingled with GRZ funding to finance any activity in the mutually agreed MoE’s annual work plan and 
budget. This funding modality attempts to address both the identified weaknesses in the current pool 
and to reap the efficiency gains from closer alignment of donor support to national systems, as out-
lines in Zambia’s Aid Policy and Strategy an in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.  
 
Democratisation, State and Civil Society – Good Governance Programme (2011), p7; Delegated 
Cooperation and combi-financing arrangements as novel approach (Governance – CSOs): In addition 
to direct funding and bilateral support under longer-term engagement and partnership between aid 
agencies and organisations from civil society a specific mode is the delegated cooperation arrange-
ment, sometimes referred to combi-financing agreements. Delegated cooperation is a specific instru-
ment that is applied by the European Union, however, predominantly through aid agencies in the con-
text of government to government cooperation. In the combi-financing arrangement, one donor re-
mains a “silent partner’ and channels funding to an “active partner” who then channels the funds to 
partner CSOs of need. Pioneers in the combi-financing approach have been Irish Aid and DFD with 
GTZ’s Good Governance Programme. The aim is to sustain partner CSOs, in this case five larger um-
brella and thematic focused national CSOs that have been supported under the arrangement since 
2007. The combi-financing as practiced in Zambia is a novel approach in financing partner CSOs. In 
many respects it’s in tune with global trends on harmonisation of support among CPs as articulated in 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In the world of changing aid architecture, the combi re-
mains unique features that make it attractive to both CPs and partners CSOs. Dialogue, capacity sup-
port and networking are some of the features peculiar to the modality of this instrument. Reduced 
transaction costs for both CPs and partner CSOs is another unique characteristic. It is also true, how-
ever, that the delegated cooperation agreement is not without challenges of its own which include is-
sues of appropriateness of capacity support, delays in disbursement of funds, lack of structured feed-
back format, attribution gap, independence versus appendage, gate-keeper influence and restricted 
dialogue. 
 
 Indicator 8.2.3: Policy dialogue reporting incorporated emerging issues 
With the JASZ a well elaborated institutional platform is in place for facilitating policy dialogue between 
the Government of Zambia and the Cooperating Partners. This structure in principle should make it 
possible to rapidly react to emerging issues of common interest and concern through broad based and 
encompassing policy dialogue for (remedial) actions to be taken where necessary. Also the different 
reporting mechanisms including the Joint Annual Reports (JAR) are venues for policy dialogue report-
ing on emerging issues. The desk study of these reports provided empirical evidence of this capacity 
and actual practice.  
An example in case is the reporting on the road sector which had been overshadowed by the results of 
a comprehensive financial, technical and procurement audit under the Office of the Auditor General 
following Cooperating Partners (CPs) serious concern on sector specific Public Finance Management 
(PFM) issues raised during the April 2009 Joint Donor Forum. This led to CPs putting on hold funding 
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for new road projects including the release of SPSP I tranches 4 and 5 amounting to €8,5m + €3,15m = 
€11,65m (5th variable tranche only qualifies for 75% release). The audit findings in summary reveal (i) 
mismanagement of resources and disregard of AWPs, (ii) irregularities in procurement, (iii) sub-
standard execution of or road works, (iv) unsubstantiated payments to contractors and (v) the non-
observation of Regulations and Acts governing the sector. The 2009 Ministry of Health case of mis-
management of public funds had an impact on the relations between the Government and the group of 
General Budget Support donors (and also within the latter group), although it reportedly was only one of 
different issues triggering the formal dialogue on underlying principles which was launched by the do-
nors in June 2009. In mid 2010 new governance concerns by the donors returned the issue of the vol-
ume of the GBS to the surface and made some donors deciding not to disburse its GBS.  
By opening up these governance issues and making them widely visible, the JASZ and related policy 
dialogue instruments and reporting mechanisms fulfil important transparency enhancement functions. 
At the same time, the two mismanagement cases are also concrete illustrations of the inherent weak-
nesses of these dialogue platforms. They have not been able to address and solve the issues in a co-
ordinated, decisive and uniform manner. On the contrary, they prove to have failed to adequately reme-
dy the situation even in spite the corrective measures proposed and special instruments developed as 
governance action plans for GRZ to comply with. Despite the existence of the policy dialogue platforms 
as the JASZ, the CPs failed to achieve a consensus on reacting in a unified manner to the situation. 
The result was an even worsening situation, resulting in high level diplomatic raws between GRZ and 
CPs. The JASZ and related fora were not able to prevent the issues from spreading out and contami-
nating the entire dialogue in all its facets. The issue directly affected the overall cooperation strategy 
and programme, and as such even impacted on the country’s MDGs and poverty alleviation perfor-
mance. A recent EUD note (2011) on the health sector budget support disbursements in 2010 clarified 
that as a result of the health sector misappropriation / mismanagement case and of the Governance 
Action Plan drawn up to remedy the situation, the Ministry continued to implement the remedial 
measures for strengthening financial governance which had been agreed with the Cooperating Part-
ners.  
During field visit discussions with the different parties concerned, at the Delegation, with Member States 
and other Cooperation Partners, it were particularly the inadequacies of the JASZ in its present format 
as harmonisation forum which were stressed. The criticism amongst others pertained to inefficiencies 
related to the complex if not cumbersome processes and procedures to arrive at decision making, the 
differences in policies and strategies of individual CPs which impeded consensus building and the 
weaknesses of the instruments at its disposal, particularly with regard to performance monitoring. An-
other main issue emanating from the evaluation field phase was that the political dialogue has not been 
proactive enough and the aid methods have not been flexible enough in adapting to the new macro-
economic situation gradually emerging from the middle of the 2001-2010 ten year period under review. 
This period saw Zambia in the process of becoming a lower middle income country, with increasing 
direct foreign investments (especially from the BRIC countries and particularly from South Africa), in-
creased revenues from the copper mines following intensified world demand and concomitant higher 
commodity prices, and with as a result increasingly more substantive public resources from taxation of 
the mines and less dependent on foreign assistance as argued elsewhere in this report. 
In the same context, the recent 2011 evaluation of budget support in Zambia covering the period 2005-
2010 concluded
95
 that budget support as an instrument for promoting policy reforms and governance 
has not performed to its anticipated potential as an instrument for promoting policy reforms and govern-
ance. While important achievements were made in the areas of PFM, the Office of the Auditor General, 
decentralisation, budget cycle procedures and tackling corruption, budget support has not been able to 
influence institutional reforms or influence policy in such a way as to substantially improve governance. 
While the period between 2006 and 2010 shows an overall upward trend regarding some core govern-
ance indicators, the ownership of improving core aspects of governance has decreased over the last 
two years. The instrument had little systemic effect on the general situation of the rule of law in Zambia. 
The report however concluded that nevertheless budget support is one of the few external factors that 
have built up a certain leverage, which has worked against a deterioration of governance in the last two 
years. 
Extracts: 
EARM Jan 2011, p12: The road sector has been overshadowed by the results of a comprehensive 
financial, technical and procurement audit under the Office of the Auditor General following Cooperat-
ing Partners (CPs) serious concern on sector specific Public Finance Management (PFM) issues 
                                               
95
  DIE & IOB (2011) ; p15 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
  
Page - 287 - 
raised during the April 2009 Joint Donor Forum. This led to CPs putting on hold funding for new road 
projects including the release of SPSP I tranches 4 and 5 amounting to €8,5m + €3,15m = €11,65m 
(5th variable tranche only qualifies for 75% release). The audit findings in summary reveal (i) mis-
management of resources and disregard of AWPs, (ii) irregularities in procurement, (iii) sub-standard 
execution of or road works, (iv) unsubstantiated payments to contractors and (v) the non-observation 
of Regulations and Acts governing the sector. 
 
Oden, B. & Wohlgemuth, L. (2011), p16; on general budget support: General budget support: GBS 
is potentially one of the most powerful instruments when it comes to improved donor harmonisation, 
alignment and increased ownership. In absolute terms the GBS to Zambia more than doubled be-
tween 2005 and 2008 – from 72 to 155m USD. Its share of total net ODA inflow was in the range of 
16-18 per cent during 2007 and 2008, historically the highest level up to that point. The largest GBS 
providers in 2008 were the UK, EC and Norway. The largest donor in Zambia, the USA, does not use 
this aid modality.  
The GBS modality is vulnerable to incidents reducing the trust between the partners, for instance cor-
ruption incidents. In Zambia the highly publicised affair of corruption within the Ministry of Health in 
2009 is one example. It had an impact both on the relations between the Government and within the 
group of GBS donors, although it was only one of many issues triggering the formal dialogue on un-
derlying principles which was launched by the donors in June 2009. In mid 2010 new governance 
concerns by the donors, related to the new role of former president Chiluba, returned the issue of the 
volume of the GBS to the surface and made some donors, including Sweden, reluctant to disburse al-
ready committed GBS. Later in the year Sweden decided not to disburse its GBS. 
 
DIE – IOB (2011) p156 ; Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia – Synthesis Report; Draft; Annex V 
– the 2009 corruption scandal in the health sector: The dialogue mechanism and its effectiveness has 
been put to the test after in 2009 a whistle blower tipped the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) about 
theft in the MoH involving the disappearance of over K27 billion in 2008-2009 and estimated at over 
K64 billion since 2006 (The actual figures are yet to be established and the case is currently with the 
courts of law). A number of donors, including the most important ones in the health sector – the Neth-
erlands, Sweden, the GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria – 
immediately took the decision to suspend and/or delay aid disbursements. During the year, Cooperat-
ing Partners complained about the lack of vigour of GRZ in tacking this case of corruption (as well as 
tackling corruption in general) and at one time aide flows to the Ministry of Health dried up completely. 
Resumption of disbursements was made dependent on an action plan, including recovery and repay-
ment of misappropriated funds, prosecution of the officers involved and preventive measures. Sweden 
and the Netherlands proposed a joint Swedish – Dutch (SIDA/DGIS) position on the conditions to be 
met by GRZ before a resumption of gradual release of committed funds for the MoH could be consid-
ered. Structural measures should include strengthening MoH’s financial management capacity such 
as the revival of the Audit Committee, the annual external performance audits, and the institutionalisa-
tion of core values of integrity and good management practices within the MoH.  
Field Visit Additional Information on I-8.2.3: 
EUD Lusaka (2011), Note on the Health Sector Budget Support Disbursements 2010: The Minis-
try continued to implement the remedial measures for strengthening financial governance, which had 
been agreed with Cooperating Partners following a case of mismanagement in 2009: A review of the 
“Governance Action Plan”, a set of actions for building structures for effective management of the ‘dis-
trict basket” (a special arrangement for channelling donor funds to the district level services), was car-
ried out in November 2011 and confirmed that satisfactory progress has been made. A “Capacity 
Building and Transition Plan”, which is based on a 2010 audit by the Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) of the Global Fund for Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), appears to be on track. In ad-
dition, the Government repaid to the Global Fund the amounts not accounted for in 2009. On this ba-
sis, GFATM recently signed two new agreements totalling USD 141.8m ($66m for round 8 and USD 
75m for round 10). Finally, the Government plans to launch in December 2011 a comprehensive 
“Governance and Management Capacity Strengthening Plan” (G&MCSP). The G&MCSP is to consol-
idate all presently ongoing capacity building activities – including the EU supported roll out of IFMIS 
(Integrated Financial Management and Information System) – into one comprehensive concept for 
capacity building in the public health services. The development of this comprehensive capacity build-
ing concept is a prerequisite for release of disbursements from certain donors. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on JC 8.2: 
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MoFNP (2004) p28; Annual Economic Report; Chapter 5 External Sector Developments, 5.3. External 
Aid: In 2004, a total of US $789.1m was expected as external aid out of which US $475.6m was to be in 
form of project support and US $313.5m as programme support. Preliminary data indicates that only US 
$297.9m, representing 38 per cent of the total funds expected was received… As for programme sup-
port, the inflows received during the year were only 21 per cent of the US $313.5m that was expected 
(see Table 5.3). The lesser than programmed inflows received were due to administrative bottlenecks 
by Government and cooperating partners as well as failure, by Government, to meet certain conditional-
ities for the disbursement of funds. 
Programme Support (in US$ millions), 2000-2004 
 
 
Project Financing (in US$ millions), 2002-2004 
   
DIE & IOB (2011) Annex VI; GRZ Revenue 2002-2009 
 
Government of Zambia Revenue 2002-2009, CP Data 
 
 Source: Whitworth (2010); MoFNP Financial Reports; cited in DIE&IOB (2011) p.266 
 Remark: 2009 data are provisional 
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Government of Zambia Revenue 2002-2009, MoFNP Data 
 Source: MoFNP Financial Reports and authors’ calculations; cited in DIE&IOB (2011) p.266 
 Remark: 2009 data are provisional 
 
 
DIE & IOB (2011) p15; Evaluation Summary and Conclusions: Budget support as an instrument for 
promoting policy reforms and governance - Budget support has not performed to its anticipated poten-
tial as an instrument for promoting policy reforms and governance. While important achievements 
were made in the areas of PFM, the Office of the Auditor General, decentralisation, budget cycle pro-
cedures and tackling corruption, budget support has not been able to influence institutional reforms or 
influence policy in such a way as to substantially improve governance. While the period between 2006 
and 2010 shows an overall upward trend regarding some core governance indicators, the ownership 
of improving core aspects of governance has decreased over the last two years. The instrument had 
little systemic effect on the general situation of the rule of law in Zambia. Nevertheless, budget sup-
port is one of the few external factors that have built up a certain leverage, which has worked against 
a deterioration of governance in the last two years.  
 
JC 8.2:  Emerging issues were incorporated quickly and effectively into EU programming and 
policy dialogue 
The mix of EU aid programming instruments, approaches and financing modalities generally has been 
adapted well to sector specific factors and also has changed over the period along with the context. An 
analysis of the Zambia projects portfolio and the sectoral and PCM documentation generally attest to it 
that this mix tends to be different according to sector specific factors. Sectoral analyses indeed have 
been amongst the determining factors for decision making on the appropriate aid modality, although 
that this cannot be across the board.  
For example, the July 2007 EAMR stressed that ongoing and forthcoming sector projects and pro-
grammes are and will be embedded in the existing dialogue mechanisms. The go-signal for sector 
budget support (SPSP) in the health sector under the EDF9 was based on the assessed higher than 
average capacity at the MoH compared to other government departments, with a core of committed 
staff, and with a strategic plan and sector dialogue in place, aimed at greater transparency and a more 
results oriented process (JAR 2003). For education, the assessments (JAR 2007) by the CPs have 
been somehow varied leading different CPs opting for different aid modalities. The 2011 Budget Sup-
port Evaluation in Zambia concluded that two factors are important for budget support being effective. 
First of all, sectors of interest must be supported by strong Government ownership. This for example 
was missing for the rural water and sanitation supply, where NGOs remained the main providers. Se-
cond, budget support can only work if policies of Government and objectives of Cooperating Partners 
are aligned. This has been the case for the health and education sectors, and less the case for the ag-
ricultural sector where “an inherent contradiction between ownership and donor influence became ap-
parent. 
The support modalities through which funding to CSOs is channelled shows a high degree of diversity 
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(capacity development and financial support) and are basically provided to annual work programmes 
and budgets of CSOs (project support and direct support), whereas core funding for multiannual plan 
implementation (sort of budget support) is a rather rare modality. The combi-financing approach is just 
one of the several support modalities through which CPs channel funding to CSOs in Zambia. Under 
the EDF9, SPSP support was provided to three sectors: transport, education and health, whereas un-
der the EDF10 sector budget support covered the transport and health sectors, whereas possibly the 
support to the electoral system also can be considered as a sort of (sub-)sector budget support (trust 
fund setting). The 2011 MTR of the EU-SADEC co-operation under the EDF10 considers the large Pub-
lic Finance Management (PFM) programme – PEMFA – managed as a basket fund by several CPs 
working closely together to support the agreed strategy, whereas for the EU strictly speaking it is a 
general budget support intervention. (I-8.2.2 (fig. PF-1)) 
In the ten year period 2001-2011 a total of 64 interventions have been financed by the European Union 
(as assigned a special CRIS code). Of these, by far the majority (54 or 84.4% of the total) are of the 
project approach (PA) type, 6 (or 9.4%) are Sector Policy Support Programmes (SPSPs) and 4 (6.3%) 
are General Budget Support (GBS). A more balanced picture of the relative importance of the three 
main aid modalities emerges when comparing the amounts involved (allocated / committed, contracted, 
and paid) in each of the three. Of the about 1.1 billion Euro country strategy financing in the 2001 – 
2010 period, an about equal amount has been allocated to general budget support (39.2%) and project 
approach (39.9%). Sector Budget Support has been allocated about one fifth of the total resources 
(20.9%). However, and in directly reply to the present indicator query, there are important evolutions in 
aid modality over time in the mix of instruments, approaches and financing modalities along with the 
subsequent EDF cycles. The EDF8 portfolio solely consisted of project approaches (all 23 interven-
tions). The three General Budget Support (GBS) interventions under EDF9 represented almost half of 
the total allocated resources (47.0%) which further increased to 55.3% under the EDF10. Sector Budg-
et Support (3 SPSPs in resp. transport, education and health) took up 29.4% of the EDF9 resources, to 
be slightly reduced to 25.9% of the EDF10 resources (3 SPSPs in transport, health and electoral sys-
tems). Overall the share of project approach (PA) financing has been reduced from 100% under the 
EDF8, over 23.5% under the EDF9 to 18.8% under the EDF10 (fig.PF-2, I-8.2.2). 
In as much as actual payments in relation to the allocated/committed amounts are considered a proxy 
indicator for efficiency of aid delivery (e.g. in relation to absorptive capacity), as far as the EDF9 financ-
ing is concerned of the GBS budgetary resources 94.4% have been paid, 87.5% of the SPSP resources 
and 66.1% of the project approach resources. Unfortunately no data are available on actual expendi-
tures in relation to the intended uses / for the intended results (performance budgeting and expendi-
tures monitoring). Broken down by EDF strategy / programme cycle, a total of 95.2% of the (pre 2001-
2010 period) EDF8 resources committed still in the 2001-2010 period have been contracted and paid 
out as of the end of this period (thus 4.8% not yet paid out as of 2010). For the EDF9 covering the peri-
od 2001-2007, this amounts to 85.7%, implying that 14.3% of the committed EDF9 resources have not 
been paid yet (with 5.6% of the total committed EDF9 resources not having been contracted yet). In the 
first half period 2008-2010 of the total EDF10 six year period (2008-2013), about one fourth (25.5%) of 
the committed / allocated resources have been paid (68.0% of the committed EDF10 resources have 
been contracted). The portfolio efficiency analysis by aid method / modality expressed as per cent 
amount paid of total allocated / committed resources shows that 72.8% of the committed project ap-
proach resources in the ten year period 2001-2010 have been actually paid, against 60.7% for the GBS 
modality and 49.4% for the SPS modality. For EDF9 which covers the completed CSP-NIP cycle 2001-
2007, the total paid amounts in percentage of the total allocated/committed resources amount to re-
spectively 66.1% for the Project Approach, 94.4% for General Budget Support and 87.5% for Sector 
Budget Support (fig.PF-3, I-8.2.2).  
The scope of the pooled support from Cooperating Partners in the health sector was originally restricted 
to recurrent expenditures at district level but gradually the “basket” expanded both vertically (e.g. higher 
level hospitals) and horizontally to include more cost items (capital expenditure, technical assistance) 
as such gradually paving the way for sectoral budget support (JAR 2003). Whereas education was a 
focal sector under the EDF9 benefiting from sector budget support, it no longer figured as priority focal 
sector under the EDF10. The MTR of the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) reported in this con-
nection on the education sector pool performance “…documented major inefficiencies with the current 
sector pool by having a dual planning, accounting and reporting system for domestic and donor funding 
from Ministry of Education headquarters down to the school level. Based on the findings of the PETS, 
the local donor group undertook a Fiduciary Risk Assessment (FRA) in August 2008 to explore ways to 
improve the sector pool and propose a more efficient channel for donor funding, including those from 
the FTI. The main recommendation of the FRA is to move the sector pool to targeted sector budget 
support. In essence, this modality entails that donors would continue to provide an earmarked financial 
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contribution in support of MoE instead of full-fledged general budget support. However, rather than 
disbursing to an MoE managed account with specific accounting and reporting requirements, as in the 
past sector pool, donor funds would be mingled with GRZ funding to finance any activity in the mutually 
agreed MoE’s annual work plan and budget. This funding modality attempts to address both the identi-
fied weaknesses in the past pool and to reap the efficiency gains from closer alignment of donor sup-
port to national systems, as outlined in Zambia’s Aid Policy and Strategy an in line with the Paris Decla-
ration on Aid Effectiveness.  
Over time, the budget support financing instruments got more refined and more performance based. 
This particularly relates to the tools to assess progress and results as basis for decision making on the 
release of the variable tranches. Whereas under EDF9 these variable tranches for general budget sup-
port were related to / based on PFM and PRSP indicators performance, under the EDF these were 
additionally determined by achievements in relation to the attainment of the MDGs. The Sector Budget 
Support modality in relation to the Sector Policy Support Programmes (SPSPs) initially only had fixed 
annual tranches, but in the process under EDFX also variable tranches were introduced based on 
achievements on Key Performance Indicators. As far as General Budget Support (GBS) is concerned, 
in reaction to the international economic and financial crisis, the Commission decided to create an ad-
hoc Vulnerability FLEX mechanism to be financed under the reserves of the national and regional in-
dicative programmes of the EDF10. In 2009 Zambia was considered eligible under V-FLEX on the basis 
of economic and social vulnerability criteria, the nature of the residual financing gap and the capacity of 
the EC to quickly provide meaningful support. The €30m V/Flex allocated to Zambia which was dis-
bursed end 2009 contributed to close the financing gap, thus maintaining priority expenditure, especial-
ly in the social sectors and infrastructures. The EDF portfolio analysis at the end of this evaluation ma-
trix section on EQ9 includes a more detailed analysis of the technical evolution of the EU budget sup-
port tools applied in Zambia. 
Delegated cooperation arrangements, sometimes referred to as combi-financing agreements, has be-
come a preferential specific instrument by the EU (an arrangement where one donor remains a “silent 
partner” and channels funding to an “active partner” who then channels the funds to the intended part-
ner CSOs of need. Of the total EDF resources allocation to Zambia in the period 2001-2010, a total of 
56.9% (or €636m) were under decentralised management (DM), whereas 40.6% (or €454m) under 
Centralised Management (basically CM, but also CM-IO or ICM-DA) and 2.5% under Partially Decen-
tralised Management as main management mode / modality. A more detailed portfolio analysis by 
method of implementation / management mode is provided at the end of this EQ-9 information matrix (I-
8.2.2) 
With the JASZ a well elaborated institutional platform is in place for facilitating policy dialogue between 
the Government of Zambia and the Cooperating Partners. This structure in principle should make it 
possible to rapidly react to emerging issues of common interest and concern through broad based and 
encompassing policy dialogue for (remedial) actions to be taken where necessary. Also the different 
reporting mechanisms including the Joint Annual Reports (JAR) are venues for policy dialogue report-
ing on emerging issues. The desk study of these reports provided empirical evidence of this capacity 
and actual practice.  
An example in case is the reporting on the road sector which had been overshadowed by the results of 
a comprehensive financial, technical and procurement audit under the Office of the Auditor General 
following Cooperating Partners (CPs) serious concern on sector specific Public Finance Management 
(PFM) issues raised during the April 2009 Joint Donor Forum. This led to CPs putting on hold funding 
for new road projects including the release of SPSP I tranches 4 and 5 amounting to €8,5m + €3,15m = 
€11,65m (5th variable tranche only qualifies for 75% release). The audit findings in summary revealed 
(i) mismanagement of resources and disregard of AWPs, (ii) irregularities in procurement, (iii) sub-
standard execution of or road works, (iv) unsubstantiated payments to contractors and (v) the non-
observation of Regulations and Acts governing the sector. The 2009 Ministry of Health case of mis-
management of public funds had an impact on the relations between the Government and the group of 
General Budget Support donors (and also within the latter group), although it reportedly was only one of 
different issues triggering the formal dialogue on fundamental underlying principles and values which 
was launched by the donors in June 2009. In mid-2010 new governance concerns by the donors re-
turned the issue of the volume of the GBS to the surface and made some donors deciding not to dis-
burse its GBS.  
By opening up these governance issues and making them widely visible, the JASZ and related policy 
dialogue instruments and reporting mechanisms fulfil important transparency enhancement functions. 
At the same time, the two mismanagement cases are also concrete illustrations of the inherent weak-
nesses of these dialogue platforms. They have not been able to address and solve the issues in a co-
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 292 - 
ordinated, decisive and uniform manner. On the contrary, they prove to have failed to adequately reme-
dy the situation even in spite the corrective measures proposed and special instruments developed as 
governance action plans for GRZ to comply with. Also, despite the existence of the policy dialogue plat-
forms as the JASZ, the CPs failed to achieve a consensus on reacting in a unified manner to the situa-
tion. The result was an even worsening situation, resulting in high level diplomatic rows between GRZ 
and CPs. The JASZ and related fora were not able to prevent the issues from spreading out and con-
taminating the entire dialogue in all its facets. The issue directly affected the overall cooperation strate-
gy and programme, and as such even impacted on the country’s MDGs and poverty alleviation perfor-
mance. But a recent EUD note (2011) on the health sector budget support disbursements in 2010 clari-
fied that as a result of the health sector misappropriation / mismanagement case and of the Govern-
ance Action Plan drawn up to remedy the situation, the Ministry continued to implement the remedial 
measures for strengthening financial governance which had been agreed with the Cooperating Part-
ners.  
During field visit discussions with the different parties concerned, at the Delegation, with Member States 
and other Cooperating Partners, it were particularly the inadequacies of the JASZ in its present format 
as harmonisation forum which were stressed. The criticism amongst others pertains to inefficiencies 
related to the complex if not cumbersome processes and procedures to arrive at decision making, the 
differences in policies and strategies of individual CPs which impeded consensus building and the 
weaknesses of the instruments at its disposal, particularly with regard to performance monitoring. An-
other main issue emanating from the evaluation field phase was that the political dialogue has not been 
proactive enough and the aid methods have not been flexible enough in adapting to the new macro-
economic situation gradually emerging from the middle of the 2001-2010 ten year period under review 
onwards. This period saw Zambia in the process of becoming a lower middle income country, with dras-
tically improved direct foreign investments (especially from the BRIC countries and particularly from 
South Africa), increased revenues from the copper mines following intensified world demand and con-
comitant higher commodity prices, and with as a result increasingly more substantive public resources 
from taxation of the mines and less dependence on foreign assistance as argued later in this report. 
In the same context, the recent 2011 evaluation of budget support in Zambia covering the period 2005-
2010 concluded
96
 that budget support as an instrument for promoting policy reforms and governance 
has not performed to its anticipated potential as an instrument for promoting policy reforms and govern-
ance. While important achievements were made in the areas of PFM, the Office of the Auditor General, 
decentralisation, budget cycle procedures and tackling corruption, budget support has not been able to 
influence institutional reforms or influence policy in such a way as to substantially improve governance. 
While the period between 2006 and 2010 shows an overall upward trend regarding some core govern-
ance indicators, the ownership of improving core aspects of governance has decreased over the last 
two years. The instrument had little systemic effect on the general situation of the rule of law in Zambia. 
The report however concluded that nevertheless budget support is one of the few external factors that 
have built up a certain leverage, which has worked against a deterioration of governance in the last two 
years. 
 
JC 8.3: The synergy between aid modalities has been discussed both within each focal sector 
and overall 
 Indicator 8.3.1: Link between instruments, approaches and financing modalities during the 
reporting period are analysed in EU (internal) strategy formulation documents 
Evidence of such analyses of links between instruments, approaches and financing modalities in the 
EU strategy formulation documents are found both at the country strategy formulation level (notably the 
two CSP-NIPs covering the reporting period) and at regional level (Region of Eastern and Southern 
Africa and the Indian Ocean – ESA-IO) with direct repercussions for the Zambia national level (e.g. the 
RSP/RIP of 2008-2013). An example in case is the discussion on the appropriate approach and financ-
ing modality for the health sector under the EDF10 CSP-NIP. Earlier in 2005, the development of the 
Health Human Resources Strategic Plan had led to the identification of an EDF9 sector budget support 
(€10m) operation specifically addressed to finance the Human Resources plan in support of human 
resources retention. However, the delayed approval of the health sector budget support financial plan 
had a negative impact on the implementation of the Human Resources Strategic Plan and undermined 
the confidence the Ministry of Health had in the predictability of funding with the Sector Budget Support 
operations. The financing modality worked out as solution consisted of the Poverty Reduction Budget 
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Support (PRBS) operation complementing the sector budget support with a focus on activities aimed at 
improving the retention of health workers in the most deprived and remote settings. The rationale for 
the complementarity of Sector Budget Support and General Budget Support was widely discussed in 
the course of the preceding two years (JAR, 2007). 
Early under EDF8, support to the transport sector has been entirely given via project support. Under 
EDF9 and 10, with the evolvement of the sector through sector reforms, for the move from ROADSIP I 
to ROADSIP II the three basic elements to consider ROADSIP II as a “sector programme” according to 
EC guidelines led to consider support to the sector via Sector Budget Support (SBS). Consequently and 
in line with the general policy directions on aid delivery and the utilisation of sector budget support as 
financing modality, the road maintenance support programme which had been initially prepared as 
“classical project’ was ‘retrofitted’ to a “sector policy support programme” (SPSP) in support of 
ROADSIP II with funding to be channelled through the Treasury to the Road Fund. To that end the EU 
prescribed seven key areas of assessment (macro-economic framework, sector policy, sector MTEF, 
accountability and PEM system, donor coordination, programme monitoring, institutional capacity) to 
decide whether a sector programme and the environment a sector programme is operating in are con-
ducive to follow sector budget support modalities, had been assessed, but only briefly. Identified weak-
nesses in the management of the road sector at RDA and NFRA levels were addressed through an 
accompanying capacity building component under classical EDF procedures (= project approach)... 
The lessons learned section in Annex 12 on road transport to the EDF10 CSP-NIP consists of not less 
than two and a half pages and focuses on sector dialogues, monitoring and assessment of sector per-
formance, launching of sector studies, transparency of procurement procedures, etc. in order to arrive 
at the ultimate decision making regarding the most appropriate aid modality and financing mechanism. 
Some elements: Difficulties arose to find the right balance between really looking at the sector as a 
whole in the spirit of sector budget support and the risk of sliding back in the “project mode” with regard 
to the physical interventions and their execution financed under the SBS tranches.  
The discussion of synergies between aid modalities, instruments and approaches can also be found in 
the regional strategy documents. But as for example is illustrated by the 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, overall 
this discussion is less prominent and outspoken at regional level compared to the Zambia national level 
itself. The discussions in first instance relate to the regional financing instruments. These are consid-
ered to have considerable potential as a means to improve local ownership of externally supported 
programmes, to reduce transaction costs and to improve the harmonisation and alignment of aid. At the 
same time, extending the aid effectiveness agenda to the regional level is a declared commitment on 
the part of both the EC and the EU Member States. Concrete examples: the COMESA Fund was estab-
lished in 2002 by a Protocol, and operates with two “windows”: an Adjustment Facility and an Infrastruc-
ture Facility. Similarly, EAC established a Partnership Fund in 2006 under which Development Partners 
contribute to short-term activities aiming to promote implementation of the Treaty and to boost EAC’s 
integration agenda. 
Overall, as is one of the main conclusions and recommendations from the recent evaluation of budget 
support in Zambia, it appears preferable not to just think in terms of alternative aid modalities, as it is 
more effective to stress the complementarity of instruments and the right combination for a specific 
context. The evaluation also shows that GBS is not always the best modality for realizing cooperating 
partners’ objectives. If there is no common understanding on priorities and strategies, and if partners 
are unable to influence the agenda through coherent incentives, other aid modalities may be more ef-
fective. Also, GBS may be more effective if it is supported by other aid modalities – and in return sector 
budget support (SBS), basket funding and project aid may be more effective if supported by GBS. This 
complementarity is assessed not to be automatic, however. 
  
Extracts: 
JAR 2007, p23; 2.3. Projects and programmes outside focal sectors - 2.3.1 Health: In 2005 the de-
velopment of the Health Human Resources Strategic Plan (approved in December 2005), led to the 
identification of a EDF9 sector budget support (€10m) operation specifically labelled to finance the 
Human Resources plan in support of human resources retention. This [delayed approval of the Health 
sector budget support Financial Plan], unfortunately, had a negative impact on the implementation of 
the Human Resources Strategic Plan and undermined the confidence Ministry of Health had in the 
predictability of funding with the Sector Budget Support operations. Following the revised disburse-
ment calendar the first disbursement of this support (Financial Agreement signed in February 2007) 
took place only at the end of December 2007. The financing modality worked out consisted of the 
Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) operation complementing the sector budget support oper-
ation with a focus on activities aimed at improving the retention of health workers in the most deprived 
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and remote settings. The rationale for the complementarity of Sector Budget Support and General 
Budget Support was widely discussed in the course of the last two years. 
 
JAR 2007, p17; 2.2.2. Capacity building – PFM: PFM reforms in Zambia are driven by the Public Ex-
penditure Management and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) programme, which, together with Right-
Sizing and Pay Reform and Decentralisation, is one of the three pillars of the GRZ Public Service Re-
form Programme (PSRP), aiming at improving the quality of public service delivery. The five-year 
PEMFA programme launched in June 2005 is a comprehensive programme covering 13 components 
spanning budget planning, budget execution and control, transparency and accountability. The evolu-
tion of PFM reforms and their assessment is therefore closely linked (though not exclusively) to pro-
gress under PEMFA. The EDF9 PEMFA Financing Agreement (€13m, in addition to the €2.5m from 
the PRBS 1 already disbursed by end 2005) was signed in March 2006. 
 
JAR 2007, p21: Moreover, with growing responsibilities for the Economic and Technical Cooperation 
(ETC) Department, the TAs to the NAO have found themselves increasingly involved in non-traditional 
NAO tasks, such as the support to the joint Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) operation, as 
well as donor harmonisation processes. 
 
EDF10, CSP-NIP 2008-2013 – Annex 12 Road Transport, pp. xci – xcii: (2) EC cooperation in the 
sector: 2.1) Project Support as financing modality and 2.2) Sector Budget Support as financing modal-
ity / Under EDF8, support to the transport sector has been entirely given via project support. Under 
EDF9 and 10, with the evolvement of the sector through the aforementioned sector reforms, the move 
from ROADSIP I to ROADSIP II, the three basic elements to consider ROADSIP II as a “sector pro-
gramme” according to EC guidelines led to consider support to the sector via SBS. Basic elements: (i) 
approved sectoral policy document and an overall strategic framework – PRSP and transport policy of 
2002, (ii) a sectoral medium term expenditure framework and an annual budget (financing plan in 
ROADSIP) and (iii) a coordination process amongst the donors in the sector, led by Government 
(regular ROADSIP steering committee meetings). Also efforts toward strengthening the management 
system of the ROADSIP II sector programme (performance monitoring system, agreed upon process 
for moving towards harmonised systems for reporting, and a systematic client and stakeholder consul-
tation mechanism. Furthermore there were supporting conditions for a “sector programme”. ... 
Consequently and in line with general policy directions on aid delivery and the utilisation of sector 
budget support as financing modality, the road maintenance support programme which had been ini-
tially prepared as “classical project’ was ‘retrofitted’ to a “sector policy support programme” in support 
of ROADSIP II with funding to be channelled through the Treasury to the Road Fund.  
Since the Zambia case was in fact a “retrofit” exercise, a model approach according to the 2003 
Guidelines for EC support to Sector Programmes” has not been entirely followed. To that end the 
seven key areas of assessment (macro-economic framework, sector policy, sector MTEF, accounta-
bility and PEM system, donor coordination, programme monitoring, institutional capacity) to decide 
whether a sector programme and the environment a sector programme is operating in are conducive 
to follow sector budget support modalities has only been briefly assessed. Identified weaknesses in 
the management of the road sector at RDA and NFRA levels were addressed through an accompany-
ing capacity building component under classical EDF procedures.  
 
EDF10, CSP-NIP 2008-2013 Annex 12 Road transport 2.4) Lessons learnt pp. xcii-xciv: The Les-
sons Learnt section in Annex 12 on the road transport to the CSP-NIP consists of two and a half pag-
es. Lessons learnt focus on sector dialogues, monitoring and assessment of sector performance, 
launching of sector studies, transparency of procurement procedures, etc. Some quotes: “Certainly, 
the utilisation of sector budget support can certainly not overcome the problems in sector financing, 
but it gives the EC the means to make it a top priority of the future sector dialogue between the CPs 
and the GRZ and to jointly discuss the way forward on sector financing enhancement agreed upon by 
all parties. Difficulties arise to find the right balance between really looking at the sector as a whole in 
the spirit of sector budget support and the risk of sliding back in the “project mode” with regard to the 
physical interventions and their execution financed under the SBS tranches. To find a right balance is 
sometimes difficult… The EC is the only CP using sector budget support in that magnitude in Zambia. 
Other CPs are mainly operating in the project mode but within the framework of a sector approach in 
support of ROADSIP II.  
Based on the anticipated further success of the SPSP, the EDF10 programme is designed to continue 
with the support to the sector mainly through SBS. In that context, it will however be important to carry 
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out an assessment of the seven key areas according to the model approach of the relevant EC guide-
lines. This will be done in the framework of the Mid-Term Review of the SPSP which is scheduled for 
the end of the 2
nd
 semester 2007. A close collaboration between the economic section and the infra-
structure section would then be required. The issue of sector financing will have to be critically looked 
at.  
Project aid will be provided to other small interventions in the transport sector. This programme com-
ponent should serve for other demand driven transport interventions. The component would be gen-
erally open for soundly substantiated interventions/studies in the country context under FNDP across 
the transport sector. 
 
RSP & RIP 2008-2013; P20; Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013 
– Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean; 2007 - Chapter 3.1.4 Establishing 
Regional Development Financing Instruments: Regionally owned development financing instruments 
have considerable potential as a means to improve local ownership of externally supported pro-
grammes, to reduce transaction costs and to improve the harmonisation and alignment of aid. At the 
same time, extending the aid effectiveness agenda to regional level is a declared commitment on the 
part of both the EC and the EU Member States. 
To assist Member states with the regional integration process, Article 150 of the COMESA Treaty 
provides for the establishment of a “special” Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development 
for tackling the special problems of underdeveloped areas and other disadvantages arising from the 
integration process. The COMESA Fund was accordingly established in 2002 by a Protocol, and op-
erates with two “windows”: an Adjustment Facility and an Infrastructure Facility. The two windows are 
interlinked in that the creation of an efficient regional market requires both policy reforms and physical 
infrastructure development. The Adjustment Facility, which became operational in 2007, aims to sup-
port member states in implementing regional integration policies and programmes, which because of 
their potential short-term negative impact on fiscal revenue or the economic and social costs of ad-
justment cannot be sustained through their national budget and other national aid programmes. The 
purpose of the Infrastructure facility is to provide a mechanism through which member states, cooper-
ating partners and private investors can all contribute to seeding regional infrastructure projects. In 
March 2008, the COMESA Fund Committee, which comprises the Ministers of Finance of Fund mem-
ber states, agreed a Road Map for the operationalisation of the Infrastructure Facility by 2009. The 
Fund can receive contributions from member states, cooperating partners and international financing 
institutions. The EC has already made an initial contribution of €78m to the Adjustment Facility under 
the EDF9. 
Similarly, EAC establish a Partnership Fund in 2006 under which Development Partners contribute to 
short-term activities aiming to promote implementation of the Treaty and to boost EAC’s integration 
agenda. The Partnership Fund is the focus for aid coordination activities within EAC. In addition, to 
address the issue of revenue losses as a result of the CU, EAC has also launched preparations for 
establishing an EAC Development Fund. This Fund also has the potential to attract funds for major 
projects and to be the principal channel for upscaled external aid. A protocol to establish the Fund will 
be completed by December 2008. 
 Indicator 8.3.2: Link between instruments, approaches and financing modalities during the 
reporting period are analysed for focal sectors in EU (internal) identification or preparation 
documents 
More or less the same findings and observations apply to the focal sectors identification and prepara-
tion documents as reported here above regarding the overall strategy formulation documents in con-
nection with indicator 8.3.1. It should be noted that the project approach is considered the “regular”, 
“traditional” aid modality, whereas sector budget support (SPSP) is still considered a “special” case 
requiring special justification. In the context of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda of Action on Aid 
effectiveness, this is a kind of upside down situation. But as reported earlier in the context of the dis-
cussion of reports and notes on the comparative advantages of the various instruments and approach-
es, there appears to be a kind of fatigue in discussing budget support and related issues. Preliminary 
discussions at the NAO Support Office during the evaluation preparatory mission at the end of August – 
early September event pointed into the direction of project approaches becoming “on vogue” again, 
which to a certain extent also was confirmed by interview discussions during the evaluation field visit in 
December 2011, despite budget support being reconfirmed by the Zambian Government through the 
NAO as the preferred cooperation modality. This revisiting of the choice of aid modalities no doubt also 
has to do with the rather sensitive issues surrounding the discussion in relation to good governance 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 296 - 
issues, which strongly affected the discussions and in a way muted the political dialogue on the issue. 
Extracts: 
Sofreco (2006), p44; Chapter 3.2.4 - Conclusions on Implementation Channels; EC has been the lead 
donor in providing budget support to GRZ. General budget support may not be the best instrument to 
address critical elements of poverty in Zambia which is the income inequality, although it has certainly 
been instrumental to support GRZ in creating macroeconomic stability. The evidence that with a selec-
tive choice of indicators certain sectors may be benefiting more from the increased availability of funds 
is lacing. Implementation channels are a mix of different modes: overall budget support, sector-wide 
budget support and project support. The introduction of budget support was made possible following 
improvement of Zambia public financial management, as assessed by the EC and other cooperating 
partners. Increased harmonisation between different donors, including bilateral donors, has enhanced 
the financial planning capacity of GRZ. The analysis of macro-economic climate and institutional capac-
ity of the government follows the World Bank / IMF analysis and is sufficient. 
In non-focal sectors without a sector-wide approach, e.g. the agriculture sector, the main channel of 
implementation is project funding with international TA being tendered. Project or programme funding 
goes against the Declaration of Paris about harmonisation of Development Aid which has been signed 
by the EU Member states and the EC. There is no indication of a proper strategy – be it with or without 
other donors – to create a situation what would lead to agriculture sector-wide support.  
Private Sector: For the private sector the main channel is through project funding: No programme fund-
ing on the basis of an organisational comprehensive strategic plan exists. Implementation channels in 
project support include loan facilities and Technical Assistance, both long-term and short-term. Loan 
facilities appear to be relatively easy to make, but lack of an exit strategy hampers the final destination 
of the funds made available. Cumbersome and bureaucratic procedures hamper the swift and timely 
recruitment of short-term TA and disbursement of funds. 
 Indicator 8.3.3: Follow-up or monitoring reports assess the actual synergy between aid 
modalities overall and for focal sectors 
This indicator on the assessment in monitoring reports of the actual synergies between aid modalities 
overall and for focal areas more or less examines the same aspects, covers the same issues as those 
reported with regard to earlier indicators regarding lessons learned from previous or other aide modali-
ties documented (8.1.2), regarding monitoring and evaluation focused on instrument and a approach 
efficiency and ability to achieve EU assistance goals (8.1.3) and Link between instruments, approaches 
and financing modalities during the reporting period are analysed for the focal sectors in EU (internal) 
identification or preparation documents (8.3.2.).  
By way of illustration, in the 2010 JAR is reported as general monitoring assessment of General Budget 
Support that as far as results are concerned, and based on an assessment of progress in relation to the 
Performance Assessment Framework (PAF), 2010 was marked by the lowest achievement in the last 4 
years. Performance indeed dropped from 70% in 2007, to 66.7% in 2008, 65.6% in 2009 and 58.3% in 
2010. Straight comparisons over the years are not entirely possible, as indicators have been strength-
ened and modified over time. However some sectors have consistently shown a positive trend (Educa-
tion, HIV/AIDS, most of PFM), while others continue to fail to achieve their targets, e.g. agriculture poli-
cy and investments, rural feeder roads, child immunisation in the rural areas. The 'urban-rural divide' 
has therefore become a recurrent theme during the PRBS reviews. 
As far as the findings of the Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) missions are concerned, the EAMR of 
January 2011 just briefly indicates that the findings of the 14 projects ROMs were reflected in the pro-
jects concerned without further elaboration. In this connection, it may be considered to have a consoli-
dated summary / assessment of the conducted ROMs included standard in the EAMR. Such consoli-
dated analysis then preferably also focuses on issues of actual synergies between aid modalities. 
The MoFNP Development Cooperation Report for 2009 especially zeroes in on common basket fund-
ing. For MoFNP special accounts with multiple contributors are termed ‘common basket funding’. The 
largest basket funding arrangements are the Education and Health Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps). 
Other basket funding arrangements include the Rural Electrification Authority (REA), Public Service 
Management (PSM), Private Sector Development (PSD), and the Public Expenditure Management and 
Financial Accountability (PEMFA) Programmes. In the EU EDF10- portfolio, this basket funding aid 
modality is the modus operandi for the Access to Justice programme (co-funded by GiZ and executed 
under indirect centralised management with delegation agreement with GiZ), for the agricultural sector 
performance enhancement programme (together with Finland and IFAD) and for the support to the 
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electoral process in a trust fund with 5 other CPs with UNDP as lead of the consortium. 
Extracts: 
EAMR Jan 2011, p4: The findings of the Result Oriented Monitoring on 14 projects were reflected in 
the projects concerned  
 
JAR 2010, p9: On General Budget Support: “As far as results are concerned, and based on an as-
sessment of progress in relation to the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF), 2010 was 
marked by the lowest achievement in the last 4 years. Performance indeed dropped from 70% in 
2007, to 66.7% in 2008, 65.6% in 2009 and 58.3% in 2010. Straight comparisons over the years are 
not entirely possible, as indicators have been strengthened and modified over time; some sectors 
have consistently shown a positive trend (Education, HIV/AIDS, most of PFM), while others continue 
to fail to achieve their targets, e.g. agriculture policy and investments, rural feeder roads, child immun-
isation in the rural areas. The 'urban-rural divide' has therefore become a recurrent theme during the 
PRBS reviews.” 
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Field Visit Additional Information on JC 8.3: 
 
DIE & IOB (2011) p25; Evaluation Recommendations: Do not think just in terms of alternative aid 
modalities – it is more effective to stress the complementarity of instruments and the right combination 
for a specific context. The evaluation has shown that GBS is not always the best modality for realizing 
cooperating partners’ objectives. If there is no common understanding on priorities and strategies, and 
if partners are unable to influence the agenda through coherent incentives, other aid modalities may 
be more effective. Also, GBS may be more effective if it is supported by other aid modalities – and in 
return sector budget support (SBS), basket funding and project aid may be more effective if supported 
by GBS. This complementarity is not automatic, however. 
 
MoFNP Development Cooperation Report 2009 (2010) p11-13; 3.3 Common Basket Funding –In 
this report, special accounts with multiple contributors are termed ‘common basket funding’. The larg-
est basket funding arrangements are the Education and Health Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps). 
Other basket funding arrangements include the Rural Electrification Authority (REA), Public Service 
Management (PSM), Private Sector Development (PSD), and the Public Expenditure Management 
and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) Programmes.  
3.3.1. Education Sector Wide Approach: A Memorandum of Understanding for donor cooperation in 
the education sector was signed in 2003 to support the Ministry of Education Strategic Plan, 2003 to 
2007. This led to an increase in donor funding. In 2008 the National Implementation Framework was 
launched and became the main vehicle for implementing the FNDP Education strategy. Table 3.4 
shows that funding for the Education SWAp increased from US$ 61.0m in 2006 to US$ 100.0m in 
2009. However, 2008 saw a decline to US$ 66.0m due to the decision by four Cooperating Partners 
(the UK, Norway, Finland and the European Union) to shift their disbursement modality to budget 
support. 
Education SWAp 2006-2009 by Participating CPs (US$ million) 
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JC 8.3:  The synergy between aid modalities has been discussed both within each focal sector 
and overall 
This JC has been assessed on the basis of three indicators related the synergy / link between instru-
ments, approaches and financing modalities in (i) EU strategy formulation documents, (ii) focal sectors 
identification and or preparation documents, and (iii) overall and focal sectors monitoring reports. 
Evidence of such analyses of links between instruments, approaches and financing modalities in the 
EU strategy formulation documents are found both at the country strategy formulation level (notably the 
two CSP-NIPs covering the reporting period) and at regional level (Region of Eastern and Southern 
Africa and the Indian Ocean – ESA-IO) with direct repercussions for the Zambia national level (e.g. the 
RSP/RIP of 2008-2013). However, this concerns rather individual (if not isolated) cases and as such the 
assessment cannot be automatically generalised for the overall strategy level and for each and every of 
its main components.  
An example in case is the discussion on the appropriate approach and financing modality for the health 
sector under the EDF10 CSP-NIP. Earlier in 2005, the development of the Health Human Resources 
Strategic Plan had led to the identification of an EDF9 sector budget support operation specifically ad-
dressed to finance the Human Resources plan in support of human resources retention. However, the 
delayed approval of the health sector budget support financial plan unfortunately had a negative impact 
on the implementation of the Human Resources Strategic Plan and undermined the confidence the 
Ministry of Health had in the predictability of funding with the Sector Budget Support operations. The 
financing modality worked out as solution consisted of the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) 
operation complementing the sector budget support with a focus on activities aimed at improving the 
retention of health workers in the most deprived and remote settings. The rationale for the complemen-
tarity of Sector Budget Support and General Budget Support was widely discussed in the course of the 
preceding two years (JAR, 2007). 
Early under EDF8, support to the transport sector has been entirely given via project support. Under 
EDF9 and 10, with the evolvement of the sector through sector reforms, for the move from ROADSIP I 
to ROADSIP II the three basic elements to consider ROADSIP II as a “sector programme” according to 
EC guidelines led to consider support to the sector via Sector Budget Support (SBS). Consequently and 
in line with the general policy directions on aid delivery and the utilisation of sector budget support as 
financing modality, the road maintenance support programme which had been initially prepared as 
“classical project’ was ‘retrofitted’ to a “sector policy support programme” (SPSP) in support of 
ROADSIP II with funding to be channelled through the Treasury to the Road Fund. To that end the EU 
prescribed seven key areas of assessment (macro-economic framework, sector policy, sector MTEF, 
accountability and PEM system, donor coordination, programme monitoring, institutional capacity) to 
decide whether a sector programme and the environment a sector programme is operating in are con-
ducive to follow sector budget support modalities, had been assessed, but only briefly. Identified weak-
nesses in the management of the road sector at RDA and NFRA levels were addressed through an 
accompanying capacity building component under classical EDF procedures (= project approach)... 
The comprehensive lessons learned section in Annex 12 on road transport to the EDF10 CSP-NIP fo-
cuses on sector dialogues, monitoring and assessment of sector performance, launching of sector stud-
ies, transparency of procurement procedures, etc. in order to arrive at the ultimate decision making 
regarding the most appropriate aid modality and financing mechanism. Difficulties especially arose in 
finding the right balance between really looking at the sector as a whole in the spirit of sector budget 
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support and the risk of sliding back in the “project mode” with regard to the physical interventions and 
their execution financed under the SBS tranches. 
The discussion of synergies between aid modalities, instruments and approaches can also be found in 
the regional strategy documents. But as for example is illustrated by the 2008-2013 RSP/RIP, overall 
this discussion is less prominent and outspoken at regional level compared to the Zambia national level 
itself. The discussions in first instance relate to the regional financing instruments. These are consid-
ered to have considerable potential as a means to improve local ownership of externally supported 
programmes, to reduce transaction costs and to improve the harmonisation and alignment of aid. At the 
same time, extending the aid effectiveness agenda to the regional level is a declared commitment on 
the part of both the EC and the EU Member States. Concrete examples: the COMESA Fund was estab-
lished in 2002 by a Protocol, and operates with two “windows”: an Adjustment Facility and an Infrastruc-
ture Facility. Similarly, EAC established a Partnership Fund in 2006 under which Development Partners 
contribute to short-term activities aiming to promote implementation of the Treaty and to boost EAC’s 
integration agenda.  
Overall, as is one of the main conclusions and recommendations from the recent evaluation of budget 
support in Zambia, it appears preferable not to just think in terms of alternative aid modalities, as it is 
more effective to stress the complementarity of instruments and the right combination for a specific 
context. The evaluation also shows that GBS is not always the best modality for realizing cooperating 
partners’ objectives. If there is no common understanding on priorities and strategies, and if partners 
are unable to influence the agenda through coherent incentives, other aid modalities may be more ef-
fective. Also, GBS may be more effective if it is supported by other aid modalities – and in return sector 
budget support (SBS), basket funding and project aid may be more effective if supported by GBS. This 
complementarity is assessed not to be automatic, however. (I-8.3.1) 
More or less the same findings and observations apply to the focal sectors identification and prepara-
tion documents as reported here above regarding the overall strategy formulation documents in con-
nection with indicator 8.3.1. It should be noted that the project approach is considered the “regular”, 
“traditional” aid modality, whereas sector budget support (SPSP) is still considered a “special” case 
requiring special justification. In the context of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda of Action on Aid 
effectiveness, this is a kind of upside down situation. But as reported earlier in the context of the dis-
cussion of reports and notes on the comparative advantages of the various instruments and approach-
es, there appears to be a kind of fatigue in discussing budget support and related issues. Preliminary 
discussions at the NAO Support Office during the evaluation preparatory mission at the end of August – 
early September event pointed into the direction of project approaches becoming “on vogue” again, 
which to a certain extent also was confirmed by interview discussions during the evaluation field visit in 
December 2011, despite budget support being reconfirmed by the Zambian Government through the 
NAO as the preferred cooperation modality. This revisiting of the choice of aid modalities no doubt also 
has to do with the rather sensitive issues surrounding the discussion in relation to good governance 
issues, which strongly affected the discussions and in a way muted the political dialogue on the issue. 
(1.8.3.2). 
Indicator I-8.3.3 on the assessment in monitoring reports of the actual synergies between aid modalities 
overall and for focal areas covers about the same issues as those reported with regard to earlier indica-
tors I-8.1.2, I-8.1.3 and I-8.3.2. By way of illustration, in the 2010 JAR is reported as general monitoring 
assessment of General Budget Support that as far as results are concerned, and based on an assess-
ment of progress in relation to the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF), 2010 was marked by 
the lowest achievement in the last 4 years. Performance indeed dropped from 70% in 2007, to 66.7% in 
2008, 65.6% in 2009 and 58.3% in 2010. Straight comparisons over the years are not entirely possible, 
as indicators have been strengthened and modified over time. However some sectors have consistently 
shown a positive trend (Education, HIV/AIDS, most of PFM), while others continue to fail to achieve 
their targets, e.g. agriculture policy and investments, rural feeder roads, child immunisation in the rural 
areas. The 'urban-rural divide' has therefore become a recurrent theme during the PRBS reviews. 
As far as the findings of the Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) missions are concerned, the EAMR of 
January 2011 just briefly indicates that the findings of the 14 projects ROMs were reflected in the pro-
jects concerned without further elaboration. In this connection, it may be considered to have a consoli-
dated summary / assessment of the conducted ROMs included standard in the EAMR. Such consoli-
dated analysis then preferably also focuses on issues of actual synergies between aid modalities. 
The MoFNP Development Cooperation Report for 2009 especially zeroes in on common basket fund-
ing. For MoFNP special accounts with multiple contributors are termed ‘common basket funding’. The 
largest basket funding arrangements are the Education and Health Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps). 
Other basket funding arrangements include the Rural Electrification Authority (REA), Public Service 
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Management (PSM), Private Sector Development (PSD), and the Public Expenditure Management and 
Financial Accountability (PEMFA) Programmes. In the EU EDF10- portfolio, this basket funding aid 
modality is the modus operandi for the Access to Justice programme (co-funded by GiZ and executed 
under indirect centralised management with delegation agreement with GiZ), for the agricultural sector 
performance enhancement programme (together with Finland and IFAD) and for the support to the 
electoral process in a trust fund with 5 other CPs with UNDP as lead of the consortium. (I-8.3.3) 
 
JC 8.4: Combinations of instruments and approaches were defined to suit partners’ capacity 
more than regulations of each financing modality 
 Indicator 8.4.1: Existence of detailed capacity assessment in EU programming and project 
implementation 
Capacity assessment of both the main programme/project stakeholders (policy makers, management 
and staff) and of the core institutions / organisations involved in / responsible for the programme or 
project is essential for ensuring the viability and ultimate success of the cooperation intervention. This a 
fortiori pertains to more complex instruments and aid modalities as sectoral budget support and espe-
cially general budget support. The 2011 Country Evaluation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia (Phase 
II) made a review of overall aid coordination and management capacities of the country and concluded 
that the capacity of Zambia to coordinate and manage aid generally is growing slowly, with improve-
ments in public financial management and procurement. However, major gaps remain in terms of ana-
lytical work, policy formulation, strategic planning and monitoring and evaluation capacities. These also 
have been receiving the least support. Most capacity-building has focused on core ministries, with lim-
ited attention to the needs of parliaments, auditors and civil society who play an active role. In direct 
reaction to the JC, capacity assessment and their results are featured indeed in the EU programming 
and project/programme implementation documents, but one cannot conclude to this being the general 
rule and particularly not to this being the basis for comprehensive capacity development strategies and 
programmes to adequately answer these needs. There is insufficient empirical evidence to support 
such conclusion even if most (if not all) general and sectoral budget support programmes have an in-
herent capacity strengthening component built in. 
On the other hand there is documented evidence in the EU programming and project implementation 
documents of the due importance and care being given to capacity elements. The JAR of early 2003 for 
example indicated that EDF support to the Education Strategic Plan pool was deliberately limited to 
basic education only with a “designated fund” modality explicitly described in the MoU. The reason pro-
vided in the JAR for this prudent approach is that unlike the Health sector, where EDF support to basket 
funding has been going on for four years already, in education, EDF has been implementing support 
through a traditional project and therefore still lacks deep knowledge of the specific sector dialogue to 
make it a suitable candidate for fully fledged sectoral budget support (at present multi-donor basket 
funding is in place for the education sector, however without active involvement of the EU programmed 
under EDF10)... 
A practical illustration of capacity issues having influenced decision making on re-programming and re-
allocations is provided by the EDF10 mid-term review which recommended considering the major re-
structuring process launched in the agriculture and livestock sector, and given the complementarity 
existing with interventions under the focal sector 'Regional integration – transport infrastructure' high-
lighted in the NIP, to reallocate part of the funds between the two sectors to support, amongst others, 
agricultural market development and cross-border trade.  
A more recent example relates to the current capacity assessment in the Access to Justice Programme. 
The Good Governance Programme in cooperation with the EUD and the Danish Embassy reconfirmed 
their commitment to support the Access to Justice Programme and thereto is currently undertaking a 
capacity assessment of the Governance Secretariat and the five criminal justice institutions (Prison 
Service, Police, Judiciary, Legal Aid Board and the Public Prosecutor’s Office). The findings of the as-
sessment are expected not only to highlight the capacity needs of the AJP institutions and to accentu-
ate the interface for civil society engagement in the AJP, but also to provide the necessary information 
to decide on an adequate funding modality.  
At a more general and strategic level, the July 2007 EAMR was unambiguously clear by stating that 
“The ongoing and forthcoming sector projects and programmes are and will be embedded in the exist-
ing sector dialogue mechanisms, i.e. joint broad ownership through the use of existing coordinating 
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fora, and through the full use of monitoring and reporting modalities in place for sector support (e.g. the 
framing of monitoring activities within existing joint sector reviews when possible).” At the same time the 
EAMR indicated indiscriminately, regardless the capacity status of the executing entity / implementing 
unit that use of centralised, long term technical assistance-staffed implementation units will be avoided 
and use of local expertise maximised. The EAMR continues that ownership of the EDF portfolio of pro-
jects will be enhanced through increased focus on capacity building of the NAO functions within the 
Economic and Technical Co-operation Department of the Ministry of Finance. But in another EAMR 
report (2004) it is mentioned that the lack of funding for training activities (for local staff, NAO etc.) seri-
ously impedes the ability of the Delegation to step up knowledge of EDF rules and procedures, both at 
NAO and line-Ministries. 
A related issue reported in the 2011 Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia is that while budget sup-
port and similar aid delivery methodologies require special coordination and managerial capacities, at 
the same time these capacities are so much stretched in relation to policy dialogue issues that there is 
limited time left for the planning, steering and management of the actual development actions to the 
benefit of the targeted beneficiaries (or in short: the policy dialogue agenda negatively impacting on the 
development agenda). The report continues: “While it would be definitely exaggerated to expect budget 
support to resolve all challenges at GRZ side, the instrument could have been better adapted to the 
case of Zambia. Like many other countries in the region, Zambia’s relatively weak systemic capac ity to 
cope with its tremendous political and economic challenges could have been taken into account in a 
more appropriate way by the PRBS group. The country and its government in particular have not yet 
developed the level of systemic strength that allows for effectively harmonising and aligning Cooperat-
ing Partners according to a coherence strategic framework. Moreover, especially in recent years, GRZ 
has not shown substantial will to engage in far reaching institutional reforms nor did it show sufficient 
administrative capacity in several sectors and at the level of inter-sector organisation to coordinate 
complex development plans and to align Cooperating Partners accordingly. In such a scenario, Coop-
erating Partners themselves become much more responsible for contributing to coherent policy making 
and institutional strengthening.”  
Also, from the different discussions at EUD, with EU Member States and the CPs during the December 
field visit to Zambia, it was learned that the present broader political enabling environment in Zambia 
under the new government appears more conducive and favourable with regard to the different key 
factors constituting such necessary enabling environment for budget support. 
Data, figures, tables: 
EAMR, Jan 2010, Annex A:  
17416
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Extracts: 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p. xii Has the implementation of the Paris Decla-
ration strengthened the contribution of aid to sustainable development results (development out-
comes)? How? – Core Question 3. Overall, there are indications that the capacity of Zambia to coor-
dinate and manage aid is growing slowly, with improvements in public financial management, and 
procurement. However, major gaps remain in terms of analytical work, policy formulation, strategic 
planning and evaluation capacities. These have been receiving the least support. Most capacity-
building has focused on core ministries, with limited attention to the needs of parliaments, auditors 
and civil society who play an active role.  
 
JAR 2003, p32: v) Education: The 9th EC support to the education sector will be provided through 
support to the Education Strategic Plan pool. The financing decision is due in February 2004. After-
wards, the EC will sign the MoU binding the ‘like-minded’ cooperating partners and the MoE. Howev-
er, EDF support will initially be directed to basic education only, with a ‘designated fund’ modality ex-
plicitly described in the MoU. The reason for this prudent approach is that unlike the Health sector, 
where EDF support to basket funding has been going on for four years already, in education, EDF has 
been implementing support through a traditional project approach (ZECAB, funded from EDF8 and 
due to end in June 2004), and therefore still lacks deep knowledge of the specific sector dialogue. 
 
EAMR Jul 2007, p2: Quality. The ongoing and forthcoming sector projects and programmes are and 
will be embedded in the existing sector dialogue mechanisms, i.e. joint broad ownership through the 
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use of existing coordinating fora, and through the full use monitoring and reporting modalities in place 
for sector support (e.g. frame monitoring activities within existing joint sector reviews when possible). 
This will enhance sustainability, increased pertinence and provide early warning signals through en-
hanced ownership and broadened monitoring. Transaction costs will be minimised with the focusing 
on the NAO office of most EDF-related operations. The use of centralised, long term technical assis-
tance-staffed implementation units will be avoided and use of local expertise maximised. Ownership 
of the EDF portfolio of project will be enhanced through increased focus on capacity building of the 
NAO functions within the Economic and Technical Co-operation department of Ministry of Finance. A 
new EDF training cycle is planned for November 2007 
 
EAMR Sep 2004, p1: The capacity leap in terms of additional human resources gradually becoming 
available in the newly deconcentrated Delegation is not matched with the capacity inside the NAO of-
fice. This created some problems that have been tackled by stepping up information exchange 
through formal and informal contacts between the Delegation and the Ministry of Finance + National 
Planning at all hierarchical levels. We also advised stronger co-ordination inside the Ministry, espe-
cially between the directorates directly involved with our programmes, e.g. the Economic Technical 
Co-Operation Direction, hosting the NAO staff, the Budget Office and the Planning Department in or-
der to further reduce the observed bottle-necks inside the NAO office. However, lack of funding for 
training activities (for local staff, NAO etc.) seriously impedes the ability of the Delegation to step up 
knowledge of EDF9 rules and procedures, both at NAO and line-Ministries. 
 
JAR 2007, p24: The Joint Annual Review of the Health Sector, conducted in March 2007, had Human 
Resources as one of its three themes, and it once more allowed to focus field level analysis as well as 
the policy debate on this issue, keeping it very much on top of the sector agenda. 
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p. xii; Has the implementation of the Paris Dec-
laration strengthened the contribution of aid to sustainable development results (development out-
comes)? How? – Core Question 3. With respect to administrative efficiency, reports and minutes of 
the SWAp coordination meetings from 2002 to 2010 showed that a substantial amount of time is spent 
attending these meetings. MoH staff interviewed indicated that considerable time is spent organising 
and staging SWAp-specific and other technical meetings. As part of the organisation process, matters 
arising during the meetings have to be followed-up and action taken, reports produced and circulated 
to all members in time for the next meeting. The donors who were not polling resources had their own 
separate planning, budgeting and reporting formats. This is reported to have increased the admin-
istration workload of staff, especially the programme managers at lower levels who have had to regu-
larly submit reports to the Ministry of Health headquarters.  
 
EDF10 – CSP-NIP 2008-2013 Annex 6 p. xxiii; The harmonisation / alignment in Zambia. The JASZ: 
On the Wider Harmonisation in Practice (WHIP) agreement signed by 10 cooperating partners in April 
2004 and by 2006 signed by all EU Member States represented in Zambia, the EC and the main non-
EU cooperating partners: Government. The WHIP agreement aims to increase Government leader-
ship of coordination by calling for the establishment of an external development assistance policy, 
with the Ministry of Finance and National Planning at the head, to provide guidelines and procedures 
to govern various areas including coordination and harmonisation, ODA agreements, and technical 
assistance as well as financial and accounting systems. In addition, the WHIP agreement called for an 
Aid Management Capacity Assessment to be undertaken. Key element of the Memorandum is an an-
nex with specific actions and initiatives to be taken.  
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p9: Considering the major restructuring process launched in the ag-
riculture and livestock sector, and given the complementarity existing with interventions under the fo-
cal sector 'Regional integration – transport infrastructure' highlighted in the NIP, it is recommended to 
reallocate part of the funds between the two sectors to support, amongst others, agricultural market 
development and cross-border trade.  
 
DIE – IOB (2011), pp. v-vi; Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia – Synthesis Report, Main Find-
ings of the Evaluation regarding budget support and harmonisation: A political economy perspective: 
“Based on the common intervention logic of budget support, one could argue it to be crucial for the ef-
fectiveness of the instrument that a recipient country not only has a substantial level of ownership for 
poverty reduction policies and institutional reforms but also possesses the institutional capacity to 
craft and implement complex development plans. Moreover, the intervention logic requires a recipient 
country to strongly support the alignment of a heterogeneous set of Cooperating Partners according 
to its reform strategies and priorities. Consequently, with an increasing level of the recipient country’s 
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systemic capacity to address development issues – that is with increasing levels of democratic ac-
countability, transparency and administrative capability – the endogenous collective action problems 
of Cooperating Partners are resolved by the recipients. As recipient countries with such systemic ca-
pacity will have not only ownership for development oriented processes but also the capability to for-
mulate and implement development oriented reforms, the responsibility for harmonising and aligning 
donor countries will tend to move relatively smooth to the partner country’s government.  
While it would be definitely exaggerated to expect budget support to resolve all challenges at GRZ 
side, the instrument could have been better adapted to the case of Zambia. Like many other countries 
in the region, Zambia’s relatively weak systemic capacity to cope with its tremendous political and 
economic challenges could have been taken into account in a more appropriate way by the PRBS 
group. The country and its government in particular have not yet developed the level of systemic 
strength that allows for effectively harmonising and aligning Cooperating Partners according to a co-
herence strategic framework. Moreover, especially in recent years, GRZ has not shown substantial 
will to engage in far reaching institutional reforms nor did it show sufficient administrative capacity in 
several sectors and at the level of inter-sector organisation to coordinate complex development plans 
and to align Cooperating Partners accordingly. In such a scenario, Cooperating Partners themselves 
become much more responsible for contributing to coherent policy making and institutional strength-
ening.  
Systemic weaknesses in Zambia: The mentioned weaknesses can be summarised as follows: (i) 
Vague National Development Plan (more focused on past developments than in setting out well-
defined scenarios for future policies); (ii) Inter-ministerial incoherency; (iii) Weak aid management, 
and (iv) Declining political will for political dialogue.” 
 
Good Governance Programme (2011a); Capacity Assessment in the Access to Justice Programme: 
The Good Governance Programme in cooperation with the Delegation of the European Commission 
in Zambia and the Danish Embassy is committed to support the Access to Justice Programme and is 
currently undertaking a capacity assessment of the Governance Secretariat and the five criminal jus-
tice institutions (Prison Service, Police, Judiciary, Legal Aid Board and the Public Prosecutor’s Office). 
The findings of the assessment will highlight the capacity needs of the AJP institutions. It will also pro-
vide the necessary information to decide on an adequate funding modality. Furthermore, it will accen-
tuate the interface for civil society engagement in the AJP. 
 
EUD Access to Justice Programme (2011); Capacity In the past, during phase I of the "DANIDA" 
project, the Governance Secretariat (GS) was the entity in charge of channelling the monies to the 5 
institutions benefitting from the AtoJ project. At present, after a capacity assessment and after approv-
ing the work plan for 2011, GS only channels monies to LAB and DPP while others receive funds di-
rectly from GIZ. 
 
 Indicator 8.4.2: Mix of instruments, approaches and financing modalities different accord-
ing to sector-specific institutional capacity 
This indicator I-8.4.2 regarding the mix of instruments, approaches and financing modalities being dif-
ferent according to / adapted to sector specific institutional capacity in fact is not significantly different 
from the earlier indicator I-8.2.1 regarding the mix of instruments, approaches and modalities being 
dependent on sector specific factors. This for the simple reason that institutional capacity is one of, if 
not the main sector specific factor itself. As illustrated earlier the mix of instruments, approaches and 
financing modalities for sectors with established and sustainable institutional capacity as health and 
transport are substantially different from sectors characterised by relatively low capacity as agriculture / 
food security and to a certain extent also still education. 
An example in case to illustrate project/programme modalities determined / or at least influenced by 
sector-specific institutional capacity is provided by the 2010 PEMFA (Public Expenditure Management 
and Financial Accountability) evaluation as commented on in the 2010 JAR as follows: “…the evalua-
tion also highlighted factors that have negatively affected the outcome of the programme, such as: poor 
project design, with an over-ambitious scope and timescale for a relative low-capacity country such as 
Zambia; the lack of a Change Management Strategy since inception, key for such a complex pro-
gramme; the absence on the Zambian side of ownership and strong leadership until very late in pro-
gramme implementation. This was compelled both by the initial institutional set up (with a programme 
driven by a Secretariat made up of external consultants), and the pressure exerted by Cooperating 
Partners.” 
Generally however, there is still substantive room for improvement in assessing and, especially, taking 
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into consideration sector-specific institutional capacity for the determination of the ultimate choice / of 
the best mix of instruments, approaches and financing modalities. The earlier cited recent 2011 budget 
support evaluation
97
 concluded from a police economy perspective that while it definitely would be over-
optimistic to expect budget support to resolve all GRZ’s challenges, the instrument could have been 
better adapted to the case of Zambia. Like many other countries in the region, Zambia’s relatively weak 
systemic capacity to cope with its tremendous political and economic challenges could have been taken 
into account in a more appropriate way by the PRBS group. The country, and particularly its govern-
ment, has not yet developed the level of systemic strength that allows for effective harmonisation and 
alignment of cooperating partners according to a coherent strategic framework. In recent years in par-
ticular, GRZ has not shown a substantial will to engage in far-reaching institutional reforms. It has also 
not demonstrated that it has enough administrative capacity in certain sectors and at the level of inter-
sector organisation to coordinate complex development plans and to align cooperating partners accord-
ingly. In such a scenario, cooperating partners themselves become much more responsible for contrib-
uting to coherent policy making and institutional strengthening.  
The evaluation acknowledges that budget support has contributed to the realisation of a number of, 
albeit modest, objectives and that these results make a significant difference. Yet at the same time the 
study points out that the incentives created by the PRBS group, and the policy signals they have sent, 
have often been inconsistent and at times even contradictory. This has unnecessarily narrowed the 
margin of policy and political reform. The statement that aid cannot buy reforms – while true – thus 
easily obscures the fact that aid agencies can also miss opportunities in the margins of this reform. 
And then there not only are the necessary political, institutional and capacity related dimensions of the 
necessary enabling environment for budget support, particularly for its variant with flexible tranches 
related to / dependent on the achievement of predetermined results at outcome and impact level as for 
example the MDGs. There are also a number of more down to earth, technical and operational precon-
ditions which do not appear to have been fulfilled well to ensure effective and efficient budget support 
programmes execution. From the interviews during the field visit it for example was learned that the 
necessary monitoring tools and systems are simply not in place yet to provide reliable, accurate and 
representative information on these MDG key performance indicators with the necessary frequency and 
intervals to enable solid, empirically based decision making regarding the release or not of the variable 
tranches.  
Extracts: 
JAR 2010, p9; On the 2010 PEMFA evaluation: “… the evaluation also highlighted factors that have 
negatively affected the outcome of the programme, such as: poor project design, with an over-
ambitious scope and timescale for a relative low-capacity country such as Zambia; the lack of a 
Change Management Strategy since inception, key for such a complex programme; the absence on 
the Zambian side of ownership and strong leadership until very late in programme implementation. 
This was compelled both by the initial institutional set up (with a programme driven by a Secretariat 
made up of external consultants), and the pressure exerted by Cooperating Partners.” 
 
EAMR, August 2004, p3: Periodic discussion with the RAO (COMESA) during the reporting period 
focused on both revealed and supposed difficulties with the new EDF9 rules and regulations for the 
implementation of the ESA-RIP and the specific problems encountered by different RO’s such as 
COMESA. The recent availability of key Guidelines, including proposed solutions published by AID-
CO, allowed for a clarification of the issue. 
 
Access to Justice Project – Meeting Report (14 February 2011): Three possible modes of Delivery 
– Financing Agreement, Local Subsidy Agreement and Direct Procurement, which are standard ap-
proaches and follow contractual, financial and procurement procedures of GIZ – were explained to the 
representatives of the various AtoJ institutions. Formats were made available. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on JC 8.4: 
DIE & IOB (2011) p15; Evaluation Summary and Conclusions: Banerjee and Duflo’s message is that 
one can make a difference by creating the right incentives. In principle, the intervention logic of budget 
support takes these insights seriously. The logic of providing a harmonised combination of financial 
inputs and non-financial components (dialogue, conditionality and technical assistance) is congruent 
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with such a dynamic perspective on ownership. The challenge for aid agencies in Zambia (and else-
where) has been to implement this intervention logic and to provide a coherent incentive system. The 
results of this evaluation show that, like any other government, GRZ has responded to external incen-
tives as well. Budget support has contributed to the realisation of a number of albeit modest – objec-
tives and these results make a significant difference. Yet the incentives created by the PRBS group, 
and the policy signals they have sent, have often been inconsistent and at times even contradictory. 
This has unnecessarily narrowed the margin of policy and political reform. The statement that aid 
cannot buy reforms – while true – thus easily obscures the fact that aid agencies can also miss oppor-
tunities in the margins of this reform. 
 
DIE & IOB (2011) p20; Evaluation Summary and Conclusions: Budget Support and Harmonisation: A 
Political Economy Perspective: While it would definitely be over-optimistic to expect budget support to 
resolve all GRZ’s challenges, the instrument could have been better adapted to the case of Zambia. 
Like many other countries in the region, Zambia’s relatively weak systemic capacity to cope with its 
tremendous political and economic challenges could have been taken into account in a more appro-
priate way by the PRBS group. The country, and particularly its government, has not yet developed 
the level of systemic strength that allows for effective harmonisation and alignment of cooperating 
partners according to a coherent strategic framework. In recent years in particular, GRZ has not 
shown a substantial will to engage in far-reaching institutional reforms. It has also not demonstrated 
that it has enough administrative capacity in certain sectors and at the level of inter-sector organisa-
tion to coordinate complex development plans and to align cooperating partners accordingly. In such 
a scenario, cooperating partners themselves become much more responsible for contributing to co-
herent policy making and institutional strengthening. 
 
The above report continues (pp. 21-22) by identifying a number of systemic weaknesses, which are 
summarily highlighted as follows: (i) Vagueness of the National Development Plan; (ii) Inter-ministerial 
incoherence; (iii) Weak aid management, and; (iv) Less will for political reform.  
 
JC 8.4:  Combinations of instruments and approaches were defined to suit partners’ capacity 
more than regulations of each financing modality 
The statement upon this JC is built around the issue of provisions for capacity assessment in EU pro-
gramming and project implementation on the one hand (I-8.4.1.) and the mix of instruments, approach-
es and financing modalities determined (or not) by sector-specific institutional capacity on the other. (I-
8.4.2.) 
Capacity assessment of both the main programme/project stakeholders (policy makers, management, 
staff) and of the core institutions / organisations involved in / responsible for the programme or project is 
essential for ensuring the viability and ultimate success of the cooperation intervention. This a fortiori 
pertains to more complex instruments and aid modalities as sectoral budget support and especially 
general budget support. The 2011 Country Evaluation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia (Phase II) 
made a review of overall aid coordination and management capacities of the country and concluded 
that the capacity of Zambia to coordinate and manage aid generally is growing slowly, with improve-
ments especially in public financial management and procurement. However, major gaps remain in 
terms of analytical work, policy formulation, strategic planning and monitoring and evaluation capacities. 
These also have been receiving the least support. Most capacity-building has focused on core minis-
tries, with limited attention to the needs of parliaments, auditors and civil society who play an active 
role. In direct reaction to the JC, capacity assessment and its results are featured indeed in the EU 
programming and project/programme implementation documents, but one cannot conclude to this being 
the general rule and particularly not to this being the basis for comprehensive capacity development 
strategies and programmes to adequately address these needs. There is insufficient empirical evidence 
to support such conclusion even if most (if not all) general and sectoral budget support programmes 
have an inherent capacity strengthening component built in. (I-8.4.1) 
On the other hand, there is documented evidence in the EU programming and project implementation 
documents of the due importance and care being given to capacity strengthening. The JAR of early 
2003 for example indicated that EDF support to the Education Strategic Plan pool was deliberately lim-
ited to basic education only with a “designated fund” modality explicitly described in the MoU. The rea-
son provided in the JAR for this prudent approach is that unlike the health sector, where EDF support to 
basket funding has been going on for four years already, in education, EDF has been implementing 
support through a traditional project and therefore still lacks deep knowledge of the specific sector dia-
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logue to make it a suitable candidate for fully fledged sectoral budget support (at present multi-donor 
basket funding is in place for the education sector, however without active involvement of the EU pro-
grammed under EDF10)... 
A practical illustration of capacity issues having influenced decision making on re-programming and re-
allocations is provided by the EDF10 mid-term review which recommended considering the major re-
structuring process launched in the agriculture and livestock sector, and given the complementarity 
existing with interventions under the focal sector 'Regional integration – transport infrastructure' high-
lighted in the NIP, to reallocate part of the funds between the two sectors to support, amongst others, 
agricultural market development and cross-border trade.  
A more recent example relates to the current capacity assessment in the Access to Justice Programme. 
The Good Governance Programme in cooperation with the EUD and the Danish Embassy reconfirmed 
their commitment to support the Access to Justice Programme and thereto is currently undertaking a 
capacity assessment of the Governance Secretariat and the five criminal justice institutions (Prison 
Service, Police, Judiciary, Legal Aid Board and the Public Prosecutor’s Office). The findings of the as-
sessment are expected not only to highlight the capacity needs of the AJP institutions and to accentu-
ate the interface for civil society engagement in the AJP, but also to provide the necessary information 
to decide on an adequate funding modality.  
At a more general and strategic level, the July 2007 EAMR was unambiguously clear by stating that 
“The ongoing and forthcoming sector projects and programmes are and will be embedded in the exist-
ing sector dialogue mechanisms, i.e. joint broad ownership through the use of existing coordinating 
fora, and through the full use of monitoring and reporting modalities in place for sector support (e.g. the 
framing of monitoring activities within existing joint sector reviews when possible). At the same time, the 
EAMR indicated indiscriminately, regardless the capacity status of the executing entity / implementing 
unit, that use of centralised, long term technical assistance-staffed implementation units will be avoided 
and use of local expertise maximised. The EAMR continues that ownership of the EDF portfolio of pro-
jects will be enhanced through increased focus on capacity building of the NAO functions within the 
Economic and Technical Co-operation Department of the Ministry of Finance. But in another EAMR 
report (2004) it is mentioned that the lack of funding for training activities (for local staff, NAO etc.) seri-
ously impedes the ability of the Delegation to step up knowledge of EDF rules and procedures, both at 
NAO and line-Ministries. 
A related issue reported in the 2011 Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia is that while budget sup-
port and similar aid delivery methodologies require special coordination and managerial capacities, at 
the same time these capacities are so much stretched in relation to policy dialogue issues that there is 
limited time left for the planning, steering and management of the actual development actions to the 
benefit of the targeted beneficiaries (or in short: the policy dialogue agenda negatively impacting on the 
development agenda). The report continues: “While it would be definitely exaggerated to expect budget 
support to resolve all challenges at GRZ side, the instrument could have been better adapted to the 
case of Zambia. Like many other countries in the region, Zambia’s relatively weak systemic capac ity to 
cope with its tremendous political and economic challenges could have been taken into account in a 
more appropriate way by the PRBS group. The country and its government in particular have not yet 
developed the level of systemic strength that allows for effectively harmonising and aligning Cooperat-
ing Partners according to a coherence strategic framework. Moreover, especially in recent years, GRZ 
has not shown substantial will to engage in far reaching institutional reforms nor did it show sufficient 
administrative capacity in several sectors and at the level of inter-sector organisation to coordinate 
complex development plans and to align Cooperating Partners accordingly. In such a scenario, Coop-
erating Partners themselves become much more responsible for contributing to coherent policy making 
and institutional strengthening.”  
Also, from the different discussions at EUD, with EU Member States and the CPs during the December 
field visit to Zambia, it was learned that the present broader political enabling environment in Zambia 
under the new government appears more conducive and favourable with regard to the different key 
factors constituting such necessary enabling environment for budget support. (I-8.4.1) 
This indicator 8.4.2. regarding the mix of instruments, approaches and financing modalities being differ-
ent according to / adapted to sector specific institutional capacity in fact is not significantly different from 
the earlier indicator regarding the mix of instruments, approaches and modalities being dependent on 
sector specific factors. This for the simple reason that institutional capacity is one of, if not the main 
sector specific factor itself. As illustrated earlier, the mix of instruments, approaches and financing mo-
dalities for sectors with established and sustainable institutional capacity as health and transport are 
substantially different from sectors characterised by relatively low capacity as agriculture / food security 
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and to a certain extent also still education. 
An example in case to illustrate project/programme modalities determined / or at least influenced by 
sector-specific institutional capacity is provided by the 2010 PEMFA (Public Expenditure Management 
and Financial Accountability) evaluation as commented on in the 2010 JAR as follows: “…the evalua-
tion also highlighted factors that have negatively affected the outcome of the programme, such as: poor 
project design, with an over-ambitious scope and timescale for a relative low-capacity country such as 
Zambia; the lack of a Change Management Strategy since inception, key for such a complex pro-
gramme; the absence on the Zambian side of ownership and strong leadership until very late in pro-
gramme implementation. This was compelled both by the initial institutional set up (with a programme 
driven by a Secretariat made up of external consultants), and the pressure exerted by Cooperating 
Partners.” 
Generally however, there is still substantive room for improvement in assessing and, especially, taking 
into consideration sector-specific institutional capacity for the determination of the ultimate choice / of 
the best mix of instruments, approaches and financing modalities. The earlier cited recent 2011 budget 
support evaluation
98
 concluded from a police economy perspective that while it definitely would be over-
optimistic to expect budget support to resolve all GRZ’s challenges, the instrument could have been 
better adapted to the case of Zambia. Like many other countries in the region, Zambia’s relatively weak 
systemic capacity to cope with its tremendous political and economic challenges could have been taken 
into account in a more appropriate way by the PRBS group. The country, and particularly its govern-
ment, has not yet developed the level of systemic strength that allows for effective harmonisation and 
alignment of cooperating partners according to a coherent strategic framework. In recent years in par-
ticular, GRZ has not shown a substantial will to engage in far-reaching institutional reforms. It has also 
not demonstrated that it has enough administrative capacity in certain sectors and at the level of inter-
sector organisation to coordinate complex development plans and to align cooperating partners accord-
ingly. In such a scenario, cooperating partners themselves become much more responsible for contrib-
uting to coherent policy making and institutional strengthening.  
The evaluation acknowledges that budget support has contributed to the realisation of a number of, 
albeit modest, objectives and that these results make a significant difference. Yet at the same time the 
study points out that the incentives created by the PRBS group, and the policy signals they have sent, 
have often been inconsistent and at times even contradictory. This has unnecessarily narrowed the 
margin of policy and political reform. The statement that aid cannot buy reforms – while true – thus 
easily obscures the fact that aid agencies can also miss opportunities in the margins of this reform. 
And then there not only are the necessary political, institutional and capacity related dimensions of the 
necessary enabling environment for budget support, particularly for its variant with flexible tranches 
related to/ dependent on the achievement of predetermined results at outcome and impact level as for 
example the MDGs. There are also a number of more down to earth, technical and operational precon-
ditions which do not appear to have been fulfilled well to ensure effective and efficient budget support 
programmes execution. From the interviews during the field visit it for example was learned that the 
necessary monitoring tools and systems are simply not in place yet to provide reliable, accurate and 
representative information on these MDG key performance indicators with the necessary frequency and 
intervals to enable solid, empirically based decision making regarding the release or not of the variable 
tranches. 
 
JC 8.5: Combining EU aid modalities was an inclusive internal strategic process 
 Indicator 8.5.1: Comparative advantages of possible combination of aid modalities included 
in policy dialogue with NAO and line ministries for focal sectors 
The issue of comparative advantages of possible combination of aid modalities included in the policy 
dialogue with line ministries for focal sectors has already been addressed in the earlier discussion on 
the different mixes of instruments, approaches and financing modalities depending on sector specific 
factors (I-8.2.1) and in relation to JC 8.3 on the synergy between aid modalities, discussed both within 
each focal sector and overall (indicators I-8.3.1 to I-83.3.).  
The recent budget support evaluation in Zambia concluded with regard to the financing function of 
budget support in relation to the developments in budget composition that budget support was predom-
inantly additional to domestic financing and there has been no evidence for substantial crowding out of 
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domestic resources. Zambia’s budget has also become more pro-poor over the past years as poverty 
related expenditure increased as a share of the total budget and as a share of GDP. Budget allocations 
and expenditure in Zambia have been roughly in line with strategic priorities as set out in the Fifth Na-
tional Development Plan. Overall budget increases in social sectors such as health and education over-
proportionally stemmed from GRZ contributions. 
As far as the policy dialogue with the NAO is concerned, in the EU-ACP relations set-up in line with the 
Lomé and Cotonou agreements, the National Authorising Officer (NAOs) plays a pivotal role in the 
overall policy dialogue between the ACP Country and the European Union. This particularly pertains to 
all matters regarding the Country Strategy Paper and the National Indicative Programme, throughout 
the integrated programme cycle form preparation to ex-post evaluation. As far as Zambia is concerned, 
in 2010 the NAO function shifted from the Minister of Finance to the Secretary to the Treasury. The 
NAO Support Office continued to be located outside the Ministry. As far as the intensity and quality of 
the EUD-NAO relations and coordination are concerned, in the EAMR July 2011 is reported in this re-
gard that “Government officials involved with EDF issues did not demonstrate much motivation in famil-
iarising themselves with the procedures and requirements of just one particular donor.”  
On the other hand, from the different contacts with the MoFNP and the NAO support office emanated a 
positive relationship of which both parties expressed the desire of further strengthening also on issues 
related to the policy dialogue and the joint search for aid modalities best adapted to the evolving needs 
and macro-economic situation of the country. The Secretary to the Treasury as NAO reconfirmed 
budget support to be the preferred aid modality of Zambia and the openness to discuss combinations of 
aid modalities best fitting the evolving macro-economic and financial situation of the country as a whole 
and the specific requirements of each sector and thematic area, of local authorities and civil society. 
The elements of a necessary enabling environment for budget support including policy dialogue at all 
levels, harmonisation, capacity strengthening, performance monitoring and evaluation systems, 
amongst others, were confirmed to be requiring special attention. The interviews at EUD and with CPs 
all pointed at new windows of opportunity with the coming into power of the new government in Sep-
tember 2012.  
Extracts: 
EAMR Jan 11, p3: Work intensified with the two Ministries responsible for Agriculture and Livestock 
ahead of the implementation of Performance Enhancement Programme which should bring changes 
to the overall management of the sector. 
 
EAMR Jan 11, p3: The NAO function was shifted from the Minister of Finance to the Secretary to the 
Treasury. The NAO Support Office continued to be located outside the Ministry. Government officials 
involved with EDF issues did not demonstrate much motivation in familiarising themselves with the 
procedures and requirements of just one particular donor. 
 
DIE – IOB (2011), p.iii; Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia – Synthesis Report, Main Findings of 
the Evaluation regarding the financing function of budget support: Development of budget composi-
tion: Budget support was predominantly additional to domestic financing and there has been no evi-
dence for substantial crowding out of domestic resources. Zambia’s budget has also become more 
pro-poor over the past years as poverty related expenditure increased as a share of the total budget 
and as a share of GDP. Budget allocations and expenditure in Zambia have been roughly in line with 
strategic priorities as set out in the Fifth National Development Plan. Overall budget increases in so-
cial sectors such as health and education over-proportionally stemmed from GRZ contributions. 
 Indicator 8.5.2: EU organised fora and workshops for stakeholders (incl. NSAs) on compar-
ative strengths and weaknesses of various EU instruments and approaches 
There is evidence of the EU organising fora and workshops for stakeholders, both government and 
non-government on EU procedures, instruments and approaches, which also cover the latter’s compar-
ative strengths and weaknesses. There is less evidence that such capacity building events were part of 
a more comprehensive and structured capacity building programme and process on the topic, rather 
than these being more ad hoc events. The need for such more systematic and comprehensive capacity 
strengthening is reported in relation to both national stakeholders as for the Delegation itself. The 2004 
EAMR for example reported as risks affecting the work of the Delegation: “Not enough training on EDF 
rules and procedures has been provided to NAO, RAO, PMUs and Project Managers. Therefore it is 
possible that not all procedures are followed and can be corrected only when tender dossiers, contract 
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dossiers, or payment requests reach the Delegation for control and endorsement. This will cause de-
lays in payments and deliveries.” This need was repeated in subsequent EARMs as for example in the 
2007 EAMR which reported: “In conclusion, the Delegation will require in 2006 continued technical 
guidance from HQ on all the areas and sectors mentioned above. Areas of special relevance are: 
budget support orientations and modalities (variable tranches), sector support modalities (in particular 
health and education), institutional framework for private sector, actions with public services and NSA 
for agriculture/food security and support to electoral process. However, the Delegation insists on a clear 
definition of competences between AIDCO and DEV on these matters.” 
Towards the end of last year 2011, the EUD initiated a structured local consultation with the main 
stakeholder parties on aid modalities following the issuance by the Commission of the Green Paper on 
Budget Support. In the EUD note on this Green Paper local consultation is noted: “A structured dia-
logue with the Government has unfortunately not been possible. Copies of the Green Paper have how-
ever been made available and the National Authorising Officer (Secretary to the Treasury) has been 
invited to share comments; these are yet to be received. In general, the mood surrounding the discus-
sions was one of broad fatigue on issues pertaining to Budget Support. The specific Zambian context, 
where difficult discussions are taking place on the pertinence and impact of the modality and where 
Government is challenged on its commitment to PFM (Public Finance Management) and good govern-
ance, seems to have affected the degree of participation and interest in the consultation process. 
Though the scope of the consultation was repeatedly explained, it has proved impossible to delink the 
discussions from the situation experienced locally. It should also be noted that a number of questions 
listed in the Paper required clarification as they did not come across too clearly.” (See also the discus-
sion related to Indicator I-8.1.1). On the other hand, the consultations and interviews during the De-
cember 2011 evaluation field visit to Zambia led to conclude to a generally more optimistic view regard-
ing the quality and intensity of GRZ-CPs policy dialogue on aid modalities and related issues especially 
also with the more recent developments in the broader political context.  
The subsequent EAMRs alerting about the need for further strengthened capacity building of the main 
national stakeholders on EDF procedures, aid modalities, approaches and instruments especially ze-
roed in on the special role and needs of the NAO in this regard. An example in case is the EAMR of 
July 2007 which indicated: “Ownership of the EDF portfolio of projects will be enhanced through in-
creased focus on capacity building of the NAO functions within the Economic and Technical Co-
operation Department of the Ministry of Finance. A new EDF training cycle is planned for November 
2007.” The need for continued capacity strengthening via workshops and other fora on the various EU 
instruments and fora has been a recurrent theme in EUD reporting and was also stressed during the 
December field interviews. This need for intensified capacity strengthening pertains to both GRZ and 
CSO stakeholders. EUD also underscored the need for continued in-house capacity strengthening on 
EU instruments and approaches, particularly also against the background of evolving procedures, pro-
cesses, systems and tools in relation to the various EU aid modalities. 
Extracts: 
EAMR Jan 11, p6: In relation to Non State Actors, the Delegation participated in the Governance CP 
Group in the discussions on the NGO Bill which raised concerns: “The Delegation invited NSA to dis-
cuss the Commission Green Paper on Budget Support and Direct interactions took place notably in 
the context of the Calls for Proposals on "Innovative Approaches to Food Security". 
 
JAR 2010, p4: Technical Cooperation Reform 'Backbone strategy': Seminar held in March in Lusaka 
to further embed the TC Reform principles in new institutional related programmes (Civil aviation, Ag-
riculture, Statistics, etc.). 
 
JAR 2010, p17: In relation to Non State Actors, the Delegation participated in the Governance CP 
Group in the discussions on the NGO Bill which raised concerns. The Delegation invited NSA to dis-
cuss the Commission Green Paper on Budget Support and Direct interactions took place notably in 
the context of the Calls for Proposals on "Innovative Approaches to Food Security", "Non State Actors 
and Local Authorities in development" and under the EIDHR. Information meetings were well attended 
and a large number of proposals were received. The implementation of the civil society project under 
the capacity building component of PRBS2 was initiated; the project will develop communities' and lo-
cal civil society organisations’ ability to monitor budget execution and service delivery in urban and ru-
ral areas and to engage in policy dialogue on these issues. A number of civil society organisations at 
different levels through the NGO umbrella organisation CSPR (Civil Society for Poverty Reduction) 
will be involved in the implementation of this pilot project. 
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EUD Lusaka (2010) ; Note on the Local Consultation on the Budget Support Green Paper; “The EU 
Delegation in Lusaka, based on the guidance note made available in October, organised country-level 
consultations involving Cooperating Partners (including EU Member States) and Non-State Actors. A 
structured dialogue with the Government has unfortunately not been possible. Copies of the Green 
Paper have however been made available and the National Authorising Officer (Secretary to the 
Treasury) has been invited to share comments; these are yet to be received. In general, the mood 
surrounding the discussions was one of broad fatigue on issues pertaining to Budget Support. The 
specific Zambian context, where difficult discussions are taking place on the pertinence and impact of 
the modality and where Government is challenged on its commitment to PFM (Public Finance Man-
agement) and good governance, seems to have affected the degree of participation and interest in the 
consultation process. Though the scope of the consultation was repeatedly explained, it has proved 
impossible to delink the discussions from the situation experienced locally. It should also be noted that 
a number of questions listed in the Paper required clarification as they did not come across too clear-
ly.” 
In addition to the internal discussion on the Green Paper within the Delegation, three formal consulta-
tion sessions were organised by the EUD as follows:  
1. Meeting with Member States (Heads of Cooperation) – 24 November 2010 with main focus on 
BS underlying principles (UPs) and eligibility criteria (7 Heads of Cooperation participated) 
2. Meeting with Civil Society Organisations - 08 December 2010 (3 of the 10 invited organisations 
attended) 
3. Meeting with CP Economists – 15 December 2010 (7 participants – consultation took place dur-
ing the December 2010 Macroeconomic Group meeting (MEG) (e.g. “benchmarks” to replace 
the word “conditionalities”) 
Green Paper discussions within the Delegation focused on political governance issues, 
 
EAMR Jul 2007, p2; Quality. Ownership of the EDF portfolio of projects will be enhanced through in-
creased focus on capacity building of the NAO functions within the Economic and Technical Co-
operation Department of the Ministry of Finance. A new EDF training cycle is planned for November 
2007. 
 
EAMR, Jan 2007, p12: A regional training seminar on sector budget support road transport organised 
by AIDCO E/7 was hosted by the Delegation in Zambia in May 2006 bringing together transports sec-
tor specialist from various Delegations. 
 
EAMR, Jan 2007, p14: In conclusion, the Delegation will require in 2006 continued technical guid-
ance from HQ on all the areas and sectors mentioned above. Areas of special relevance are: budget 
support orientations and modalities (variable tranches), sector support modalities (in particular health 
and education), institutional framework for private sector, actions with public services and NSA for ag-
riculture/food security and support to electoral process. However, the Delegation insists on a clear 
definition of competences between AIDCO and DEV on these matters. 
 
EAMR, Aug. 2004, p7; Risks affecting the work of the Delegation: Not enough training on EDF rules 
and procedures has been provided to NAO, RAO, PMUs and Project Managers. Therefore it is possi-
ble that not all procedures are followed and can be corrected only when tender dossiers, contract 
dossiers, or payment requests reach the Delegation for control and endorsement. This will cause de-
lays in payments and deliveries. 
 Indicator 8.5.3: Panel of EU aid modalities known by partners 
The suggestion is to combine this indicator with the just preceding indicator I-8.5.2. above since its sub-
ject / contents are already covered by the latter indicator, amongst other elements. 
Extracts: 
EAMR Jan 11, p30: On ICS 2, EUD management maintained the vademecum containing the most 
important documents on ethical conduct, avoidance of conflict of interest, fraud prevention and report-
ing for irregularities 
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Field Visit Additional Information on JC 8.5: 
JASZ-II (2011), p15; Chapter 3. Principles of Cooperation – 3.1.3 Managing for Results: How: The 
detailed actions to be taken include the following:  
 CPs will support and join GRZ in the Annual SAG / Poverty Conference for the debate of the 
SNDP Annual Progress Report, engaging national and sub-national level institutions as well as 
NSA. This dialogue provides the basis for subsequent annual planning and budgeting and ad-
justment of targets, and enhances accountability and transparency. 
 The M&E Department of the MoFNP has a key coordinating role in ensuring effecting monitoring 
and evaluation of the SNDP. Having accurate and comparable data is central to measuring re-
sults and managing performance. With this in mind, the selected Key Performance Indicators, the 
PRBS-PAF, and the overall M&E framework for the SNDP, and JASZ will be aligned as much as 
possible. A review of the KPIs will be carried out annually. Deriving information from the regular 
SNDP Annual Progress Reports. It will be supervised by the MAG and results will be fed into dis-
cussions between the Secretary to the Treasury and the Cooperating Partners Group-Troika as 
well as the High Level Policy Dialogue and the Annual Poverty Conference. 
 To bolster the collection and analysis of data, CPs will support GRZ in implementing its National 
Strategy for Development of Statistics (NDSD) through capacity development of Management In-
formation Systems (MIS), national M&E systems with the M&E Department in MoFNP and the 
Central Statistical Office in a lead technical role. 
 The Joint Monitoring, Evaluation and Statistics working group will provide the forum through 
which GRZ, CPs and non-state actors will work to improve monitoring and evaluation of the 
SNDP. Topic related representation of sector CPs in this group will strengthen the link to sector 
M&E systems and the sector responsibility for M&E at different levels (District, Provincial, Nation-
al levels). 
 
 
JC 8.5:  Combining EU aid modalities was an inclusive internal strategic process 
The issue of comparative advantages of possible combination of aid modalities included in the policy 
dialogue with line ministries for focal sectors has already been addressed in the earlier discussion on 
the different mixes of instruments, approaches and financing modalities depending on sector specific 
factors (I-8.2.1) and in relation to JC 8.3 on the synergy between aid modalities, discussed both within 
each focal sector and overall (indicators I-8.3.1 to I-8.3.3.). Partly as a result of a strategic combination 
of aid modalities, it has been assessed in general that with regard to its financing function in relation to 
the developments in budget composition, that budget support was predominantly additional to domestic 
financing and that there has been no evidence for substantial crowding out of domestic resources. 
Zambia’s budget has also become more pro-poor over the past years as poverty related expenditure 
increased as a share of the total budget and as a share of GDP. Budget allocations and expenditure in 
Zambia have been roughly in line with strategic priorities as set out in the Fifth National Development 
Plan. Overall budget increases in social sectors such as health and education over-proportionally 
stemmed from GRZ contributions. 
The most important component of the inclusive internal strategic process regarding the selection and 
decision making on the combination of EU aid modalities is the policy dialogue with the national stake-
holders, particularly the NAO, the line ministries for focal sectors and the Non State Actors. The issue of 
comparative advantages of possible combination of aid modalities included in the policy dialogue with 
line ministries for focal sectors has already been addressed in the earlier discussion on the mix of in-
struments, approaches and financing modalities which is different according to sector specific factors (I-
8.2.1) and in relation to JC 8.3 on the synergy between aid modalities discussed both within each focal 
sector and overall (indicators I-8.3.1 to I-8.3.3.).  
As far as the policy dialogue with the NAO is concerned, in the EU-ACP relations set-up in line with the 
Lomé and Cotonou Agreements, the National Authorising Officer (NAOs) plays a pivotal role in the 
overall policy dialogue between the ACP Country and the European Union. This particularly pertains to 
all matters regarding the Country Strategy Paper and the National Indicative Programme, throughout 
the integrated programme cycle from preparation to evaluation. As far as Zambia is concerned, in 2010 
the NAO function shifted from the Minister of Finance to the Secretary of the Treasury. The NAO Sup-
port Office continued to be located outside the Ministry. As far as the intensity and quality of the EUD-
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NAO relations and coordination are concerned, in the EAMR July 2011 is reported in this regard that 
“Government officials involved with EDF issues did not demonstrate much motivation in familiarising 
themselves with the procedures and requirements of just one particular donor.” 
On the other hand, from the different contacts with the MoFNP and the NAO support office emanated a 
positive relationship of which both parties expressed the desire of further strengthening also on issues 
related to the policy dialogue and the joint search for aid modalities best adapted to the evolving needs 
and macro-economic situation of the country. The Secretary to the Treasury as NAO reconfirmed 
budget support to be the preferred aid modality of Zambia and the openness to discuss combinations of 
aid modalities best fitting the evolving macro-economic and financial situation of the country as a whole 
and the specific requirements of each sector and thematic area, of local authorities and civil society. 
The elements of a necessary enabling environment for budget support including policy dialogue at all 
levels, harmonisation, capacity strengthening, performance monitoring and evaluation systems, 
amongst others, were confirmed to be requiring special attention. The interviews at EUD and with CPs 
all pointed at new windows of opportunity with the coming into power of the new government in Sep-
tember 2012. (I-8.5.1) 
There is evidence of the EU organising fora and workshops for stakeholders, both government and 
non-government on EU procedures, instruments and approaches, which also cover the latter’s compar-
ative strengths and weaknesses. There is less evidence that such capacity building events were part of 
a more comprehensive and structured capacity building programme and process on the topic, rather 
than these being more ad hoc events. The need for such more systematic and comprehensive capacity 
strengthening is reported in relation to both national stakeholders as for the Delegation itself. The 2004 
EAMR for example reported as risks affecting the work of the Delegation: “Not enough training on EDF 
rules and procedures has been provided to NAO, RAO, PMUs and Project Managers. Therefore it is 
possible that not all procedures are followed and can be corrected only when tender dossiers, contract 
dossiers, or payment requests reach the Delegation for control and endorsement. This will cause de-
lays in payments and deliveries.” This need was repeated in subsequent EARMs as for example in the 
2007 EAMR which reported: “In conclusion, the Delegation will require in 2006 continued technical 
guidance from HQ on all the areas and sectors mentioned above. Areas of special relevance are: 
budget support orientations and modalities (variable tranches), sector support modalities (in particular 
health and education), institutional framework for private sector, actions with public services and NSA 
for agriculture/food security and support to electoral process. However, the Delegation insists on a clear 
definition of competences between AIDCO and DEV on these matters.” 
Towards the end of last year 2011, the EUD initiated a structured local consultation with the main local 
stakeholder parties on aid modalities following the issuance by the Commission of the Green Paper on 
Budget Support. In an EUD note on this Green Paper local consultation is noted: “A structured dialogue 
with the Government has unfortunately not been possible. Copies of the Green Paper have however 
been made available and the National Authorising Officer (Secretary to the Treasury) has been invited 
to share comments; these are yet to be received. In general, the mood surrounding the discussions was 
one of broad fatigue on issues pertaining to Budget Support. The specific Zambian context, where diffi-
cult discussions are taking place on the pertinence and impact of the modality and where Government 
is challenged on its commitment to PFM (Public Finance Management) and good governance, seems 
to have affected the degree of participation and interest in the consultation process. Though the scope 
of the consultation was repeatedly explained, it has proved impossible to delink the discussions from 
the situation experienced locally. It should also be noted that a number of questions listed in the Paper 
required clarification as they did not come across too clearly.” On the other hand, the consultations and 
interviews during the December 2011 evaluation field visit to Zambia led to conclude to a generally 
more optimistic view regarding the quality and intensity of GRZ-CPs policy dialogue on aid modalities 
and related issues especially also with the more recent developments in the broader political context. 
(See also the discussion related to earlier Indicator I-8.1.1) 
The subsequent EAMRs have been alerting about the need for further strengthened capacity building of 
the main national stakeholders on EDF procedures, aid modalities, approaches and instruments. They 
especially zeroed in on the special role and needs of the NAO in this regard. An example in case is the 
EAMR of July 2007 which indicated:: “Ownership of the EDF portfolio of projects will be enhanced 
through increased focus on capacity building of the NAO functions within the Economic and Technical 
Co-operation Department of the Ministry of Finance. A new EDF training cycle is planned for November 
2007.” The need for continued capacity strengthening via workshops and other fora on the various EU 
instruments and approaches has been a recurrent theme in EUD reporting and was also stressed dur-
ing the December field interviews. This need for intensified capacity strengthening pertains to both GRZ 
and CSO stakeholders. EUD also underscored the need for continued in-house capacity strengthening 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
  
Page - 313 - 
on these EU instruments and approaches, particularly also against the background of evolving proce-
dures, processes, systems and tools in relation to the various EU aid modalities. (I-8.5.2) 
The follow-up Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia II (JASZ II) covering the years 2011-2015 of No-
vember 2011 - in which the EU is involved as one of the main Cooperating Partners and has signed up 
to - zeroes in on a number of political dialogue fora, events, structures and tools to ensure the neces-
sary enabling environment for aid delivery along the most appropriate choice of aid modalities. Provi-
sions explicitly foreseen in the JASZ-II document include that: (i) CPs will support and join GRZ in the 
Annual SAG / Poverty Conference for the debate of the SNDP Annual Progress Report, engaging na-
tional and sub-national level institutions as well as NSA. This dialogue provides the basis for subse-
quent annual planning and budgeting and adjustment of targets, and enhances accountability and 
transparency; (ii) The M&E Department of the MoFNP has a key coordinating role in ensuring effecting 
monitoring and evaluation of the SNDP. Having accurate and comparable data is central to measuring 
results and managing performance. With this in mind, the selected Key Performance Indicators, the 
PRBS-PAF, and the overall M&E framework for the SNDP, and JASZ will be aligned as much as possi-
ble. A review of the KPIs will be carried out annually. Deriving information from the regular SNDP An-
nual Progress Reports. It will be supervised by the MAG and results will be fed into discussions be-
tween the Secretary to the Treasury and the Cooperating Partners Group-Troika as well as the High 
Level Policy Dialogue and the Annual Poverty Conference; (iii) To bolster the collection and analysis of 
data, CPs will support GRZ in implementing its National Strategy for Development of Statistics (NDSD) 
through capacity development of Management Information Systems (MIS), national M&E systems with 
the M&E Department in MoFNP and the Central Statistical Office in a lead technical role; (iv) The Joint 
Monitoring, Evaluation and Statistics working group will provide the forum through which GRZ, CPs and 
non-state actors will work to improve monitoring and evaluation of the SNDP. Topic related representa-
tion of sector CPs in this group will strengthen the link to sector M&E systems and the sector responsi-
bility for M&E at different levels (District, Provincial, National levels). (JC 8.5) 
 
JC 8.6: Aid modality combinations were the result of complementarity with other donors 
 Indicator 8.6.1: The EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour used 
in strategic/programming documents determining donors’ aid modalities 
As per the EU Toolkit (2009) for the implementation of complementarity and division of labour in devel-
opment policy (which includes the 11 principles of the EU Code of Conduct), complementarity is the 
result of an optimum division of labour (DOL) between various actors in order to achieve optimum use of 
human and financial resources for enhanced aid effectiveness, i.e. to attain country strategy objectives 
and achieve better results in poverty reduction. The concluding general principle is to deepen the reform 
of aid systems with special focus on decentralised structure, institutional incentives and redeployment of 
financial and human resources. As major constraint is listed under this concluding general principle to 
avoid negative impact of DOL on global aid volumes and predictability. Complementarity goes much 
further than just coordination. It means each donor focusing its assistance on areas where it has the 
most added value, and complementing the activities of others. One of the dimensions of complementari-
ty is the “cross-modalities and instruments complementarity” which looks at strengthening synergies 
between budget support and projects, grants and loans, etc. The EU Code of Conduct consists of 11 
principles on complementarity, of which 5 are explicitly on in-country complementarity (related to in-
crease of donor concentration, redeployment of funds, lead donor arrangements, delegated coopera-
tion, and support to sectors of key priority for poverty reduction).  
Since the EU Code of Conduct was adopted in 2009 only, it obviously could not be used in / applied to 
the EDF8, 9 and 10 strategic/programming documents, simply because these have been concluded 
earlier already. But there is evidence that, even ahead of their codification, the principles listed in the 
Code and in the Division of Labour (DOL) already have provided strong guidance to the elaboration of 
the strategic/programming documents determining donors’ (and particularly EU’s) aid modalities. This 
complementarity and Division of Labour was especially facilitated through the Joint Assistance Strategy 
for Zambia (JASZ) institutional and strategic coordination framework. 
In Zambia, in execution of the aid effectiveness agenda, the first Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia 
(JASZ) was signed in May 2007 by 17 CPs present in the country, including an agreed Division of La-
bour (DOL) matrix. The JASZ is the CPs response to the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) and 
the Aid Policy, also adopted in 2007 by GRZ. The Policy states that budget support is the government’s 
preferred aid modality. The EDF10 CSP Mid-Term Review made reference to the 2007 Paris Monitoring 
survey conducted in 2008 which showed a number of improvements in implementing the Paris Agenda 
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(PA) in Zambia, notably with respect to CPs alignment, the use of country systems, and aid predictabil-
ity. Challenges remain in the areas of coordinated technical cooperation, number of PIUs, and on mutu-
al accountability. In response to the launch of the Sixth NDP in February 2011, a JASZ II (including a 
revised DOL table) has been finalised and signed by the 15 CPs on 28 November 2011. The EU DOL 
Fast Track Initiative has been playing an important role in stimulating the debate within the CP group 
but also between the CPs and Government. 
A first plan for the Division of Labour (sectors) between cooperating partners has been agreed in 2006, 
based on the FNDP 2006-2010 framework. At the same time, the terms of reference for lead and active 
cooperating partners in each sector have been prepared. The EC Delegation assumed the position of 
lead-cooperating partner for macroeconomic/budget support and for the transport sector, as well as for 
food security under the agriculture sector and for mining under the private sector. The Delegation re-
mains an active donor, with responsibilities in the context of the specific sector dialogues, in a number 
of other sectors (health, education, agriculture, private sector, governance…). Moreover, the EUD as-
sumed (together with Germany and the UNDP) the responsibility of the WHIP coordination from mid-
2006.  
The 2007 JAR indicated that the JASZ is the adequate instrument to progress towards further coordina-
tion and harmonisation, in line with the requirements of the Cotonou Agreement. It also confirmed that 
the EU joint programming is fully compatible with this wider JASZ agreement and that coordination be-
tween EU partners must be coherent with this wider agreement. The October 2009 Mid-Term Review 
report of the EDF10 CSP for Zambia concluded with regard to the status of the Division of Labour and 
aid effectiveness in Zambia that the aid effectiveness agenda is progressing well with a Joint Assistance 
Strategy for Zambia signed and an agreed Division of Labour and aid effectiveness.  
That the JASZ has been instrumental in strengthening the coordination and complementarity between 
the Cooperating Partners, also with regard to the aid modality combinations, was reconfirmed by an 
evaluation of the JASZ in March 2010 which summarised the main achievements / strengths of the 
JASZ as including the following: (i) Improved sector level coordination among CPs with genuine at-
tempts to try other methods of shared working, such as delegated cooperation; (ii) More coordinated 
responses to GRZ and some decrease of bilateral demands on Ministerial time; (iii) Improved alignment 
to GRZ priorities as outlined in the FNDP; (iv) Inclusion of both PRBS and non-PRBS cooperating part-
ners in JASZ processes. The evaluation of the first JASZ, however, also identified a number of short-
comings. While harmonisation and alignment of CPs engagement has improved, it has been less effec-
tive in enhancing GRZ ownership, building mutual accountability between government and CPs and 
managing for results. In addition the evaluation noted that: (i) While some Sector Advisory Groups 
(SAG) perform well, others are less effective; (ii) Although described as a strategy, the JASZ lacked 
targets, an implementation plan and performance indicators. This limited the implementation of the 
JASZ as well as the ability to monitor progress; (iii) There is no obvious reduction of the number of pro-
jects in health or education, although coordination around government leadership has greatly improved; 
(iv) Transaction costs remain high for those taking the lead in particular sectors, and most importantly 
(v) Although the JASZ has led to better processes, there is less evidence of a contribution to improved 
development outcomes.  
 These latter challenges and concerns were especially brought to the attention of the evaluation team 
during the field visit interviews and consultations of last December 2011. The general mood was one of 
potentials not fully utilised and further improvements needing to be made in the JASZ processes and 
tools, which were put forward in a constructive way as special challenges for the successor JASZ-II. 
This more critical assessment of the capacity of the JASZ to generate effective CP coordination and 
harmonisation and DOL, and of the quality of harmonisation in general also emerges in the more recent 
evaluations and reports covering the last two years of the here reviewed 2001-2010 ten year period. 
This is precisely the period wherein serious governance issues emerged in the transport and health 
sectors, which entailed substantive repercussions on the CP harmonisation quality with different CPs 
reacting in different ways to the situation without the JASZ being able to synchronise and harmonise 
these reactions. The recent 2011 budget support evaluation for example in this connection analysed: 
“The root causes of this lack of harmonisation relate to the disagreement among cooperating partners 
about the hierarchy of budget support objectives: Some cooperating partners see the provision of fund-
ing to alleviate poverty as the main objective of budget support, while others give priority to institutional 
or governance reforms. Thus, cooperating partners were often unable to offer joint and consistent priori-
ties to the GRZ through dialogue and incentives. Interference from headquarters, who responded more 
to domestic political situations than to Zambia’s needs, hindered the harmonisation and alignment at-
tempts being made by aid managers in Lusaka… Cooperating partners, especially in times of crisis, 
have to rank the relative importance of these two goals in order to send credible and coherent signals to 
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the recipient government. In Zambia, the relative priority given to governance promotion as opposed to 
financing poverty alleviation has varied from partner to partner. This has complicated any possible joint 
approach of the PRBS group in the dialogue process.” 
Moreover, a deeper analysis learns that the CP harmonisation not exceptionally in first instance is win-
dow-dressing confined to the political dialogue level, not necessarily entailing effective repercussions on 
the operational and programme execution levels, where it not exceptionally stayed “business-as-usual”. 
This was attested to on different occasions during the field interviews and for example is confirmed in 
studies as the recent budget support evaluation which concluded to an incomplete harmonisation and 
alignment and related these weaknesses to a lack of administrative capacity and coherence as well as 
to a declining political will. The latter have made it impossible for cooperating partners to rely on a pure-
ly alignment-based harmonisation strategy. On the one hand, cooperating partners have, at least partly, 
taken on the challenge of harmonisation and substantial progress has been made in setting up dialogue 
structures and a common conditionality framework. However, a closer look at conditionality, disburse-
ment mechanisms, the dialogue process and knowledge management reveals several flaws in the har-
monisation and alignment process.  
The current evaluation field interviews confirmed and made it further clear that the biggest harmonisa-
tion challenges ahead are situated at the operational level, particularly with regard to the harmonisation 
of planning, management, monitoring and evaluation systems, covering all hierarchical levels from be-
low district to national level and covering all sectors and thematic areas.  
Data, figures, tables: 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p21: 
 
 
Extracts: 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p6: Division of Labour and Aid effectiveness: In Zambia the aid effec-
tiveness agenda is progressing well, with a Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) signed in 
May 2007 by 17 CPs present in the country, and an agreed Division of Labour (DOL) matrix. The 
JASZ is the CPs response to the FNDP and the Aid Policy, also adopted in 2007 by GRZ. The Policy 
states that budget support is government preferred aid modality. The 2007 Paris Monitoring survey 
conducted in 2008 showed a number of improvements in implementing the Paris agenda in Zambia, 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 316 - 
notably with respect to CPs alignment, the use of country systems, and aid predictability. Challenges 
remain in the areas of coordinated technical cooperation, number of PIUs, and on mutual accountabil-
ity. In response to the launch of the Sixth NDP which was launched in February 2011, a JASZ II (in-
cluding a revised DOL table) is being finalised by CPs. It must be noted that the EU DOL Fast Track 
Initiative is playing an important role in stimulating the debate within the CP group but also between 
the CPs and Government. 
 
EU (2009) p3; EU Toolkit for the implementation of complementarity and division of labour in devel-
opment policy - 1.2. Definitions: 
Complementarity is the result of an optimum division of labour (DOL) between various actors in order 
to achieve optimum use of human and financial resources for enhanced aid effectiveness, i.e. to attain 
country strategy objectives and achieve better results in poverty reduction. Complementarity goes 
much further than just coordination. It means each donor focusing its assistance on areas where it has 
the most added value, and complementing the activities of others. It involves complex decisions on 
DOL, on concentration on a limited number of sectors, on defining the role a donor wishes to play in a 
particular partner country. Division of labour is particularly important in the context of scaling up of aid 
as it enhances absorptive capacity. In-country complementarity seeks to address a situation where aid 
fragmentation in a sector or country leads to increased administrative burden and transaction costs for 
both partner countries and donors, blurs policy dialogue, and may lead to a situation where some polit-
ically attractive sectors receive increased funding while other areas of development priority remain un-
der-funded. It concerns all aid modalities and instruments. It may interact with other dimensions of 
complementarity: 
 Cross-sector complementarity: refers to a situation at country level where some sectors receive 
much more donor attention than others, leading to congestion and/or under-funding. 
 Cross-country complementarity: refers to a situation at the global level where some countries re-
ceive in relative terms much more donor support (“aid darlings”) than others (“aid orphans”). 
 Vertical complementarity: relates to global aid initiatives concentrating on one particular sector 
worldwide, adding more complexity to the existing aid architecture. 
 Cross-modalities and instruments complementarity: whether at the sector, country or global level, 
looks at strengthening synergies between, say, budget support and projects, or grants and loans. 
 
EU (2009) p3; EU Toolkit for the implementation of complementarity and division of labour in devel-
opment policy: Recalling the 11 principles of the EU Code of Conduct: 
On in-country complementarity: 
1.  Increase donor concentration: a maximum of three sectors in country + general budget support 
+ support to Non-State Actors + plus research and education schemes, based on: 
-  Comparative advantage of each donor, self-assessed, endorsed by partner government and 
recognised by other donors, 
-  Partner countries to identify areas for increased or reduced support and identify donors re-
maining engaged in the sector, 
-  Donors to work with governments to identify sectors in which to remain and propose sectors 
from which they will withdraw, 
-  Assure long term engagement in sectors by remaining donors. 
2.  Redeploy funds for other in-country activities, based on local negotiations. Where donors are in 
more than three sectors, either use delegated cooperation or exit, responsibly redeploying funds 
in three priority sectors or into general budget support, avoiding any gaps in aid. 
3.  Lead donor arrangements for each sector to reduce transaction costs. 
4.  Delegated cooperation/partnership arrangements. 
5.  Ensure adequate donor support to sectors of key priority for poverty reduction. At least one ac-
tive EU donor per sector, maximum 3-5 active EU donors per sector. 
On other dimensions of complementarity: 
6.  Replicate these practices at regional level. 
7.  MS opt for limited number of priority countries; in non-priority countries consider delegation. 
8.  Address the “orphans” gap, often countries in situation of fragility. 
9.  Analyse and expand global areas of strength: the Commission to further develop expertise in ar-
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eas of comparative advantage, at country level, in line with deconcentration and ownership. 
10.  Progress on other dimensions of complementarity (vertical and cross-cutting instruments). 
11.  General principle: Deepen the reform of aid systems: decentralised structure, institutional incen-
tives and redeployment of financial and human resources. Constraints: avoid negative impact of 
DOL on global aid volumes and predictability. 
 
JAR 2010, p17: In relation to Non State Actors, the Delegation participated in the Governance CP 
Group in the discussions on the NGO Bill which raised concerns. The Delegation invited NSA to dis-
cuss the Commission Green Paper on Budget Support and Direct interactions took place notably in 
the context of the Calls for Proposals on "Innovative Approaches to Food Security", "Non State Actors 
and Local Authorities in development" and under the EIDHR. Information meetings were well attended 
and a large number of proposals were received. The implementation of the civil society project under 
the capacity building component of PRBS2 was initiated; the project will develop communities' and lo-
cal civil society organisations’ ability to monitor budget execution and service delivery in urban and ru-
ral areas and to engage in policy dialogue on these issues. A number of civil society organisations at 
different levels through the NGO umbrella organisation CSPR (Civil Society for Poverty Reduction) will 
be involved in the implementation of this pilot project. 
 
JAR 2007, p29: A plan for the division of labour (sectors) between cooperating partners has been 
agreed in 2006, based on the FNDP 2006-2010 framework. At the same time, the terms of reference 
for lead and active cooperating partners in each sector have been prepared. The EC Delegation has 
assumed the position of lead-cooperating partner for macroeconomic/budget support and for the 
transport sector, as well as for food security under the agriculture sector and for mining under the pri-
vate sector. The Delegation will remain an active donor, with responsibilities in the context of the spe-
cific sector dialogues, in a number of other sectors (health, education, agriculture, private sector, gov-
ernance…). Moreover, the Delegation assumed (together with Germany and the UNDP) the responsi-
bility of the WHIP coordination from mid-2006. 
The JASZ (Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia) document has been completed and signed (May 
2007), after the official launching of the FNDP. The JASZ is the adequate instrument to progress to-
wards further coordination and harmonisation, in line with the requirements of the Cotonou Agree-
ment. The EU joint programming is fully compatible with this wider JASZ agreement. Coordination be-
tween EU partners must be coherent with this wider agreement.  
Co-ordination between cooperating partners and government is also increasing in significance in spe-
cific areas like public finance management and reform (PEMFA), budget support and macroeconomic 
issues (PRBS group), social sectors, roads, agriculture/food security…. 
 
GOZ and Cooperating Partners (2011) pp. 3-4; Memorandum of Understanding between the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Zambia and its Cooperating Partners on Development and Aid Effective-
ness in Zambia; Chapter 1.2 Assessment of Aid Effectiveness progress under the first JASZ (2007-
2010): Government’s Aid Policy and Strategy (2007), and Zambia’s Fifth National Development Plan 
(FNDP) (2006), provided overarching development frameworks for CP alignment and harmonisation. 
In 2007 CPs developed the first Joint Assistance Strategy to manage their development cooperation in 
line with both the PD principles and the FNDP. It also aimed to improve the Division of Labour (DOL) 
between CPs. 
An evaluation in March 2010 found that the first JASZ contributed to: 
 More coordinated responses to GRZ and some decrease of bilateral demands on Ministerial 
time; 
 Improved alignment to GRZ priorities as outlined in the FNDP;  
 More effective division of labour between CPs, resulting in decongestion in some sectors and 
greater focus in some CP’s country programmes; 
 Improved sector level coordination among CPs with genuine attempts to try other methods of 
shared working, such as delegated cooperation; and 
 Inclusion of both PRBS and non-PRBS cooperating partners in JASZ processes.  
The evaluation of the first JASZ, however, identified a number of shortcomings. While harmonisa-
tion and alignment of CPs engagement has improved, it has been less effective in enhancing GRZ 
ownership, building mutual accountability between government and CPs and managing for results. 
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In addition the evaluation noted that: 
 While some Sector Advisory Groups (SAG) perform well, others are less effective; 
 Although described as a strategy, the JASZ lacked targets, an implementation plan and perfor-
mance indicators. This limited the implementation of the JASZ as well as the ability to monitor 
progress; 
 There is no obvious reduction of the number of projects in health or education, although coordi-
nation around government leadership has greatly improved; 
 Transaction costs remain high for those taking the lead in particular sectors; 
 Although the JASZ has led to better processes, there is less evidence of a contribution to im-
proved development outcomes. 
 Indicator 8.6.2: Donor mapping of sectoral involvement and their perceived comparative 
advantages were used in strategic response as a basis for decisions on modalities 
In Zambia, formal donor coordination and harmonisation has been pioneered from the very onset of the 
2001-2010 period under review by this evaluation onwards, as evidenced by the list of policy agree-
ments on the subject: HIP in 2003, WHIP in 2004, the Poverty Reduction Budget Support Memorandum 
of Understanding (PRBS-MoU) in 2005, the Zambia Aid Policy and Strategy in 2006, the Joint Assis-
tance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) in 2007, and the successor JASZ-II recently on 18 November 2011 
for the period 2011-2015.  
The JASZ and the Division of Labour (DOL) provide the broader strategic framework for the donor map-
ping of sectoral involvement and their perceived comparative advantages, including for the EU and the 
EU Member States. This analysis was used for the identification and selection process of the Lead Co-
operating Partners (CPs) for each of the sectors from the National Development Plan, and with for each 
of the sectors also the active CPs listed. The version as of January 2009 of this Division of Labour ma-
trix under the JASZ is included in the 2009 Mid-Term Review of the EDF10 CSP (copy hereunder). It 
shows the EC leading two NDP sectors (Macro-economics and transport), active in five other sectors 
(Agriculture, Education, Governance, Health and Private Sector Development) and phasing out in two, 
energy and water. The latest updated DOL matrix sees EU as being requested by the GRZ to take the 
lead of the Governance sector. The JASZ-II Division of Labour matrix 2012-2015 attached to the JASZ-
II agreement signed by the CPs on 18 November 2011 lists the EU as “lead” in the four sectors / the-
matic areas of (i) Transport, (ii) Agriculture, Livestock & Fisheries, (iii) Governance and (iv) Macroeco-
nomics, and furthermore as “active” in the sector of health (see the JASZ-II DOL 2012-2015 matrix 
hereunder). 
These JASZ-DOL mappings of donors and their perceived comparative advantages with assignment 
accordingly of main responsibilities for the different NDP sectors, also inherently cover the dialogue on 
the preferred options and decision making on aid modalities. This for example is captured in the above 
EDF10 mid-term review based summary table on aid effectiveness / donor matrix regarding planned 
donor disbursements which for each of the sectors also has the indication of the applied aid modality 
(GGS, SBS, SWAP, project grant, project loan) explicitly mentioned.  
The second below table dated June 2006 on the Division of Labour in Zambia identifies for each of the 
NDP sectors the involved Cooperating Partners and determines for each of them whether they are lead 
or just active CP. This table is included under Annex 6 of the EDF10 CSP/NIP document and thus pro-
vides ample evidence that for the design of the EDF10 EU response strategy (the CSP/NIP 2008-2013) 
donor mapping of sectoral involvement and their perceived comparative advantages were used in stra-
tegic responses as a basis for decisions on modalities.  
From the December 2011 field evaluation interviews with EUD and EU Member States it was learned 
that the function and responsibility of the JASZ with regard to the DOL is confirmed for the EUD and the 
EU Member States, but at the same time that it is preferred to have a stronger preparatory consultation 
process amongst the EUD and EU Member States ahead of the broader overall JASZ and SAGs meet-
ings.  
The MoFNP 2009 Development Cooperation Report illustrated the European Union, which disbursed 
US$ 424m over the period (14 per cent of the total), was the largest contributor, followed by the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the United Nations system and the World Bank. 
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Data, figures, tables:  
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p23: 
 
 
EDF10 CSP/NIP 2008-2013 – Annex 6 – p. xxiii: The Harmonisation / Alignment in Zambia: The JASZ 
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 Indicator 8.6.3: "Orphan" and "darling" sectors actively discussed with other donors with a 
view to levelling out donor involvement across sectors 
 
The 2009 EU Toolkit for the implementation of complementarity and Division of Labour in development 
policy includes cross-sector complementarity as one of the key dimensions of DOL complementarity. 
Cross-sector complementarity tries to remedy situations at country level where some sectors receive 
much more donor attention (“the darling sectors”) than other (“the orphan sectors”). This cross-sector 
complementarity is one of the key issues taken up by the JASZ.  
But also in the EDF10 CSP/NIP document of 2007 this cross-sector complementarity was already taken 
on “avant-la-lettre” for designing the country strategy and indicative programme, complementary to the 
EU member states and other EU inputs as for example from the EIB (See table under Annex 3 of the 
CSP/NIP, copy of which here below).  
For most of the review period, the DOL harmonisation, complementarity and alignment efforts of the 
Cooperating Partners in relation to the National Development Plan had gone beyond the JASZ partners. 
Since 2003, the Government in collaboration with some pioneer cooperating partners (Nordic Plus 
Group) developed a framework for harmonisation and alignment. In April 2004, the “Memorandum of 
Understanding for Harmonisation of Government / Donor Practices for Aid Effectiveness in Zambia”, 
often referred to as the Wider Harmonisation in Practice (WHIP) agreement, was signed by 10 cooper-
ating partners. By 2006, the Memorandum had been signed by all the EU Members States represented 
in Zambia, the EC and the main non-EU cooperating partners. 
 
Data, figures, tables: 
 
EDF10 CSP/NIP 2008-2013 – Annex 3– p. 3: Donor matrix for the European Union 
 
 
Extracts: 
EAMR, July 2007, p1: The Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) has been completed and 
signed (May 2007). The purpose of the JASZ is to focus and organise development assistance pro-
vided by cooperating partners to support the implementation of Zambia's national development goals 
as they will be defined in the FNDP 2006-2010. This is in line with the Paris Declaration 2005 to which 
Zambia and its cooperating partners are signatory. The JASZ is foreseen to harmonise and align the 
many individual country strategies that cooperating partners in Zambia are currently using. The JASZ 
is the adequate instrument to progress towards further coordination and harmonisation following the 
requirements of the Cotonou Agreement and the EU development strategy. The EU joint programming 
can be fully compatible with this wider JASZ agreement. 
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EDF10 CSP/NIP 2008-2013 – Annex 6 – p. xxiii: The Harmonisation / Alignment in Zambia - The 
Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ). Since 2003, the Government in collaboration with some 
pioneer cooperating partners (Nordic Plus Group) developed a framework for harmonisation and 
alignment. In April 2004, the “Memorandum of Understanding for Harmonisation of Government / Do-
nor Practices for Aid Effectiveness in Zambia”, often referred to as the Wider Harmonisation in Prac-
tice (WHIP) agreement, was signed by 10 cooperating partners. By 2006, the Memorandum had been 
signed by all the EU Members States represented in Zambia, the EC and the main non EU cooperat-
ing partners.  
The JASZ seeks to rationalise and coordinate interventions by cooperating partners within the frame-
work of the national development strategy (FNDP) and to establish a Division of Labour (agreed by the 
Government and cooperating partners in June 2006) for “de-congesting” sectors that were oversub-
scribed, with a reduced number of lead partners in each sector, to act under agreed terms of refer-
ence. The selection of leading donors has been done not only examining the amount of resources 
committed but also the sector technical capacities of the possible leading donor. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on JC 8.6: 
 
JASZ-II (2011), Annex 2 p5: CP Division of Labour Matrix 2012-2015 (Update Dec. 2011) 
 
 
DIE & IOB (2011) p16; Evaluation Summary and Conclusions: The root causes of this lack of harmo-
nisation relate to the disagreement among cooperating partners about the hierarchy of budget support 
objectives: some cooperating partners see the provision of funding to alleviate poverty as the main 
objective of budget support, while others give priority to institutional or governance reforms. Thus, co-
operating partners were often unable to offer joint and consistent priorities to the GRZ through dia-
logue and incentives. Interference from headquarters, who responded more to domestic political situa-
tions than to Zambia’s needs, hindered the harmonisation and alignment attempts being made by aid 
managers in Lusaka. 
 
DIE & IOB (2011) pp. 20-23; Evaluation Summary and Conclusions: Budget support and harmonisa-
tion: A political economy perspective: Budget support has not reached its expected potential in terms 
of realizing all its objectives. This is the result not only of a lack of commitment or capacity at the GRZ 
level, but also of the limited progress being made by the PRBS group in the areas of harmonisation 
and alignment. This has not rendered the instrument ineffective, but it has impaired its application. 
According to the intervention logic of budget support, the instrument has the potential to promote pov-
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erty reduction and institutional reforms through an effective combination of the instrument’s financial 
and non-financial components. However, regarding budget support as useful in principle for promoting 
institutional capacity, democratic accountability and poverty reduction, does not automatically lead to 
its effectiveness. What is crucial is the extent to which cooperating partners adapt to a country’s sys-
temic capacity to address its own development barriers. Equally crucial is the willingness of the gov-
ernment to address these issues….  
 
Incomplete harmonisation and alignment: These weaknesses, which are related to the lack of admin-
istrative capacity and coherence as well as to a declining political will, have made it impossible for co-
operating partners to rely on a purely alignment-based harmonisation strategy. On the one hand, co-
operating partners have, at least partly, taken on the challenge of harmonisation and substantial pro-
gress has been made in setting up dialogue structures and a common conditionality framework. How-
ever, a closer look at conditionality, disbursement mechanisms, the dialogue process and knowledge 
management reveals several flaws in the harmonisation and alignment process…  
 
DIE & IOB (2011), Annexes 
 
Overview Table of Policy Agreements for harmonisation (2003-2010) 
Year Policy Agreement 
2003 HIP 
2004 WHIP 
2005 PRBS MoU 
2006 Zambia Aid Policy and Strategy 
2007 JASZ 
Source: Saasa (2010) cited in DIE & IOB (2011) p.58 
Division of Labour in Selected Sectors: Situation in 2005/2006 and in 2009 
  
 Source: DIE & IOB (2011), p59 
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DIE & IOB (2011) pp. 20-23; Evaluation Summary and Conclusions: The root causes of imperfect 
harmonisation and alignment - Differences of objectives, the role of underlying assumptions and the 
unfinished harmonisation agenda have all hindered a more effective utilisation of the instrument of 
budget support. Financing poverty reduction versus promoting institutional reforms: according to one 
possible interpretation, budget support is primarily an instrument for channelling resources through a 
recipient country’s budget into sectors that are most relevant in reducing poverty in order to fund pov-
erty reduction policies in the most effective and efficient way. Alternatively, budget support can also 
be interpreted as a set of incentives that combine financial and non-financial components in a way 
that stimulates institutional change in favour of sound public policies and democratic accountability. 
While the common intervention logic assumes that these goals can be mutually reinforcing, this paral-
lel achievement is not a given. Cooperating partners, especially in times of crisis, have to rank the rel-
ative importance of these two goals in order to send credible and coherent signals to the recipient 
government. In Zambia, the relative priority given to governance promotion as opposed to financing 
poverty alleviation has varied from partner to partner. This has complicated any possible joint ap-
proach of the PRBS group in the dialogue process. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on JC 8.6: 
MoFNP (2004) p28; Annual Economic Report; Chapter 5 External Sector Developments, 5.3. External 
Aid: In 2004, a total of US$789.1m was expected as external aid out of which US$475.6m was to be in 
form of project support and US$313.5m as programme support. Preliminary data indicates that only 
US$297.9m, representing 38 per cent of the total funds expected was received… As for programme 
support, the inflows received during the year were only 21 per cent of the US$313.5m that was ex-
pected (see Table 5.3). The lesser than programmed inflows received were due to administrative bot-
tlenecks by Government and cooperating partners as well as failure, by Government, to meet certain 
conditionalities for the disbursement of funds. 
 Project Financing (in US$ millions), 2002-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Programme Support (in US$ millions), 2000-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MoFNP (2010) p3; Development Cooperation Report 2009 – Chapter 3: Disbursement Trends 2006-
2009 - Total disbursements between 2006 and 2009 amounted to US$ 2,971.6m. On a year to year 
basis, disbursements increased by 14 per cent from 2006 to 2007, by 28 per cent in 2008 and remained 
static in 2009 (see below Table). The reasons for the lack of increase in 2009 are discussed in sections 
3.2 and 3.3. The below table shows the list of disbursing Cooperating Partners and their assistance. 
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Ten Cooperating Partners accounted for 79 per cent of the total external assistance disbursed between 
2006 and 2009. The European Union, which disbursed US$ 424m over the period (14 per cent of the 
total), was the largest contributor, followed by the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Na-
tions system and the World Bank. 
Disbursements by Cooperating Partner, 2006 – 2009, US$ million 
 
General budget support refers to external resources channelled directly to the Government’s budget. 
The provision of budget support indicates that Cooperating Partners agree on and buy into the Gov-
ernment’s development objectives and policies. In 2005 the Government signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Cooperating Partners for the provision of budget support targeted towards poverty 
reduction, ‘Poverty Reduction Budget Support’ (PRBS). General budget support disbursements in-
creased from US$ 111m in 2006 to US$ 218m in 2009, bringing total general budget support for the 
four years to US$ 674m (see Table 3.3 below). The EU and UK provided the largest amount of budget 
support amounting to US$ 191m and US$ 190m respectively over the period. Sector budget support 
(SBS) refers to external resources channelled through the budget earmarked for specific sectors. For 
instance, the EU support to Roads, Health and Public Expenditure Management and Financial Ac-
countability (PEMFA) is provided in the form of SBS, as is the Global Fund support to the health sector 
which is channelled through Ministry of Finance and National Planning. 
Sector budget support (SBS) refers to external resources channelled through the budget earmarked for 
specific sectors. For instance, the EU support to Roads, Health and Public Expenditure Management 
and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) is provided in the form of SBS, as is the Global Fund support to 
the health sector which is channelled through Ministry of Finance and National Planning. 
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Budget Support by Cooperating Partner, 2006 – 2009, US$ million 
 
 
 
 
JC 8.6:  Aid modality combinations were the result of complementarity with other donors 
Since the EU Code of Conduct for the implementation of complementarity and division of labour (DOL) 
in development policy was adopted in 2009 only, it obviously could not have been used in / applied to 
the EDF8, 9 and 10 strategic/programming documents, since these had been concluded earlier already. 
But there is evidence that, even ahead of their codification, the principles listed in the Code and in the 
Division of Labour documents have already provided strong guidance to the elaboration of the strate-
gic/programming documents determining donors’ (and particularly EU’s) aid modalities in Zambia. This 
complementarity and Division of Labour was especially facilitated through the Joint Assistance Strategy 
for Zambia (JASZ) institutional and strategic coordination framework. 
In Zambia, formal donor coordination and harmonisation has been pioneered from the very onset of the 
2001-2010 period under review by this evaluation onwards, as evidenced by the list of policy agree-
ments on the subject: HIP in 2003, WHIP in 2004, the Poverty Reduction Budget Support Memorandum 
of Understanding (PRBS-MoU) in 2005, the Zambia Aid Policy and Strategy in 2006, the Joint Assis-
tance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) in 2007, and the successor JASZ-II recently on 18 November 2011 
for the period 2011-2015. 
In execution of the Paris Declaration aid effectiveness agenda, the first Joint Assistance Strategy for 
Zambia (JASZ) was signed in May 2007 by 17 CPs present in the country, including an agreed Division 
of Labour (DOL) matrix. The JASZ is the CPs response to the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) 
and the Aid Policy, also adopted in 2007 by GRZ. The Policy states that budget support is the govern-
ment’s preferred aid modality. The EDF10 CSP Mid-Term Review made reference to the 2007 Paris 
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Monitoring survey conducted in 2008 which showed a number of improvements in implementing the 
Paris Agenda (PA) in Zambia, notably with respect to CPs alignment, the use of country systems, and 
aid predictability. Challenges remain in the areas of coordinated technical cooperation, number of PIUs, 
and on mutual accountability. In response to the launch of the Sixth NDP in February 2011, a JASZ II 
(including a revised DOL table) has been finalised and signed by the 15 CPs on 28 November 2011. 
The EU DOL Fast Track Initiative has been playing an important role in stimulating the debate within 
the CP group but also between the CPs and Government. 
A first plan for the Division of Labour (sectors) between cooperating partners has been agreed in 2006, 
based on the FNDP 2006-2010 framework. At the same time, the terms of reference for lead and active 
cooperating partners in each sector have been prepared. The EC Delegation assumed the position of 
lead-cooperating partner for macroeconomic/budget support and for the transport sector, as well as for 
food security under the agriculture sector and for mining under the private sector. The Delegation re-
mains an active donor, with responsibilities in the context of the specific sector dialogues, in a number 
of other sectors (health, education, agriculture, private sector, governance…). Moreover, the EUD as-
sumed (together with Germany and the UNDP) the responsibility of the WHIP coordination from mid-
2006.  
The 2007 JAR indicated that the JASZ is the adequate instrument to progress towards further coordina-
tion and harmonisation, in line with the requirements of the Cotonou Agreement. It also confirmed that 
the EU joint programming is fully compatible with this wider JASZ agreement and that coordination be-
tween EU partners must be coherent with this wider agreement. The October 2009 Mid-Term Review 
report of the EDF10 CSP for Zambia concluded with regard to the status of the Division of Labour and 
aid effectiveness in Zambia that the aid effectiveness agenda is progressing well with a Joint Assis-
tance Strategy for Zambia signed and an agreed Division of Labour and aid effectiveness.  
That the JASZ has been instrumental in strengthening the coordination and complementarity between 
the Cooperating Partners, also with regard to the aid modality combinations, was reconfirmed by an 
evaluation of the JASZ in March 2010 which summarised the main achievements / strengths of the 
JASZ as including the following: (i) Improved sector level coordination among CPs with genuine at-
tempts to try other methods of shared working, such as delegated cooperation; (ii) More coordinated 
responses to GRZ and some decrease of bilateral demands on Ministerial time; (iii) Improved alignment 
to GRZ priorities as outlined in the FNDP; (iv) Inclusion of both PRBS and non-PRBS cooperating part-
ners in JASZ processes. The evaluation of the first JASZ, however, also identified a number of short-
comings. While harmonisation and alignment of CPs engagement has improved, it has been less effec-
tive in enhancing GRZ ownership, building mutual accountability between government and CPs and 
managing for results. In addition the evaluation noted that: (i) While some Sector Advisory Groups 
(SAG) perform well, others are less effective; (ii) Although described as a strategy, the JASZ lacked 
targets, an implementation plan and performance indicators. This limited the implementation of the 
JASZ as well as the ability to monitor progress; (iii) There is no obvious reduction of the number of pro-
jects in health or education, although coordination around government leadership has greatly improved; 
(iv) Transaction costs remain high for those taking the lead in particular sectors, and most importantly 
(v) Although the JASZ has led to better processes, there is less evidence of a contribution to improved 
development outcomes.  
These latter challenges and concerns were especially brought to the attention of the evaluation team 
during the field visit interviews and consultations of last December 2011. The general mood was one of 
potentials not fully utilised and further improvements needing to be made in the JASZ processes and 
tools, which were put forward in a constructive way as special challenges for the successor JASZ-II. 
This more critical assessment of the capacity of the JASZ to generate effective CP coordination and 
harmonisation and DOL, and of the quality of harmonisation in general also emerges in the more recent 
evaluations and reports covering the last two years of the here reviewed 2001-2010 ten year period. 
This is the period wherein serious governance issues emerged in the transport and health sectors, 
which entailed substantive repercussions on the CP harmonisation quality with different CPs reacting in 
different ways to the situation without the JASZ being able to synchronise and harmonise these reac-
tions. The recent 2011 budget support evaluation for example in this connection analysed: “The root 
causes of this lack of harmonisation relate to the disagreement among cooperating partners about the 
hierarchy of budget support objectives: Some cooperating partners see the provision of funding to alle-
viate poverty as the main objective of budget support, while others give priority to institutional or gov-
ernance reforms. Thus, cooperating partners were often unable to offer joint and consistent priorities to 
the GRZ through dialogue and incentives. Interference from headquarters, who responded more to 
domestic political situations than to Zambia’s needs, hindered the harmonisation and alignment at-
tempts being made by aid managers in Lusaka… Cooperating partners, especially in times of crisis, 
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have to rank the relative importance of these two goals in order to send credible and coherent signals to 
the recipient government. In Zambia, the relative priority given to governance promotion as opposed to 
financing poverty alleviation has varied from partner to partner. This has complicated any possible joint 
approach of the PRBS group in the dialogue process.” 
Moreover, a deeper analysis learns that the CP harmonisation not exceptionally is confined to the politi-
cal dialogue level only, not necessarily entailing effective repercussions on the operational and pro-
gramme execution levels, where it often stayed “business-as-usual”. This was attested to on different 
occasions during the field interviews and is confirmed in studies as for example the recent budget sup-
port evaluation which concluded to an incomplete harmonisation and alignment. It related these weak-
nesses to a lack of administrative capacity and coherence as well as to a declining political will. The 
latter have made it impossible for cooperating partners to rely on a purely alignment-based harmonisa-
tion strategy. On the one hand, cooperating partners have, at least partly, taken on the challenge of 
harmonisation and substantial progress has been made in setting up dialogue structures and a com-
mon conditionality framework. However, a closer look at conditionality, disbursement mechanisms, the 
dialogue process and knowledge management reveals several flaws in the harmonisation and align-
ment process.  
The current evaluation field interviews confirmed and made it further clear that the biggest harmonisa-
tion challenges ahead are situated at the operational level, particularly with regard to the harmonisation 
of planning, management, monitoring and evaluation systems, covering all hierarchical levels from be-
low district to national level and covering all sectors and thematic areas. (I-8.6.1) 
Donor mapping of sectoral involvement and their perceived comparative advantages were used in stra-
tegic responses of the EU as a basis for decisions on modalities. Particularly the JASZ and the Division 
of Labour (DOL) provide the broader strategic framework for this donor mapping of sectoral involve-
ment and their perceived comparative advantages, including for the EU and the EU Member States. 
The DOL analysis is used for the identification and selection process of the Lead Cooperating Partners 
(CPs) for each of the sectors from the National Development Plan, and with for each of the sectors also 
the active CPs listed. The version as of January 2009 of this Division of Labour matrix under the JASZ 
is included in the 2009 Mid-Term Review of the EDF10 CSP. It confirms the EC leading two NDP sec-
tors (Macro-economics and transport), active in five other sectors (Agriculture, Education, Governance, 
Health and Private Sector Development) and phasing out in two, energy and water. The JASZ-II Divi-
sion of Labour matrix 2012-2015 attached to the JASZ-II agreement signed by the CPs on 18 Novem-
ber 2011 lists the EU as “lead” in four sectors / thematic areas of (i) Transport, (ii) Agriculture, Livestock 
& Fisheries, (iii) Governance and (iv) Macroeconomics, and furthermore as “active” in the sector of 
health. 
These JASZ-DOL mappings of donors and their perceived comparative advantages with assignment 
accordingly of main responsibilities for the different NDP sectors, also inherently cover the dialogue on 
the preferred options and decision making on aid modalities. The summary table on aid effectiveness / 
donor matrix regarding planned donor disbursements has for each of the sectors also the applied aid 
modality (GGS, SBS, SWAP, project grant, project loan) explicitly mentioned. The summary Division of 
Labour tables determine for each of the NDP sectors the involved Cooperating Partners and with for 
each of them also determined whether they are lead or just active CP. The June 2006 table for example 
is included under Annex 6 of the EDF10 CSP/NIP document and thus provides ample evidence that for 
the design of the EDF10 EU response strategy (the CSP/NIP 2008-2013) donor mapping of sectoral 
involvement and their perceived comparative advantages were used in strategic responses as a basis 
for decisions on modalities.  
From the December 2011 field evaluation interviews with EUD and EU Member States it was learned 
that the function and responsibility of the JASZ with regard to the DOL is confirmed for the EUD and the 
EU Member States, but at the same time that it is preferred to have a stronger preparatory consultation 
process amongst the EUD and EU Member States ahead of the broader overall JASZ and SAGs meet-
ings. Not without importance probably also is that, as illustrated in the MoFNP 2009 Development Co-
operation Report, the European Union which disbursed US$ 424m over the period (14 per cent of the 
total) is the largest contributor amongst the Cooperating Partners (I-8.6.2) 
“Orphan" and "darling" sectors have been actively discussed with other donors with a view to levelling 
out donor involvement across sectors. The 2009 EU Toolkit for the implementation of complementarity 
and Division of Labour in development policy includes cross-sector complementarity as one of the key 
dimensions of DOL complementarity. Cross-sector complementarity tries to remedy situations at coun-
try level where some sectors receive much more donor attention (“the darling sectors”) than other (“the 
orphan sectors”). This cross-sector complementarity is one of the key issues taken up by the JASZ. But 
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also in the EDF10 CSP/NIP document of 2007 this cross-sector complementarity was already taken on 
“avant-la-lettre” for designing the country strategy and indicative programme, complementary to the EU 
member states and other EU inputs as for example from the EIB. 
For most of the review period, the DOL harmonisation, complementarity and alignment efforts of the 
Cooperating Partners in relation to the National Development Plan has even gone beyond the JASZ 
partners. Since 2003, the Government in collaboration with some pioneer cooperating partners (Nordic 
Plus Group) developed a framework for harmonisation and alignment. In April 2004, the “Memorandum 
of Understanding for Harmonisation of Government / Donor Practices for Aid Effectiveness in Zambia”, 
often referred to as the Wider Harmonisation in Practice (WHIP) agreement, was signed by 10 cooper-
ating partners. By 2006, the Memorandum had been signed by all the EU Members States represented 
in Zambia, the EC and the main non-EU cooperating partners (I-8.6.3) 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on EQ 8: 
JASZ-II (2011), p14; Chapter 3.1 – Principles of Cooperation with focus on Managing for Development 
Results: This chapter outlines the three main principles that guide cooperation under the JASZ II: (1) 
Results orientation; (2) Working in partnership, and; (3) Domestic accountability.  
3.1. Development Results – 3.1.1. Managing for Results: Why: … the objective of JASZ II it to deliver 
aid effectively and with mutual accountability to support the development results as described in the 
SNDP. Managing for results will therefore receive more emphasis during the course of the SNDP. This 
entails managing and implementing ODA in ways that focuses on desired results rather than just out-
puts, and using systematic information to improve decision making. Many CPs in Zambia (as in other 
countries) are placing increased emphasis on value for money and achieving development results for 
their aid. Different tools will be put in place to support the focus on development and aid effectiveness 
results.  
 
MoFNP – 2011 Budget Address Minister of Finance and National Planning to Parliament; Reve-
nue Estimates and Measures (2010) Par. 150; Summary of the estimates of revenue and financing to 
support expenditure in 2011: 
 
Total Resource Envelope for the 2011 Budget 
 ( K billion ) % of total 
 Tax Revenues  15,230.1 74.16% 
Direct Taxes 
 Company Income Tax 
 Other Income Taxes 
 Pay As You Earn 
 Mining tax  
 o/w Mineral Royalty Tax 
 Mining Tax Arrears 
7,800.8 
1,337.1 
894.7 
3,710.6 
1,858.4 
404.7 
554.8 
 
37.98% 
6.51% 
4.36% 
18.07% 
9.05% 
1.97% 
2.70% 
Value Added Tax 
 Domestic 
 Import 
3,998.8 
828.5 
3,170.3 
 
19.47% 
4.03% 
15.44% 
Customs and Excise Duty 
 Customs Duty 
 Excise Duty 
 o/w Fuel Levy 
3,430.5 
1,674.5 
1,756.0 
313.8 
 
16.70% 
8.15% 
8.55% 
1.53% 
Non-Tax Revenue  539.0 2.62% 
Total Domestic Revenues  15,769.1 76.78% 
Domestic Financing  1,219.8 5.93% 
Total Domestic Revenues and Financing  16,988.9 82.72% 
Total Foreign Grants and Loans  3,548.5 17.28% 
Grants 1,587.7  7.73% 
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 Direct Budget Support 
 Project Support 
 o/w SWAPS 
586.6 
1,001.1 
220.5 
2.86% 
4.87% 
1.07% 
Foreign Financing 
 Project Financing 
 Budget Financing 
1,960.8 
1,762.0 
198.8 
 
9.55% 
8.58% 
0.97% 
Total Revenue and Financing  20,537.4 100.00% 
 Note: Percentages added by the Evaluators 
 
 
MoFNP – 2009 Budget Address Minister of Finance and National Planning to Parliament; Reve-
nue Estimates and Measures (2009, p19; Summary of the estimates of revenue and financing to sup-
port expenditure in 2011: 
 
MoFNP Estimates of Revenues for 2009 
 ( K’ billion ) In % of Total 
Tax Revenues   10,191.6  66.70% 
Direct Taxes 4,530.0    29.65% 
 Company Income Tax 1,104.0    7.23% 
 Pay As You Earn 2,692.5    17.62% 
 Other Income Taxes  579.0    3.79% 
 Mineral Royalty Tax  154.4    1.01% 
Value Added Tax  2,549.9    16.69% 
Customs and Excise duty  3,111.6    20.37% 
Customs duty  1,452.5    9.51% 
Excise duty  1,659.1    10.86% 
o/w fuel levy   308.5    2.02% 
Non-Tax Revenue   454.3  2.97% 
User Fees and Charges  353.3    2.31% 
Exceptional revenue  34.8    0.23% 
Dividends, Interest & other Levies  66.2    0.43% 
Domestic Financing    1,069.0  7.00% 
Total Domestic Revenues And Financing     11,714.9  76.67% 
Total Foreign Grants And Loans     3,564.1  23.33% 
Grants  2,768.6    18.12% 
Direct Budget Support   810.1    5.30% 
Sector Budget Support  409.6    2.68% 
Project Support  1,548.9    10.14% 
o/w SWAPS   643.8    4.21% 
Foreign Financing  795.5    5.21% 
Project Financing  580.5    3.80% 
Budget Financing  215.0    1.41% 
Total Revenue And Financing   15,279.0  100.00% 
 
MoFNP Development Cooperation Report (2010) pp. 20-21; Chapter 4.2.1 – External Assistance 
Disbursement by Sector: (Below) Table 4.3 shows that Government in collaboration with Cooperating 
Partners projected to mobilise up to US$ 3,319m as external assistance. Key sectors that were pro-
jected to receive this funding were infrastructure, health and HIV/AIDS, education, and agriculture with 
projected proportions of 25, 23, 14, and 12 per cent of the mobilised external resources. Actual dis-
bursements to the sectors between 2006 and 2009 are shown in Column 4 of Table 4.3, while Column 
5 gives the corresponding shares. Over the four years 2006 to 2009 about US$ 2,212.9m, or 67 per 
cent of projected external financing for the FNDP period, was disbursed to the various sectors. In ad-
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dition, US$ 758.3m was disbursed as non-sector allocable funding, including general budget support. 
Sectors such as Education, Health and HIV/AIDS received close to the projected external resources 
and in cases such as Governance more than the projected amounts. Other sectors such as Agricul-
ture, Energy and Mining, Environment, Lands and Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Tourism and 
Water and Sanitation received far much less than was projected. 
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Evaluation Matrix Support Section for EQ 8 on Aid Modalities and Aid Efficiency: 
Aid Modalities Differentiated Portfolio Analysis of EDF Funding to Zambia 2001-2010 
 
Overall Portfolio Analysis Table 
 Table PF-1 Portfolio list of Zambia bilateral EDF funding in the period 2001-2010), by EDF 
CSP-NIP (EDF8, 9 and 10)  
Portfolio Analysis by Aid Method / Modality Tables and Graphics  
 Table PF-2 Portfolio list of Zambia bilateral EDF funding under EDF8, EDF9 and EDF10 (peri-
od 2001-2010), by aid method / modality  
 Table PF-3 Zambia CSP-NIP portfolio summary table of EDF8, 9 and 10 bilateral funding (pe-
riod 2001-2010), by aid method / modality   
 Figure PF-1 Breakdown of total EDF resources allocation to Zambia in the period 2001-2010 by 
aid method / modality  
 Figure PF-2 Trends in total EDF commitments by aid modality in the period 2001-2010 (for 
EDF8, 9 and 10)  
 Figure PF-3 Actually paid in percentage of total commitments, broken down by aid modality and 
per EDF in the period 2001-2010  
 Figure PF-4 Trend in total number of EDF projects by EDF cycle in the period 2001-2010 with 
breakdown by aid modality  
Portfolio Analysis by Method of Implementation / Management Mode Tables   
 Table PF-4 Portfolio list of Zambia bilateral EDF funding in the period 2001-2010, by method of 
implementation / management mode  
 Table PF-5 Zambia CSP-NIP portfolio summary table of EDF bilateral funding (period 2001-
2010), by method of implementation / management mode  
 Figure PF-5 Breakdown of total EDF resources allocation to Zambia in the period 2001-2010, 
by method of implementation / management mode  
 Figure PF-6 Trends in total EDF commitments by method of implementation / management 
mode in the period 2001-2010 (for EDF8, 9 and 10)  
 Figure PF-7 Actually paid in percentage of total commitments, broken down by method of im-
plementation / management mode and per EDF in the period 2001-2010  
 Figure PF-8 Trends in total number of EDF projects by EDF cycle in the period 2001-2010 with 
breakdown by method of implementation / management mode  
Budget Support Portfolio Analysis Table  
 Table PF-6 List and totals of budget support funding under Zambia EDF8, 9 and 10, including 
financial data (period 2001-2010)  
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GBS
438,200,000 €
39.2%
SBS
233,973,693 €
20.9% Projects
445,898,983 €
39.9%
Figure  PF-1 :  Breakdown of Total EDF Resources Allocation to 
Zambia in the Period 2001 - 2010 by Aid Method / Modality
Source:  EU CRIS database 
Aid Modality and Management Mode Differentiated Portfolio Analysis of European  
Development Fund (EDF) Funding to Zambia in the Period 2001-2010 
 
Overall Portfolio Analysis 
 
Basis of the Aid Modalities Differentiated Portfolio Analysis: The portfolio analysis of cooperation inter-
ventions financed from the EU’s European Development Fund in the period 2001-2010 basically per-
tains to the EDF9 CSP-NIP period for Zambia covering the period 2001-2007 and the EDF10 CSP-NIP 
period as far as the first three years 2008 to 2010 are concerned. However substantive resources from 
the preceding EDF8 CSP-NIP have also been committed / allocated still in the 2001-2010 period un-
der review. Also the non CSP-NIP interventions financed from EDF resources (e.g. vertical thematic 
budget lines programmes, ECHO humanitarian / emergency aid, sugar protocol, etc.) are included in 
the portfolio analysis. Basis of the portfolio analysis is the EU CRIS database status update of 31 May 
2011. Additional sources of information concerning data for the variables aid method (column 7 of 
base portfolio listing table PF-1), methods of implementation / management mode (column 8), EU 
funding source / financing sources (column 9) and original FA maximum commitment (column 
10),special remarks on financing (column 11) and originally planned closing date (column 14) have 
been used. These include in hierarchical order: (i) First and prevailing source of information: the origi-
nal Financing Agreement, including the Technical and Administrative Provisions; (ii) then 2nd: Action 
Fiche; (iii) then 3rd: the Project Summary Sheet (CRIS); and then finally as 4th: the CRIS Detailed 
Decision Form. The cancelled projects (code CA in the CRIS database) have been filtered out. The 
following categories of CRIS database funding entries have been retained in the EDF portfolio for fur-
ther analysis: (i) PO = provisional; (ii) EG = committed; (iii) EC Under implementation / execution, and; 
(iv) CL = Closed. 
 
The Overall Portfolio of EU Bilateral EDF Funding of the Zambia CSPs in the Period 2001-2010: Total 
EU commitments for the Zambia country strategies and programmes (CSPs-NIPs) over the ten year 
period 2001-2010 from European Development Fund (EDF) resources amounted to €1,118 billion. Of 
this total, €267m (or 23.9% of the total) originate from the preceding EDF8 CSP/NIP, 34.8% from the 
2001-2007 EDF9 CSP/NIP and 41.25% from the 2008-2013 EDF10 CSP/NIP. Of this total of commit-
ted / allocated resources, €946m (or 84.6%) has been contracted and €706m (or 63.1%) actually paid. 
A total of 64 interventions are in the Zambia 2001-2010 portfolio (23 from EDF8, 26 from EDF9 and 15 
from EDF10). This corresponds to an average project/intervention funding size of €17.470m. The av-
erage project budget size increases over time, with an average intervention size of €11.626m for 
EDF8 projects, €14.980m for EDF9 projects and €30.748m for EDF10 projects approved and commit-
ted in the 2001-2010 period. 
 
Portfolio Analysis by Aid Method / Modality 
 
EDF Portfolio Analysis by Aid Method / Modality: The portfolio analysis by aid method/modality is 
based on the three main categories of EU development cooperation aid: Project Approach (PA), Sec-
tor Budget Support (SBS) 
99
 and General Budget Support (GBS). Of the 1,118 million total EDF com-
mitments to Zambia in the 2001-
2010 period, 39.9% (or 446 mil-
lion Euro) has been allocated 
through the project approach 
funding modality, an almost 
equal proportion of 39.2% (or 
429 million Euro) through Gen-
eral Budget Support, and about 
one fifth (20.9% or 234 million 
Euro) through Sector Budget 
Support. There is a substantive 
increase over time of budget 
support, and especially of Gen-
eral Budget Support, as aid 
method / modality over the three 
EDF CSPs/NIPs in the 2001-
2010 ten year period. Under 
                                               
99
  Sector Budget Support is also referred to as Sector Policy Support Programme (SPSP). 
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Figure  PF-3 :  Actually Paid in Percentage of Total Commitments, Broken Down                  
by Aid Modality and per EDF in the Period 2001-2010
Projects SBS GBS
Source:  EU CRIS database 
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Figure  PF-2 :  Trends in Total EDF Commitments by Aid Modality in the                      
Period 2001-2010 (for EDF 8, 9 and 10) 
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Source:  EU CRIS database 
EDF8, all (100%) resources where still allocated under the “traditional” project approach cooperation 
modality. This PA proportion drastically reduced under the EDF9 to less than one quarter (23.5%) of 
all committed resources and further down to 18.8% under EDF10. From zero per cent under EDF8, 
the General Budget Support funding under EDF8 increased to almost half (47.0%) of all EDF9 re-
sources (equivalent to 183 million Euro) and more than half (55.3%) of all EDF10 resources (€255m ). 
Sector Budget Support saw 
an increase to about half the 
amounts of General Budget 
Support (€115m or 29.4% 
under EDF9 and €119m or 
25.9% under EDF10).  
 
EDF Aid Modality Portfolio 
Analysis of Number of Inter-
ventions and Average Inter-
vention Size: A total of four 
General Budget Support 
(GBS) bilateral fundings 
have been approved (three 
under EDF8 and one under 
EDF10) in the 2001-2010 
period with an average size 
of €110m. With €255m, the 
one General Budget Support 
approved so far under EDF10 is bigger than the combined three GBS commitments under EDF9 be-
fore (with an average size of €61m). Under both EDF9 and EDF10, three commitments for Sector 
Budget Support were made with an average size of respectively €38m and €39m. The number of pro-
ject approaches decreased from 23 under EDF8 (with a total of €267m or €11.626m per project) to 20 
under EDF9 (total €92m or €4.584m per project) and further down to 11 so far under EDF10 (total 
€87m or €7.894m per project).  
 
Aid Modality Portfolio Analysis of Amounts Contracted and Paid: To a certain extent, actual amounts 
paid and expenditures can be considered a proxy for measuring the efficiency of aid management. As 
far as the contracted and paid amounts per EDF strategy / programme cycle are concerned, a total of 
95.2% of the (pre 2001-2010 period) EDF8 resources committed still in the 2001-2010 period have 
been contracted and paid out as of the end of this period (thus 4.8% not yet paid out). For the EDF9 
covering the period 2001-
2007, this amounts to 
85.7%, implying that 14.3% 
of the committed EDF9 re-
sources have not been paid 
yet (with 5.6% of the total 
committed EDF9 resources 
have not been contracted 
yet). In the first half period 
2008-2010 of the total 
EDF10 six year period 
(2008-2013), about one 
fourth (25.5%) of the com-
mitted/allocated resources 
have been paid (68.0% of 
the committed EDF10 re-
sources have been contract-
ed). The portfolio efficiency 
analysis by aid meth-
od/modality expressed as per cent amount paid of total allocated/committed resources shows that 
72.8% of the committed project approach resources in the ten year period 2001-2010 have been actu-
ally paid, against 60.7% for the GBS modality and 49.4% for the SPS modality. For EDF9 which co-
vers the completed CSP-NIP cycle 2001-2007, the total paid amounts in percentage of the total allo-
cated/committed resources amount to respectively 66.1% for the Project Approach, 94.4% for General 
Budget Support and 87.5% for Sector Budget Support.  
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DM -
Decentralised
635,765,837 €
56.9%
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Decentralised
28,078,507 €
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CM - Centralised
454,228,332 €
40.6%
Figure  PF-5 :  Breakdown of Total EDF Resources Allocation to 
Zambia in the Period 2001 - 2010 by Method of Implementation / 
Management Mode
Source:  EU CRIS database 
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Portfolio Analysis by Method of Implementation / Management Mode 
 
Basis of the Portfolio Analysis by Method of Implementation / Management Mode: For the 2001-2010 
EU support to Zambia portfolio analysis by method of implementation, also referred to as management 
mode, the following classification, principally based on the CRIS project summary sheets, is used: (i) 
DM = Decentralised management; (ii) PM or DPM = Partially decentralised management; (iii) CM = 
Centralised Management. This latter category also covers the special sub-categories CM-IO = Cen-
tralised management - Joint management with international organisation, and ICM-DA = Indirect cen-
tralised management - Delegation agreement. Thus “CM - Centralised Management” is a clustering of 
the three centralised management modes CM, CM-IO and ICM-DA.  
 
Portfolio Analysis by Manage-
ment Mode: Of the total EDF 
resources allocation to Zambia in 
the period 2001-2010, a total of 
56.9% (or 636m Euro) were un-
der decentralised management 
(DM), whereas 40.6% (or 454m 
Euro) were under Centralised 
Management (basically CM, but 
also CM-IO or ICM-DA) and 2.5% 
under Partially Decentralised 
Management as main manage-
ment mode / modality. The man-
agement mode was fairly con-
sistent under EDFs 8 and 9 with 
respectively 84.0% and 89.1% of 
the resources managed decen-
tralised at Zambian level, but at 
the same time in terms of number of projects the proportion of centrally managed interventions in-
creased. Under EDF10 a different picture emerged with the proportion of centrally managed interven-
tions drastically increased both in number of projects (8 out of a total of 15 or 53.3%) as in terms of 
total committed resources 
(€389m out of a total of €461m, 
or 84.4%). These figures should 
be interpreted with caution since 
they can be directly related to an 
administrative reclassification of 
budget support projects under 
EDF10.
100
 Overall for the entire 
portfolio over the 10 years peri-
od, a total of 81.2% of the com-
mitted resources has been paid 
as far as the decentralised inter-
ventions are concerned. These 
actually paid figures are consid-
erably lower for the centrally 
managed resources (39.9% of 
the total committed) and the par-
tially decentralised resources 
(28.5% of the total committed). A more accurate picture of this absorptive capacity efficiency proxy 
indicator is probably provided by the EDF9 figures concerned which cover the whole EDF9 originally 
envisioned strategy and programming cycle for 2001-2007 with respectively 87.7%, 37.6% and 97.9% 
of the committed resources also actually contracted and paid for DM, PM and CM interventions.  
 
                                               
100
  In the summary identification table of the Technical and Administrative Provisions (TAPS) of budget support programmes 
under EDF 10 these are categorized under the item of “Management Mode”, these are categorized as “Centralised man-
agement” (e.g. the MDG Contract for Zambia 2009-2014). Sector Policy Support Programmes (SPSPs) as the SPSP Road 
Transport II are categorised as “centralised management” for the sector budget support, and “partially decentralised man-
agement” for the capacity development component. In case of double categorisation, the most prominent mode is featured 
in the portfolio analysis tables. 
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Overall and Sectoral Budget Support in the Zambia EDF Projects Portfolio 2001-2010: Budget support 
as EU aid method / modality entered for the first time in the EDF9 country strategy / national indicative 
programme. Before, under EDF8, it had taken the format of Structural Adjustments Funds (SAF) under 
the SYSMIN system (e.g. SAF V – SYSMIN with a total budget of 106,6m Euro). The SAF SYSMIN 
assistance was a kind of budget support avant-la-lettre. Zambia was one of the first ACP countries to 
have General Budget Support (GBS) introduced in its CSP-NIP portfolio. This happened under EDF9 
with the programme entitled “Poverty Reduction Budget Support Programme 2003-2008 (PRBS-01)” 
with a total budget of 108.2m Euro. This RBS consisted of one fixed annual amount and 5 variable 
tranches related to performance on both Public Finance Management (PFM) and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) indicators. PRBS-2 covering the period 2007-2008 was organised along virtu-
ally the same performance based modalities (62m Euro, including 2m Euro complementary support). 
The accompanying EU support to public expenditure management (PEMFA) also took the format of 
General Budget Support with 10 semi-annual fixed tranches (total of 13 million EDF resources plus 2.5 
million from other CPs) with complementary multi-donor support together with 8 other Cooperating 
Partners (CPs) for a total amount of 42.1m Euro. All PEMFA resources were paid (100%), whereas 
these payments amount to 99.36% for PRBS-1 and 84.64% for PRBS-2 
 
Sector Budget Support under EDF9: Under EDF9, in addition three (3) Sector Budget Support (SBS or 
Sector Budget Support Policies) were launched in respectively (i) the basis education sector: 9-ACP 
ZA-007 – Support to the Education Strategic Plan – total commitment: 10 million Euro; (ii) the transport 
sector (9-ACP ZA-013 – Periodic Maintenance of Trunk, Main and District Roads – total commitment: 
96 million Euro, and: (iii) the basic health sector (9-ACP ZA-025 – Retention of Human Resources for 
Health – total commitment: €8.57m). The basic education and the transport SBS only had fixed annual 
tranches (resp. 4 and 3), whereas the SBS tool for the health sector was more refined including both 
fixed and variable tranches. The basic education SBS got fully contracted and paid for 100%. For the 
transport sector this proportion of paid amounts in relation to the foreseen commitments stands at 
86.12% as of the end of the 2001-2010 period. The basic health SBS got paid out 100% according to 
CRIS data, but this is a special case since project was closed on the request of the NAO following the 
misappropriation case (the original foreseen budget commitment from EDF resources was €10m). 
 
Budget Support under EDF10: Under EDF10, the budget support tools for Zambia got further refined 
in line with the evolving official EU provisions, guidelines, rules and regulations. Under EDF10 (cover-
ing the CSP/NIP period 2008-2013) so far one GBS and three SBS interventions have been approved 
and budgetary resources committed for a total amount of 374.4m Euro. The bulk of the resources are 
allocated to the PRBS-3 – MDG Contract 1 programme in the amount of 255m Euro. This further re-
fined SBS tool consists of both fixed annual and variable tranches, with the latter in turn consisting of 
two types: Annual PFM performance measured at the end of programme years 2 to 6 and in addition 
V-FLEX tranches related to the status of progress towards achievement of selective Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs) for a total amount of 30m Euro, measured at the end of years 4 to 6. As of 
the end of 2010 (about halfway the programme), the total paid resources amount to 36.40% (93m 
Euro) of the total PRBS-3 commitment. The three committed Sector Budget Support programmes 
under EDF10 labelled as such concern respectively: (i) the basis health sector: 10-ACP ZA-005 – 
Supporting Public Health Service Delivery in Zambia – total commitment: €35m); (ii) the transport sec-
tor: 2
nd
 Sector Policy Support Programme for the Road Sector – total commitment: €77m), and; (iii) the 
governance and civil society sector: 10-ACP ZA-007 – Supporting the electoral system in Zambia – 
total commitment: €7.4m. The latter in fact is a trust fund together with 7 Cooperating Partners at date 
of signing and with UNDP as lead. The EU component is managed by GiZ under Indirect Centralised 
Management – Delegation Agreement (ICM-DA) mode. The two former SPSPs are fully blown sector 
budget support programmes both consisting of annual fixed (resp. 3 and 4) and variable (resp. 3 and 
3) tranches. Following the misappropriation case in the transport sector virtually none of the committed 
resources have been actually paid (only 0.27% or €204,846), whereas for the health project the paid 
amounts at the end of 2010 stood at 32.86% and for the governance programme at 48.38%.  
                                               
101
  The list and totals of budget support funding under Zambia EDF-8, EDF-9 and EDF-10, including financial data, for the 
entire 2001-2010 period are included under portfolio analysis table PF-6 hereafter. 
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1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Contracted in 
% of Allocated
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Paid in % of 
Allocated
1
8-ACP-ZA-019   
9-ACP-ZA-002
FED/1999/014-310 CL
PUBLIC WELFARE ASSISTANCE SCHEME 
(PWAS)
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 1,160,000 03.03.1999 01.03.2000 29.02.2004 29.02.2004 1,072,059 0.10% 1,072,059 0.11% 100.00% 1,072,059 0.15% 100.00%
2 8-ACP-ZA-020 FED/1999/014-315 CL
REHABILIT. KABWE-KAPIRI MPOSHI AND 
CHISAMBA ROADS (+7ZA025)
21020 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-8 Sysmin 26,000,000 8th EDF Sysmin 01.03.1999 01.09.2000 30.04.2004 30.04.2005 16,757,544 1.50% 16,757,544 1.77% 100.00% 16,757,544 2.37% 100.00%
3 na FED/1999/014-498 CL
ECHO/ZMB/254/1999/01000- EMERGENCY 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO CONGOLESE 
REFUGEES
72010 Emergency Response PA CM EDF-8 ECHO 1,500,000 0.13% 1,500,000 0.16% 100.00% 1,500,000 0.21% 100.00%
4 8-ACP-ZA-030 FED/2000/014-789 CL SUPPORT TO THE CULTURAL SECTOR 16061
Other social infra and 
services
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 1,970,000 05.01.2000 30.11.2003 30.11.2004 1,620,512 0.14% 1,620,512 0.17% 100.00% 1,620,512 0.23% 100.00%
5 8-ACP-ZA-032 FED/2000/014-828 CL FEASIBILITY STUDY LIVINGSTONE AIRPORT 21050 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-8 NIP 334,730 28.01.2000 01.05.2000 30.09.2000 30.09.2000 334,730 0.03% 334,730 0.04% 100.00% 334,730 0.05% 100.00%
6 8-ACP-ZA-034 FED/2000/014-875 CL SUPPORT TO NAO'S OFFICE (+ 7ZA089 + 8ZA022) 15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 31.03.2000 01.01.2000 31.12.2003 1,697,081 0.15% 1,697,081 0.18% 100.00% 1,697,081 0.24% 100.00%
7 na FED/2000/014-938 CL FEASIBILITY STUDY ON NRDC 31181 Agriculture PA DM EDF-8 NIP 208,310 na na na 208,310 0.02% 208,310 0.02% 100.00% 208,310 0.03% 100.00%
8 8-ACP-ZA-036 FED/2000/014-985 EC
PROGRAMME DE DIVERSIFICATION DU SECTEUR 
MINIER
32220
Mineral resources and 
mining
PA DM EDF-8 Sysmin 30,000,000 Sysmin 09.06.2000 01.12.2001 30.11.2007 02.11.2010 30,000,000 2.68% 28,441,816 3.01% 94.81% 19,968,480 2.83% 66.56%
9
8-ACP-ZA-037/ 
038/039/040/041/
042/043/044
FED/2000/015-065 CL SAF V - SYSMIN 32220
Mineral resources and 
mining
PA DM EDF-8 Sysmin 109,620,000 SAF, NIP and Sysmin 18.09.2000 01.09.2000 31.12.2002 31.12.2004 115,574,913 10.34% 115,574,913 12.21% 100.00% 115,574,913 16.37% 100.00%
10 8-ACP-ZA-045 FED/2000/015-078 CL MICROPROJECTS PROGRAMME II 16050
Other social infra and 
services
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 14,500,000 NIP 30.11.2005 13,745,114 1.23% 13,745,114 1.45% 100.00% 13,745,114 1.95% 100.00%
11 na FED/2000/015-191 CL
PROJECT FORMULATION ESSENTIAL ROAD 
MAINTENANCE INPUTS""
21020 Transport and storage PA DM 16,079 0.00% 16,079 0.00% 100.00% 16,079 0.00% 100.00%
12 na FED/2000/015-277 CL
EVALUATION PREQUALIF DOSSIERS & 
INTERNATIONAL RESTR DOSSIERS
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 23,577 0.00% 23,577 0.00% 100.00% 23,577 0.00% 100.00%
13 na FED/2001/015-394 CL
EVALUATION TENDER DOSSIERS EXPORT 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME II
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 10,555 0.00% 10,555 0.00% 100.00% 10,555 0.00% 100.00%
14 8-ACP-ZA-050 FED/2001/015-399 CL
CAPITAL INVESTMENT LINE II PROJECT_(21000, 
22151)
32120 Industry PA CM-IO EDF-8 NIP 40,000,000
Capital Investment Line 
global loan iia & b - EIB
16.02.2001 01.01.2001 31.12.2003 39,058,745 3.49% 39,058,745 4.13% 100.00% 39,058,745 5.53% 100.00%
15 8-ACP ZA-051 FED/2001/015-454 CL FORESTRY SUPPORT PROGRAMME 31220 Forestry PA DM EDF-8 NIP 1,900,000 22.06.2001 01.03.2002 30.09.2005 30.09.2005 1,359,873 0.12% 1,359,873 0.14% 100.00% 1,359,873 0.19% 100.00%
16 8-ACP-ZA-053 FED/2001/015-572 CL LUMWANA STUDY 32220
Mineral resources and 
mining
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 7,000,000 13.07.2001 22.05.2001 31.12.2002 31.12.2002 7,000,000 0.63% 7,000,000 0.74% 100.00% 7,000,000 0.99% 100.00%
17 na FED/2002/015-781 CL
SUPPORT TO PLANNING AND BUDGETING 
REFORMS
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 462,332 0.04% 462,332 0.05% 100.00% 462,332 0.07% 100.00%
18 8-ACP-ZA-108 FED/2002/015-804 CL
Echo/zmb/254/2002/01000 EMERGENCY TO 
REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-8 ECHO 2,139,587 ECHO 31.01.2001 01.01.2002 30.06.2003 03.06.2002 2,139,587 0.19% 2,139,587 0.23% 100.00% 2,139,587 0.30% 100.00%
19
8-ACP-ZA-055   
9-ACP-ZA-010
FED/2002/015-858 EC
REHABILITATION OF LIVINGSTONE AND LUSAKA 
AIRPORTS AIRPORT RECONSTRUCTION AND 
REHABILITATION
21050 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-8 NIP 11,250,000 18.07.2002 01.10.2003 30.09.2007 30.06.2011 13,450,000 1.20% 12,672,522 1.34% 94.22% 12,470,470 1.77% 92.72%
20 na FED/2002/015-876 CL
PRE-FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR A FEEDER ROADS 
PROGRAMME
21020 Transport and storage PA DM 63,570 0.01% 63,570 0.01% 100.00% 63,570 0.01% 100.00%
21
8-ACP-ZA-059  9-
ACP-ZA-023
FED/2002/016-047 EC URBAN MARKETS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 43030 Other multisector PA DM EDF-8 & 9 NIPs 21,200,000
Financing under EDF-8 
and 9
19.11.2002 10.12.2003 09.06.2009 15.01.2003 21,200,000 1.90% 21,136,455 2.23% 99.70% 19,268,450 2.73% 90.89%
22 8-ACP ZA-060 FED/2003/016-151 CL
SUPPORT TO THE NAO FOR CLOSURE OF EDF 
COMMITMENTS
91010
Administrative cost of 
donors
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 79,500 06.02.2003 10.02.2003 30.06.2004 30.06.2004 79,500 0.01% 79,500 0.01% 100.00% 79,500 0.01% 100.00%
23 8-ACP ZA-061 FED/2003/016-188 CL
PROJECT APPRAISAL & PREP FP FOR 
CONSERVATION FARMING
31130 Agriculture PA DM EDF-8 NIP 14,704 18.03.2003 01.06.2003 31.07.2003 31.07.2003 14,704 0.00% 14,704 0.00% 100.00% 14,704 0.00% 100.00%
23 267,376,831 267,388,785 23.92% 264,989,578 28.00% 99.10% 254,446,185 36.05% 95.16%
EC-JEU  Country  Level  Evaluation  Zambia   (2011)
Table  PF-1 :   Portfolio  List   of   Zambia   Bilateral   EDF   Funding  in  the  Period  2001 - 2010 )   -    By  EDF CSP-NIP  (EDF 8, 9 and 10)  
(1) (4) (5)
V.2  -  10 Jan 2011
Funding Identification and Implementation Details EC Financial Data (in €)
Aid  Modalities  Differentiated  Portfolio  Analysis  of  EDF  Funding  to  Zambia  over  the  Period  2001 - 2010 
DAC 
Code
Sector ZM Signature 
Date of FA
Starting 
Date
Seq.
No.
Project No.
Decision No.  
(CRIS)
Status
(3)
Title
Aid Method 
/ Modality
(4)
Method of 
Implementati
on / Mngt.  
Mode
(5)
Contracted Paid
TOTALS  EDF-8
Closing 
Date (DLE) 2
Allocated  / CommittedEU Funding 
Source / 
Financing 
Source
Original FA 
Maximum 
Commitment
 Special Remarks on 
Financing (Modalities) 
- if any
Originally 
Planned 
Closing 
Date  (FA) 6
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1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Contracted in 
% of Allocated
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Paid in % of 
Allocated
1 9-ACP ZA-001 FED/2003/016-242 CL REHABILITATION OF KAZUNGULA PONTOONS 21040 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-9 NIP 380,000 19.08.2003 19.08.2003 31.12.2008 31.12.2008 370,336 0.03% 370,336 0.04% 100.00% 370,336 0.05% 100.00%
2 9-ACP ZA-003 FED/2003/016-305 CL
CAPACITY BUILDING IN DPT OF ECONOMIC AND 
TECHN. COOPERATION, MINISTRY OF FINANCE 
AND NATIONAL PLANNING
15111
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM EDF-9 NIP 747,400 TA 19.09.2003 19.09.2003 31.12.2007 30.06.2008 743,068 0.07% 743,068 0.08% 100.00% 743,068 0.11% 100.00%
3 9-ACP ZA-005 FED/2003/016-366 EC
POVERTY REDUCTION BUDGET SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME 2003-2006 (PRBS01 )
51010 General budget support GBS DM EDF-9 NIP 117,000,000
General budget support 
with 1 fixed annual and 
5 variable tranches 
(PFM and PRSP 
indicators performance 
related)
22.12.2003 22.12.2003 31/12.2008 31.12.2010 108,200,000 9.68% 108,180,921 11.43% 99.98% 107,509,599 15.23% 99.36%
4 9-ACP-ZA-007 FED/2003/016-404 EC SUPPORT TO THE EDUCATION STRATEGIC PLAN 11230 Basic education SPSP DM EDF-9 NIP 10,000,000
Sector budget support 
consisting of 4 fixed 
annual tranches
15.03.2004 15.03.2004 31.12.2010 31.12.2010 10,002,243 0.89% 10,002,243 1.06% 100.00% 10,002,243 1.42% 100.00%
5 9-ACP ZA-008 FED/2003/016-534 CL
FEASIBILITY STUDY ''REHABILITATION AND 
MAINTENANCE OF FEEDER ROADS IN ZAMBIA
21020 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-9 NIP 470,816 24.12.2003 05.11.2007 31.12.2007 31.12.2007 470,816 0.04% 470,816 0.05% 100.00% 470,816 0.07% 100.00%
6 9-ACP-ZA-009 FED/2004/016-586 EC TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY 99810 Unallocated PA DPM EDF-9 ACP 2,847,757
ACP TCF - Technical 
Cooperation Facility
25.05.2004 25.05.2004 31.10.2010 30.09.2011 2,847,757 0.25% 2,631,757 0.28% 92.42% 2,299,004 0.33% 80.73%
7 9-ACP ZA-014 FED/2004/016-972 EC Capacity Building for Private Sector Development 32130 Industry PA DM EDF-9 NIP 15,000,000 26.04.2005 26.04.2005 31.12.2012 31.12.2012 15,000,000 1.34% 13,830,987 1.46% 92.21% 12,216,548 1.73% 81.44%
8 9-ACP ZA-012 FED/2004/017-400 CL
ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2004/01000 HUMANITARIAN AID 
TO FACILITATE THE R REPATRIATION TO 
ANGOLA OF ANGOLAN REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-9 ECHO 2,000,000 ECHO 07.09.2004 07.09.2004 31.12.2006 31.12.2006 2,000,000 0.18% 2,000,000 0.21% 100.00% 2,000,000 0.28% 100.00%
9 9-ACP ZA-011 FED/2004/017-408 CL
PROMOTION OF CONSERVATION FARMING AND 
CROP DIVERSITY
31161 Agriculture PA DM EDF-9 NIP 1,970,000 26.11.2004 26.11.2004 31.12.2009 31.12.2009 1,601,322 0.14% 1,601,322 0.17% 100.00% 1,601,322 0.23% 100.00%
10 9-ACP ZA-013 FED/2004/017-416 EC
PERIODIC MAINTENANCE OF TRUNK, MAIN AND 
DISTRICT ROADS
21020 Transport and storage SPSP DM EDF-9 NIP 70,000,000
Sector budget support 
with 3 annual fixed 
tranches
11.02.2005 17.12.2004 31.12.2011 31.12.2013 96,000,000 8.59% 95,134,941 10.05% 99.10% 81,711,354 11.58% 85.12%
11 9-ACP ZA-015 FED/2005/017-436 CL
ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2005/01000 HUMANITARIAN AID 
TO FACILITATE THE REPATRIATION TO ANGOLA 
OF ANGOLAN REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-9 ECHO 3,500,000 ECHO 07.03.2005 07.03.2005 31.12.2007 31.12.2007 3,500,000 0.31% 3,500,000 0.37% 100.00% 3,500,000 0.50% 100.00%
12 9-ACP ZA-016 FED/2005/020-661 CL
4TH MICORPROJECTS PROGRAMME IN ZAMBIA - 
COMPLEMENTARY FUNDING TO 8 ACP ZA 12 (
43010 Other multisector PA DM EDF-9 NIP 1,423,891 19.09.2007 19.09.2007 31.12.2009 31.12.2009 1,423,891 0.13% 1,423,891 0.15% 100.00% 1,423,891 0.20% 100.00%
13 9-ACP-ZA-017 FED/2006/017-955 EC
SUPPORT TO AGRICULTURAL DIVERSIFICATION 
AND FOOD SECURITY IN WESTERN AND NORTH 
WESTERN ZAMBIA
31110 Agriculture PA DM EDF-9 NIP 15,000,000 19.12.2005 19.12.2005 31.12.2013 31.12.2013 15,000,000 1.34% 14,733,034 1.56% 98.22% 12,635,976 1.79% 84.24%
14 9-ACP ZA-018 FED/2006/017-956 EC
EC SUPPORT TO THE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
MANAGEMENT (PEMFA)
15111
Government and civil 
society, general
GBS CM EDF-9 NIP 15,500,000
15.5m GBS  with 10 
semi-annual fixed 
tranches and 42.1m 
complementary support  
(multi-donor: with 8 
other CPs)
22.03.2006 19.12.2005 31.12.2012 31.12.2012 13,000,000 1.16% 13,000,000 1.37% 100.00% 13,000,000 1.84% 100.00%
15 9-ACP ZA-025 FED/2006/018-559 CL
RETENTION FOR HUMAN RESOURCES FOR 
HEALTH
12281 Basic health SPSP DM EDF-9 NIP 10,000,000
Sector budget support 
with fixed and variable 
tranches (closure 
request NAO)
04.12.2006 04.12.2006 30.11.2011 30.06.2011 8,571,450 0.77% 8,571,450 0.91% 100.00% 8,571,450 1.21% 100.00%
16 9-ACP ZA-024 FED/2006/018-569 EC PRBS 02 (2007-2008) 51010 General budget support GBS DM EDF-9 NIP 62,000,000
60m GBS and 2m 
complementary support
29.03.2007 04.12.2006 31.12.2011 31.12.2013 62,000,000 5.55% 53,017,437 5.60% 85.51% 52,478,486 7.43% 84.64%
17 9-ACP ZA-022 FED/2006/020-681 EC
ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2006/01000 HUMANITARIAN AID 
FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS SUFFERING 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF DROUGHT AND 
AIDS
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-9 ECHO 2,200,000 ECHO 27.03.2006 27.03.2006 31.12.2011 31.12.2008 2,200,000 0.20% 1,952,068 0.21% 88.73% 1,952,068 0.28% 88.73%
18
9-ACP-ZA-026    
9 ACP-ZA-027
FED/2007/019-150 EC
Programme for the Institutional Development and 
Involvement of Non-State Actors in the Cooperation 
Between the European Commission and Zambian
92010 Support to NGOs PA DM EDF-9 NIP 5,000,000
Only Financing Proposal 
(Not approved yet)
03.07.2007 03.07.2007 31.12.2012 31.12.2012 5,000,000 0.45% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
19 9-ACP ZA-020 FED/2007/019-261 EC
CAPACITY BUILDING WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT 
OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
15111
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 18.08.2006 18.08.2006 31.12.2011 1,700,000 0.15% 1,630,879 0.17% 95.93% 1,431,451 0.20% 84.20%
20 9-ACP RPR-116 FED/2007/019-313 EC
1st CfP Water Facility (163B) : Implementation of 
Integrated Water Resources Management in Zambia
14010 Water and Sanitation PA DPM EDF-9 ACP 3,750,000
TPS Intra ACP 
Allocations
08.11.2007 24.07.2007 30.06.2013 07.11.2013 3,750,000 0.34% 3,501,403 0.37% 93.37% 2,381,862 0.34% 63.52%
Funding Identification and Implementation Details EC Financial Data (in €)
DAC 
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Date of FA
Starting 
Date
Seq.
No.
Project No.
Decision No.  
(CRIS)
Status
(3)
Title
Aid Method 
/ Modality
(4)
Method of 
Implementati
on / Mngt.  
Mode
(5)
Contracted Paid
Closing 
Date (DLE) 2
Allocated  / CommittedEU Funding 
Source / 
Financing 
Source
Original FA 
Maximum 
Commitment
 Special Remarks on 
Financing (Modalities) 
- if any
Originally 
Planned 
Closing 
Date  (FA) 6
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 338 - 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Contracted in 
% of Allocated
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Paid in % of 
Allocated
21 9-ACP RPR-117 FED/2007/019-315 EC
1st CfP Water Facility (163A) : Support Improving 
Water Supply and Sanitation for the Urban Poor in 
Zambia
14010 Water and Sanitation PA DM EDF-9 NIP 4,092,258
Basket funding with KfW 
and GTZ
10.03.2008 04.10.2007 31.12.2014 31.12.2014 4,092,258 0.37% 3,060,118 0.32% 74.78% 2,640,729 0.37% 64.53%
22 9-ACP ZA-021 FED/2007/019-642 EC
REHABILITATION OF THE ZIMBA-LIVINGSTONE 
ROAD
21020 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-9 NIP 15,000,000 12.04.2006 12.12.2006 31.12.2015 31.12.2015 15,000,000 1.34% 13,159,556 1.39% 87.73% 9,033,349 1.28% 60.22%
23 9-ACP-RPR-119 FED/2007/020-837 EC
ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2007/01000 ASSISTANCE FOR 
THE REPATRIATION OF CONGOLESE REFUGEES 
FROM ZAMBIA TO THE DRC
72010 Emergency Response PA DM EDF-9 ECHO 1,997,136 ECHO 10.08.2007 10.08.2007 15.03.2010 15.03.2010 2,000,000 0.18% 1,780,913 0.19% 89.05% 1,780,913 0.25% 89.05%
24 9-ACP SAD-023 FED/2007/020-866 EC
POST-FLOOD RECOVERY PROGRAMME IN 
ZAMBIA
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-9 ECHO 1,500,000 ECHO 21.12.2007 21.12.2007 30.06.2011 30.06.2011 1,500,000 0.13% 1,318,540 0.14% 87.90% 1,281,680 0.18% 85.45%
25 9-ACP-ZA-028 FED/2008/019-727 EC TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY  II (TCF II) 99810 Unallocated PA DPM EDF-9 ACP 3,500,000
TCF - Technical 
Cooperation Facility
20.09.2007 20.09.2007 30.12.2012 31.12.2012 3,500,000 0.31% 3,105,355 0.33% 88.72% 2,875,890 0.41% 82.17%
26(7) 9-ACP-RPR-174 FED/2008/020-660 EC
RURAL ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURES AND 
SMALL SCALE PROJECTS
23040
Energy generation and 
supply
PA DPM EDF-9 ACP             9,980,750
Intra-ACP-EU Energy 
Facility: EU contrib-
ution €9,980,750;           
REA €26,530,461
10.03.2008 07.12.2007 31.12.2015 31.12.2015 9,980,750 0.89% 8,993,566 0.95% 90.11% 0 0.00% 0.00%
26 374,860,008 389,453,891 34.83% 367,714,601 38.86% 94.42% 333,912,035 47.31% 85.74%
2 10-ACP-ZA-002 FED/2008/020-931 EC
SUPPORTING ACTIONS AGAINST CHILD TRAFFIC 
AND CHILD LABOUR IN ZAMBIA
15140
Government and civil 
society, general
PA CM-IO
EDF-10 NIP and 
Intra ACP
1,600,000
Complementary funding 
by Intra ACP  TACKLE 
project .
19.08.2009 01.01.2008 19.08.2015 19.08.2015 1,600,000 0.14% 1,600,000 0.17% 100.00% 425,000 0.06% 26.56%
3 10-ACP-ZA-004 FED/2008/020-949 EC
PRBS 3 - MDG CONTRACT 1 - CRIS REF. 2008/199-
76
51010 General budget support GBS CM EDF-10 NIP 225,000,000
General budget support 
with fixed annual and 
variable tranches 
(2types: annual 
performance Y2-6 and V-
FLEX MDG-C tranches 
Y4-6) with V-FLEX 
component: 30m €
14.12.2009 17.12.2008 05.03.2017 05.03.2017 255,000,000 22.81% 255,000,000 26.95% 100.00% 92,812,500 13.15% 36.40%
4 10-ACP-ZA-005 FED/2008/020-950 EC
SUPPORTING PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
DELIVERY IN ZAMBIA CRIS REF. 2008/198-54
12220 Basic health SPSP CM EDF-10 NIP 35,000,000
Sector budget support: 
3 annual fixed tranches 
and 3 variable tranches
09.04.2009 17.12.2008 09.04.2015 09.04.2015 35,000,000 3.13% 35,000,000 3.70% 100.00% 11,500,000 1.63% 32.86%
5 10-ACP-ZA-006 FED/2008/020-974 EC
SECOND SECTOR POLICY SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME - ROAD Sector CRIS REF. 2008/199-
08
21020 Transport and storage SPSP CM EDF-10 NIP 77,000,000
Budget support: 69.3m 
Eur - Complementary 
support: 7.7m. 4 fixed 
(09-12) and 3 (10012) 
variable tranches
03.07.2009 17.12.2008 03.07.2016 03.07.2016 77,000,000 6.89% 341,410 0.04% 0.44% 204,846 0.03% 0.27%
6 10-ACP-ZA-007 FED/2008/020-975 EC
SUPPORTING THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN 
ZAMBIA - CRIS REF. FED/2008/203-74
15151
Government and civil 
society, general
SPSP CM-IO EDF-10 NIP 7,400,000
Trust Fund with 7CPs at 
date of FA signing with 
UNDP lead
19.08.2009 01.01.2008 19.08.2015 19.08.2015 7,400,000 0.66% 7,400,000 0.78% 100.00% 3,580,000 0.51% 48.38%
7 10 EDF FED/2009/021-385 EC Urban Food Vouchers Project, Zambia 52010
Developmental food 
aid/Food security 
assistance
PA CM-IO EDF-10 NIP 4,630,000 21.12.2009 21.12.2009 30.06.2014 4,630,000 0.41% 4,600,000 0.49% 99.35% 3,680,000 0.52% 79.48%
8 10 EDF FED/2009/021-433 EC Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) III 99810 Unallocated PA DPM EDF-10 NIP 5,000,000
ACP TCF - Technical 
Cooperation Facility
05.05.2010 na 05.05.2015 05.05.2015 5,000,000 0.45% 1,302,064 0.14% 26.04% 450,845 0.06% 9.02%
9 10 EDF FED/2009/021-628 EC ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2009/01000 72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-10 ECHO 2,700,000 ECHO na na 15.10.2011 15.10.2011 2,700,000 0.24% 2,311,827 0.24% 85.62% 2,080,062 0.29% 77.04%
10 10 EDF FED/2009/022-082 PO Support to Statistics 16062
Other social infra and 
services
PA DM EDF-10 NIP 6,000,000 6,000,000 0.54% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
11 10 EDF FED/2010/021-651 EC
Support to the strengthening of the Justice Sector in 
Zambia: Access to Justice
15130
Government and civil 
society, general
PA ICM-DA EDF-10 NIP 6,000,000
Co-funding with GTZ: 
1.5m Euro with project 
management delegated 
to GTZ
04.11.2010 07.07.2010 04.05.2016 04.05.2016 6,000,000 0.54% 6,000,000 0.63% 100.00% 2,739,383 0.39% 45.66%
12 10 EDF FED/2010/021-973 EG Aviation Sector Support Programme 21050 Transport and storage PA DPM EDF-10 NIP 3,000,000
Joint management with 
WFP
3,000,000 0.27% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
13 10 EDF FED/2010/022-057 EG
Agriculture Sector Performance Enhancement 
Programme
31110 Agriculture PA DM EDF-10 NIP 8,900,000
Basket funding          
(Finland & IFAD)
8,900,000 0.80% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
Funding Identification and Implementation Details EC Financial Data (in €)
DAC 
Code
Sector ZM Signature 
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Date
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No.
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(CRIS)
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(3)
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(4)
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(5)
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TOTALS  EDF-9
Closing 
Date (DLE) 2
Allocated  / CommittedEU Funding 
Source / 
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Maximum 
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 Special Remarks on 
Financing (Modalities) 
- if any
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Closing 
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14 10 EDF FED/2010/022-275 PO
Support to National Authorising Officer (NAO), 
Ministry of Finance & National Planning, Zambia
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM EDF-10 NIP 4,000,000 4,000,000 0.36% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
15 10 EDF FED/2010/022-409 EG Rehabilitation of the Great East Road (T4) 21020 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-10 NIP 38,000,000 38,000,000 3.40% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
16 10 EDF FED/2010/022-712 PO
Support to Economic Governance: PFM reforms and 
Domestic Accountability
15111
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM EDF-10 NIP 7,000,000 7,000,000 0.63% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
15 431,230,000 461,230,000 41.25% 313,555,301 33.14% 67.98% 117,472,636 16.64% 25.47%
64 1,073,466,839 1,118,072,676 100.00% 946,259,480 100.00% 84.63% 705,830,856 100.00% 63.13%
Notes:   (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Funding Identification and Implementation Details EC Financial Data (in €)
GRAND TOTALS  EDFs 8, 9 and 10 in 2001-2010
DAC 
Code
Sector ZM Signature 
Date of FA
Starting 
Date
Seq.
No.
Project No.
Decision No.  
(CRIS)
Status
(3)
Title
Aid Method 
/ Modality
(4)
Method of 
Implementati
on / Mngt.  
Mode
(5)
Contracted Paid
TOTALS   EDF-10
Closing 
Date (DLE) 2
Allocated  / CommittedEU Funding 
Source / 
Financing 
Source
Original FA 
Maximum 
Commitment
 Special Remarks on 
Financing (Modalities) 
- if any
Originally 
Planned 
Closing 
Date  (FA) 6
Base Source:  CRIS database - Status update as of 31 May 2011,  as reflected in the Country Level Evaluation Final Inception Report on pp. 106 - 111
Additional Sources of data for Aid method (column 7), methods of implementation / management mode (column 8), EU funding source / financing sources (column 9) and original FA maximum commitment (column 10),special remarks on financing (column 11) and 
originally planned closing date (column 14) are in hierachical order: 1st: The original Financing Agreement;    then 2nd: Action Fiche;     then  3rd:  the Project Summary Sheet (CRIS);    and then 4th: the CRIS Detailed Decision Form
CLE IR Closing date  =  DLE  (End of Period of Execution)
Classification of project cycle status codes (column 3):  PO = Provisional,   EG =  Committed ,  EC = Under Implementation / Execution,  CL = Closed,   CA = Cancelled
Classification of Aid Methods:  PA = Project Approach;  GBS = General Budget Support ;   SPSP = Sector Policy Support Programme (Sector Budget Support)
Classification of Methods of Implementation / Management Modes:  DM = Decentralised management;  DPM = Partially decentralised management;  CM = Centralised management;  
CM-IO = Centralised management - Joint management with international organisation;  ICM-DA = Indirect centralised management - Delegation agreement
Orginally planned closing date is the "end date of project execution" as determined in the Financing Agreement (FA), which comprisies both the operational implementation phase and the closure phase.
Project 9-ACP-RPR-174 "Rural Electricity Infrastructures and Small Scale Projects" has been re-categorized from original CLE IR project portfolio listing (see pp 106 to 110) under EDF-10 to EDF-09 in line with the TA and 
other project and CRIS documents, henceforth the differences in financial totals for the EDF 9 and EDF 10 portfolio's.
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Allocated
1
8-ACP-ZA-019        
9-ACP-ZA-002
FED/1999/014-310 CL
PUBLIC WELFARE ASSISTANCE SCHEME 
(PWAS)
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 1,072,059 0.40% 1,072,059 0.40% 100.00% 1,072,059 0.42% 100.00%
2 8-ACP-ZA-020 FED/1999/014-315 CL
REHABILIT. KABWE-KAPIRI MPOSHI AND 
CHISAMBA ROADS (+7ZA025)
21020 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-8 Sysmin 8th EDF Sysmin 16,757,544 6.27% 16,757,544 6.32% 100.00% 16,757,544 6.59% 100.00%
3 na FED/1999/014-498 CL
ECHO/ZMB/254/1999/01000- EMERGENCY 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO CONGOLESE 
REFUGEES
72010 Emergency Response PA CM EDF-8 ECHO 1,500,000 0.56% 1,500,000 0.57% 100.00% 1,500,000 0.59% 100.00%
4 8-ACP-ZA-030 FED/2000/014-789 CL SUPPORT TO THE CULTURAL SECTOR 16061
Other social infra and 
services
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 1,620,512 0.61% 1,620,512 0.61% 100.00% 1,620,512 0.64% 100.00%
5 8-ACP-ZA-032 FED/2000/014-828 CL FEASIBILITY STUDY LIVINGSTONE AIRPORT 21050 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-8 NIP 334,730 0.13% 334,730 0.13% 100.00% 334,730 0.13% 100.00%
6 8-ACP-ZA-034 FED/2000/014-875 CL SUPPORT TO NAO'S OFFICE (+ 7ZA089 + 8ZA022) 15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 1,697,081 0.63% 1,697,081 0.64% 100.00% 1,697,081 0.67% 100.00%
7 na FED/2000/014-938 CL FEASIBILITY STUDY ON NRDC 31181 Agriculture PA DM EDF-8 NIP 208,310 0.08% 208,310 0.08% 100.00% 208,310 0.08% 100.00%
8 8-ACP-ZA-036 FED/2000/014-985 EC
PROGRAMME DE DIVERSIFICATION DU SECTEUR 
MINIER
32220
Mineral resources and 
mining
PA DM EDF-8 Sysmin Sysmin 30,000,000 11.22% 28,441,816 10.73% 94.81% 19,968,480 7.85% 66.56%
9
8-ACP-ZA-037/ 
038/039/040/041/
042/043/044
FED/2000/015-065 CL SAF V - SYSMIN 32220
Mineral resources and 
mining
PA DM EDF-8 Sysmin SAF, NIP and Sysmin 115,574,913 43.22% 115,574,913 43.61% 100.00% 115,574,913 45.42% 100.00%
10 8-ACP-ZA-045 FED/2000/015-078 CL MICROPROJECTS PROGRAMME II 16050
Other social infra and 
services
PA DM EDF-8 NIP NIP 13,745,114 5.14% 13,745,114 5.19% 100.00% 13,745,114 5.40% 100.00%
11 na FED/2000/015-191 CL
PROJECT FORMULATION ESSENTIAL ROAD 
MAINTENANCE INPUTS""
21020 Transport and storage PA DM 16,079 0.01% 16,079 0.01% 100.00% 16,079 0.01% 100.00%
12 na FED/2000/015-277 CL
EVALUATION PREQUALIF DOSSIERS & 
INTERNATIONAL RESTR DOSSIERS
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 23,577 0.01% 23,577 0.01% 100.00% 23,577 0.01% 100.00%
13 na FED/2001/015-394 CL
EVALUATION TENDER DOSSIERS EXPORT 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME II
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 10,555 0.00% 10,555 0.00% 100.00% 10,555 0.00% 100.00%
14 8-ACP-ZA-050 FED/2001/015-399 CL
CAPITAL INVESTMENT LINE II PROJECT_(21000, 
22151)
32120 Industry PA CM-IO EDF-8 NIP
Capital Investment Line global 
loan iia & b - EIB
39,058,745 14.61% 39,058,745 14.74% 100.00% 39,058,745 15.35% 100.00%
15 8-ACP ZA-051 FED/2001/015-454 CL FORESTRY SUPPORT PROGRAMME 31220 Forestry PA DM EDF-8 NIP 1,359,873 0.51% 1,359,873 0.51% 100.00% 1,359,873 0.53% 100.00%
16 8-ACP-ZA-053 FED/2001/015-572 CL LUMWANA STUDY 32220
Mineral resources and 
mining
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 7,000,000 2.62% 7,000,000 2.64% 100.00% 7,000,000 2.75% 100.00%
17 na FED/2002/015-781 CL
SUPPORT TO PLANNING AND BUDGETING 
REFORMS
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 462,332 0.17% 462,332 0.17% 100.00% 462,332 0.18% 100.00%
18 8-ACP-ZA-108 FED/2002/015-804 CL
Echo/zmb/254/2002/01000 EMERGENCY TO 
REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-8 ECHO ECHO 2,139,587 0.80% 2,139,587 0.81% 100.00% 2,139,587 0.84% 100.00%
19
8-ACP-ZA-055   
9-ACP-ZA-010
FED/2002/015-858 EC
REHABILITATION OF LIVINGSTONE AND LUSAKA 
AIRPORTS AIRPORT RECONSTRUCTION AND 
REHABILITATION
21050 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-8 NIP 13,450,000 5.03% 12,672,522 4.78% 94.22% 12,470,470 4.90% 92.72%
EU Funding 
Source / 
Financing 
Source
EC-JEU  Country  Level  Evaluation  Zambia   (2011)
 Table  PF-2 :   Portfolio  List   of   Zambia   Bilateral   EDF   Funding   under   EDF-8,   EDF-9   and   EDF-10    ( Period  2001 - 2010 )   -    By  Aid  Method / Modality  
(1) (4) (5)
V.2  -  10/010/2011
Funding Identification and Implementation Details EC Financial Data (in €)
Seq.
No.
Project No.
Decision No.  
(CRIS)
Status
(3)
Title
Contracted Paid
 Special Remarks on 
Financing (Modalities) - if any
Aid  Modalities  Differentiated  Portfolio  Analysis  of  EDF  Funding  to  Zambia  over  the  Period  2001 - 2010 
Method of 
Implementatio
n / Mngt.  
Mode
(5)
DAC 
Code
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Aid Method 
/ Modality
(4)
Allocated  / Committed
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20 na FED/2002/015-876 CL
PRE-FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR A FEEDER ROADS 
PROGRAMME
21020 Transport and storage PA DM 63,570 0.02% 63,570 0.02% 100.00% 63,570 0.02% 100.00%
21
8-ACP-ZA-059  9-
ACP-ZA-023
FED/2002/016-047 EC URBAN MARKETS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 43030 Other multisector PA DM EDF-8 & 9 NIPs Financing under EDF-8 and 9 21,200,000 7.93% 21,136,455 7.98% 99.70% 19,268,450 7.57% 90.89%
22 8-ACP ZA-060 FED/2003/016-151 CL
SUPPORT TO THE NAO FOR CLOSURE OF EDF 
COMMITMENTS
91010
Administrative cost of 
donors
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 79,500 0.03% 79,500 0.03% 100.00% 79,500 0.03% 100.00%
23 8-ACP ZA-061 FED/2003/016-188 CL
PROJECT APPRAISAL & PREP FP FOR 
CONSERVATION FARMING
31130 Agriculture PA DM EDF-8 NIP 14,704 0.01% 14,704 0.01% 100.00% 14,704 0.01% 100.00%
23 100% 267,388,785 100.00% 264,989,578 100.00% 99.10% 254,446,185 100.00% 95.16%
23 100% 267,388,785 100.00% 264,989,578 100.00% 99.10% 254,446,185 100.00% 95.16%
3 9-ACP ZA-005 FED/2003/016-366 EC
POVERTY REDUCTION BUDGET SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME 2003-2006 (PRBS01 )
51010 General budget support GBS DM EDF-9 NIP
General budget support with 1 
fixed annual and 5 variable 
tranches (PFM and PRSP 
indicators performance related)
108,200,000 27.78% 108,180,921 29.42% 99.98% 107,509,599 32.20% 99.36%
14 9-ACP ZA-018 FED/2006/017-956 EC
EC SUPPORT TO THE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
MANAGEMENT (PEMFA)
15111
Government and civil 
society, general
GBS CM EDF-9 NIP
15.5m GBS  with 10 semi-
annual fixed tranches and 42.1m 
complementary support  (multi-
donor: with 8 other CPs)
13,000,000 3.34% 13,000,000 3.54% 100.00% 13,000,000 3.89% 100.00%
16 9-ACP ZA-024 FED/2006/018-569 EC PRBS 02 (2007-2008) 51010 General budget support GBS DM EDF-9 NIP
60m GBS and 2m 
complementary support
62,000,000 15.92% 53,017,437 14.42% 85.51% 52,478,486 15.72% 84.64%
3 11.5% 183,200,000 47.04% 174,198,358 47.37% 95.09% 172,988,085 51.81% 94.43%
4 9-ACP-ZA-007 FED/2003/016-404 EC SUPPORT TO THE EDUCATION STRATEGIC PLAN 11230 Basic education SPSP DM EDF-9 NIP
Sector budget support 
consisting of 4 fixed annual 
tranches
10,002,243 2.57% 10,002,243 2.72% 100.00% 10,002,243 3.00% 100.00%
10 9-ACP ZA-013 FED/2004/017-416 EC
PERIODIC MAINTENANCE OF TRUNK, MAIN AND 
DISTRICT ROADS
21020 Transport and storage SPSP DM EDF-9 NIP
Sector budget support with 3 
annual fixed tranches
96,000,000 24.65% 95,134,941 25.87% 99.10% 81,711,354 24.47% 85.12%
15 9-ACP ZA-025 FED/2006/018-559 CL
RETENTION FOR HUMAN RESOURCES FOR 
HEALTH
12281 Basic health SPSP DM EDF-9 NIP
Sector budget support with fixed 
and variable tranches (closure 
request NAO)
8,571,450 2.20% 8,571,450 2.33% 100.00% 8,571,450 2.57% 100.00%
3 11.5% 114,573,693 29.42% 113,708,634 30.92% 99.24% 100,285,047 30.03% 87.53%
1 9-ACP ZA-001 FED/2003/016-242 CL REHABILITATION OF KAZUNGULA PONTOONS 21040 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-9 NIP 370,336 0.10% 370,336 0.10% 100.00% 370,336 0.11% 100.00%
2 9-ACP ZA-003 FED/2003/016-305 CL
CAPACITY BUILDING IN DPT OF ECONOMIC AND 
TECHN. COOPERATION, MINISTRY OF FINANCE 
AND NATIONAL PLANNING
15111
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM EDF-9 NIP TA 743,068 0.19% 743,068 0.20% 100.00% 743,068 0.22% 100.00%
5 9-ACP ZA-008 FED/2003/016-534 CL
FEASIBILITY STUDY ''REHABILITATION AND 
MAINTENANCE OF FEEDER ROADS IN ZAMBIA
21020 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-9 NIP 470,816 0.12% 470,816 0.13% 100.00% 470,816 0.14% 100.00%
6 9-ACP-ZA-009 FED/2004/016-586 EC TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY 99810 Unallocated PA DPM EDF-9 ACP
ACP TCF - Technical 
Cooperation Facility
2,847,757 0.73% 2,631,757 0.72% 92.42% 2,299,004 0.69% 80.73%
EU Funding 
Source / 
Financing 
Source
Funding Identification and Implementation Details EC Financial Data (in €)
Seq.
No.
Project No.
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TOTALS  FOR  EDF-8 Total # of EDF-8 projects (2001-2010)
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Implementatio
n / Mngt.  
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(5)
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(4)
EDF-9 - GBS  : Totals  for "GBS" -  General Budget Support # of  "GBS" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-9 Projects
EDF-9 -  SPSP  : Totals  for "SPSP" -  Sector Policy Support Programme # of  "SPSP" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-9 Projects
Allocated  / Committed
EDF-8 -  PA  : Totals  for "PA" -  Project Approach # of  "PA" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-8 Projects
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7 9-ACP ZA-014 FED/2004/016-972 EC Capacity Building for Private Sector Development 32130 Industry PA DM EDF-9 NIP 15,000,000 3.85% 13,830,987 3.76% 92.21% 12,216,548 3.66% 81.44%
8 9-ACP ZA-012 FED/2004/017-400 CL
ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2004/01000 HUMANITARIAN AID 
TO FACILITATE THE R REPATRIATION TO 
ANGOLA OF ANGOLAN REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-9 ECHO ECHO 2,000,000 0.51% 2,000,000 0.54% 100.00% 2,000,000 0.60% 100.00%
9 9-ACP ZA-011 FED/2004/017-408 CL
PROMOTION OF CONSERVATION FARMING AND 
CROP DIVERSITY
31161 Agriculture PA DM EDF-9 NIP 1,601,322 0.41% 1,601,322 0.44% 100.00% 1,601,322 0.48% 100.00%
11 9-ACP ZA-015 FED/2005/017-436 CL
ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2005/01000 HUMANITARIAN AID 
TO FACILITATE THE REPATRIATION TO ANGOLA 
OF ANGOLAN REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-9 ECHO ECHO 3,500,000 0.90% 3,500,000 0.95% 100.00% 3,500,000 1.05% 100.00%
12 9-ACP ZA-016 FED/2005/020-661 CL
4TH MICORPROJECTS PROGRAMME IN ZAMBIA - 
COMPLEMENTARY FUNDING TO 8 ACP ZA 12 (
43010 Other multisector PA DM EDF-9 NIP 1,423,891 0.37% 1,423,891 0.39% 100.00% 1,423,891 0.43% 100.00%
13 9-ACP-ZA-017 FED/2006/017-955 EC
SUPPORT TO AGRICULTURAL DIVERSIFICATION 
AND FOOD SECURITY IN WESTERN AND NORTH 
WESTERN ZAMBIA
31110 Agriculture PA DM EDF-9 NIP 15,000,000 3.85% 14,733,034 4.01% 98.22% 12,635,976 3.78% 84.24%
17 9-ACP ZA-022 FED/2006/020-681 EC
ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2006/01000 HUMANITARIAN AID 
FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS SUFFERING 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF DROUGHT AND 
AIDS
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-9 ECHO ECHO 2,200,000 0.56% 1,952,068 0.53% 88.73% 1,952,068 0.58% 88.73%
18
9-ACP-ZA-026    
9 ACP-ZA-027
FED/2007/019-150 EC
Programme for the Institutional Development and 
Involvement of Non-State Actors in the Cooperation 
Between the European Commission and Zambian
92010 Support to NGOs PA DM EDF-9 NIP
Only Financing Proposal              
(Cancelled)
5,000,000 1.28% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
19 9-ACP ZA-020 FED/2007/019-261 EC
CAPACITY BUILDING WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT 
OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
15111
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 1,700,000 0.44% 1,630,879 0.44% 95.93% 1,431,451 0.43% 84.20%
20 9-ACP RPR-116 FED/2007/019-313 EC
1st CfP Water Facility (163B) : Implementation of 
Integrated Water Resources Management in Zambia
14010 Water and Sanitation PA DPM EDF-9 ACP TPS Intra ACP Allocations 3,750,000 0.96% 3,501,403 0.95% 93.37% 2,381,862 0.71% 63.52%
21 9-ACP RPR-117 FED/2007/019-315 EC
1st CfP Water Facility (163A) : Support Improving 
Water Supply and Sanitation for the Urban Poor in 
Zambia
14010 Water and Sanitation PA DM EDF-9 NIP
Basket funding with KfW and 
GTZ
4,092,258 1.05% 3,060,118 0.83% 74.78% 2,640,729 0.79% 64.53%
22 9-ACP ZA-021 FED/2007/019-642 EC
REHABILITATION OF THE ZIMBA-LIVINGSTONE 
ROAD
21020 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-9 NIP 15,000,000 3.85% 13,159,556 3.58% 87.73% 9,033,349 2.71% 60.22%
23 9-ACP-RPR-119 FED/2007/020-837 EC
ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2007/01000 ASSISTANCE FOR 
THE REPATRIATION OF CONGOLESE REFUGEES 
FROM ZAMBIA TO THE DRC
72010 Emergency Response PA DM EDF-9 ECHO ECHO 2,000,000 0.51% 1,780,913 0.48% 89.05% 1,780,913 0.53% 89.05%
24 9-ACP SAD-023 FED/2007/020-866 EC
POST-FLOOD RECOVERY PROGRAMME IN 
ZAMBIA
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-9 ECHO ECHO 1,500,000 0.39% 1,318,540 0.36% 87.90% 1,281,680 0.38% 85.45%
25 9-ACP-ZA-028 FED/2008/019-727 EC TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY  II (TCF II) 99810 Unallocated PA DPM EDF-9 ACP
TCF - Technical Cooperation 
Facility
3,500,000 0.90% 3,105,355 0.84% 88.72% 2,875,890 0.86% 82.17%
26(7) 9-ACP-RPR-174 FED/2008/020-660 EC
RURAL ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURES AND 
SMALL SCALE PROJECTS
23040
Energy generation and 
supply
PA DPM EDF-9 ACP             
Intra-ACP-EU Energy Facility: 
EU contrib-ution €9,980,750;           
REA €26,530,461
9,980,750 2.56% 8,993,566 2.45% 90.11% 0 0.00% 0.00%
20 76.9% 91,680,198 23.54% 79,807,609 21.70% 87.05% 60,638,903 18.16% 66.14%
26 100% 389,453,891 100.00% 367,714,601 100.00% 94.42% 333,912,035 100.00% 85.74%
EU Funding 
Source / 
Financing 
Source
Funding Identification and Implementation Details EC Financial Data (in €)
Seq.
No.
Project No.
Decision No.  
(CRIS)
Status
(3)
Title
Contracted Paid
 Special Remarks on 
Financing (Modalities) - if any
EDF-9 -  PA  : Totals  for "PA" -  Project Approach # of  "PA" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-9 Projects
Method of 
Implementatio
n / Mngt.  
Mode
(5)
DAC 
Code
Sector
Aid Method 
/ Modality
(4)
Allocated  / Committed
TOTALS  FOR  EDF-9 Total # of EDF-9 projects (2001-2010)
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1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10 
EDF-X
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
EDF-X
Contracted in 
% of Allocated
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
EDF-X
Paid in % of 
Allocated
3 10-ACP-ZA-004 FED/2008/020-949 EC
PRBS 3 - MDG CONTRACT 1 - CRIS REF. 2008/199-
76
51010 General budget support GBS CM EDF-10 NIP 
General budget support with 
fixed annual and variable 
tranches (2types: annual 
performance Y2-6 and V-FLEX 
MDG-C tranches Y4-6) with V-
FLEX component: 30m €
255,000,000 55.29% 255,000,000 26.95% 100.00% 92,812,500 13.15% 36.40%
1 6.7% 255,000,000 55.29% 255,000,000 81.33% 100.00% 92,812,500 79.01% 36.40%
4 10-ACP-ZA-005 FED/2008/020-950 EC
SUPPORTING PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
DELIVERY IN ZAMBIA CRIS REF. 2008/198-54
12220 Basic health SPSP CM EDF-10 NIP
Sector budget support: 3 annual 
fixed tranches and 3 variable 
tranches
35,000,000 7.59% 35,000,000 3.70% 100.00% 11,500,000 1.63% 32.86%
5 10-ACP-ZA-006 FED/2008/020-974 EC
SECOND SECTOR POLICY SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME - ROAD Sector CRIS REF. 2008/199-
08
21020 Transport and storage SPSP CM EDF-10 NIP
Budget support: 69.3m Eur - 
Complementary support: 7.7m. 4 
fixed (09-12) and 3 (10012) 
variable tranches
77,000,000 16.69% 341,410 0.04% 0.44% 204,846 0.03% 0.27%
6 10-ACP-ZA-007 FED/2008/020-975 EC
SUPPORTING THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN 
ZAMBIA - CRIS REF. FED/2008/203-74
15151
Government and civil 
society, general
SPSP CM-IO EDF-10 NIP
Trust Fund with 7CPs at date of 
FA signing with UNDP lead
7,400,000 1.60% 7,400,000 0.78% 100.00% 3,580,000 0.51% 48.38%
3 20.0% 119,400,000 25.89% 42,741,410 13.63% 35.80% 15,284,846 13.01% 12.80%
2 10-ACP-ZA-002 FED/2008/020-931 EC
SUPPORTING ACTIONS AGAINST CHILD TRAFFIC 
AND CHILD LABOUR IN ZAMBIA
15140
Government and civil 
society, general
PA CM-IO
EDF-10 NIP and 
Intra ACP
Complementary funding by Intra 
ACP  TACKLE project .
1,600,000 0.35% 1,600,000 0.17% 100.00% 425,000 0.06% 26.56%
7 10 EDF FED/2009/021-385 EC Urban Food Vouchers Project, Zambia 52010
Developmental food 
aid/Food security 
assistance
PA CM-IO EDF-10 NIP 4,630,000 1.00% 4,600,000 0.49% 99.35% 3,680,000 0.52% 79.48%
8 10 EDF FED/2009/021-433 EC Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) III 99810 Unallocated PA DPM EDF-10 NIP
ACP TCF - Technical 
Cooperation Facility
5,000,000 1.08% 1,302,064 0.14% 26.04% 450,845 0.06% 9.02%
9 10 EDF FED/2009/021-628 EC ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2009/01000 72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-10 ECHO ECHO 2,700,000 0.59% 2,311,827 0.24% 85.62% 2,080,062 0.29% 77.04%
10 10 EDF FED/2009/022-082 PO Support to Statistics 16062
Other social infra and 
services
PA DM EDF-10 NIP 6,000,000 1.30% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
11 10 EDF FED/2010/021-651 EC
Support to the strengthening of the Justice Sector in 
Zambia: Access to Justice
15130
Government and civil 
society, general
PA ICM-DA EDF-10 NIP
Co-funding with GTZ: 1.5m Euro 
with project management 
delegated to GTZ
6,000,000 1.30% 6,000,000 0.63% 100.00% 2,739,383 0.39% 45.66%
12 10 EDF FED/2010/021-973 EG Aviation Sector Support Programme 21050 Transport and storage PA DPM EDF-10 NIP Joint management with WFP 3,000,000 0.65% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
13 10 EDF FED/2010/022-057 EG
Agriculture Sector Performance Enhancement 
Programme
31110 Agriculture PA DM EDF-10 NIP 
Basket funding                                                 
(Finland & IFAD)
8,900,000 1.93% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
EU Funding 
Source / 
Financing 
Source
Funding Identification and Implementation Details EC Financial Data (in €)
Seq.
No.
Project No.
Decision No.  
(CRIS)
Status
(3)
Title
Contracted Paid
 Special Remarks on 
Financing (Modalities) - if any
Method of 
Implementatio
n / Mngt.  
Mode
(5)
DAC 
Code
Sector
Aid Method 
/ Modality
(4)
Allocated  / Committed
EDF-10 - GBS  : Totals  for "GBS" -  General Budget Support # of  "GBS" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-10 Projects
EDF-10-  SPSP  : Totals  for "SPSP" -  Sector Policy Support Programme # of  "SPSP" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-10 Projects
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1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10 
EDF-X
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
EDF-X
Contracted in 
% of Allocated
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
EDF-X
Paid in % of 
Allocated
14 10 EDF FED/2010/022-275 PO
Support to National Authorising Officer (NAO), 
Ministry of Finance & National Planning, Zambia
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM EDF-10 NIP 4,000,000 0.87% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
15 10 EDF FED/2010/022-409 EG Rehabilitation of the Great East Road (T4) 21020 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-10 NIP 38,000,000 8.24% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
16 10 EDF FED/2010/022-712 PO
Support to Economic Governance: PFM reforms and 
Domestic Accountability
15111
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM EDF-10 NIP 7,000,000 1.52% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
11 73.3% 86,830,000 18.83% 15,813,891 5.04% 18.21% 9,375,290 7.98% 10.80%
15 100% 461,230,000 100.00% 313,555,301 100.00% 67.98% 117,472,636 100.00% 25.47%
64 1,118,072,676 100.00% 946,259,480 100.00% 84.63% 705,830,856 100.00% 63.13%
Notes:   (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
EU Funding 
Source / 
Financing 
Source
Funding Identification and Implementation Details EC Financial Data (in €)
Seq.
No.
Project No.
Decision No.  
(CRIS)
Status
(3)
Title
Contracted Paid
 Special Remarks on 
Financing (Modalities) - if any
Method of 
Implementatio
n / Mngt.  
Mode
(5)
DAC 
Code
Sector
Aid Method 
/ Modality
(4)
Allocated  / Committed
Base Source:  CRIS database - Status update as of 31 May 2011.
Additional Sources of data for Aid method (column 7), methods of implementation / management mode (column 8), EU funding source / financing sources (column 9) and original FA maximum 
commitment (column 10),special remarks on financing (column 11) and originally planned closing date (column 14) are in hierachical order: 1st: The original Financing Agreement;    then 2nd: Action 
Fiche;     then  3rd:  the Project Summary Sheet (CRIS);    and then 4th: the CRIS Detailed Decision Form
CLE IR Closing date  =  DLE  (End of Period of Execution)
Classification of project cycle status codes (column 3):  PO = Provisional,   EG =  Committed ,  EC = Under Implementation / Execution,  CL = Closed,   CA = Cancelled
Classification of Aid Methods:  PA = Project Approach;  GBS = General Budget Support ;   SPSP = Sector Policy Support Programme (Sector Budget Support)
Classification of Methods of Implementation / Management Modes:  DM = Decentralised management;  DPM = Partially decentralised management;  CM = Centralised management;  
CM-IO = Centralised management - Joint management with international organisation;  ICM-DA = Indirect centralised management - Delegation agreement
Orginally planned closing date is the "end date of project execution" as determined in the Financing Agreement (FA), which comprisies both the operational implementation phase and the closure phase.
Project 9-ACP-RPR-174 "Rural Electricity Infrastructures and Small Scale Projects" has been re-categorized from original CLE IR project portfolio listing (see pp 106 to 110) under EDF-10 to EDF-09 in 
line with the TA and other project and CRIS documents, henceforth the differences in financial totals for the EDF 9 and EDF 10 portfolio's.
TOTALS  FOR  EDF-10 Total # of EDF-10 projects (2001-2010)
EDF-10 -  PA  : Totals  for "PA" -  Project Approach # of  "PA" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-10 Projects
GRAND TOTALS  EDFs 8, 9 and 10 
in 2001-2010
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Remarks
#
% of 
EDF-X 
Total
In  €
In % of 
Total
 2001-10 
EDF-X
Average 
Allocation  
per Project
In  €
In % of 
Total             
2001-10
EDF-X
Contracted 
in % of 
Allocated
In  €
In % of 
Total         
2001-10
EDF-X
Paid 
in % of 
Allocated
General Budget Support  (GBS) 0 0.0% 0 0.0% - 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
Sector Policy Support Programme 
(SPSP - Sector Budget Support) 
0 0.0% 0 0.0% - 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
Project Approach  (PA) 23 100.0% 267,388,785 100.0% 11,625,599 264,989,578 100.0% 99.1% 254,446,185 100.0% 95.2%
Totals  EDF-8 23 100.0% 267,388,785 100.0% 11,625,599 264,989,578 100.0% 99.1% 254,446,185 100.0% 95.2%
General Budget Support  (GBS) 3 11.5% 183,200,000 47.0% 61,066,667 174,198,358 47.4% 95.1% 172,988,085 51.8% 94.4%
PRSP related variable 
tranches
Sector Policy Support Programme 
(SPSP - Sector Budget Support) 
3 11.5% 114,573,693 29.4% 38,191,231 113,708,634 30.9% 99.2% 100,285,047 30.0% 87.5%
3: Transport, Education & 
Health Sectors
Project Approach  (PA) 20 76.9% 91,680,198 23.5% 4,584,010 79,807,609 21.7% 87.0% 60,638,903 18.2% 66.1%
Totals  EDF-9 26 100.0% 389,453,891 100.0% 14,978,996 367,714,601 100.0% 94.4% 333,912,035 100.0% 85.7%
General Budget Support  (GBS) 1 6.7% 255,000,000 55.3% 255,000,000 255,000,000 81.3% 100.0% 92,812,500 79.0% 36.4%
V-flex MDG-C variable 
tranches
Sector Policy Support Programme 
(SPSP - Sector Budget Support) 
3 20.0% 119,400,000 25.9% 39,800,000 42,741,410 13.6% 35.8% 15,284,846 13.0% 12.8%
3: Transport, Health & 
Electoral system (trust)
Project Approach  (PA) 11 73.3% 86,830,000 18.8% 7,893,636 15,813,891 5.0% 18.2% 9,375,290 8.0% 10.8%
Totals  EDF-10 15 100.0% 461,230,000 100.0% 30,748,667 313,555,301 100.0% 68.0% 117,472,636 100.0% 25.5%
General Budget Support  (GBS) 4 6.3% 438,200,000 39.2% 109,550,000 429,198,358 45.4% 97.9% 265,800,585 37.7% 60.7%
Sector Policy Support Programme 
(SPSP - Sector Budget Support) 
6 9.4% 233,973,693 20.9% 38,995,616 156,450,044 16.5% 66.9% 115,569,893 16.4% 49.4%
Project Approach  (PA) 54 84.4% 445,898,983 39.9% 8,257,389 360,611,078 38.1% 80.9% 324,460,378 46.0% 72.8%
Grand Totals  EDF 8, 9 & 10 
(2001-2010)
64 100.0% 1,118,072,676 100.0% 17,469,886 946,259,480 100.0% 84.6% 705,830,856 100.0% 63.1%
Contracted Paid
EDF-X
(2001-
2010)
Aid Method / 
Cooperation Modality
Table  PF-3 :  Zambia CSP-NIP Portfolio Summary Table of  EDF-8, 9 and 10 Bilateral Funding  ( Period  2001 - 2010 )   -    By  Aid  Method / Modality   
Projects in Portfolio Allocated  / Committed
EDF-9
EDF-10
Totals 
EDF 
8 to 10
EDF-8
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1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Contracted in 
% of Allocated
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Paid in % of 
Allocated
1
8-ACP-ZA-019   
9-ACP-ZA-002
FED/1999/014-310 CL
PUBLIC WELFARE ASSISTANCE SCHEME 
(PWAS)
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 03.03.1999 01.03.2000 29.02.2004 29.02.2004 1,072,059 0.1% 1,072,059 0.1% 100.0% 1,072,059 0.2% 100.0%
2 8-ACP-ZA-020 FED/1999/014-315 CL
REHABILIT. KABWE-KAPIRI MPOSHI AND 
CHISAMBA ROADS (+7ZA025)
21020 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-8 Sysmin 01.03.1999 01.09.2000 30.04.2004 30.04.2005 16,757,544 1.5% 16,757,544 1.8% 100.0% 16,757,544 2.4% 100.0%
4 8-ACP-ZA-030 FED/2000/014-789 CL SUPPORT TO THE CULTURAL SECTOR 16061
Other social infra and 
services
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 05.01.2000 30.11.2003 30.11.2004 1,620,512 0.1% 1,620,512 0.2% 100.0% 1,620,512 0.2% 100.0%
5 8-ACP-ZA-032 FED/2000/014-828 CL FEASIBILITY STUDY LIVINGSTONE AIRPORT 21050 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-8 NIP 28.01.2000 01.05.2000 30.09.2000 30.09.2000 334,730 0.0% 334,730 0.0% 100.0% 334,730 0.0% 100.0%
6 8-ACP-ZA-034 FED/2000/014-875 CL SUPPORT TO NAO'S OFFICE (+ 7ZA089 + 8ZA022) 15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 31.03.2000 01.01.2000 31.12.2003 1,697,081 0.2% 1,697,081 0.2% 100.0% 1,697,081 0.2% 100.0%
7 na FED/2000/014-938 CL FEASIBILITY STUDY ON NRDC 31181 Agriculture PA DM EDF-8 NIP na na na 208,310 0.0% 208,310 0.0% 100.0% 208,310 0.0% 100.0%
8 8-ACP-ZA-036 FED/2000/014-985 EC
PROGRAMME DE DIVERSIFICATION DU SECTEUR 
MINIER
32220
Mineral resources and 
mining
PA DM EDF-8 Sysmin 09.06.2000 01.12.2001 30.11.2007 02.11.2010 30,000,000 2.7% 28,441,816 3.0% 94.8% 19,968,480 2.8% 66.6%
9
8-ACP-ZA-037/ 
038/039/040/041/
042/043/044
FED/2000/015-065 CL SAF V - SYSMIN 32220
Mineral resources and 
mining
PA DM EDF-8 Sysmin 18.09.2000 01.09.2000 31.12.2002 31.12.2004 115,574,913 10.3% 115,574,913 12.2% 100.0% 115,574,913 16.4% 100.0%
10 8-ACP-ZA-045 FED/2000/015-078 CL MICROPROJECTS PROGRAMME II 16050
Other social infra and 
services
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 30.11.2005 13,745,114 1.2% 13,745,114 1.5% 100.0% 13,745,114 1.9% 100.0%
11 na FED/2000/015-191 CL
PROJECT FORMULATION ESSENTIAL ROAD 
MAINTENANCE INPUTS""
21020 Transport and storage PA DM 16,079 0.0% 16,079 0.0% 100.0% 16,079 0.0% 100.0%
12 na FED/2000/015-277 CL
EVALUATION PREQUALIF DOSSIERS & 
INTERNATIONAL RESTR DOSSIERS
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 23,577 0.0% 23,577 0.0% 100.0% 23,577 0.0% 100.0%
13 na FED/2001/015-394 CL
EVALUATION TENDER DOSSIERS EXPORT 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME II
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 10,555 0.0% 10,555 0.0% 100.0% 10,555 0.0% 100.0%
15 8-ACP ZA-051 FED/2001/015-454 CL FORESTRY SUPPORT PROGRAMME 31220 Forestry PA DM EDF-8 NIP 22.06.2001 01.03.2002 30.09.2005 30.09.2005 1,359,873 0.1% 1,359,873 0.1% 100.0% 1,359,873 0.2% 100.0%
16 8-ACP-ZA-053 FED/2001/015-572 CL LUMWANA STUDY 32220
Mineral resources and 
mining
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 13.07.2001 22.05.2001 31.12.2002 31.12.2002 7,000,000 0.6% 7,000,000 0.7% 100.0% 7,000,000 1.0% 100.0%
17 na FED/2002/015-781 CL
SUPPORT TO PLANNING AND BUDGETING 
REFORMS
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 462,332 0.0% 462,332 0.0% 100.0% 462,332 0.1% 100.0%
19
8-ACP-ZA-055   
9-ACP-ZA-010
FED/2002/015-858 EC
REHABILITATION OF LIVINGSTONE AND LUSAKA 
AIRPORTS AIRPORT RECONSTRUCTION AND 
REHABILITATION
21050 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-8 NIP 18.07.2002 01.10.2003 30.09.2007 30.06.2011 13,450,000 1.2% 12,672,522 1.3% 94.2% 12,470,470 1.8% 92.7%
20 na FED/2002/015-876 CL
PRE-FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR A FEEDER ROADS 
PROGRAMME
21020 Transport and storage PA DM 63,570 0.0% 63,570 0.0% 100.0% 63,570 0.0% 100.0%
21
8-ACP-ZA-059  9-
ACP-ZA-023
FED/2002/016-047 EC URBAN MARKETS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 43030 Other multisector PA DM EDF-8 & 9 NIPs 19.11.2002 10.12.2003 09.06.2009 15.01.2003 21,200,000 1.9% 21,136,455 2.2% 99.7% 19,268,450 2.7% 90.9%
22 8-ACP ZA-060 FED/2003/016-151 CL
SUPPORT TO THE NAO FOR CLOSURE OF EDF 
COMMITMENTS
91010
Administrative cost of 
donors
PA DM EDF-8 NIP 06.02.2003 10.02.2003 30.06.2004 30.06.2004 79,500 0.0% 79,500 0.0% 100.0% 79,500 0.0% 100.0%
23 8-ACP ZA-061 FED/2003/016-188 CL
PROJECT APPRAISAL & PREP FP FOR 
CONSERVATION FARMING
31130 Agriculture PA DM EDF-8 NIP 18.03.2003 01.06.2003 31.07.2003 31.07.2003 14,704 0.0% 14,704 0.0% 100.0% 14,704 0.0% 100.0%
20 87.0% - - - - 224,690,453 20.1% 222,291,246 23.5% 98.9% 211,747,853 30.0% 94.2%
0 0.0% - - - - 0 0.0% 0 0.0% - 0 0.0% -
EDF-8 -  DM  : Totals  for "DM" -  Decentralised Management   (DM)
EDF-8 -  PM  : Totals  for "PM" -  Partially Decentralized Management   (DPM)
# of  "DM" Projects and 
in % of Total # of EDF-8 Projects
Paid
# of  "DPM" Projects and 
in % of Total # of EDF-8 Projects
ZM Signature 
Date of FA
Starting 
Date
Originally 
Planned 
Closing 
Date  (FA) 6
Closing 
Date (DLE) 2
Allocated  / Committed Contracted
Sector
Aid Method 
/ Modality
(4)
Method of 
Implementati
on / Mngt.  
Mode
(5)
EU Funding 
Source / 
Financing 
Source
Seq.
No.
Project No.
Decision No.  
(CRIS)
Status
(3)
Title DAC 
Code
EC-JEU  Country  Level  Evaluation  Zambia   (2011)
Aid  Modalities  Differentiated  Portfolio  Analysis  of  EDF  Funding  to  Zambia  over  the  Period  2001 - 2010 
Table  PF-4 :   Portfolio  List   of   Zambia   Bilateral   EDF   Funding  in  the   Period  2001 - 2010   -    By  Method  of  Implementation  /  Management Mode  
(1) (4) (5)
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1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Contracted in 
% of Allocated
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Paid in % of 
Allocated
3 na FED/1999/014-498 CL
ECHO/ZMB/254/1999/01000- EMERGENCY 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO CONGOLESE 
REFUGEES
72010 Emergency Response PA CM EDF-8 ECHO 1,500,000 0.1% 1,500,000 0.2% 100.0% 1,500,000 0.2% 100.0%
14 8-ACP-ZA-050 FED/2001/015-399 CL
CAPITAL INVESTMENT LINE II PROJECT_(21000, 
22151)
32120 Industry PA CM-IO EDF-8 NIP 16.02.2001 01.01.2001 31.12.2003 39,058,745 3.5% 39,058,745 4.1% 100.0% 39,058,745 5.5% 100.0%
18 8-ACP-ZA-108 FED/2002/015-804 CL
Echo/zmb/254/2002/01000 EMERGENCY TO 
REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-8 ECHO 31.01.2001 01.01.2002 30.06.2003 03.06.2002 2,139,587 0.2% 2,139,587 0.2% 100.0% 2,139,587 0.3% 100.0%
3 13.0% - - - - 42,698,332 3.8% 42,698,332 4.5% 100.0% 42,698,332 6.0% 100.0%
23 - - 23 35.9% - - - - 267,388,785 23.9% 264,989,578 28.0% 99.1% 254,446,185 36.0% 95.2%
1 9-ACP ZA-001 FED/2003/016-242 CL REHABILITATION OF KAZUNGULA PONTOONS 21040 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-9 NIP 19.08.2003 19.08.2003 31.12.2008 31.12.2008 370,336 0.0% 370,336 0.0% 100.0% 370,336 0.1% 100.0%
2 9-ACP ZA-003 FED/2003/016-305 CL
CAPACITY BUILDING IN DPT OF ECONOMIC AND 
TECHN. COOPERATION, MINISTRY OF FINANCE 
AND NATIONAL PLANNING
15111
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM EDF-9 NIP 19.09.2003 19.09.2003 31.12.2007 30.06.2008 743,068 0.1% 743,068 0.1% 100.0% 743,068 0.1% 100.0%
3 9-ACP ZA-005 FED/2003/016-366 EC
POVERTY REDUCTION BUDGET SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME 2003-2006 (PRBS01 )
51010 General budget support GBS DM EDF-9 NIP 22.12.2003 22.12.2003 31/12.2008 31.12.2010 108,200,000 9.7% 108,180,921 11.4% 100.0% 107,509,599 15.2% 99.4%
4 9-ACP-ZA-007 FED/2003/016-404 EC SUPPORT TO THE EDUCATION STRATEGIC PLAN 11230 Basic education SPSP DM EDF-9 NIP 15.03.2004 15.03.2004 31.12.2010 31.12.2010 10,002,243 0.9% 10,002,243 1.1% 100.0% 10,002,243 1.4% 100.0%
5 9-ACP ZA-008 FED/2003/016-534 CL
FEASIBILITY STUDY ''REHABILITATION AND 
MAINTENANCE OF FEEDER ROADS IN ZAMBIA
21020 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-9 NIP 24.12.2003 05.11.2007 31.12.2007 31.12.2007 470,816 0.0% 470,816 0.0% 100.0% 470,816 0.1% 100.0%
7 9-ACP ZA-014 FED/2004/016-972 EC Capacity Building for Private Sector Development 32130 Industry PA DM EDF-9 NIP 26.04.2005 26.04.2005 31.12.2012 31.12.2012 15,000,000 1.3% 13,830,987 1.5% 92.2% 12,216,548 1.7% 81.4%
9 9-ACP ZA-011 FED/2004/017-408 CL
PROMOTION OF CONSERVATION FARMING AND 
CROP DIVERSITY
31161 Agriculture PA DM EDF-9 NIP 26.11.2004 26.11.2004 31.12.2009 31.12.2009 1,601,322 0.1% 1,601,322 0.2% 100.0% 1,601,322 0.2% 100.0%
10 9-ACP ZA-013 FED/2004/017-416 EC
PERIODIC MAINTENANCE OF TRUNK, MAIN AND 
DISTRICT ROADS
21020 Transport and storage SPSP DM EDF-9 NIP 11.02.2005 17.12.2004 31.12.2011 31.12.2013 96,000,000 8.6% 95,134,941 10.1% 99.1% 81,711,354 11.6% 85.1%
12 9-ACP ZA-016 FED/2005/020-661 CL
4TH MICORPROJECTS PROGRAMME IN ZAMBIA - 
COMPLEMENTARY FUNDING TO 8 ACP ZA 12 (
43010 Other multisector PA DM EDF-9 NIP 19.09.2007 19.09.2007 31.12.2009 31.12.2009 1,423,891 0.1% 1,423,891 0.2% 100.0% 1,423,891 0.2% 100.0%
13 9-ACP-ZA-017 FED/2006/017-955 EC
SUPPORT TO AGRICULTURAL DIVERSIFICATION 
AND FOOD SECURITY IN WESTERN AND NORTH 
WESTERN ZAMBIA
31110 Agriculture PA DM EDF-9 NIP 19.12.2005 19.12.2005 31.12.2013 31.12.2013 15,000,000 1.3% 14,733,034 1.6% 98.2% 12,635,976 1.8% 84.2%
15 9-ACP ZA-025 FED/2006/018-559 CL
RETENTION FOR HUMAN RESOURCES FOR 
HEALTH
12281 Basic health SPSP DM EDF-9 NIP 04.12.2006 04.12.2006 30.11.2011 30.06.2011 8,571,450 0.8% 8,571,450 0.9% 100.0% 8,571,450 1.2% 100.0%
16 9-ACP ZA-024 FED/2006/018-569 EC PRBS 02 (2007-2008) 51010 General budget support GBS DM EDF-9 NIP 29.03.2007 04.12.2006 31.12.2011 31.12.2013 62,000,000 5.5% 53,017,437 5.6% 85.5% 52,478,486 7.4% 84.6%
18
9-ACP-ZA-026    
9 ACP-ZA-027
FED/2007/019-150 EC
Programme for the Institutional Development and 
Involvement of Non-State Actors in the Cooperation 
Between the European Commission and Zambian
92010 Support to NGOs PA DM EDF-9 NIP 03.07.2007 03.07.2007 31.12.2012 31.12.2012 5,000,000 0.4% 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
19 9-ACP ZA-020 FED/2007/019-261 EC
CAPACITY BUILDING WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT 
OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
15111
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM 18.08.2006 18.08.2006 31.12.2011 1,700,000 0.2% 1,630,879 0.2% 95.9% 1,431,451 0.2% 84.2%
21 9-ACP RPR-117 FED/2007/019-315 EC
1st CfP Water Facility (163A) : Support Improving 
Water Supply and Sanitation for the Urban Poor in 
Zambia
14010 Water and Sanitation PA DM EDF-9 NIP 10.03.2008 04.10.2007 31.12.2014 31.12.2014 4,092,258 0.4% 3,060,118 0.3% 74.8% 2,640,729 0.4% 64.5%
# of  EDF-8 Projects and 
in % of Total # of Projects {2001-2010)
EDF-8 -  CM  : Totals  for "CM" -  Centralized Management  (CM & CM-IO & ICM-DA)
Paid
TOTALS  EDF-8
# of  "CM" Projects and 
in % of Total # of EDF-8 Projects
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1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Contracted in 
% of Allocated
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Paid in % of 
Allocated
22 9-ACP ZA-021 FED/2007/019-642 EC
REHABILITATION OF THE ZIMBA-LIVINGSTONE 
ROAD
21020 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-9 NIP 12.04.2006 12.12.2006 31.12.2015 31.12.2015 15,000,000 1.3% 13,159,556 1.4% 87.7% 9,033,349 1.3% 60.2%
23 9-ACP-RPR-119 FED/2007/020-837 EC
ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2007/01000 ASSISTANCE FOR 
THE REPATRIATION OF CONGOLESE REFUGEES 
FROM ZAMBIA TO THE DRC
72010 Emergency Response PA DM EDF-9 ECHO 10.08.2007 10.08.2007 15.03.2010 15.03.2010 2,000,000 0.2% 1,780,913 0.2% 89.0% 1,780,913 0.3% 89.0%
17 65.4% - - - - 347,175,384 31.1% 327,711,912 34.6% 94.4% 304,621,531 43.2% 87.7%
6 9-ACP-ZA-009 FED/2004/016-586 EC TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY 99810 Unallocated PA DPM EDF-9 ACP 25.05.2004 25.05.2004 31.10.2010 30.09.2011 2,847,757 0.3% 2,631,757 0.3% 92.4% 2,299,004 0.3% 80.7%
20 9-ACP RPR-116 FED/2007/019-313 EC
1st CfP Water Facility (163B) : Implementation of 
Integrated Water Resources Management in Zambia
14010 Water and Sanitation PA DPM EDF-9 ACP 08.11.2007 24.07.2007 30.06.2013 07.11.2013 3,750,000 0.3% 3,501,403 0.4% 93.4% 2,381,862 0.3% 63.5%
25 9-ACP-ZA-028 FED/2008/019-727 EC TECHNICAL COOPERATION FACILITY  II (TCF II) 99810 Unallocated PA DPM EDF-9 ACP 20.09.2007 20.09.2007 30.12.2012 31.12.2012 3,500,000 0.3% 3,105,355 0.3% 88.7% 2,875,890 0.4% 82.2%
26(7) 9-ACP-RPR-174 FED/2008/020-660 EC
RURAL ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURES AND 
SMALL SCALE PROJECTS
23040
Energy generation and 
supply
PA DPM EDF-9 ACP             10.03.2008 07.12.2007 31.12.2015 31.12.2015 9,980,750 0.9% 8,993,566 1.0% 90.1% 0 0.0% 0.0%
4 15.4% - - - - 20,078,507 1.8% 18,232,081 1.9% 90.8% 7,556,756 1.1% 37.6%
14 9-ACP ZA-018 FED/2006/017-956 EC
EC SUPPORT TO THE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
MANAGEMENT (PEMFA)
15111
Government and civil 
society, general
GBS CM EDF-9 NIP 22.03.2006 19.12.2005 31.12.2012 31.12.2012 13,000,000 1.2% 13,000,000 1.4% 100.0% 13,000,000 1.8% 100.0%
8 9-ACP ZA-012 FED/2004/017-400 CL
ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2004/01000 HUMANITARIAN AID 
TO FACILITATE THE R REPATRIATION TO 
ANGOLA OF ANGOLAN REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-9 ECHO 07.09.2004 07.09.2004 31.12.2006 31.12.2006 2,000,000 0.2% 2,000,000 0.2% 100.0% 2,000,000 0.3% 100.0%
11 9-ACP ZA-015 FED/2005/017-436 CL
ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2005/01000 HUMANITARIAN AID 
TO FACILITATE THE REPATRIATION TO ANGOLA 
OF ANGOLAN REFUGEES IN ZAMBIA
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-9 ECHO 07.03.2005 07.03.2005 31.12.2007 31.12.2007 3,500,000 0.3% 3,500,000 0.4% 100.0% 3,500,000 0.5% 100.0%
17 9-ACP ZA-022 FED/2006/020-681 EC
ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2006/01000 HUMANITARIAN AID 
FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS SUFFERING 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF DROUGHT AND 
AIDS
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-9 ECHO 27.03.2006 27.03.2006 31.12.2011 31.12.2008 2,200,000 0.2% 1,952,068 0.2% 88.7% 1,952,068 0.3% 88.7%
24 9-ACP SAD-023 FED/2007/020-866 EC
POST-FLOOD RECOVERY PROGRAMME IN 
ZAMBIA
72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-9 ECHO 21.12.2007 21.12.2007 30.06.2011 30.06.2011 1,500,000 0.1% 1,318,540 0.1% 87.9% 1,281,680 0.2% 85.4%
5 19.2% - - - - 22,200,000 2.0% 21,770,608 2.3% 98.1% 21,733,748 3.1% 97.9%
26 - - 26 40.6% - - - - 389,453,891 34.8% 367,714,601 38.9% 94.4% 333,912,035 47.3% 85.7%
10 10 EDF FED/2009/022-082 PO Support to Statistics 16062
Other social infra and 
services
PA DM EDF-10 NIP 6,000,000 0.5% 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
13 10 EDF FED/2010/022-057 EG
Agriculture Sector Performance Enhancement 
Programme
31110 Agriculture PA DM EDF-10 NIP 8,900,000 0.8% 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
14 10 EDF FED/2010/022-275 PO
Support to National Authorising Officer (NAO), 
Ministry of Finance & National Planning, Zambia
15110
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM EDF-10 NIP 4,000,000 0.4% 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
15 10 EDF FED/2010/022-409 EG Rehabilitation of the Great East Road (T4) 21020 Transport and storage PA DM EDF-10 NIP 38,000,000 3.4% 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
16 10 EDF FED/2010/022-712 PO
Support to Economic Governance: PFM reforms and 
Domestic Accountability
15111
Government and civil 
society, general
PA DM EDF-10 NIP 7,000,000 0.6% 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
5 33.3% - - - - 63,900,000 5.7% 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
# of  EDF-9 Projects and 
in % of Total # of Projects {2001-2010)
EDF-10 -  DM  : Totals  for "DM" -  Decentralised Management   (DM)
# of  "DM" Projects and 
in % of Total # of EDF-10 Projects
EDF-9 -  DM  : Totals  for "DM" -  Decentralised Management   (DM)
# of  "DM" Projects and 
in % of Total # of EDF-9 Projects
EDF-9 -  PM  : Totals  for "PM" -  Partially Decentralized Management   (DPM)
# of  "DPM" Projects and 
in % of Total # of EDF-9 Projects
EDF-9 -  CM  : Totals  for "CM" -  Centralized Management  (CM & CM-IO & ICM-DA)
# of  "CM" Projects and 
in % of Total # of EDF-9 Projects
Paid
TOTALS  EDF-9
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Closing 
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Date (DLE) 2
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In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Contracted in 
% of Allocated
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
Paid in % of 
Allocated
8 10 EDF FED/2009/021-433 EC Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF) III 99810 Unallocated PA DPM EDF-10 NIP 05.05.2010 na 05.05.2015 05.05.2015 5,000,000 0.4% 1,302,064 0.1% 26.0% 450,845 0.1% 9.0%
12 10 EDF FED/2010/021-973 EG Aviation Sector Support Programme 21050 Transport and storage PA DPM EDF-10 NIP 3,000,000 0.3% 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
2 13.3% - - - - 8,000,000 0.7% 1,302,064 0.1% 16.3% 450,845 0.1% 5.6%
3 10-ACP-ZA-004 FED/2008/020-949 EC
PRBS 3 - MDG CONTRACT 1 - CRIS REF. 2008/199-
76
51010 General budget support GBS CM EDF-10 NIP 14.12.2009 17.12.2008 05.03.2017 05.03.2017 255,000,000 22.8% 255,000,000 26.9% 100.0% 92,812,500 13.1% 36.4%
4 10-ACP-ZA-005 FED/2008/020-950 EC
SUPPORTING PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
DELIVERY IN ZAMBIA CRIS REF. 2008/198-54
12220 Basic health SPSP CM EDF-10 NIP 09.04.2009 17.12.2008 09.04.2015 09.04.2015 35,000,000 3.1% 35,000,000 3.7% 100.0% 11,500,000 1.6% 32.9%
5 10-ACP-ZA-006 FED/2008/020-974 EC
SECOND SECTOR POLICY SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME - ROAD Sector CRIS REF. 2008/199-
08
21020 Transport and storage SPSP CM EDF-10 NIP 03.07.2009 17.12.2008 03.07.2016 03.07.2016 77,000,000 6.9% 341,410 0.0% 0.4% 204,846 0.0% 0.3%
11 10 EDF FED/2010/021-651 EC
Support to the strengthening of the Justice Sector in 
Zambia: Access to Justice
15130
Government and civil 
society, general
PA ICM-DA EDF-10 NIP 04.11.2010 07.07.2010 04.05.2016 04.05.2016 6,000,000 0.5% 6,000,000 0.6% 100.0% 2,739,383 0.4% 45.7%
2 10-ACP-ZA-002 FED/2008/020-931 EC
SUPPORTING ACTIONS AGAINST CHILD TRAFFIC 
AND CHILD LABOUR IN ZAMBIA
15140
Government and civil 
society, general
PA CM-IO
EDF-10 NIP and 
Intra ACP
19.08.2009 01.01.2008 19.08.2015 19.08.2015 1,600,000 0.1% 1,600,000 0.2% 100.0% 425,000 0.1% 26.6%
6 10-ACP-ZA-007 FED/2008/020-975 EC
SUPPORTING THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN 
ZAMBIA - CRIS REF. FED/2008/203-74
15151
Government and civil 
society, general
SPSP CM-IO EDF-10 NIP 19.08.2009 01.01.2008 19.08.2015 19.08.2015 7,400,000 0.7% 7,400,000 0.8% 100.0% 3,580,000 0.5% 48.4%
7 10 EDF FED/2009/021-385 EC Urban Food Vouchers Project, Zambia 52010
Developmental food 
aid/Food security 
assistance
PA CM-IO EDF-10 NIP 21.12.2009 21.12.2009 30.06.2014 4,630,000 0.4% 4,600,000 0.5% 99.4% 3,680,000 0.5% 79.5%
9 10 EDF FED/2009/021-628 EC ECHO/ZMB/EDF/2009/01000 72010 Emergency Response PA CM-IO EDF-10 ECHO na na 15.10.2011 15.10.2011 2,700,000 0.2% 2,311,827 0.2% 85.6% 2,080,062 0.3% 77.0%
8 53.3% - - - - 389,330,000 34.8% 312,253,237 33.0% 80.2% 117,021,791 16.6% 30.1%
15 - - 15 23.4% - - - - 461,230,000 41.3% 313,555,301 33.1% 68.0% 117,472,636 16.6% 25.5%
64 - - - 64 100.0% 1,118,072,676 100.0% 946,259,480 100.0% 84.6% 705,830,856 100.0% 63.1%
Notes:   (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
# of  EDF-10 Projects and 
in % of Total # of Projects {2001-2010)
EDF-10 -  PM  : Totals  for "PM" -  Partially Decentralized Management   (DPM)
# of  "DPM" Projects and 
in % of Total # of EDF-10 Projects
EDF-10 -  CM  : Totals  for "CM" -  Centralized Management  (CM & CM-IO & ICM-DA)
# of  "CM" Projects and 
in % of Total # of EDF-10 Projects
CLE IR Closing date  =  DLE  (End of Period of Execution)
Classification of project cycle status codes (column 3):  PO = Provisional,   EG =  Committed ,  EC = Under Implementation / Execution,  CL = Closed,   CA = Cancelled
Classification of Aid Methods:  PA = Project Approach;  GBS = General Budget Support ;   SPSP = Sector Policy Support Programme (Sector Budget Support)
-   Classification of Methods of Implementation / Management Modes:  DM = Decentralised management;  DPM = Partially decentralised management;  CM = Centralised management;  
    CM-IO = Centralised management - Joint management with international organisation;  ICM-DA = Indirect centralised management - Delegation agreement
-   CM Centralised management is a clustering of the three centralised management modes CM, CM-IO and ICM-DA
Orginally planned closing date is the "end date of project execution" as determined in the Financing Agreement (FA), which comprisies both the operational implementation phase and the closure phase.
Project 9-ACP-RPR-174 "Rural Electricity Infrastructures and Small Scale Projects" has been re-categorized from original CLE IR project portfolio listing (see pp 106 to 110) under 
EDF-10 to EDF-09 in line with the TA and other project and CRIS documents, henceforth the differences in financial totals for the EDF 9 and EDF 10 portfolio's.
Paid
TOTALS  EDF-9
GRAND TOTALS  EDFs 8, 9 and 10 
for the Period 2001-2010
Base Source:  CRIS database - Status update as of 31 May 2011,  as reflected in the Country Level Evaluation Final Inception Report on pp. 106 - 111
Additional Sources of data for Aid method (column 7), methods of implementation / management mode (column 8), EU funding source / financing sources (column 9) and original FA maximum commitment (column 
10),special remarks on financing (column 11) and originally planned closing date (column 14) are in hierachical order: 1st: The original Financing Agreement;    then 2nd: Action Fiche;     then  3rd:  the Project Summary Sheet 
(CRIS);    and then 4th: the CRIS Detailed Decision Form
ZM Signature 
Date of FA
Starting 
Date
Originally 
Planned 
Closing 
Date  (FA) 6
Closing 
Date (DLE) 2
Allocated  / Committed Contracted
Sector
Aid Method 
/ Modality
(4)
Method of 
Implementati
on / Mngt.  
Mode
(5)
EU Funding 
Source / 
Financing 
Source
Seq.
No.
Project No.
Decision No.  
(CRIS)
Status
(3)
Title DAC 
Code
Funding Identification and Implementation Details EC Financial Data (in €)
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Remarks
#
% of 
EDF-X 
Total
In  €
% of 
EDF-X 
Total
Average 
Allocation  
per Project 
In  €
% of 
EDF-X 
Total
Contracted 
in % of 
Allocated
In  €
% of 
EDF-X 
Total
Paid 
in % of 
Allocated
DM - Decentralised management (DM) 20 87.0% 224,690,453 84.0% 11,234,523 222,291,246 83.9% 98.9% 211,747,853 83.2% 94.2%
PM - Partially decentralised management  
(PDM)
0 0.0% 0 0.0% - 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
CM - Centralised management  
(CM & CM-IO & ICM-DA)
3 13.0% 42,698,332 16.0% 14,232,777 42,698,332 16.1% 100.0% 42,698,332 16.8% 100.0%
Totals  EDF-8 23 100.0% 267,388,785 100.0% 11,625,599 264,989,578 100.0% 99.1% 254,446,185 100.0% 95.2%
DM - Decentralised management (DM) 17 65.4% 347,175,384 89.1% 20,422,081 327,711,912 89.1% 94.4% 304,621,531 91.2% 87.7%
PM - Partially decentralised management  
(PDM)
4 15.4% 20,078,507 5.2% 5,019,627 18,232,081 5.0% 90.8% 7,556,756 2.3% 37.6%
CM - Centralised management  
(CM & CM-IO & ICM-DA)
5 19.2% 22,200,000 5.7% 4,440,000 21,770,608 5.9% 98.1% 21,733,748 6.5% 97.9%
Totals  EDF-9 26 100.0% 389,453,891 100.0% 14,978,996 367,714,601 100.0% 94.4% 333,912,035 100.0% 85.7%
DM - Decentralised management (DM) 5 33.3% 63,900,000 13.9% 12,780,000 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
PM - Partially decentralised management  
(PDM)
2 13.3% 8,000,000 1.7% 4,000,000 1,302,064 0.4% 16.3% 450,845 0.4% 5.6%
CM - Centralised management  
(CM & CM-IO & ICM-DA)
8 53.3% 389,330,000 84.4% 48,666,250 312,253,237 99.6% 80.2% 117,021,791 99.6% 30.1%
Totals  EDF-10 15 100.0% 461,230,000 100.0% 30,748,667 313,555,301 100.0% 68.0% 117,472,636 100.0% 25.5%
DM - Decentralised management (DM) 42 65.6% 635,765,837 56.9% 15,137,282 550,003,158 58.1% 86.5% 516,369,384 73.2% 81.2%
PM - Partially decentralised management  
(PDM)
6 9.4% 28,078,507 2.5% 4,679,751 19,534,145 2.1% 69.6% 8,007,601 1.1% 28.5%
CM - Centralised management  
(CM & CM-IO & ICM-DA)
16 25.0% 454,228,332 40.6% 28,389,271 376,722,177 39.8% 82.9% 181,453,871 25.7% 39.9%
Grand Totals  EDF 8, 9 & 10  (2001-2010) 64 100.0% 1,118,072,676 100.0% 17,469,886 946,259,480 100.0% 84.6% 705,830,856 100.0% 63.1%
(1)
EDF-8
EDF-9
EDF-10
Totals 
EDF 
8 to 10
-   Classification of Methods of Implementation / Management Modes:  DM = Decentralised management;  DPM = Partially decentralised management;  CM = Centralised 
     management; CM-IO = Centralised management - Joint management with international organisation;  ICM-DA = Indirect centralised management - Delegation agreement
-   CM Centralised management is a clustering of the three centralised management modes CM, CM-IO and ICM-DA
Table  PF-5 :  Zambia CSP-NIP Portfolio Summary Table of  EDF  Bilateral  Funding  ( Period  2001 - 2010 )  -  By  Method  of  Implementation / Management  Mode
 (1)
EDF-X
(2001-
2010)
Method of Implementation (1)  
/  Management Mode
Projects in Portfolio Contracted PaidAllocated  / Committed
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Figure  PF-4 :  Trend in Total  Number of EDF Projects by EDF Cycle in the                                        
Period 2001 - 2010, with Breakdown by Aid Modality
Projects SBS GBS
Source:  EU CRIS database 
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Figure  PF-8  :  Trends in  theTotal  Number of EDF Projects in the  Period 2001 -
2010 with regard to Intervention Method of Implementation / Management Mode
DM - Decentralised PM - Partially Decentralised CM - Centralised
Source:  EU CRIS database 
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Figure  PF-6 :  Trends in Total EDF Commitments by Method of Implementation / 
Management Mode in the Period 2001-2010 (for EDF 8, 9 and 10) 
DM - Decentralised PM - Partially decentralised CM - Centralised
Source:  EU CRIS database 
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Figure  PF-7 :  Actually Paid in Percentage of Total Commitments, Broken Down                  
by Method of Implementation / Management Mode and per EDF                                            
in the Period 2001-2010
DM - Decentralised PM - Partially decentralised CM - Centralised
Source:  EU CRIS database 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 352 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10 
EDF-X
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
EDF-X
Contracted in 
% of Allocated
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
EDF-X
Paid in % of 
Allocated
0 0% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% -
0 0% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% -
0 0% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.00% -
3 9-ACP ZA-005 FED/2003/016-366 EC
POVERTY REDUCTION BUDGET SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME 2003-2006 (PRBS01 )
51010 General budget support GBS DM EDF-9 NIP
General budget support with 1 
fixed annual and 5 variable 
tranches (PFM and PRSP 
indicators performance related)
108,200,000 27.78% 108,180,921 29.42% 99.98% 107,509,599 32.20% 99.36%
14 9-ACP ZA-018 FED/2006/017-956 EC
EC SUPPORT TO THE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
MANAGEMENT (PEMFA)
15111
Government and civil 
society, general
GBS CM EDF-9 NIP
15.5m GBS  with 10 semi-
annual fixed tranches and 42.1m 
complementary support  (multi-
donor: with 8 other CPs)
13,000,000 3.34% 13,000,000 3.54% 100.00% 13,000,000 3.89% 100.00%
16 9-ACP ZA-024 FED/2006/018-569 EC PRBS 02 (2007-2008) 51010 General budget support GBS DM EDF-9 NIP
60m GBS and 2m 
complementary support
62,000,000 15.92% 53,017,437 14.42% 85.51% 52,478,486 15.72% 84.64%
3 11.5% 183,200,000 47.04% 174,198,358 47.37% 95.09% 172,988,085 51.81% 94.43%
4 9-ACP-ZA-007 FED/2003/016-404 EC SUPPORT TO THE EDUCATION STRATEGIC PLAN 11230 Basic education SPSP DM EDF-9 NIP
Sector budget support 
consisting of 4 fixed annual 
tranches
10,002,243 2.57% 10,002,243 2.72% 100.00% 10,002,243 3.00% 100.00%
10 9-ACP ZA-013 FED/2004/017-416 EC
PERIODIC MAINTENANCE OF TRUNK, MAIN AND 
DISTRICT ROADS
21020 Transport and storage SPSP DM EDF-9 NIP
Sector budget support with 3 
annual fixed tranches
96,000,000 24.65% 95,134,941 25.87% 99.10% 81,711,354 24.47% 85.12%
15 9-ACP ZA-025 FED/2006/018-559 CL
RETENTION FOR HUMAN RESOURCES FOR 
HEALTH
12281 Basic health SPSP DM EDF-9 NIP
Sector budget support with fixed 
and variable tranches (closure 
request NAO)
8,571,450 2.20% 8,571,450 2.33% 100.00% 8,571,450 2.57% 100.00%
3 11.5% 114,573,693 29.42% 113,708,634 30.92% 99.24% 100,285,047 30.03% 87.53%
6 23.1% 297,773,693 76.46% 287,906,992 78.30% 96.69% 273,273,132 81.84% 91.77%
3 10-ACP-ZA-004 FED/2008/020-949 EC
PRBS 3 - MDG CONTRACT 1 - CRIS REF. 2008/199-
76
51010 General budget support GBS CM EDF-10 NIP 
General budget support with 
fixed annual and variable 
tranches (2types: annual 
performance Y2-6 and V-FLEX 
MDG-C tranches Y4-6) with V-
FLEX component: 30m €
255,000,000 55.29% 255,000,000 81.33% 100.00% 92,812,500 79.01% 36.40%
1 6.7% 255,000,000 55.29% 255,000,000 81.33% 100.00% 92,812,500 79.01% 36.40%
Aid  Modalities  Differentiated  Portfolio  Analysis  of  EDF  Funding  to  Zambia  over  the  Period  2001 - 2010 
Paid
1.1.    EDF-8 - GBS  : Totals  for "GBS" -  General Budget Support # of  "GBS" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-8 Projects
1.      TOTALS  FOR  BUDGET  SUPPORT  UNDER   EDF-8 # of  "BS" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-8 Projects
 Special Remarks on 
Financing (Modalities) - if any
EC-JEU  Country  Level  Evaluation  Zambia   (2011)
  Table  PF-6 :  List   and  Totals  of   Budget   Support   Funding  under   Zambia  EDF-8,   EDF-9   and   EDF-10,  Including   Financial  Data   ( Period  2001 - 2010 )    
(1) (4) (5)
V.3  -  12/01/2012
Funding Identification and Implementation Details Budget Support Programmes / Interventions Financial Data (in €)
Contracted
Seq.
No.
Project No.
Decision No.  
(CRIS)
Status
(3)
Title
Allocated  / Committed
DAC 
Code
Sector
Aid Method 
/ Modality
(4)
Method of 
Implementation / 
Mngt.  Mode
(5)
EU Funding 
Source / 
Financing 
Source
3.1.    EDF-10 - GBS  : Totals  for "GBS" -  General Budget Support # of  "GBS" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-10 Projects
2.1.    EDF-9 - GBS  : Totals  for "GBS" -  General Budget Support # of  "GBS" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-9 Projects
2.2.    EDF-9 -  SPSP  : Totals  for "SPSP" -  Sector Policy Support Programme # of  "SPSP" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-9 Projects
1.2.    EDF-8 -  SPSP  : Totals  for "SPSP" -  Sector Policy Support Programme # of  "SPSP" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-8 Projects
2.      TOTALS  FOR  BUDGET  SUPPORT  UNDER   EDF-9 # of  "BS" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-9 Projects
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1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10 
EDF-X
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
EDF-X
Contracted in 
% of Allocated
In  €
In % of Total 
2001-10
EDF-X
Paid in % of 
Allocated
4 10-ACP-ZA-005 FED/2008/020-950 EC
SUPPORTING PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
DELIVERY IN ZAMBIA CRIS REF. 2008/198-54
12220 Basic health SPSP CM EDF-10 NIP
Sector budget support: 3 annual 
fixed tranches and 3 variable 
tranches
35,000,000 7.59% 35,000,000 11.16% 100.00% 11,500,000 9.79% 32.86%
5 10-ACP-ZA-006 FED/2008/020-974 EC
SECOND SECTOR POLICY SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME - ROAD Sector CRIS REF. 2008/199-
08
21020 Transport and storage SPSP CM EDF-10 NIP
Budget support: 69.3m Eur - 
Complementary support: 7.7m. 4 
fixed (09-12) and 3 (10012) 
variable tranches
77,000,000 16.69% 341,410 0.11% 0.44% 204,846 0.17% 0.27%
6 10-ACP-ZA-007 FED/2008/020-975 EC
SUPPORTING THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN 
ZAMBIA - CRIS REF. FED/2008/203-74
15151
Government and civil 
society, general
SPSP CM-IO EDF-10 NIP
Trust Fund with 7CPs at date of 
FA signing with UNDP lead
7,400,000 1.60% 7,400,000 2.36% 100.00% 3,580,000 3.05% 48.38%
3 20.0% 119,400,000 25.89% 42,741,410 13.63% 35.80% 15,284,846 13.01% 12.80%
4 26.7% 374,400,000 81.17% 297,741,410 94.96% 79.52% 108,097,346 92.02% 28.87%
4 6.3% 438,200,000 39.19% 429,198,358 45.36% 97.95% 265,800,585 37.66% 60.66%
6 9.4% 233,973,693 20.93% 156,450,044 16.53% 66.87% 115,569,893 16.37% 49.39%
10 15.6% 672,173,693 60.12% 585,648,402 61.89% 87.13% 381,370,478 54.03% 56.74%
Notes:   (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
  # of "GBS" Projects and 
  in % of Total # of EDF Projects (=64)
  # of "SPSP" Projects and 
  in % of Total # of EDF-10 Projects (=64)
   9.     GRAND TOTALS  FOR  BUDGET  SUPPORT  ( EDF-8, 9 & 10  - Period 2001-2010 )
  9.2.    Grand Totals  for "SPSP" -  Sector Policy Support Programme  
            (EDFs 8,9&10 - Period 2001-2010)
  9.1.    Grand Totals  for "GBS" -  General Budget Support    
            (EDFs 8,9 & 10 -  Period 2001-2010)
Paid
 Special Remarks on 
Financing (Modalities) - if any
Funding Identification and Implementation Details Budget Support Programmes / Interventions Financial Data (in €)
Contracted
Seq.
No.
Project No.
Decision No.  
(CRIS)
Status
(3)
Title
Allocated  / Committed
DAC 
Code
Sector
Aid Method 
/ Modality
(4)
Method of 
Implementation / 
Mngt.  Mode
(5)
EU Funding 
Source / 
Financing 
Source
3.2.    EDF-10-  SPSP  : Totals  for "SPSP" -  Sector Policy Support Programme   # of "SPSP" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-10 Projects
Base Source:  CRIS database - Status update as of 31 May 2011.
Additional Sources of data for Aid method (column 7), methods of implementation / management mode (column 8), EU funding source / financing sources (column 9) and original FA maximum commitment 
(column 10),special remarks on financing (column 11) and originally planned closing date (column 14) are in hierachical order: 1st: The original Financing Agreement;    then 2nd: Action Fiche;     then  3rd:  
the Project Summary Sheet (CRIS);    and then 4th: the CRIS Detailed Decision Form
CLE IR Closing date  =  DLE  (End of Period of Execution)
Classification of project cycle status codes (column 3):  PO = Provisional,   EG =  Committed ,  EC = Under Implementation / Execution,  CL = Closed,   CA = Cancelled
Classification of Aid Methods:  PA = Project Approach;  GBS = General Budget Support ;   SPSP = Sector Policy Support Programme (Sector Budget Support)
Classification of Methods of Implementation / Management Modes:  DM = Decentralised management;  DPM = Partially decentralised management;  CM = Centralised management;  
CM-IO = Centralised management - Joint management with international organisation;  ICM-DA = Indirect centralised management - Delegation agreement
Orginally planned closing date is the "end date of project execution" as determined in the Financing Agreement (FA), which comprisies both the operational implementation phase and the closure phase.
3.    TOTALS  FOR  BUDGET  SUPPORT  UNDER   EDF-10   # of  "BS" Projects and in % of Total # of EDF-10 Projects
  # of  "BS" Projects and
  in % of Total # of EDF-8,9&10 Projects (=64)
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 354 - 
 
EQ9:  To what extent has the EU cooperation on national and regional level 
addressed the needs of the population as well as the policy priorities of 
the GRZ? 
 
JC 9.1:  The objectives of the strategy reflect the views and priorities of GRZ with respect to a com-
prehensive policy dialogue with the EU 
JC 9.2:  The objectives of the programmes correspond to needs of the population 
JC 9.3:  The selection of focal sectors of intervention and subsequent changes in the EU strategy 
were taken on the basis of the comparative advantages of the EU (e.g. experience and ex-
pertise in the sectors)? 
JC 9.4:  The EU's co-operation strategy for Zambia and its regional strategy were mutually reinforcing 
 
Background information 
 
 Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p44 - Country Evaluation of the Implementation 
of the Paris Declaration in Zambia, Phase II  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extracts: 
JAR 2010, p4; In-country dialogue: The absence in 2010 of the traditional High Level Policy Dialogue 
was partially compensated by exchanges between Government and CPs on key policy issues (rural 
service delivery, decentralisation, macroeconomic issues, mining fiscal regime, governance public fi-
nancial management reform etc.) during the June and December PRBS Reviews. Dialogue with Non 
State Actors remained limited. 
 
EAMR, July 2007, p1: The Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) has been completed and 
signed (May 2007). The purpose of the JASZ is to focus and organise development assistance provid-
ed by cooperating partners to support the implementation of Zambia's national development goals as 
they will be defined in the FNDP 2006-2010. This is in line with the Paris Declaration 2005 to which 
Zambia and its cooperating partners are signatory. The JASZ is foreseen to harmonise and align the 
many individual country strategies that cooperating partners in Zambia are currently using. The JASZ is 
the adequate instrument to progress towards further coordination and harmonisation following the re-
quirements of the Cotonou Agreement and the EU development strategy. The EU joint programming 
can be fully compatible with this wider JASZ agreement. 
 
JAR 2003, p7; Executive Summary: The main conclusion of this Joint Annual Review report for 2003 is 
that the CSP/NIP is in line with the Government poverty reduction strategy and there is no need to 
change the focal areas of the CSP/NIP. The report also concludes that Zambia has been performing 
quite well in the implementation of the CSP/NIP… Taking the above into consideration, sequentially to 
the Mid Term Review exercise, a proposal is made to confirm the current CSP/NIP strategy. 
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EDF10 CSP/NIP 2008-2013 Annex 6; The Harmonisation / Alignment in Zambia. The JASZ – Box on 
“Summary of Draft Zambian Aid Policy and Strategy – Principles: 1. Country ownership: To the extent 
that development cannot be imposed upon a people, the Government of Zambia shall take responsibil-
ity for setting Zambia’s own development vision and goals. In this respect, the Government shall make 
a conscious effort to move away from donor-led interventions towards country ownership. This shall 
entail (a) the building of a supportive policy environment and a country-led and effective organisational 
infrastructure in support of poverty reduction; (b) the creation of a more policy and organisational space 
for Zambian people to take the lead in, and ownership of their own development programme; (c) a 
preferential shift towards untied aid, including budget support; and (d) to make better use of existing 
systems and capacities within Zambia in the implementation of externally-supported programmes and, 
consequently, reduce the reliance on external technical cooperation. In the context of these ideals, co-
operating partners shall ensure that all their supported activities in Zambia shall be consistent with the 
country’s own programme. This principle entails Government’s imposition of its will and priorities on 
cooperating partners and the implied readiness to reject aid if it is not consistent with national aspira-
tions and priorities as stated in the country’s national development plans. 
 
Ce  re  ’Eco omie  e  a  orbo  e          3; Improving Aid Effectiveness in Aid Dependent Coun-
tries: Lessons from Zambia - Conclusion: In conclusion, it is clear that for Zambia and other aid-
dependent countries the time has come to change how aid programmes are designed, how aid is deliv-
ered, how the incentives of donor agents and recipient-government officials are arrayed, and how aid-
financed projects are evaluated. For the variety of reasons described above aid continues to fail to pro-
duce its expected and necessary impact. The challenge of aid dependency is systemic and involves 
donors and recipient countries alike. Perverse and conflicting incentives, a pervasive focus on instru-
mental goals over ultimate outcomes, inaccurate assumptions and distorted expectations, and adminis-
trative mechanisms that resist beneficial change, all serve to undermine the fundamental purposes of 
aid. Addressing these challenges will not be easy, but as the saying goes, nothing worthwhile ever is. 
 
 
JC 9.1: The objectives of the strategy reflect the views and priorities of GRZ with respect to a 
comprehensive policy dialogue with the EU 
 Indicator 9.1.1: Sector balance in NIPs, RIPs and other EU aid instruments reflects national 
policy priorities 
As far as the EDF9 CSP/NIP covering the period 2001-2007 is concerned, this CSP/NIP has been de-
signed in line with the most important overall development plan of the GRZ of that period, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The main conclusion of the GRZ-EU Joint Annual Review (JAR) 
report for 2003 is that the CSP/NIP is in line with the Government poverty reduction strategy and that 
there is no need to change the three focal areas of the CSP/NIP: (i) transport infrastructure, (ii) institu-
tional reform and capacity building, and (iii) macroeconomic support. The report also concluded that 
Zambia has been performing quite well in the implementation of the CSP/NIP. Taking the above into 
consideration, sequentially to the Mid Term Review exercise, the EDF9 CSP/NIP strategy was con-
firmed as not needing changes.  
Similarly, the GRZ Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) 2006-2010 formed the basis for the discus-
sions of the new EDF10 support programme (2008-2013) and the related programming exercise (JAR 
2007). The country diagnosis under Chapter II of EDF10 CSP/NIP covers more than one third of the 
total number of CSP/NIP document pages, providing ample evidence of the EU response strategy solid-
ly anchored in the national development and poverty reduction strategies. The country diagnosis, to-
gether with the overview of past and present EU cooperation, complementarity and consistency, forms 
the main basis for the formulation of the EU response strategy and the NIP. The only dissonance maybe 
is that despite the fact that projected budget expenditures on health and education are clearly indicated 
in the GRZ FNDP on health and education, no such provisions for the latter sector are provided for in 
the EDF9 CSP/NIP.  
The solid anchoring of the EDF10 CSP-NIP 2008-2013 in and responsiveness to the national socio-
economic and macro-economic situation and needs of the country may be illustrated by the Chapter II 
on the Country Diagnosis of the CSP-NIP document which as per the standard EU prescriptions con-
sists of 4 main parts / chapters: (i) Analysis of the political, economic, social and environmental situation 
in the recipient country (6 sectors / thematic areas); (ii) Poverty reduction analysis – MDGs; (iii) Zambia 
development strategy and (iv) analysis of the challenges and risks of current and medium-term policies. 
This country diagnosis section covers pages 12 to 24 of the CSP document of 37 pages or more than 
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one third of the document. This country diagnosis, together with the overview of past and present EC 
cooperation, complementarity and consistency, is the main basis for the formulation of the response 
strategy and the NIP. The current evaluation therefore finds it somehow remarkable that the substantive 
changes in the macro-economic and macro-financial country framework which started emerging by the 
middle of the 2001-2010 period under review are not more prominently covered in the country diagnosis 
and as such automatically also not its repercussions for an adapted EU response strategy to this 
emerging new situation of Zambia gradually evolving to a lower middle income country As also attested 
to in the 2007 JAR, the GRZ FNDP 2006-2010 and the JASZ have been the prime basis for discussions 
of the new EDF10 support programme (2008-2013) and the related programming exercise, This indi-
rectly implies that the FNDP and the JASZ in reaction to that have not adequately considered and in-
corporated the actual and anticipated further pronounced transition of Zambia to this upgraded macro-
economic development status. For the calculation of the external aid projections, the Fifth National De-
velopment Plan 2006-2010 for example argues that “due to a marginal rise in domestic revenues, the 
resource gap will mainly be financed from external sources.”
102
 
The in-country dialogue on policy and programming priorities regarding the EDF10 CSP/NIP between 
GRZ and Cooperating Partners has been facilitated through the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia at 
three levels: (i) strategic - policy, (ii) tactical sectoral and (iii) operational. This JASZ has been complet-
ed and signed in May 2007. Its purpose is to focus and organise development assistance provided by 
cooperating partners to support the implementation of Zambia's national development goals as defined 
in the FNDP 2006-2010. This is in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration to which Zambia and its cooper-
ating partners are signatory. The JASZ is foreseen to harmonise and align the many individual country 
strategies that cooperating partners in Zambia are currently using and as such is a key instrument to 
progress towards further coordination and harmonisation following the requirements of the Cotonou 
Agreement and the EU development strategy. The EAMR of July 2007 confirmed that the EU joint pro-
gramming can be fully compatible with the wider JASZ agreement. The absence in 2010 of the tradi-
tional High Level Policy Dialogue under JASZ was partially compensated by exchanges between Gov-
ernment and CPs on key policy issues (rural service delivery, decentralisation, macroeconomic issues, 
mining fiscal regime, governance public financial management reform etc.) during the June and De-
cember Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) Reviews. However, the prolonged absence of high 
level policy dialogue in the last few years of the period under review (2008 to 2010)) was marked in 
many interviews at EUD and with CPs during the December field visit as one of the main reasons for a 
failed policy dialogue in general in this period. The dialogue with Civil Society Organisations remained 
rather limited, also in the absence of appropriate institutional fora with moreover substantive differences 
amongst the sectors as argued earlier in relation to EQ6 on democratic governance and CSOs. Fur-
thermore with regard to country ownership of the EU political and development response to Zambia and 
in line with one of the base principles underlying harmonisation and alignment in Zambia facilitated by 
the JASZ, it is clearly stated in the EDF10 CSP/NIP document (under annex 6) that this entails Gov-
ernment’s imposition of its will and priorities on cooperating partners and the implied readiness to reject 
aid if it is not consistent with national aspirations and priorities as stated in the country’s national deve l-
opment plans. 
Another element of the EU response strategy alignment analysis with national policy priorities pertains 
to the reflection of Zambian national policy priorities in the Regional Strategy Papers and Regional In-
dicative Programmes (RSPs/RIPs). Whereas the first focal areas of the EDF10 RSP/RIP for 2008-2013 
with the RESA-IO cover regional economic integration (the second area is related to regional political 
integration / cooperation) in the priority sectors of infrastructure (especially transport but also including. 
energy), management of natural resources, environment and food security, this attention is relatively 
high (especially in budgetary terms) in comparison to their share in the national development strategy 
(FNDP) or in the EDF10 CSP/NIP. The quality of this strategic and programmatic link between the re-
gional level and the national level is further explored hereafter under JC 9.4 (the EC’s cooperation pro-
gramme in Zambia and its regional programme were mutually reinforcing). 
As far as the overarching goal of poverty alleviation is concerned, the 2009 Mid-Term Review of the 
FNDP provided evidence that during the 2006-2008 review period, annual budget allocations to Poverty 
Reduction Programmes (PRPs) recorded an increase from 42.6 per cent in 2006 to 47.2 per cent in 
2008. Total allocations to PRPs over the review period averaged 45.78 per cent of the total budget from 
all the sectors and provinces. The budget releases out of the total allocations in the three years, howev-
er, were less than programmed and stood at an average of less than two-third (64.1%). In 2006, 42.6% 
of the budget was released to programmes classified as PRPs; in 2007 this was 46.9% while in 2008 
PRP budget allocation was 47.0% of the total budget for the year.  
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 FNDP (2006); p352 including Figure 37.1 External Aid projections (copy hereunder) 
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Performance of selected FNDP poverty indicators from the base period to the mid-term review period 
has generally been positive although varied trends have been recorded for the different sectors. Poverty 
levels in the country have slightly declined showing an improvement over the trends before. However, 
the slow rate of decline would render the MDG target of halving poverty rates to 29 per cent challenging. 
The general trend in performance for economic indicators showed sustained improvements and even 
over-performance against set targets, although employment and annual inflation targets probably would 
not be attained as trends in these indicators show declines in performance. This is indicated by the 
higher than programmed outturn of 16.6 per cent in 2008 against a single digit target of 5 per cent in 
2010. Similarly, employment rates have declined by 4 per cent from 2004 to 2008, thus rendering 
achievement of the FNDP goal of “Broad-based wealth and job creation through citizenry participation 
and technological advancement” difficult by 2010. 
Data, figures, tables: 
 
FNDP (2006) p352: Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010 - Table 37.3 Core FNDP Costs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In absolute terms, total core expenditure is estimated K 38,645.4 billion (or USD 9.4 billion) as per the 
above table 37.3 with breakdown by main sector. 
FNDP – (2006); p352 - Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010 - Below Figure 37.1 External Aid 
projections: Due to a marginal rise in domestic revenues, the resource gap will mainly be financed 
from external sources. Thus, a significant part of the resource gap of K 2, 982 billion will have to be 
met from external grants and loans, donor commitments (see below figure 37.1). Below table 37.5 
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presents the broad sectoral allocations for all the sectors during the 2006-2010 FNDP period. External 
loans are projected to average 1.0 per cent of GDP, or USD 160m per annum. This is inclusive of al-
ready existing loans to be disbursed over the Plan period. New borrowing is expected to be in the re-
gion of USD 50 to 60m per annum, mostly from the World Bank and the ADB. 
 
 
FNDP (2006) pp. 355-356; Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010 Table 37.5 Broad FNDP Sec-
toral Allocations (Percentage) 
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FNDP (2006) pp. 364-365; Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010  
Table 38.1 Institutional Roles and Responsibilities for the FNDP Implementation and Monitoring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FNDP (2006) p369; Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010 – The key performance indicators for 
the main sectors / components of the FNDP are shown in FNDP Table 38.2 (excerpt only)  
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FNDP MTR (2009) p39; Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010 - Mid-Term Review of October 
2009  
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FNDP MTR (2009) p43; Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010 - Mid-Term Review of October 
2009 - Chapter 2.6 Performance of Selected Poverty Indicators 
Performance of selected FNDP poverty indicators from the base period to the mid-term review period 
has generally been positive although varied trends have been recorded for the different sectors. Pov-
erty levels in the country have slightly declined showing an improvement over the last trends. However, 
the slow rate of decline would render the MDG target of halving poverty rates to 29 per cent challeng-
ing. The general trend in performance for economic indicators shows sustained improvements and 
even over-performance against set targets, although employment and annual inflation target may not 
be attained as trends in these indicators show declines in performance. This is indicated by the higher 
than programmed outturn of 16.6 per cent in 2008 against a single digit target of 5 per cent in 2010. 
Similarly, employment rates have declined by 4 per cent from 2004 to 2008, thus rendering achieve-
ment of the FNDP goal of “Broad-based wealth and job creation through citizenry participation and 
technological advancement” difficult by 2010 (see MTR table 2.3 hereunder). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FNDP MTR (2009) p41; Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010 - Mid-Term Review of October 
2009:  
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The budget implementation data show that spending on priority and pro-poor sectors has generally 
been satisfactory. Thus achievement of the overall funding targets to these sectors may be attained 
but there is still need for intra-budgetary re-alignment for more effective results. 
 
FNDP MTR (2009) p42; Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010 - Mid-Term Review of October 
2009 - Chapter 2.5 Budget Implementation: During the review period, annual budget allocations to 
Poverty Reduction Programmes (PRPs) recorded an increase from 42.6 per cent in 2006 to 47.2 per 
cent in 2008. Total allocations to PRPs over the review period averaged 45.78 per cent of the total 
budget from all the sectors and provinces. The budget releases out of the total allocations in the three 
years, however, were less than programmed and stood at an average of 64.1 per cent (MTR figure 2.2 
below). In 2006, a total of K2,343.7 billion (or 42.57 per cent of the budget) was released to pro-
grammes classified as PRPs. During 2007, a total of K5,645.7 billion (or 46.9 per cent of the total 
budget) was allocated to poverty reduction programmes while the 2008 PRP budget allocation was 
K6,488.8 billion, representing 47 per cent of the total budget for the year. The actual percentage re-
leases in respect of PRP allocations are shown in MTR figure 2.3 further below on the next page. 
 
Extracts: 
 
EDF10 CSP/NIP 2008-2013: Chapter II Country Diagnosis of the CSP/NIP document consists of 4 
main parts / chapters as per the standard prescriptions, (i) Analysis of the political, economic, social 
and environmental situation in the recipient country (6 sectors / thematic areas); (ii) Poverty reduction 
analysis – MDGs; (iii) Zambia development strategy and (iv) analysis of the challenges and risks of 
current and medium-term policies. This section covers pages 12 to 24 of the CSP document of 37 
pages or more than one third of the document. This country diagnosis, together with the overview of 
past and present EC cooperation, complementarity and consistency, is the main basis for the formula-
tion of the response strategy and the NIP. 
 JAR 2007, p30: Moreover, the GRZ FNDP 2006-2010 and the JASZ was the basis for discussions of 
the new EDF10 support programme (2008-2013) and the related programming exercise. 
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JAR 2003, p18: 4.2 Focal sectors of the EDF9 - The CSP/NIP in line with the PRSP proposed three 
focal sectors: Transport Infrastructure, Institutional Reform and Capacity Building, and Macroeconomic 
Support. 
 
JAR 2003, p37: JAR Conclusions: Overall, the implementation of the PRSP in Zambia is improving, 
although considerable room still exists to improve the implementation process and, ultimately, to gen-
erate the desirable outcomes in terms of poverty reduction. The CSP/NIP has been proved in line with 
the Government poverty reduction strategy.  
 
CSP/NIP EDF10: page 41 conditionalities FNDP budget expenditures on health and education (but no 
education in NIP) 
 
 Indicator 9.1.2: Emerging policy priorities integrated in MTR and ETR at national and re-
gional level 
There is documentary evidence of the integration of emerging policy priorities in the Mid-Term Reviews 
and End-Term Reviews at the national and regional strategy levels. How and to what extent this is done 
to ensure continued relevance of the EU response strategy is illustrated in the EDF10 CSP Mid-Term 
Review conclusions. These attest to the continued relevance of the initial response strategy of the 
Community as expressed in the CSP 2008-2013 under the EDF10 since it supports the main objectives 
of the National Development Strategy. At the same time, the strategy also has provided an appropriate 
framework to absorb additional funds allocated to address the effects of the global financial crisis and 
the food prices crisis (V-FLEX modality). The 2009 MTR concludes that the EU remains convinced that 
the budget support modality provides the levels of ownership of development and permits the GRZ to 
allocate resources in accordance with national priorities. It continues that the recent concerns on the 
effectiveness of Public Financial Management (PFM) systems, which could challenge GRZ eligibility to 
budget support, have been identified and are being addressed by GRZ through a detailed roadmap with 
support from the CPs. The MTR as such appears to underestimate the gravity of the governance issues 
in the transport and health sectors which evolved into a crisis situation with some EU member states 
suspending their cooperation and backing out. 
As far as more concrete examples of emerging policy priorities integration are concerned, the 2009 
Mid-Term Review report of the EDF10 CSP for example provides ample evidence of this smooth inte-
gration of new policy directions and priorities. In August 2009, after many delays, the GRZ had 
launched the National Anti-Corruption Policy. The EDF10 CSP MTR reported the implementation of this 
policy appearing to be on track with the major milestones in 2010 likely to be attained but at the same 
time the MRT referred to the questioning in 2010 of the Government's commitment to fight corruption as 
it removed the clause of "Abuse of office and illicit wealth" from the revised Anti-Corruption Commission 
Act. A phenomenon causing more focused concerns and requiring new EC/EU policy objectives and 
commitments as reported in the MTR of the EDF10 CSP are migrations, with three main dimensions: 
brain drain, refugees and rural migration. Although Zambia has never been counted among the major 
countries of emigration in the region, it has experienced a very critical brain drain, especially during the 
last decade and in particular in the health sector. This was met by special EDF support for the retention 
of human resources in the health sector under budget support modalities and got especially focused on 
in the MTR. An example of a sectoral MTR is the MTR of the Education Strategic Plan 2003-2007 com-
pleted in 2007. As reported in the JAR for 2007, the Ministry worked on a National Implementation 
Framework for the NDP period 2006-2010, taking the Education chapter of the National Development 
Plan as strategic document. The MTR's overall conclusion was that the policies are right, but implemen-
tation insufficient, mostly because of "little sense of accountability throughout the system". 
An example in case of the integration of emerging policy priorities at regional level and their reflection at 
Zambia country level is the Joint African EU Strategy (JAES) as reported in the MTR of the EDF10 
CSP. The review revealed that elements of the JAES objectives were already articulated in the Zam-
bia’s FNDP as prerequisites for economic growth and development. After the Lisbon Summit of De-
cember 2007, Zambia was actively involved with two key initiatives under the JAES. The Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) held a retreat in Livingstone in December 2008 to 
consider an appropriate mechanism for interaction between the Peace and Security Council and Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs) in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa within the 
framework of Article 20 of the PSC protocol. In September 2009, the Lusaka Declaration on the high-
level Meeting of the Eastern and Southern Africa – Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) Region and the European 
Commission included JAES in the agenda. The MTR furthermore reported however that there is little 
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evidence that all stakeholders including GRZ, Parliament, NSAs and private sector fully own the JAES 
and are actively involved in its implementation. 
In general, it appears that the issue is not so much the reflection of emerging policy priorities in MTRs, 
ETRs and other related documents at national and regional levels which raises concerns, but their 
ownership by the respective main stakeholder groups concerned, is as much as policies that are not 
owned by the main stakeholders tend to fail. This is confirmed by the Country Level Political Economy 
Analysis of Zambia
103
 commissioned by the EU in 2011 which under section 5.3 “Linking Analysis and 
Action – Suggestions for an EU Strategy in Zambia” provides ideas about the about the implications of 
the analysis for development assistance in Zambia based on the discussion at the workshop in Lusaka 
in June 2011, with staff of the EU delegation, member states and the World Bank. The report asserts 
that “Overall these ideas suggest that political economy analysis may not imply doing a lot of different 
things, but it does point to the need to do quite a lot of things differently, including
104
: (i) Take a longer 
term view; (ii) Find a compelling political narrative; (iii) Think about the impact of donor behaviour and 
aid modalities; (iv) Look for the short term room for manoeuvre; (v) Adopt more indirect strategies to 
help shift rules of the game over time; (vi)Taxation is a strategically important issue; (vii) Maximise the 
scope for international and EU leverage; (viii) Pay attention to local level economy dynamics; (ix) Be 
realistic about capacity building, and; (x) The political economy of the EU delegation? 
Extracts: 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p1: After many delays, GRZ launched the National Anti-Corruption 
Policy in August 2009. Overall, its implementation appears on track with the major milestones for 
2010 likely to be attained. But Government's commitment to fight corruption has been questioned in 
2010 as it removed the clause of "Abuse of office and illicit wealth" from the revised Anti-Corruption 
Commission Act. 
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p5; 1.2 New EC/EU policy objectives and commitments - Migrations: 
brain drain, refugees and rural migration: Although Zambia has never counted among the major coun-
tries of emigration in the region, it has experienced a very critical brain drain, especially during the last 
decade and in particular in the health sector. Under the EDF9, a €10m programme was designed to 
support retention of human resources for the Health Sector under budget support modalities. 
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p5; JAES: Elements of the JAES objectives were already articulated 
in the Zambia’s FNDP as prerequisites for economic growth and development. After the Lisbon Sum-
mit of December 2007, Zambia was actively involved with two key initiatives under the JAES. The 
Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) held a retreat in Livingstone in Decem-
ber 2008 to consider an appropriate mechanism for interaction between the Peace and Security 
Council and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Af-
rica within the framework of Article 20 of the PSC protocol. In September 2009, the Lusaka Declara-
tion on the high-level Meeting of the Eastern and Southern Africa – Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) Region 
and the European Commission included JAES in the agenda. There is little evidence that all stake-
holders including GRZ, Parliament, NSAs and private sector fully own the JAES and are actively in-
volved in its implementation. 
 
JAR 2007, p24; 2.3.2 Education: In 2007, the Ministry of Education concluded the implementing the 
Education Strategic Plan 2003-2007. A MTR of the Plan was completed in 2007, and the Ministry 
worked on a National Implementation Framework for the NDP period 2006-2010, taking the Education 
chapter of the National Development Plan as strategic document. The MTR's conclusion is that the 
policies are right, but implementation insufficient, mostly because of "little sense of accountability 
throughout the system”. 
 
Simutanyi, N. & Unsworth S. (2011) pp. 41-49; Section 5: Linking Analysis and Action: Country 
Level Strategies: 5.3. Suggestions for an EU strategy in Zambia: The following ideas about the impli-
cations of the analysis for development assistance in Zambia reflect discussion at the workshop in 
Lusaka in June 2011, with staff of the EU delegation, member states and the World Bank. Overall 
these ideas suggest that political economy analysis may not imply doing a lot of different things, but it 
does point to the need to do quite a lot of things differently: [Note: Only titles are reflected here, to 
                                               
103
  Simutanyi, N. & Unsworth S. (2011) pp. 41-49; Section 5: Linking Analysis and Action: Country Level Strategies : 5.3. Sug-
gestions for an EU strategy in Zambia. 
104
  Only the titles of the chapters are reflected here, in order to be able to keep the large excerpt concerned succinct. 
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keep the large excerpt succinct]: (i) Take a longer term view; (ii) Find a compelling political narrative; 
(iii) Think about the impact of donor behaviour and aid modalities; (iv) Look for the short term room for 
manoeuvre; (v) Adopt more indirect strategies to help shift rules of the game over time; (vi)Taxation is 
a strategically important issue; (vii) Maximise the scope for international and EU leverage; (viii) Pay 
attention to local level economy dynamics; (ix) Be realistic about capacity building, and; (x) The politi-
cal economy of the EU delegation? 
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, pp. 8-9: Chapter 1.4. Conclusions and Recommendations Regard-
ing the Relevance of the Response Strategy: The initial response strategy of the Community as ex-
pressed in the CSP 2008-2013 under the EDF10 remains relevant since it supports the main objec-
tives of the National Development Strategy. The strategy has provided also an appropriate framework 
to absorb additional funds allocated to address the effects of the global financial crisis and the food 
prices crisis. The EU remains convinced that the budget support modality provides the levels of own-
ership of development and permits the GRZ to allocate resources in accordance with national priori-
ties. Recent concerns on the effectiveness of Public Financial Management (PFM) systems, which 
could challenge GRZ eligibility to budget support have been identified and are being addressed by 
GRZ through a detailed roadmap with support from the CPs.  
 Indicator 9.1.3: Balance between interventions supporting policy formulation and interven-
tions improving policy implementation. 
Especially under the budget support programmes (GBS and SBS) a balance is strived for between in-
terventions supporting policy formulation and interventions improving policy implementation. The 2003 
JAR for example concluded in this connection that the Government of Zambia is committed to good 
governance. The Anti-corruption Commission is the central body in charge of the implementation of the 
zero-tolerance policy against corruption. But at the same time the 2003 JAR noticed that misappropria-
tion of funds still is a major concern. It expected the ongoing public sector reform to significantly im-
prove good governance. The EDF9 CSP/NIP addresses good governance issues through the focal 
area “Institutional Reform and Capacity Building”  
In the more recent period, since 2007 or so, policy dialogue with national authorities especially focused 
on (i) conditions for progress in budget support (PRBS group process), (ii) the situation in priority sec-
tors (social sectors, HIV/AIDS, agriculture/food security, infrastructure, private sector/PSD), and (iii) 
analysing the first period of implementation of the donor-supported programme for public finance man-
agement reform (PEMFA). Hence a balance of policy formulation and policy implementation issues is 
discussed, whereas traditionally such dialogue was more concentrated on project / programme imple-
mentation issues.  
With the budget support programmes (and particularly the General Budget Support – GBS), a shift of 
the balance to the other side is noted and reported on with special (over-)concentration on policy dia-
logue and policy formulation issues, not exceptionally to the detriment of policy and programme / pro-
ject implementation. The recently conducted country evaluation (2011) on the implementation of the 
Paris Declaration (PD) in Zambia in this regard notes that it is perceived that there is too much focus on 
PD processes rather than translating them into development action. With respect to administrative effi-
ciency, reports and minutes of the SWAp coordination meetings from 2002 to 2010 showed that a sub-
stantial amount of time is spent attending these meetings. MoH staff interviewed indicated that consid-
erable time is spent organizing and staging SWAp-specific and other technical meetings. As part of the 
organisation process, matters arising during the meetings have to be followed up and action taken, 
reports produced and circulated to all members in time for the next meeting. The donors who were not 
pooling resources had their own separate planning, budgeting and reporting formats. This is reported to 
have increased the administration workload of staff, especially the programme managers at lower levels 
who have had to regularly submit reports. Substantive, too substantive if not disproportionately high 
amounts of time and resources to be invested in policy dialogue matters, particularly those pertaining to 
budget support and the wider harmonisation efforts to the detriment of actual aid management and 
coordination, were reported to the evaluation team during different interviews with EUD, CP and GRZ 
key stakeholder parties involved / concerned. The policy dialogue reportedly has signified a particularly 
extensive burden for the smaller EU Member States Embassies in Zambia. 
The 2011 PD evaluation furthermore noted that, while Cooperating Partners (CPs) invest in and have 
access to quality information, the government does not do so, resulting in an unequal dialogue relation-
ship between the two. This seems to affect the capacity of GRZ to effectively negotiate with donors. 
Achieving recognised standards of performance and accountability remains a challenge as the govern-
ment continues to suffer from weak human and institutional capacities at all levels of governance…The 
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PD evaluation continues that areas of contribution to progress on aid effectiveness of the Paris Declara-
tion include: (i) the development policy framework, (ii) aid coordination mechanisms and (iii) sector wide 
management approaches, hence policy formulation support interventions. These are significant and 
sustainable results which have translated into some development investments which reflect all or some 
of the PD principles in their design and implementation. Specially, the Paris Declaration has enhanced 
intense dialogue in the health sector which has contributed to the development of mechanisms and 
processes that have encouraged coordinated support to national systems and the wider use of pro-
gramme-based approaches.  
Sectoral / thematic area illustrations of the balance between policy formulation and policy implementa-
tion interventions strived for in the EU response strategy are provided for by climate change and envi-
ronment. Traditionally the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on the economy 
has not been a main government priority until recently, as the modest record on the achievement of 
MDG7 – ensuring environmental sustainability – shows. However, both the FNDP and the National 
Policy on the Environment emphasize the integration of environmental issues in sector development 
plans and programmes. In 2008, the Environment Mainstreaming Strategy was developed with some 
progress reported during the year for finalisation in the next year. Another positive step was the creation 
in 2008 of the Climate Change Facilitation Unit in the Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural 
Resources (MTENR), which had been set up to prepare a more permanent secretariat in the appropri-
ate institution especially focusing on policy formulation. 
Extracts: 
JAR 2003, p35; (ix) Governance - Government of Zambia is committed to good governance. The An-
ti-corruption Commission is the central body in charge of the implementation of the zero-tolerance pol-
icy against corruption (see 3.1). However, misappropriation of funds is still a major concern. It is ex-
pected that the ongoing public sector reform (see 2) will significantly improve good governance. As 
part of the reform process, public financial management has been improving in 2003, although from a 
low basis. The CSP/NIP addresses good governance issues through the focal area “Institutional Re-
form and Capacity Building” (see 4.2.2 and 5).  
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p4: The impact of climate change and environmental degradation on 
the economy has not been a main government priority until recently, as the modest record on the 
achievement of MDG7 – ensuring environmental sustainability – shows. However, both the FNDP and 
the National Policy on the Environment emphasize the integration of environmental issues in sector 
development plans and programmes. In 2008, the Environment Mainstreaming Strategy was devel-
oped with some progress reported during the year but it was not finalised. A positive step was the 
creation in 2008 of the Climate Change Facilitation Unit in the Ministry of Tourism, Environment and 
Natural Resources (MTENR), which has been set up to prepare a more permanent secretariat in the 
appropriate institution. 
 
JAR 2007, p30: In the most recent period, policy dialogue with national authorities focussed on condi-
tions for progress in budget support (PRBS group process), the situation in priority sectors (social sec-
tors, HIV/AIDS, agriculture/food security, infrastructure, private sector/PSD), and analysing the first 
period of implementation of the donor-supported programme for public finance management reform 
(PEMFA). Moreover, the GRZ FNDP 2006-2010 and the JASZ was the basis for discussions of the 
new EDF10 support programme (2008-2013) and the related programming exercise. 
 
JAR 2007, p30: The absence of NAO representatives at important project/programme decision-
making events also adversely affects project implementation. 
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011) p. xi: Country Evaluation of the Implementation 
of the Paris Declaration in Zambia, Phase II; February 2011: To what extent and how has the imple-
mentation of the Paris Declaration led to an improvement in the efficiency of aid delivery, the man-
agement and use of aid and better partnerships (process and intermediate outcomes) – Core Ques-
tion 2. It is perceived that there is too much focus on Parish Declaration (PD) processes rather than 
translating them into development action. Another problematic area was the structure of dialogue be-
tween CPs and the recipient country. In interviews, many donors described the existing dialogue 
mechanism between GRZ and CPs as “insufficient”. It was noted that, while CPs invest in and have 
access to quality information, the government does not do so, resulting in an unequal dialogue rela-
tionship between the two. This seems to affect the capacity of GRZ to effectively negotiate with do-
nors. On achieving recognised standards of performance and accountability, it remains a challenge as 
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the government continues to suffer from weak human and institutional capacities at all levels of gov-
ernance. 
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011), p. xii; Country Evaluation of the Implementation 
of the Paris Declaration in Zambia, Phase II; February 2011: To what extent and how has the imple-
mentation of the Paris Declaration led to an improvement in the efficiency of aid delivery, the man-
agement and use of aid and better partnerships (process and intermediate outcomes) – Core Ques-
tion 2. With respect to administrative efficiency, reports and minutes of the SWAp coordination meet-
ings from 2002 to 2010 showed that a substantial amount of time is spent attending these meetings. 
MoH staff interviewed indicated that considerable time is spent organizing and staging SWAp-specific 
and other technical meetings. As part of the organisation process, matters arising during the meetings 
have to be followed up and action taken, reports produced and circulated to all members in time for 
the next meeting. The donors who were not pooling resources had their own separate planning, 
budgeting and reporting formats. This is reported to have increased the administration workload of 
staff, especially the programme managers at lower levels who have had to regularly submit reports to 
the Ministry of Health Headquarters. 
 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011) p. xii; Country Evaluation of the Implementation 
of the Paris Declaration in Zambia, Phase II; February 2011: Has the implementation of the Paris Dec-
laration strengthened the contribution of aid to sustainable development results (development out-
comes)? How? – Core Question 3. Areas of contribution to progress on aid effectiveness of the Paris 
Declaration include development policy framework, aid coordination mechanisms and sector wide 
management approaches. These are significant and sustainable results which have translated into 
some development investments which reflect all or some of the PD principles in their design and im-
plementation. Specially, the Paris Declaration has enhanced intense dialogue in the health sector 
which has contributed to the development of mechanisms and processes that have encouraged coor-
dinated support to national systems and the wider use of programme-based approaches. Paris Decla-
ration commitments have guided implementation of the National Strategic Development Plan towards 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on JC 9.1: 
 
JASZ-II (2011) p1; JASZ-II Objectives Aligned with the SNDP; The overall goal of development assis-
tance to Zambia and thus the JASZ II is to support broad based, inclusive growth and poverty reduc-
tion as set out in Zambia’s Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP). The objective of the Joint Assis-
tance Strategy for Zambia II (JASZ-II 2011-2015) is to deliver aid effectively to support the following 
development outcomes of the SNDP: (i) Economic growth and diversification is stimulated through 
improved transport infrastructure, expanded clean energy generation, and improving productivity of 
private sector; (ii) (Rural) poverty and inequality is reduced through increased investment in rural are-
as, in particular in agricultural diversification and productivity, in manufacturing and in tourism; (iii) 
Human development is improved through quality education, cost-effective, quality primary health care, 
and expanded water supply and sanitation, and; (iv) High quality and cost-effective public services are 
delivered, facilitated through a sound public finance management system including the effective man-
agement of all revenue sources, a strengthened local government system, and active engagement of 
non-state actors. 
 
JASZ-II (2011) p14; JASZ-II Principles of Cooperation – 3.1.1 Managing for Results: Hence, GRZ and 
CPs decided to formulate a Memorandum of Understanding between GRZ and CPs (MoU) which links 
the SNDP and the JASZ II, explaining what Zambia want to achieve in terms of development and how 
GRZ and CPs plan to work together to attain these development objectives. The MoU is operational-
ised by an Action Matrix and selected Sector Key Performance Indicators. 
 
DIE & IOB (2011) p27; Evaluation Summary Recommendations: Develop reliable indicators for the 
measurement of (rural) poverty. While general budget support is associated with poverty reduction, 
the PAF does not include reliable indicators for the measurement of poverty. Poverty data depend on 
four-yearly household surveys (LCMS), and it is precisely because these surveys are held once every 
four years that the results become easily politicised (as the examples of the 2006 and 2010 surveys 
show). Another consequence of the four-yearly survey is that results may come as a surprise. There-
fore, GRZ and cooperating partners should develop more reliable indicators that can be measured at 
shorter intervals. One possibility is the development of an annual or biennial household panel. 
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JC 9.1:  The objectives of the strategy reflect the views and priorities of GRZ with respect to a 
comprehensive policy dialogue with the EU 
The EDF9 CSP/NIP covering the period 2001-2007 has been designed in line with the most important 
overall development plan of the GRZ of that period, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), as 
attested to for example by the 2003 JAR and that there is no need to change the three focal areas of 
the CSP/NIP: (i) transport infrastructure, (ii) institutional reform and capacity building, and (iii) macroe-
conomic support. Similarly, the GRZ Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) 2006-2010 formed the 
basis for the discussions of the new EDF10 support programme (2008-2013) and the related program-
ming exercise. The only dissonance maybe is that despite the fact that projected budget expenditures 
on health and education are clearly indicated in the GRZ FNDP on health and education, no provisions 
for the education sector are provided for in the EDF9 CSP/NIP.  
The solid anchoring of the EDF10 CSP-NIP 2008-2013 in and responsiveness to the national socio-
economic and macro-economic situation and needs of the country is illustrated by the Chapter II on the 
Country Diagnosis of the CSP-NIP document which as per the standard EU prescriptions consists of 4 
main parts / chapters: (i) Analysis of the political, economic, social and environmental situation in the 
recipient country (6 sectors / thematic areas); (ii) Poverty reduction analysis – MDGs; (iii) Zambia de-
velopment strategy and (iv) analysis of the challenges and risks of current and medium-term policies. 
This country diagnosis section covers pages 12 to 24 of the CSP document of 37 pages or more than 
one third of the document. This country diagnosis, together with the overview of past and present EC 
cooperation, complementarity and consistency, is the main basis for the formulation of the response 
strategy and the NIP. The current evaluation therefore finds it somehow remarkable that the substantive 
changes in the macro-economic and macro-financial country framework which started emerging by the 
middle of the 2001-2010 period under review are not more prominently covered in the country diagnosis 
and as such automatically also not its repercussions for an adapted EU response strategy to this 
emerging new situation of Zambia gradually evolving to a lower middle income country As also attested 
to in the 2007 JAR, the GRZ FNDP 2006-2010 and the JASZ have been the prime basis for discussions 
of the new EDF10 support programme (2008-2013) and the related programming exercise, This indi-
rectly implies that the FNDP and the JASZ in reaction to that have not adequately considered and in-
corporated the actual and anticipated further pronounced transition of Zambia to this upgraded macro-
economic development status. For the calculation of the external aid projections, the Fifth National De-
velopment Plan 2006-2010 for example argues that “due to a marginal rise in domestic revenues, the 
resource gap will mainly be financed from external sources.”
105
 
The in-country dialogue on policy and programming priorities regarding the EDF10 CSP/NIP between 
GRZ and Cooperating Partners has been facilitated through the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia at 
three levels: (i) strategic - policy, (ii) tactical sectoral and (iii) operational. This JASZ has been complet-
ed and signed in May 2007. Its purpose is to focus and organise development assistance provided by 
cooperating partners to support the implementation of Zambia's national development goals as defined 
in the FNDP 2006-2010. This is in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration to which Zambia and its cooper-
ating partners are signatory. The JASZ is foreseen to harmonise and align the many individual country 
strategies that cooperating partners in Zambia are currently using and as such is a key instrument to 
progress towards further coordination and harmonisation following the requirements of the Cotonou 
Agreement and the EU development strategy. The EAMR of July 2007 confirmed that the EU joint pro-
gramming can be fully compatible with the wider JASZ agreement. The absence in 2010 of the tradi-
tional High Level Policy Dialogue under JASZ was partially compensated by exchanges between Gov-
ernment and CPs on key policy issues (rural service delivery, decentralisation, macroeconomic issues, 
mining fiscal regime, governance public financial management reform etc.) during the June and De-
cember Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) Reviews. However, the prolonged absence of high 
level policy dialogue in the last few years of the period under review (2008 to 2010)) was marked in 
many interviews at EUD and with CPs during the December field visit as one of the main reasons for a 
failed policy dialogue in general in this period. The dialogue with Civil Society Organisations remained 
rather limited, also in the absence of appropriate institutional fora with moreover substantive differences 
amongst the sectors as argued earlier in relation to EQ6 on democratic governance and CSOs. Fur-
thermore with regard to country ownership of the EU political and development response to Zambia and 
in line with one of the base principles underlying harmonisation and alignment in Zambia facilitated by 
the JASZ, it is clearly stated in the EDF10 CSP/NIP document (under annex 6) that this entails Gov-
ernment’s imposition of its will and priorities on cooperating partners and the implied readiness to reject 
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 FNDP (2006); p352 including Figure 37.1 External Aid projections (copy hereunder) 
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aid if it is not consistent with national aspirations and priorities as stated in the country’s national deve l-
opment plans. 
Also the objectives of the recently concluded follow-up JASZ-II covering the years 2011-2015 to which 
the EU is one of the 15 co-signatory CPs are aligned with the national development plans and strate-
gies. The overall goal of JASZ II development assistance to Zambia is to support broad based, inclusive 
growth and poverty reduction as set out in Zambia’s Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP). As such 
the SNDP and the JASZ-II form the broader reference framework for the formulation of the EDF11 
CSP/NIP. The objective of the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia II (JASZ-II 2011-2015) is to deliver 
aid effectively to support a well-defined selection of development outcomes of the SNDP. Moreover, the 
JASZ-II will be more results oriented along management for development results principles. To that 
effect, GRZ and CPs decided to formulate a Memorandum of Understanding between them which links 
the SNDP and the JASZ II, explaining what Zambia wants to achieve in terms of development and how 
GRZ and CPs plan to work together to attain these development objectives. The MoU is operationalised 
by an Action Matrix and selected Sector Key Performance Indicators.  
Another dimension of the EU response strategy alignment analysis with national policy priorities per-
tains to the reflection of Zambian national policy priorities in the Regional Strategy Papers and Regional 
Indicative Programmes (RSPs/RIPs). Whereas the first focal areas of the EDF10 RSP/RIP for 2008-
2013 with the RESA-IO cover regional economic integration (the second area is related to regional po-
litical integration / cooperation) in the priority sectors of infrastructure (especially transport but also in-
cluding. energy), management of natural resources, environment and food security, this attention is 
comparatively high (especially in budgetary terms) in comparison to their share in the national devel-
opment strategy (FNDP) or in the EDF10 CSP/NIP. The quality of this strategic and programmatic link 
between the regional level and the national level is further explored hereafter under JC 9.4 (the EC’s 
cooperation programme in Zambia and its regional programme were mutually reinforcing). 
As far as the overarching goal of poverty alleviation is concerned, the 2009 Mid-Term Review of the 
FNDP provided evidence that during the 2006-2008 review period, annual budget allocations to Poverty 
Reduction Programmes (PRPs) recorded an increase from 42.6 per cent in 2006 to 47.2 per cent in 
2008. Total allocations to PRPs over the review period averaged 45.78 per cent of the total budget from 
all the sectors and provinces. The budget releases out of the total allocations in the three years, how-
ever, were less than programmed and stood at an average of less than two-third (64.1%). In 2006, 
42.6% of the budget was released to programmes classified as PRPs; in 2007 this was 46.9% while in 
2008 PRP budget allocation was 47.0% of the total budget for the year.  
Performance of selected FNDP poverty indicators from the base period to the mid-term review period 
has generally been positive although varied trends have been recorded for the different sectors. Pov-
erty levels in the country have slightly declined showing an improvement over the trends before. How-
ever, the slow rate of decline would render the MDG target of halving poverty rates to 29 per cent chal-
lenging. The general trend in performance for economic indicators showed sustained improvements 
and even over-performance against set targets, although employment and annual inflation targets 
probably would not be attained as trends in these indicators show declines in performance. This is indi-
cated by the higher than programmed outturn of 16.6 per cent in 2008 against a single digit target of 5 
per cent in 2010. Similarly, employment rates have declined by 4 per cent from 2004 to 2008, thus ren-
dering achievement of the FNDP goal of “Broad-based wealth and job creation through citizenry partici-
pation and technological advancement” difficult by 2010. (I-9.1.1) 
There is documentary evidence of the integration of emerging policy priorities in the Mid-Term Reviews 
and End-Term Reviews at the national and regional strategy levels. How and to what extent this is done 
to ensure continued relevance of the EU response strategy is illustrated in the EDF10 CSP Mid-Term 
Review conclusions. These attest to the continued relevance of the initial response strategy of the 
Community as expressed in the CSP 2008-2013 under the EDF10 since it supports the main objectives 
of the National Development Strategy. At the same time, the strategy also has provided an appropriate 
framework to absorb additional funds allocated to address the effects of the global financial crisis and 
the food prices crisis (V-FLEX modality). The 2009 MTR concludes that the EU remains convinced that 
the budget support modality provides the levels of ownership of development and permits the GRZ to 
allocate resources in accordance with national priorities. It continues that the recent concerns on the 
effectiveness of Public Financial Management (PFM) systems, which could challenge GRZ eligibility to 
budget support, have been identified and are being addressed by GRZ through a detailed roadmap with 
support from the CPs. The MTR as such appears to underestimate the gravity of the governance issues 
in the transport and health sectors which evolved into a crisis situation with some EU member states 
suspending their cooperation and backing out. 
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As far as more concrete examples of emerging policy priorities integration are concerned, the 2009 
Mid-Term Review report of the EDF10 CSP for example provides ample evidence of this smooth inte-
gration of new policy directions and priorities. In August 2009, after many delays, the GRZ had 
launched the National Anti-Corruption Policy. The EDF10 CSP MTR reported the implementation of this 
policy appearing to be on track with the major milestones in 2010 likely to be attained but at the same 
time the MRT referred to the questioning in 2010 of the Government's commitment to fight corruption as 
it removed the clause of "Abuse of office and illicit wealth" from the revised Anti-Corruption Commission 
Act. A phenomenon causing more focused concerns and requiring new EC/EU policy objectives and 
commitments as reported in the MTR of the EDF10 CSP are migrations, with three main dimensions: 
brain drain, refugees and rural migration. Although Zambia has never been counted among the major 
countries of emigration in the region, it has experienced a very critical brain drain, especially during the 
last decade and in particular in the health sector. This was met by special EDF support for the retention 
of human resources in the health sector under budget support modalities and got especially focused on 
in the MTR. An example of a sectoral MTR is the MTR of the Education Strategic Plan 2003-2007 com-
pleted in 2007. As reported in the JAR for 2007, the Ministry worked on a National Implementation 
Framework for the NDP period 2006-2010, taking the Education chapter of the National Development 
Plan as strategic document. The MTR's overall conclusion was that the policies are right, but implemen-
tation insufficient, mostly because of "little sense of accountability throughout the system". 
An example in case of the integration of emerging policy priorities at regional level and their reflection at 
Zambia country level is the Joint African EU Strategy (JAES) as reported in the MTR of the EDF10 
CSP. The review revealed that elements of the JAES objectives were already articulated in the Zam-
bia’s FNDP as prerequisites for economic growth and development. After the Lisbon Summit of De-
cember 2007, Zambia was actively involved with two key initiatives under the JAES. The Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) held a retreat in Livingstone in December 2008 to 
consider an appropriate mechanism for interaction between the Peace and Security Council and Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs) in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa within the 
framework of Article 20 of the PSC protocol. In September 2009, the Lusaka Declaration on the high-
level Meeting of the Eastern and Southern Africa – Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) Region and the European 
Commission included JAES in the agenda. The MTR furthermore reported however that there is little 
evidence that all stakeholders including GRZ, Parliament, NSAs and private sector fully own the JAES 
and are actively involved in its implementation. 
In general, it appears that the issue is not so much the reflection of emerging policy priorities in MTRs, 
ETRs and other related documents at national and regional levels which raises concerns, but their 
ownership by the respective main stakeholder groups concerned, is as much as policies that are not 
owned by the main stakeholders tend to fail. This is confirmed by the Country Level Political Economy 
Analysis of Zambia
106
 commissioned by the EU in 2011 which under section 5.3 “Linking Analysis and 
Action – Suggestions for an EU Strategy in Zambia” provides ideas about the about the implications of 
the analysis for development assistance in Zambia based on the discussion at the workshop in Lusaka 
in June 2011, with staff of the EU delegation, member states and the World Bank. The report asserts 
that “Overall these ideas suggest that political economy analysis may not imply doing a lot of different 
things, but it does point to the need to do quite a lot of things differently, including107: (i) Take a longer 
term view; (ii) Find a compelling political narrative; (iii) Think about the impact of donor behaviour and 
aid modalities; (iv) Look for the short term room for manoeuvre; (v) Adopt more indirect strategies to 
help shift rules of the game over time; (vi)Taxation is a strategically important issue; (vii) Maximise the 
scope for international and EU leverage; (viii) Pay attention to local level economy dynamics; (ix) Be 
realistic about capacity building, and; (x) The political economy of the EU delegation? (I-9.1.2) 
Especially under the budget support programmes (GBS and SBS) a balance is strived for between in-
terventions supporting policy formulation and interventions improving policy implementation. The 2003 
JAR for example concluded in this connection that the Government of Zambia is committed to good 
governance, but it at the same time noticed that misappropriation of funds still is a major concern. The 
EDF9 CSP/NIP addresses good governance issues through the focal area “Institutional Reform and 
Capacity Building”. In the more recent period, since 2007 or so, policy dialogue with national authorities 
especially focused on (i) conditions for progress in budget support (PRBS group process), (ii) the situa-
tion in priority sectors (social sectors, HIV/AIDS, agriculture/food security, infrastructure, private sec-
tor/PSD), and (iii) analysing the first period of implementation of the donor-supported programme for 
public finance management reform (PEMFA). Hence a balance of policy formulation and policy imple-
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  Simutanyi, N. & Unsworth S. (2011) pp. 41-49; Section 5: Linking Analysis and Action: Country Level Strategies : 5.3. Sug-
gestions for an EU strategy in Zambia. 
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  Only the titles of the chapters are reflected here, in order to be able to keep the large excerpt concerned succinct. 
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mentation issues is discussed, whereas traditionally such dialogue was more concentrated on project / 
programme implementation issues.  
With the budget support programmes (and particularly the General Budget Support – GBS), a shift of 
the balance to the other side is noted and reported on with special (over-)concentration on policy dia-
logue and policy formulation issues, not exceptionally to the detriment of policy and programme / pro-
ject implementation. The recently conducted country evaluation (2011) on the implementation of the 
Paris Declaration (PD) in Zambia in this regard notes that it is perceived that there is too much focus on 
PD processes rather than translating them into development action. With respect to administrative effi-
ciency, reports and minutes of the SWAp coordination meetings from 2002 to 2010 showed that a sub-
stantial amount of time is spent attending these meetings. MoH staff interviewed indicated that consid-
erable time is spent organizing and staging SWAp-specific and other technical meetings. As part of the 
organisation process, matters arising during the meetings have to be followed up and action taken, 
reports produced and circulated to all members in time for the next meeting.  
The donors who were not pooling resources had their own separate planning, budgeting and reporting 
formats. This is reported to have increased the administration workload of staff, especially the pro-
gramme managers at lower levels who have had to regularly submit reports. Substantive, too substan-
tive if not disproportionately high amounts of time and resources to be invested in policy dialogue mat-
ters, particularly those pertaining to budget support and the wider harmonisation efforts to the detriment 
of actual aid management and coordination, were reported to the evaluation team during different inter-
views with EUD, CP and GRZ key stakeholder parties involved / concerned. The policy dialogue report-
edly has signified a particularly extensive burden for the smaller EU Member States Embassies in 
Zambia. 
The 2011 PD evaluation furthermore noted that, while Cooperating Partners (CPs) invest in and have 
access to quality information, the government does not do so, resulting in an unequal dialogue relation-
ship between the two. This seems to affect the capacity of GRZ to effectively negotiate with donors. 
Achieving recognised standards of performance and accountability remains a challenge as the govern-
ment continues to suffer from weak human and institutional capacities at all levels of governance…The 
PD evaluation continues that areas of contribution to progress on aid effectiveness of the Paris Declara-
tion include: (i) the development policy framework, (ii) aid coordination mechanisms and (iii) sector wide 
management approaches, hence policy formulation support interventions. These are significant and 
sustainable results which have translated into some development investments which reflect all or some 
of the PD principles in their design and implementation. Specially, the Paris Declaration has enhanced 
intense dialogue in the health sector which has contributed to the development of mechanisms and 
processes that have encouraged coordinated support to national systems and the wider use of pro-
gramme-based approaches.  
Sectoral / thematic area illustrations of the balance between policy formulation and policy implementa-
tion interventions strived for in the EU response strategy are provided for by climate change and envi-
ronment. Traditionally the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on the economy 
has not been a main government priority until recently, as the modest record on the achievement of 
MDG7 – ensuring environmental sustainability – shows. However, both the FNDP and the National 
Policy on the Environment emphasize the integration of environmental issues in sector development 
plans and programmes. In 2008, the Environment Mainstreaming Strategy was developed with some 
progress reported during the year for finalisation in the next year. Another positive step was the creation 
in 2008 of the Climate Change Facilitation Unit in the Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural 
Resources (MTENR), which had been set up to prepare a more permanent secretariat in the appropri-
ate institution especially focusing on policy formulation. (I-9.1.3) 
 
JC 9.2: The objectives of the programmes correspond to needs of the population 
 Indicator 9.2.1: Logical framework of programming documents (CSP/RSP, NIP/RIP, MTR), 
based on reliable information and analyses on national needs 
The intervention framework and performance indicators for the EDF10 CSP/NIP 2008-2013 are pre-
sented under a special chapter 1.6 of the CSP/NIP document. However, the section only has the Log-
Frames for the two focal sectors (regional integration/transport infrastructure, and human development – 
health), plus the logframe for macro-economic support – general budget support. Only the three results 
levels are reflected (overall objective, programme purpose and results) in the LogFrames. No vertical 
logic / results chain levels are foreseen for inputs and activities. Objectively verifiable indicators with 
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concomitant sources of verification are included for each results level. However, the indicators are 
vaguely formulated and mostly are formulated at the logical level only (yes/no) hence not making possi-
ble refined performance measurement. Moreover, they are formulated without any indicator target set-
ting or baseline data, or timeframe indication. The Macro-economic support – General budget support 
LogFrame matrix in the EDF10 CSP/NIP does not include any specific indicators, as only broad areas of 
indicators are provided. Reference is made to the PRBS MoU as the context wherein the indicators will 
be established jointly in a common Performance Assessment Framework (PAF). This PAF is a rolling 
document, as it is updated at regular intervals. The logframe matrix in the CSP/NIP document only in-
cludes broad areas of indicators. 
Chapter 6.6 entitled “Intervention Frameworks: Programme Planning Matrix” in the EDF9 CSP/NIP doc-
ument for the period 2001-2007 consists of one page and only has the overall objectives level of the 
LogFrame matrix intervention logic included for two focal sectors, (i) Transport, and (ii) Institutional De-
velopment and Capacity Building. For the latter, the further completed LogFrame matrix for the three 
results levels (labelled respectively as overall goal, objective and results) is provided under Annex 5 to 
the CSP/NIP document, but not including the inputs and activities results chain levels. The quality char-
acteristics of EDF9 CSP/NIP indicators are basically as described above in relation to the EDF10 
CSP/NIP indicators.  
All EDF10 CSP/NIP projects were subject to Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) in 2010. The reports 
concluded that all had good potential for sustainability (all ranked between 3 and 4) with effectiveness 
being the lowest where only two projects out of five were rated 3.0 (good). However, all the projects 
were ROM reported to have weak Logical Framework matrices and had challenges with setting up work-
ing Monitoring and Evaluation systems. Two projects were said to have over-estimated their targets. 
(JAR 2010, p15).  
CSP/NIP M&E systems have been gradually refined in the process. In relation to EDF9, following the 
second poverty review conference in April 2003 to discuss the monitoring and evaluation strategies 
relating to the implementation of the PRSP/TNDP, significant progress has been achieved in refining the 
poverty indicators. In June 2003 the Refined PRSP Indicator System was finalised. The system contains 
the most important indicators (input, output, outcome and impact) needed to monitor the major objec-
tives and sectors of the PRSP/TNDP. The system however has not been completed with baseline and 
targets to monitor the indicators. Furthermore, the Poverty Monitoring and Analysis (PMA) framework 
was finalised which aims at improving coordination of PRSP activities under one single umbrella incor-
porating the main stakeholders (GRZ, Civil Society, and Cooperating Partners) with the aim of (i) har-
monizing data collection, (ii) improving dissemination of information and (iii) using the monitoring and 
evaluation mechanism for policy decision-making purposes. In October 2003, the first PRSP Implemen-
tation Progress Report was presented. In presenting the report, the Government acknowledged the fact 
that the mechanism of monitoring the PRSP has not yet been well developed and that several short-
comings still exist. Although the report presents a detailed picture of the implementation of each Poverty 
Reduction Programme (PRP) it lacks a comprehensive view of the results and outcomes in terms of 
poverty reduction at global and sectoral levels. Also, the report does not analyse trends in resource 
allocations over the years. A great deal of work was done and progress achieved in 2003 in preparation 
of the first MTEF for 2004-2006. 
The complexity of sectoral performance monitoring in a mixed (combination of GBS and SBS) budget 
support setting under the EDF10 CSP/NIP can be illustrated by the health sector (FA – 10-ACP-2A-005 
p4). Performance monitoring is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health, while the Ministry of Finance 
and National Planning coordinates monitoring the implementation of the FNDP. In the health sector 
dialogue the progress in implementing the National Health Strategic Plan is reported on through the 
routine Health Management Information System (HMIS). The Health components of the PAF (Perfor-
mance Assessment Framework under the PRBS) and the Health sector Performance Monitoring 
Framework (HPMF) are the main tools for performance assessment. They provide a synthetic picture, 
derived from the existing strategic policy frameworks and annual work plans, of sector commitments in 
terms of inputs, outputs and outcomes. The broad HPMF includes the DAC selected standard indica-
tors. 
In conclusion, generally the logical frameworks in the Zambia country level programming documents are 
partial only and very general, and they do not contain performance indicators with baseline values or 
target setting. Hence it cannot be ascertained that these LogFrames are based on reliable information 
and analyses on national needs and therefore in a broader sense if the objectives of the programmes 
correspond to the needs of the population (JC 9.2). 
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 EDF9 CSP/NIP 2001-2007; p28: Chapter 6.6: Intervention frameworks – Program Planning Matrix  
 
 
 EDF10 CSP/NIP 2008-2013; pp. 45-50: Chapter 1.6: Intervention framework & performance indica-
tors for the two focal sectors and for macro-economic support – general budget support (excerpt ) 
 
 Health Sector Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) - Health component of the PAF under 
the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) 
 
 JAR 2003, Annex 1: Rationale for the focal sectors interventions and macroeconomic support 1. 
Programme Planning Matrix – Institutional Development and Capacity Building Focal Sector 
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Extracts: 
EDF10 CSP/NIP 2008-2013: The intervention framework & performance indicators are presented un-
der chapter 1.6 of the CSP/NIP document. The section has the LogFrames for the two focal sectors 
(regional integration/transport infrastructure, and human development – health, plus the logframe for 
macro-economic support – general budget support. Only the three results levels are reflected (overall 
objective, programme purpose and results), no vertical logic / no results chain levels of inputs and ac-
tivities. Objectively verifiable indicators with concomitant sources of verification are identified for each 
results level, however without any indicator target setting or baseline data, or timeframe indication. 
 
JAR 2010, p15: All … projects were subject of Results Oriented Monitoring in 2010. The reports con-
cluded that all had good potential for sustainability (all ranked between 3 and 4) with effectiveness be-
ing the lowest where only 2 projects out of five were rated 3.0 (good). … However, all the projects had 
weak logical framework matrices and had challenges with setting up working Monitoring and Evalua-
tion systems. Self Help Africa and Plan UK projects were said to have over-estimated their targets. 
 
JAR 2003, pp. 8-9; PRSP/TNDP Monitoring and Evaluation: Following the first annual poverty review 
conference in March 2002, the Government organised a second annual conference in April 2003 to 
discuss the monitoring and evaluation strategies relating to the implementation of the PRSP/TNDP. 
Subsequently, significant progress has been achieved with the support of GTZ in refining the poverty 
indicators. In June 2003 the Refined PRSP Indicator System was finalised. The System contains the 
most important indicators (input, output, outcome and impact) needed to monitor the major objectives 
and sectors of the PRSP/TNDP. However, the system has not been completed with baseline and tar-
gets to monitor the indicators. Furthermore, the Government finalised in August/September 2003 the 
Poverty Monitoring and Analysis (PMA) framework with the support of DFID and JICA. The PMA 
framework aims at improving coordination of PRSP/TNDP activities under a single umbrella incorpo-
rating the main stakeholders (GRZ, Civil Society, and Cooperating Partners), harmonizing data collec-
tion, improving dissemination of information and using the monitoring and evaluation mechanism for 
policy decision-making purposes. In October 2003, in an effort that has to be commended, the Gov-
ernment presented the first PRSP Implementation Progress Report. In presenting the report, the Gov-
ernment acknowledged the fact that the mechanism of monitoring the PRSP has not yet been well de-
veloped and that several shortcomings still exist. Although the report presents a detailed picture of the 
implementation of each Poverty Reduction Programme (PRP) it lacks a comprehensive view of the re-
sults and outcomes in terms of poverty reduction at global and sectoral levels. Also the report does not 
analyse trends in resource allocations over the years. A great deal of work was done and progress 
achieved in 2003 in preparation of the first MTEF for 2004-2006. 
 
FA 10-ACP-2A-005 SPSP Supporting Public Health Service Delivery in Zambia; TAPA p4; Chap-
ter 2.3. Performance monitoring and disbursement criteria: Performance monitoring is the responsibil-
ity of the Ministry of Health, while the Ministry of Finance and National Planning coordinates monitor-
ing the implementation of the FNDP. In the health sector dialogue the progress in implementing the 
National Health Strategic Plan is reported on through the routine Health Management Information Sys-
tem (HMIS). The Health components of the PAF (Performance Assessment Framework under the 
PRBS) and the Health sector Performance Monitoring Framework (HPMF) will be in the coming years 
 
Intervention Performance Indicator Means of 
Verification 
Assumptions 
 
Overall Goal: 
To Strengthen the 
Institutional Capacities 
of the Zambian public 
and private sectors to 
manage the economy 
and promote private 
sector led development 
 
 
-Financial and Economic Management 
capacities of the Zambian Public Service 
Strengthened. 
-Capacities for public-private dialogue built as a 
basis for improving the policy and institutional 
environment for private sector development. 
-capacities of Non-State Actors to participate 
and benefit from EU-Zambia Cooperation 
developed. 
- access of private and public actors to the 
distance learning courses of the BOZ  increased. 
 
 
See Below 
 
See Below 
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the main tools for performance assessment. They provide a synthetic picture – derived from the exist-
ing strategic policy frameworks and annual work plans – of the sector commitments, in terms of inputs, 
output and outcomes. The broad HPMF includes the DAC selected standard indicators. 
 Indicator 9.2.2: Existence of updates of the content of the policy dialogue and the coopera-
tion programme according to the analysis of needs’ satisfaction 
There is no evidence of systematic needs assessment through satisfaction surveys or other similar 
types of analyses at the level of the targeted beneficiaries / clientele and/or of the population in general, 
at least not in as much as these are reflected in the overall strategy and programming documents or 
strategy implementation reviews. Also no evidence of such needs and satisfaction surveys emanated 
from the sectoral analyses under this evaluation. Hence no conclusive answer or indication can be giv-
en in relation to the indicator measuring / assessing the existence of updates of the content of the policy 
dialogue and the cooperation programme according to the analysis of needs’ satisfaction. In the field 
visit interviews it was confirmed that needs assessments, target groups / beneficiaries / clients satisfac-
tion surveys are not (yet) systematically used as planning and programme management tools. 
An overall appreciation of the outcomes / impact of budget support on poverty reduction has been pro-
vided in the 2011 budget support evaluation. The main finding / conclusion in this regard is summarised 
as follows: “Within its short existence, budget support could not contribute very much to the reduction of 
poverty in Zambia. While improvements are visible in a number of areas, developments have been 
slow. The improvement of living conditions in poor rural areas had not always been the highest priority. 
On the other hand, more realism is needed… So far Government and Cooperating Partners have not 
been able to meet the rising expectations of the poorest groups. At the same time, it would be illusive to 
think that with the small amounts of aid (per capita) it would be possible to “make poverty history” within 
a few years. Too many other variables are at stake, while the contribution to budget support was not 
that high.” (DIE-IOB, 2011, p.v) 
Extracts: 
DIE – IOB (2011), p. v; Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia – Synthesis Report, Main Findings of 
the Evaluation regarding budget support and poverty reduction: “Within its short existence, budget 
support could not contribute very much to the reduction of poverty in Zambia. While improvements are 
visible in a number of areas, developments have been slow. The improvement of living conditions in 
poor rural areas had not always been the highest priority. On the other hand, more realism is need-
ed… So far Government and Cooperating Partners have not been able to meet the rising expecta-
tions of the poorest groups. At the same time, it would be illusive to think that with the small amounts 
of aid (per capita) it would be possible to “make poverty history” within a few years. Too many other 
variables are at stake, while the contribution to budget support was not that high.” 
 Indicator 9.2.3: Enhanced CSOs participation in policy dialogue platforms and external co-
operation frameworks 
The recent 2010 GRZ-EU Joint Assessment Review (JAR) is straightforward on the topic of CSO partic-
ipation in policy dialogue platforms and external cooperation frameworks and particularly in relation to 
the budget support policy dialogue platform by asserting that “… engagement of other stakeholders 
such as parliamentarians and civil society on issues pertaining to budget support remained limited; this 
further reinforced the need for EU capacity building interventions to complement the budget support 
programme, for example in support to Parliament and civil society on the budgetary process.” This JAR 
observation is supported by an independent study
108
 on the impact of civil society on the national budg-
eting process in Zambia. The study highlighted both the opportunities and challenges CSOs face in 
their endeavour to influence important national programmes such as the budget. The findings point at 
an urgent need for the development of a legal and policy framework for civil society participation in the 
budget process and other national programmes. This will help to clarify the extent of civil society’s role 
in the national programmes budget process in order to make this more inclusive and thus how CSOs 
can participate meaningfully in this process. An earlier ZCSD (2010) case study report in the framework 
of an assessment of civic engagement trends in Zambia pointed out that in the last years, the civil soci-
ety in Zambia has been engaged in a number of policy related activities. The most salient participation 
reportedly is in the formulation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) launched in 2002, as 
well as the formulation of the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP), which was launched in 2006 
and was aiming to come to completion in 2010.  
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The EDF10 CSP/NIP Mid-Term Review pointed at weaknesses of CSO’s vertical networking in the 
other direction, namely the links with the grassroots, with the population / target groups the CSOs claim 
to defend or to represent: “There is also a gap between organised interest at the national level and par-
ticipation at community level. CS organisations should ensure that the real population is not left aside in 
the dialogue with the government and the donors. Targeted communication between service, develop-
ment and advocacy organisations would help narrowing the gap. CSO should also be more active in 
influencing the legislation for NGOs as well as more engaged in the decentralisation process. In addi-
tion, they need to be more coordinated to guide discussions with government and donors.” (Op. Cit., 
p16). This brings with it the still unresolved issue on the definition and classification of CSOs and their 
delineation vis-à-vis NSAs, NGOs, POs, etc. as further elaborated on in the discussion on EQ-6 The 
EDF9 CSP-NIP document for example refers to the involvement of Non-Stake Actors, which only co-
vers private sector intermediary organisations. 
The EDF9 CSP/NIP document clarifies under a special chapter on the involvement of Non-State Actors 
that consultations with the private sector and the civil society have reinforced the choices of the focal 
sectors under the CSP/NIP. The former has identified deficiencies in the transport infrastructure as well 
as lack of capacity in public administration as major obstacles. The CSP/NIP document foresees that 
civil society and NGO capacity building will be assisted by specific requests for budget lines. In a spe-
cial annex 10 to the CSP/NIP document a listing of CSP consultations (meetings and participants) is 
provided: Of the 15 preparatory meetings, 2 were with civil society organisations. The first meeting had 
4 NGO’s participating; the second had representatives from 3 CSOs. 
A recent report on modalities of civil society support
109
 clarified that National CSOs prefer unilateral 
support as found in the high scores this model gets for promoting results, dialogue, ownership and 
alignment. Unilateral funding tends to create stronger, strategic and more equal partnerships between 
donors and NCSOs, which in turn gives better dialogue, enables alignment and creates stronger own-
ership. This is particularly true when unilateral and joint support is direct and the chain of actors the 
shortest possible, thus strengthening the position of the end recipient CSOs in direct touch with the 
population. The NCSOs themselves however think that International CSOs (ICSOs) are better at pro-
moting donor coordination and harmonisation. The explanation may be that ICSOs are considered as 
closer connected to donors and therefore better positioned to promote donor coordination. Remarkably, 
ICSOs score equally high on promoting mutual accountability between intermediaries and donors. The 
report concludes from this that NCSOs appear good at promoting dialogue and mutual accountability 
between donors and end recipient CSOs but less successful in promoting mutual accountability be-
tween themselves as intermediaries and their CSO partners.  
Extracts: 
JAR 2010, p9: Nevertheless, engagement of other stakeholders such as parliamentarians and civil 
society on issues pertaining to budget support remained limited; this further reinforced the need for 
EU capacity building interventions to complement the Budget Support programme, for example in 
support to Parliament and civil society on the budgetary process. 
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p16: Despite Zambia's vibrant civil society (CS), there is a need to 
strengthen the vertical linkages with the grass roots level. There is also a gap between organised in-
terest at the national level and participation at community level. CS organisations should ensure that 
the real population is not left aside in the dialogue with the government and the donors. Targeted 
communication between service, development and advocacy organisations would help narrowing the 
gap. CSO should also be more active in influencing the legislation for NGOs as well as more engaged 
in the decentralisation process. In addition, they need to be more coordinated to guide discussions 
with government and donors. 
 
EDF9, CSP/NIP 2001-2007: Chapter 5.3 on involvement of Non-State Actors only refers to the private 
sector intermediary organisations. The NIP foresees for targeted support for private sector intermedi-
ary organisations capacity development for and cooperation with a broad range of non-state actors. 
Quote: “Consultations with the private sector and the civil society have reinforced the choices of the 
focal sectors. The former has identified deficiencies in the transport infrastructure as well as lack of 
capacity in public administration as major obstacles. Civil society and NGO capacity building will be 
assisted by specific requests for budget lines. The consultations with NSA’s and other stakeholders 
are presented in Annex 7. 
However, in the copy of the EDF9 CSP/NIP document available with the evaluation team, no such 
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Annex 7 on NSAs and other stakeholders could be found, neither under another annex number. May-
be symptomatic for the broad absence of CSO’s in the EDF9 policies, strategies and programmes? 
Under Annex 10 to the CSP/NIP document a listing of CSP consultations (meetings and participants) 
is provided. Of the 15 preparatory meetings, 2 were with civil society organisations. The first meeting 
had 4 NGO’s participating; the second one had representatives from 3 CSOs. 
 
ZCSD and CIVICUS (2011) pp. 74-76: Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Zambia – 
Chapter 3 – Mapping Civil Society Case study 3: An Assessment of Civil Society Impact on the Na-
tional Budgeting Process in Zambia: The aim of the study was to assess the impact of civil society on 
the national budgeting process in Zambia. It examined the potential influence of CSOs in all stages of 
the budgeting process, from the drafting stage through to the implementation stage, and it also exam-
ined whether governments actually take these interventions and influences seriously. At this point, it 
suffices to mention that the Zambian government policy is said to be ambiguous on the role of the civil 
society in the budgetary process. Mudenda, Ndulo and Wakumelo, (2005) pointed out that govern-
ment does provide an opportunity to civil society to submit proposals to the budget, but it is not 
obliged to take CSOs submissions into account. CSOs also lack information on the processes and 
capacity to effectively interact with the public institutions, in order for them to make meaningful sub-
missions. The study highlighted both the opportunities and challenges CSOs face in their endeavour 
to influence important national programmes such as the budget. The findings of the study will there-
fore enable the stakeholders in issues of public policy to see the need for the development of a legal 
and policy framework for civil society participation in the budget process and other national pro-
grammes. This will help to clarify the extent of civil society’s role in the in the national programmes 
budget process inclusive and how they can participate meaningfully. 
 
ZCSD (2010); Assessing Civic Engagement Trends in Zambia - A Case Study Report: In the most re-
cent past, the civil society in Zambia has been engaged in a number of policy related activities. The 
most salient participation being in the formulation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
launched in 2002, as well as the formulation of the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP), which 
was launched in 2006 and was aiming to come to completion in 2010 (Sichone, 1996). Civil society 
has also been very instrumental in the ongoing constitutional setting process, where they have con-
tinued sensitising the masses to the importance of the process and also continued providing checks 
and balances to the National Constitutional Conference (NCC), a body constituted to deliberate on the 
constitutional agenda setting process. 
 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on I-9.2.3: 
Embassy of Sweden (2010) p10; Implementation of the Nordic+ Conclusions on Civil Society Sup-
port – Chapter 3.2. Results – Unilateral Support and Joint Support: The answer to why NCSOs (Na-
tional CSOs) prefer unilateral support may be found in the high scores this model gets for promoting 
results, dialogue, ownership and alignment. As pointed out by Scanteam and by many NCSOs since 
then, unilateral funding tends to create stronger, strategic and more equal partnerships between do-
nors and NCSOs, which in turn gives better dialogue, enables alignment and creates stronger owner-
ship… This is particularly true when unilateral and joint support is direct and the chain of actors the 
shortest possible, thus strengthening the position of the end recipient CSOs.  
 
Embassy of Sweden (2010) p14; Implementation of the Nordic+ Conclusions on Civil Society Sup-
port – Chapter 3.3.1 Results – Indirect Support via CSO Intermediaries: Because of donors’ strong 
support, NCSOs (National CSOs) also rank as the top intermediary in relation to donor coordination 
and harmonisation. The NCSOs themselves however think that ICSOs (International CSOs) are better 
at promoting donor coordination and harmonisation. The explanation may be that ICSOs are consid-
ered as closer connected to donors and therefore better positioned to promote donor coordination. 
NCSOs are also top rated in total in relation to dialogue between CSOs, donors and other stakehold-
ers, and to mutual accountability between end recipient CSOs and donors. ICSOs however score 
equally high on promoting mutual accountability between intermediaries and donors. This is quite re-
markable given that NCSOs are frequently voiced as the intermediaries who are closest to the end re-
cipient CSOs. Thus NCSOs appear good at promoting dialogue and mutual accountability between 
donors and end recipient CSOs but less successful in promoting mutual accountability between them-
selves as intermediaries and their CSO partners. 
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 Indicator 9.2.4: Examples of significant changes (thematic, target areas or groups) brought 
to policy frameworks by CSOs participation to public debates/policy dialogue platforms 
This indicator I-9.2.4 on examples of significant changes brought to policy frameworks by CSOs partici-
pation to public debases / policy dialogue platforms is closely related to the prior indicator I-9.2.3. on 
enhanced CSOs participation in policy dialogue platforms. Whereas a major finding in relation to the 
latter was that engagement of other stakeholders such as parliamentarians and civil society in policy 
frameworks was limited, this also implies that it is questionable that significant changes in policy frame-
works may have brought about by this CSOs participation in public debates and policy dialogue plat-
forms. 
The EDF10 CSP/NIP Mid-Term Review report nevertheless mentioned that in 2009 the MTR process 
greatly benefited from the input of NSA during the in-country consultations and drafting of the JAR and 
governance action plan update. The MTR further specified that although not directly affecting the set-up 
of the CSP/NIP, the number of proposals made by the NSAs could make CSP/NIP implementation 
more successful for the remainder of the EDF10. A 2009 study on how non-state-actors lobby to influ-
ence budget outcomes in Zambia (Bwalya S. & Mpembamoto P.; 2009; p25). Most of these proposals 
did influence tax policy and budget outcomes, but those submitted through line government ministries, 
departments and agencies have a greater chance of being adopted in the budget than those submitted 
directly to the tax policy committee in the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. 
Extracts: 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p6; Participation of MS other donors, NSA LA and Parliament in the 
review process: In 2008, the European Commission Delegation presented to the Zambian Parliament 
the EDF10 CSP. Members of Parliament were also associated to a number of sector related meetings 
during programming and the MTR process. In 2009, the MTR process benefited greatly from the input 
of NSA during the in-country consultations and drafting of the JAR and governance action plan up-
date. NSAs made a number of proposals which, although not directly affecting the setup of the CSP, 
could make its implementation more successful for the remainder of the EDF10. 
 
Bwalya Samuel M., Phiri E. & Mpembamoto, K (2009) p25; How non-state actors lobby to influence 
budget outcomes in Zambia. One key objective of the study was to establish whether the current 
budget process provides adequate scope for productive engagement of non-state actors in formulat-
ing the national budget and whether participation of non-state actors in the budget process has led to 
the adoption of pro-poor tax and expenditures policies in Zambia. Firstly, an analysis of registration 
data has revealed significant growth in the number of interest groups, including business and civil so-
ciety organisations formed following political and economic liberalisation in 1991. This suggests an in-
creasing interest of non-state actors to actively participate in political and economic governances of 
the country. Secondly, an analysis of tax and expenditure proposals submitted to government sug-
gests that those through the Ministry of Finance and National Planning have also increased reaching 
42 submissions containing 249 different proposals. Most of these proposals did influence tax policy 
and budget outcomes, but those submitted through line government ministries, departments and 
agencies have a greater chance of being adopted in the budget than those submitted directly to the 
tax policy committee in the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, unless when these are compe-
tently presented and justified. This means that the capacity to articulate policy proposals is important 
in influencing fiscal policy decision-making, but other political and institutional factors also come into 
play. 
 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on JC 9.2: 
 
DIE & IOB (2011) p15; Evaluation Summary and Conclusions: Overall, the results of this evaluation 
contribute to the debate on the potential of budget support. On the one hand, the Zambian experience 
confirms that budget support cannot simply ‘buy’ fundamental institutional reform, nor can it reduce 
poverty in a matter of a couple of years. Aid agencies can only expect to push through sustainable re-
form when there is a critical level of government ownership. On the other hand, this cannot be used 
as an ex-post reason to argue that budget support is an ineffective instrument…The budget increases 
helped to improve service delivery, especially in the social sectors. Nevertheless, serious challenges 
remain. While the situation has improved, the allocation of funds to the main sectors remains regres-
sive and shortages persist at all levels. While there is evidence that the poorest groups did benefit 
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from the increased spending, poverty levels remain high, especially in rural areas, and access to 
many public services is still unsatisfactory. However – and here a warning is in place as well – realis-
tic time frames need to be set and over-optimistic expectations about what can be achieved in a short 
period of time need to be kept in check. The evaluation covers the period 2005-2009, which is not a 
long time, especially taking into account the extensive ambitions of cooperating partners. These ambi-
tions were not always realistic. 
 
DIE & IOB (2011) p19; Evaluation Summary and Conclusions: Budget support and poverty reduction 
- Because it had not been in existence for very long, budget support was not able to contribute very 
much to the reduction of poverty in Zambia. While improvements are visible in a number of areas, de-
velopment has been slow. Although improving living conditions in poor rural areas was not always 
given the highest priority, more realism is needed when addressing expectations. Economic policy 
created conditions that were favourable for economic growth. But in spite of this, poverty has not de-
creased much and the already high income disparities have widened further. According to 2006 data, 
64% of the households may be classified as poor (and in rural areas 80%). Preliminary data of the 
most recent survey (2010) do not suggest an improved situation. Rural poverty is particularly persis-
tent. One of the main causes is the slow growth of agricultural production. Moreover, a simulation of 
the potential effects showed that aid may exert a negative impact on the income of farmers. This 
means that increased aid should be accompanied by well-targeted programmes. One of the main 
programmes in this sector, the Fertilizer Support Programme (FSP), did not sufficiently target the 
poorest groups. Recently, the programme has been transformed into the Farmer Input Support Pro-
gramme (FISP). It has been suggested that this programme will target these groups more effectively. 
Cooperating partners have continued to show their concerns over service delivery in the most under-
served areas. However, the government and cooperating partners have not, so far, been able to meet 
the rising expectations of the poorest groups. Evidence shows that access to many facilities has not 
improved much for the poorest rural groups. There continue to be major disparities between rural are-
as, and between the poorest groups and other groups in terms of access to basic services. Roads 
and water and sanitation programmes insufficiently targeted the poorest rural groups. However, more 
dynamic analyses also identify some improvements in health and education. The poorest groups par-
ticularly benefited from improved access to basic education. 
 
Norwegian Embassy (2010); pp1-2; Aid transformation in Zambia: From large scale grant aid trans-
fers towards regular partnership in development - Why and How?; Discussion Paper, May 2010 – 1. 
Why?: Zambia has been a land of great development contrasts since independence to date. It started 
off its independence in 1964 being the second richest country in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) in GDP 
per capita terms. In terms of resources the country harbour some of the most fertile soil, extensive 
water resources, extensive forestry cover and among the richest mineral deposits in the region or 
even in the world for key base metals and gemstones in particular. In the first decade after independ-
ence this development potential seemed to have been utilised with success as the economy grew at 
high rates, the domestic revenues were at 25-30 % of GDP and there was a strong expansion in the 
public expenditure as the independent state established extensive social and industrial base infra-
structure.  
Towards the end of the first decade of independence the country moved towards nationalisation of 
key industries and a model of state control and import substitution that gradually changed the devel-
opment model in a radical manner. This coincided with a sharp decline in the price of copper in partic-
ular from 1973 onwards. In the 80s and 90s, this led the country into high aid dependency to fund its 
continued high public expenditure and state led development model. From 1975-2000, Zambia re-
ceived in aid close to 20 % of GDP (the equivalent of between 50-75 % of the national budget), and 
with considerable loans being part of this package, combined with negative or very low economic 
growth, this pushed the country into an external debt crisis. In relative terms this made Zambia one of 
the most aid dependent countries in the world in this time period as well as one of the most heavily 
indebted.  
In the last decade (2000-2010) this situation has changed fundamentally, following the results of a 
wave of much debated rapid liberalisation and privatisation undertaken primarily in the 90s, together 
with extensive foreign direct reinvestment in the mining sector on the back of a steep recovery in min-
eral price. In this period Zambia has managed to re-establish macroeconomic balance and growth, 
and in 2005 reached the HIPC completion point and with this received large scale international debt 
cancellation. In this period, the importance of aid in the economy has declined considerably as com-
pared with earlier decades. In the first half of the decade aid was at 10 % of GDP, whereas in recent 
years it has come down to 5-7% of GDP. In this period the national budget has been reduced down-
wards in relative terms, and as such the aid contribution to the national budget has gone down to be-
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low 20 %.  
In terms of development, Zambia is now therefore once again just about to be classified in 2010 as a 
low middle income country. Now with a population that is four times higher than at independence, but 
with similar levels of urbanisation and a similar intensity of livelihood and employment in agriculture 
(70% now compared with 80-85% after independence).  
However the benefits of development have been highly skewed in the last growth recovery with only 
slow poverty reduction and increasing levels of inequality. As a result still about 60 % of the popula-
tion lives below the national poverty line, only down from 68 % in the end 90s, and poverty in the rural 
areas seems to have increased or only reduced marginally between some years. This represents a 
very high incidence of inequality and absolute poverty compared with most other developing countries 
in the African region, and in particular comparing with low middle income countries. Regional compar-
isons are however fraught with difficulties due to divergent national poverty lines. As Zambia prepares 
the sixth national development for the period 2011-2015, it is now an opportunity for the donor com-
munity, together with the Government and the rest of Zambian society, to reflect upon how the country 
can move more effectively towards full independence in terms of financing its own development and 
why this is important. 
As Zambia prepares the sixth national development for the period 2011-2015, it is now an opportunity 
for the donor community, together with the Government and the rest of Zambian society, to reflect up-
on how the country can move more effectively towards full independence in terms of financing its own 
development and why this is important. Global experience has shown that it is important in such pro-
cesses to move decisively towards the mobilisation of domestic revenues through taxation and non-
taxation related local funding, thereby firmly establishing a more mature relationship between the 
firms, the citizens and the state. The elected government and the parliament, must increasingly be-
come responsive to its electorate rather than towards external aid agencies and considerable funding 
flows from outside. The emergence of a truly independent and genuine modern African state without 
the strengthening of this link will be difficult.  
So what are the chances of this movement off large scale grant aid in Zambia? We will argue that if 
we as donors put increased emphasis on domestic revenue mobilisation, domestic accountability in-
stitutions and efficient and transparent public expenditures coupled with effective national and sector 
development strategies, it is feasible to move gradually off large scale grant aid in the next 5-10 years. 
We will also argue that much more can be done through innovative direct funding and programming to 
address rural poverty, food security and livelihood and to improve social protection. If implemented on 
a national level with sufficient funding and efficiency, as is the plan with the reformed national food 
security pack and the social cash transfer programs, this could have the potential to address more ef-
fectively, the challenge of rising inequality and slow progress with regards to the reduction of poverty 
and human development overall. This will remain important in the Zambian economy as it is likely that 
future growth trends will remain capital intensive without reaching its full potential in terms of poverty 
reduction. In many ways this could also represent an initial attempt to put in place adequate social 
welfare systems and mechanisms reflective of the fact that Zambia is an emerging lower middle in-
come country in Africa. Obviously there are numerous risks in this scenario, among them the devel-
opment in the world economy and in particular the mineral prices, as well as domestic risks. 
 
Norwegian Embassy (2010); pp3-4; Aid transformation in Zambia: From large scale grant aid trans-
fers towards regular partnership in development - Why and How?; Discussion Paper, May 2010 – 1. 
How?: Now let us examine briefly below some areas where further progress need to be made to ena-
ble a movement from a large scale grant aid relationship towards a more regular partnership in devel-
opment or on relevant policy areas. As explained above there are many reasons for the necessity of 
such a transformation process to happen in Zambia.  
It is time to emphasize that aid can be part of the problem, and not only part of the solution to promote 
development in a sustainable manner. Adverse unintended effects of aid are associated with and form 
part of the problem of aid dependency, as is well documented in the development literature over the 
last decade in particular. It is important to realize that there are important opportunity costs linked to 
providing continued large scale aid to Zambia, basically since the level of global aid is limited and 
several other countries may have much more limited potential domestic resource-revenue base as 
well as policy implementation that would deliver poverty reduction and human development more ef-
fectively. To some extent the areas of emphasis described below are not new. What could and should 
be new would be the level of focus and the possible transformation of aid modalities and funding pat-
terns. How a decision on this is decided upon will obviously vary between donors and should happen 
in a dialogue with the government and relevant stakeholders in Zambia. It is likely and maybe also an 
advantage that the process and speed of such a move will vary between the donors and other stake-
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holders.  
The first area of focus is the untapped domestic revenue potential. As mentioned above Zambia used 
to collect 25-30 % of GDP at similar real prices and export levels of minerals in the first decade after 
independence. The average for African low middle income countries is 22 % of GDP. The IMF esti-
mates that there is could be an under collection of perhaps 30-40 % in domestic tax revenue in Zam-
bia and is currently carrying out detailed studies of this in the case of Value added tax (VAT) and pay 
as you earn (PAYE) to get more detailed information regarding possible actions to address this issue.  
In contrast to this, the current actual collection rate in Zambia is expected at 16 % of GDP for both 
2010 and as the preliminary estimated average for the sixth national development plan (SNDP) peri-
od. Support can and should be provided to Zambia, in the areas of improved tax policy and admin-
istration over the next years to re-establish domestic revenues up to and well above 20 % of GDP. As 
a contrast and comparison Tanzania is just finalizing their next five year development plan and aims 
to reach 19-20 % of GDP in domestic revenues with an expected GDP/capita level of about half the 
Zambian. Without more progress in this area, Zambia is not utilizing its potential to develop, as public 
investments will have to be kept at a minimum in the period 2011-2015 and gains from the extraction 
of non-renewable resources will continue to mainly be taken out of the country.  
The second key area of focus is to ensure higher efficiency in public expenditures. Here several priori-
ty actions should be selected, and the SNDP has a very ambitious target of reducing recurrent ex-
penditures down to comparable levels in South Saharan Africa as they are currently very high. Fur-
thermore continued focus on audit of public expenditures and revenues should increasingly contribute 
towards reduced levels of irregularities. This should improve the service delivery and facilitate devel-
opment outcomes. Public procurement is also important in this context and measures need to be tak-
en to improve its planning, implementation and follow up. In particular considering the deficits antici-
pated in terms of fiscal space where currently the projections under the SNDP are not promising for 
public investments.  
The third area of focus is a better prioritisation and implementation of strategies and action plans in 
key sectors under the SNDP, delivering in particular more direct productivity improvements in the rural 
agricultural and livelihood sectors. Linked to this is a need to implement effective rural development 
with a focus on food security, social and productive infrastructure that ultimately delivers much higher 
agricultural productivity growth among the majority of farming households. Simultaneously improved 
employment and growth opportunities need to emerge in low and semi-skilled manufacturing in both 
rural and urban areas, to increase the value added and structural transformation towards higher pay-
ing jobs that improve living standards for larger parts of the workforce. Underlying much of the above 
is the current challenge in Zambia of competitiveness of production and exports, and more progress in 
this area will to a large extent also decide whether the country can diversify and sustain its own de-
velopment in the years and decades to come.  
SAG on Macro-Economy (2012); Macro Economic Group; 2012 Budget Highlights; Presentation, 
January 2012 – Slides 1-17: Because of providing in a succinct way an updated overview of the 
Country’s macro-economic and fiscal performance in 2011 and the highlights of the 2011 budget of 
direct relevance for EU-EDF strategic and operational planning and programming, the presentation is 
presented hereunder in detail: 
- Excellent Macro Performance in 2011: GDP growth of 6.5% (projected); Inflation of 8.7% to Octo-
ber 2011; Forex reserves US$ 2.6 bn at September 2011 – 4.3 months imports; Maize harvest 3.0 
MT in 2011 (a record); Copper exports US$ 8.4 bn (projected) in 2011 from $5.8 bn in 2010 (re-
flects price and volume increases); Non-traditional exports increased from $1.2 bn to (projected) 
$1.5 bn; Kwacha relatively stable; Modest rise in credit to private sector; Increase in GRZ bond and 
Treasury Bill yields due to increased borrowing; External and domestic debt both healthy at 8.2% 
and 16.1% of GDP respectively in September. 
- 2011 Fiscal Performance Less Impressive: Expenditure 18.8% over budget, mainly because of 
FRA maize purchases of K1.7 trillion (1.8% of GDP) – and Formula 1 (K1.3 tr?); Revenue 23.2% 
over budget – largely due to windfall tax arrears from 2008 of K1.7 trillion (1.9% of GDP); Deficit 
3.1% (0.2% over budget). Excluding tax arrears, deficit 5.0% - largest since 2003.  
- 2012 Objectives: GDP growth > 7%; Inflation < 7%; Maintain reserves > 4 months import cover; In-
crease revenue / GDP ratio to 19%; Overall fiscal deficit < 4.3% of GDP; Domestic borrowing < 
1.3% of GDP; Net external borrowing < 3% of GDP; Social sector & infrastructure > 50% of ex-
penditure. 
- Expenditure 2012; Increases from outturn of K17.6 trillion (22.7% of GDP) in 2010 to K26.3 tr 
(25.2%); 27% real increase over 2 years; Slight fall from 25.4% of GDP in 2011 to 25.2%; Due to 
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FRA maize purchases falling from K1.7 tr (1.8% of GDP) to K0.3 tr (0.3%). How realistic is this?  
- Tax Revenue 2012: Increase from K 13.1 tr (16.9% of GDP) in 2010 to K19.3 tr (18.4% of GDP) in 
2012; 25% real increase – unclear where it will come from; Doubling of mining royalties to contrib-
ute K 981 billion (0.9% of GDP); Minimum threshold for PAYE doubled to K24 million pa, exempt-
ing 80,000, & tax brackets widened; Pro-poor? Revenue cost K1 trillion pa (0.9% of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Fiscal Deficit: Increases from 3.1% of GDP in 2011 to 4.3% in 2012; Highest level since 2003; Net 
domestic and external borrowing increase by 1.3% of GDP and 3.0% respectively; $500m sover-
eign bonds.  
- Massive Increase in Roads Allocation: 2010 outturn $243 mn (record, 1.5% of GDP); 2011 budget 
$650 mn; 2012 budget $905 mn (4.3% of GDP); largely inherited from MMD; Largely uneconomic; 
Mongu – Kalabo confirmed ($260 mn); Fuel levy (maintenance) $93 mn. 
- Large Increases for Education & Health (from 2011 Budget): Education up 18% real; Health up 
36% real; Net recruitment of 5,000 teachers & 2,500 health workers; User fees abolished for prima-
ry health care; Total wage bill from 7.9% to 8.3% of GDP. 
- Agriculture: FISP to be ‘redesigned’; Allocation K500 bn (<K600 bn in 2011); FRA Maize subsidy 
from K1.7 tn (1.8% of GDP) in 2011 to K0.3 tn (0.3%): Risk of major overspend – again 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Inflation of 7%? Food inflation suppressed by 2 bumper harvests; Non-food inflation double digits; 
Large increase in public expenditure; Tax giveaways; Suppressed interest rates  
- Decentralisation: “It is a priority of this Government to decentralize appropriate functions to councils 
over the medium term. The focus in 2012 will be to build capacity at local level in preparation for 
the phased devolution of functions from 2013.”; Grants to councils doubled “to demonstrate com-
mitment to capacitating councils”;  
- Debt management / project appraisal: “This Government will ensure transparent and accountable 
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use of loans by strengthening parliamentary oversight. Further, the capacity to appraise projects in 
the Ministry of Finance and other ministries implementing major projects will be strengthened. The 
Government will also review the existing legal framework in order to strengthen debt management.”  
- Two Major Mining Reforms: Royalties on copper & cobalt from 3% to 6%; Hedging to be taxed 
separately from core mining activities; No intention to increase GRZ equity to 35%. 
- Summary: Populist, expansionary budget; Still affordable with macro picture so healthy – con-
sistent with IMF framework; But worries over quality of expenditure – roads, FRA, etc; Wait & see 
 
JC 9.2:  The objectives of the programmes correspond to needs of the population 
The JC examining if the objectives of the programmes correspond to the needs of the Zambian popula-
tion has been assessed along four indicators respectively on (i) the quality of the logical frameworks in 
relation to national needs; (ii) the quality of dialogue and programming updates based on analysis of 
(changing) needs; (iii) enhanced CSO participation in policy dialogue and cooperation frameworks, and; 
(iv) significant changes in policy frameworks brought about by CSOs participation in dialogue process-
es. Some other evaluation findings which could not be associated well directly with any of these four 
indicators are added here directly in relation to the JC itself. 
The logical frameworks in the Zambia country level programming documents are partial only and very 
general, and they do not contain performance indicators with baseline values or target setting, hence it 
cannot be ascertained that these LogFrames are based on reliable information and analyses on national 
needs (I-9.2.1) and therefore in a broader sense if the objectives of the programmes correspond to the 
needs of the population (JC 9.2). For both the EDF9 and 10 CSPs/NIPs, only the LogFrames of the 
focal sectors are presented and moreover for these only the results levels (goal, purpose and direct 
results - Impact, outcome and outputs levels). The included indicators are formulated in a general way 
mostly at statistical logical level only (yes/no), without target setting and without baseline values. These 
further operationalisations are to be looked for in other documents e.g. in the Performance Assessment 
Framework (PAF) document. The ROM reports on all projects in 2010 concluded that all had good po-
tential for sustainability, but with effectiveness rating being the lowest (JAR 2010, p15). All the projects 
were reported to have weak Logical Framework matrices and had challenges with setting up working 
Monitoring and Evaluation systems. (I-9.2.1) 
CSP/NIP M&E systems have been gradually refined in the process. In relation to EDF9, following the 
second poverty review conference in April 2003 to discuss the monitoring and evaluation strategies 
relating to the implementation of the PRSP/TNDP, significant progress has been achieved in refining the 
poverty indicators. In June 2003 the Refined PRSP Indicator System was finalised. The system contains 
the most important indicators (input, output, outcome and impact) needed to monitor the major objec-
tives and sectors of the PRSP/TNDP. The system however has not been completed with baseline and 
targets to monitor the indicators. Furthermore, the Poverty Monitoring and Analysis (PMA) framework 
was finalised which aims at improving coordination of PRSP activities under one single umbrella incor-
porating the main stakeholders (GRZ, Civil Society, and Cooperating Partners) with the aim of (i) har-
monizing data collection, (ii) improving dissemination of information and (iii) using the monitoring and 
evaluation mechanism for policy decision-making purposes. In October 2003, the first PRSP Implemen-
tation Progress Report was presented. In presenting the report, the Government acknowledged the fact 
that the mechanism of monitoring the PRSP has not yet been well developed and that several short-
comings still exist. Although the report presents a detailed picture of the implementation of each Poverty 
Reduction Programme (PRP) it lacks a comprehensive view of the results and outcomes in terms of 
poverty reduction at global and sectoral levels. Also, the report does not analyse trends in resource 
allocations over the years. A great deal of work was done and progress achieved in 2003 in preparation 
of the first MTEF for 2004-2006. Sectoral performance monitoring in a mixed (combination of GBS and 
SBS) budget support setting under the EDF10 CSP/NIP is a complex undertaking based on the use of 
different instruments and systems, as illustrated by the health sector.
110
 (I-9.2.1)  
A recent evaluation of the budget support to Zambia
111
 concluded with regard to its effectiveness in 
relation to poverty alleviation and to sustainable and equitable socio-economic development that serious 
challenges remain. While the situation has improved, the allocation of funds to the main sectors remains 
regressive and shortages persist at all levels. While there is evidence that the poorest groups did benefit 
from the increased spending, poverty levels remain high, especially in rural areas, and access to many 
public services is still unsatisfactory. However – and here a warning is in place as well – realistic time 
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  More detailed discussion under JC 8.1. 
111
  DIE & IOB (2011) p15 
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frames need to be set and over-optimistic expectations about what can be achieved in a short period of 
time need to be kept in check. The extensive ambitions of cooperating partners were not always realis-
tic. Also, economic policy has created conditions that were favourable for economic growth, but in spite 
of this, poverty has not decreased much and the already high income disparities have widened further. 
According to 2006 data, 64% of the households may be classified as poor (and in rural areas 80%). 
Preliminary data of the most recent survey (2010) do not suggest an improved situation. Rural poverty is 
particularly persistent. One of the main causes is the slow growth of agricultural production. Cooperating 
partners have continued to show their concerns over service delivery in the most underserved areas. 
However, the government and cooperating partners have not, so far, been able to meet the rising ex-
pectations of the poorest groups. Evidence shows that access to many facilities has not improved much 
for the poorest rural groups. There continue to be major disparities between rural areas, and between 
the poorest groups and other groups in terms of access to basic services. Roads and water and sanita-
tion programmes insufficiently targeted the poorest rural groups. However, more dynamic analyses also 
identify some improvements in health and education. The poorest groups particularly benefited from 
improved access to basic education. (JC 9.2) 
In more recent analyses, as was also confirmed during different interviews on the occasion of the eval-
uation field visit to Zambia, an increasingly more outspoken assessment emerges of CPs’ response 
strategies not adequately adapted to the changing macro-economic situation of Zambia emerging since 
about the middle of the last decade characterised by steady and substantive GDP growth, extensive 
foreign direct investments particularly from the BRIC countries and South Africa, rising domestic public 
revenues basically from mining thanks to the booming world demand for copper and concomitant rises 
in commodity prices, which would lead Zambia to achieving lower middle-income status by the end of 
the decade. On the other hand, this steady GDP growth and income status is accompanied by a grow-
ing urban – rural divided and by growing disparities between and within Provinces, and with poverty 
alleviation, human development and socio-economic development indicators lagging far behind. Moreo-
ver, in the preceding decade Zambia has managed to re-establish macroeconomic balance and growth, 
and in 2005 reached the HIPC completion point and with this received large scale international debt 
cancellation. In this period, the importance of aid in the economy has declined considerably as com-
pared to earlier decades.  
In a 2010 discussion paper entitled “Aid transformation in Zambia: From large scale grant aid transfers 
towards regular partnership in development”
112
 it has been argued that as Zambia prepares the sixth 
national development for the period 2011-2015, this is an opportunity for the donor community, together 
with the Government and the rest of Zambian society, to reflect upon how the country can move more 
effectively towards full independence in terms of financing its own development and why this is im-
portant. Global experience has shown that it is important in such processes to move decisively towards 
the mobilisation of domestic revenues through taxation and non-taxation related local funding, thereby 
firmly establishing a more mature relationship between the firms, the citizens and the state. The elected 
government and the parliament, must increasingly become responsive to its electorate rather than to-
wards external aid agencies and considerable funding flows from outside. The emergence of a truly 
independent and genuine modern African state without the strengthening of this link will be difficult, the 
paper continues.  
It is argued that a movement off large scale grant aid in Zambia in the next 5-10 years is possible if 
CPs, in tandem with GRZ, put increased emphasis on domestic revenue mobilisation, domestic ac-
countability institutions and efficient and transparent public expenditures coupled with effective national 
and sector development strategies. It is also argued that much more can be done through innovative 
direct funding and programming to address rural poverty, food security and livelihood and to improve 
social protection. If implemented on a national level with sufficient funding and efficiency, as is the plan 
with the reformed national food security pack and the social cash transfer programs, this could have the 
potential to address more effectively, the challenge of rising inequality and slow progress with regards to 
the reduction of poverty and human development overall. This is assessed to remain important in the 
Zambian economy as it is likely that future growth trends will remain capital intensive without reaching 
its full potential in terms of poverty reduction. In many ways this could also represent an initial attempt to 
put in place adequate social welfare systems and mechanisms reflective of the fact that Zambia is an 
emerging lower middle income country in Africa. The paper acknowledges that obviously there are nu-
merous risks in this scenario, among them the development in the world economy and in particular the 
mineral prices, as well as domestic risks. Underlying much of the above is the current challenge in 
Zambia of competitiveness of production and exports, and more progress in this area will to a large 
extent also decide whether the country can diversify and sustain its own development in the years and 
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decades to come. On the other hand at CPs side, the paper asserts that what could and should be new 
would be the level of focus and the possible transformation of aid modalities and funding patterns. The 
three main areas of focus would be: (i) the untapped domestic revenue potential; (ii) ensuring higher 
efficiency in public expenditures, and; (iii) Better prioritisation and implementation of strategies and ac-
tion plans in key sectors under the SNDP. 
In relation to and as a further update of the above, continued excellent macro performance and less 
impressive fiscal performance were reported by the SAG on Macro-Economy, headed by the EU in ac-
cordance with the new DOL under the JASZ-II, in its just recent early 2012 presentation on the country’s 
performance in the past year 2011 and on the highlights of the national budget for the coming year 
2012. (JC 9.2) 
Regarding indicator 9.2.2 under this JC, there is no evidence of systematic needs assessment by 
means of satisfaction surveys or other similar types of analyses at the level of the targeted beneficiaries 
/ clientele and/or of the population in general, at least not in as much as these are reflected in the over-
all strategy and programming documents or strategy implementation reviews. Also no evidence of such 
needs and satisfaction surveys emanated from the sectoral analyses under this evaluation. Hence no 
conclusive answer or indication can be given in relation to the indicator measuring / assessing the exist-
ence of updates of the content of the policy dialogue and the cooperation programme according to the 
analysis of needs’ satisfaction. In the field visit interviews it was confirmed that needs assessments, 
target groups / beneficiaries / clients satisfaction surveys are not (yet) systematically used as planning 
and programme management tools. 
An overall appreciation of the outcomes / impact of budget support on poverty reduction has been pro-
vided in the 2011 budget support evaluation. The main finding / conclusion in this regard is summarised 
as follows: “Within its short existence, budget support could not contribute very much to the reduction of 
poverty in Zambia. While improvements are visible in a number of areas, developments have been 
slow. The improvement of living conditions in poor rural areas had not always been the highest priority. 
On the other hand, more realism is needed… So far Government and Cooperating Partners have not 
been able to meet the rising expectations of the poorest groups. At the same time, it would be illusive to 
think that with the small amounts of aid (per capita) it would be possible to “make poverty history” within 
a few years. Too many other variables are at stake, while the contribution to budget support was not 
that high.”
113
 (I-9.2.2) 
The recent 2010 GRZ-EU Joint Assessment Review (JAR) is straightforward on the topic of CSO partic-
ipation in policy dialogue platforms and external cooperation frameworks and particularly in relation to 
the budget support policy dialogue platform by asserting that engagement of other stakeholders such as 
parliamentarians and civil society on issues pertaining to budget support remained limited indeed. This 
further reinforced the need for EU capacity building interventions to complement the budget support 
programme, for example in support to Parliament and civil society on the budgetary process. This JAR 
observation is supported by an independent study
114 on the impact of civil society on the national budg-
eting process in Zambia. The findings point at an urgent need for the development of a legal and policy 
framework for civil society participation in the budget process and other national programmes. This will 
help to clarify the extent of civil society’s role in the national programmes budget process in order to 
make this more inclusive and thus how CSOs can participate meaningfully in this process. The EDF10 
CSP/NIP Mid-Term Review pointed at weaknesses of CSO’s vertical networking in the other direction, 
namely the links with the grassroots, with the population / target groups the CSOs claim to defend or to 
represent. The EDF9 CSP/NIP document stated that the involvement of Non-State Actors has rein-
forced the choices of the focal sectors under the CSP/NIP. Of the 15 preparatory meetings for the 
CSP/NIP, 2 were with civil society organisations. (I-9.2.3) 
Whereas a major finding in relation to indicator I-9.2.3. on enhanced CSOs participation in policy dia-
logue platforms is that engagement of other stakeholders such as parliamentarians and civil society in 
policy frameworks has been limited, this also implies that it is questionable that significant changes in 
policy frameworks may have been brought about by CSOs participation in public debates and policy 
dialogue platforms (as assessed by indicator I-9.2.4). However, a 2009 study on how non-state-actors 
lobby to influence budget outcomes in Zambia revealed that most of these proposals did influence tax 
policy and budget outcomes, but those submitted through line government ministries, departments and 
agencies have a greater chance of being adopted in the budget than those submitted directly to the tax 
policy committee in the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. (I-9.2.4) 
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JC 9.3:  The selection of focal sectors of intervention and subsequent changes in the EU 
strategy were taken on the basis of the comparative advantages of the EU (e.g. ex-
perience and expertise in the sectors)? 
 Indicator 9.3.1: Existence of internal reports and notes defining comparative advantages of 
the various sectors in the context 
Mutatis mutandis, this indicator I-9.3.1 “Existence of internal reports and notes defining comparative 
advantages of the various sectors in the context” is already covered under respectively (i) EQ 8 indica-
tor I-8.1.1 “Reports and notes issued by EU defining comparative advantages of the various instru-
ments and approaches in the context” and the three indicators under JC 8.6 “Aid modalities combina-
tions were the result of complementarity with other donors”: (ii) Indicator I-8.6.1. “The EU Code on 
Complementarity and Division of Labour used in strategic/programming documents determining donors’ 
aid modalities” and also indicators (iii) I-8.6.2 “Donor mapping of sectoral involvement and their per-
ceived comparative advantages were used in strategic response as a basis for decisions on modalities” 
and (iv) I-8.6.3 “”Orphan” and “Darling” sectors actively discussed with other donors with a view of level-
ling out donor involvement across sectors”. Kindly refer to the EQ-8 information matrix concerned for 
the main indicator findings, as well as for data, figures, tables and extracts. 
As a brief summary finding the following excerpt of the EDF10 CSP/NIP Mid-Term Review: The com-
parative advantage of the EU in Zambia is demonstrated through its leadership in the two focal areas of 
health and infrastructure and there is strong complementarity with other donors. These focal areas are 
vital in creating an enabling environment for Zambia to implement growth strategies. The non-focal 
areas, specifically those relating to agriculture and EPA support, are important in assisting the efforts of 
GRZ to diversify the economy.  
For the new 2012-2015 DOL in relation to the Sixth National Development Plan, the EU was demanded 
by the GRZ to lead Governance, though it for itself had suggested a lower “active” status. This EU lead 
for Governance was confirmed in the JASZ-II signed by the CPs on 18 November 2011, with further-
more also entrusted lead positions for the sectors of transport and of agriculture, livestock and fisheries. 
 
Extracts: 
 
Pls. refer to the EQ-8 information matrix, more particularly to the extracts under indicators I-8.1.1, I-
8.6.1, I-8.6.2 and I-8.6.3. 
  
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p9: The comparative advantage of the EU in Zambia is demonstrat-
ed through its leadership in the two focal areas of health and infrastructure and there is strong com-
plementarity with other donors. These focal areas are vital in creating an enabling environment for 
Zambia to implement growth strategies. The non-focal areas, specifically those relating to agriculture 
and EPA support, are important in assisting the efforts of GRZ to diversify the economy.  
 
 Indicator 9.3.2: Evidence of integration of lessons learned from previous programmes or 
other cooperating partners documented and integrated in strategic programming docu-
ments 
Mutatis mutandis, this indicator I-9.3.2 “Evidence of integration of lessons learned from previous pro-
grammes or other cooperating partners documented and integrated in strategic programming docu-
ments” is already covered under EQ 8 indicator (i) I-8.1.2 “Lessons learned from previous or other aid 
modalities documented and integrated in strategic programming documents” and the three indicators 
under JC 8.2 “Emerging issues were incorporated quickly and effectively into EU programming and 
policy dialogue”: (ii) Indicator I-8.2.2 “Mix of instruments, approaches and financing modalities changed 
over the period along with the context” and also (iii) Indicators I-8.2.1. “Mix of instruments, approaches 
and financing modalities different according to sector specific factors” and (iv) indicator I-8.2.3 “Policy 
dialogue reporting incorporated emerging issues”. Kindly refer to the EQ-8 information matrix con-
cerned for the main indicator findings, as well as for data, figures, tables and extracts. 
Pls. refer to the EQ-8 information matrix, more particularly to the extracts under indicators I-8.1.2, I-
8.2.2, I-8.2.1 and I-8.2.3. 
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 Indicator 9.3.3: Monitoring and evaluation focused on sector approach efficiency and ability 
to achieve EU assistance’s goals 
Mutatis mutandis, this indicator I-9.3.3 “Monitoring and evaluation focused on sector approach efficien-
cy and ability to achieve EU assistance’s goals” is already covered under (i) EQ 8 indicator I-8.1.3 
“Monitoring and evaluation focused on instrument and approach efficiency and ability to achieve EU 
assistance’s goals” and also (ii) Indicator I-8.3.3. “Follow-up or monitoring reports assess the actual 
synergy between aid modalities overall and for focal sectors”. Kindly refer to the EQ-8 information ma-
trix concerned for the main indicator findings, as well as for data, figures, tables and extracts. 
In the Mid-Term Review of the EDF10 CSP/NIP, progress towards the MDGs (which are the EU assis-
tance goals in harmony with the MDG indicators forming the basis of General Budget Support (GBS) 
performance monitoring for decision making on the releases of the GBS variable tranches) is summa-
rised as follows: The assessment concluded that four targets are likely to be met (those related to hun-
ger, universal primary education, gender equality, and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS). Five other 
targets will potentially be met (related to extreme poverty, under-5 mortality rate, maternal mortality 
rate, access to water and sanitation) while the environmental sustainability target is unlikely to be met. 
According to the latest available data, interim targets in 2010 will likely only be met in net enrolment 
ratio and potentially in the prevalence of underweight children under 5. 
It was noted earlier that the general budget support monitoring and evaluation indicators basically focus 
on outcome and impact indicators (PRSP related for the EDF9 CSP/NIP, FNDP and PAF / PRBS-MDG 
related for the EDF10 CSP/NIP) and inputs indicators (PEFA/PEMFA financial utilisation and good gov-
ernance related). As far as the sectors with sectoral budget support (SBS – SPSSP) are concerned, the 
above are complemented by the efficiency indicators (activities and direct outputs) from the sectoral 
performance M&E systems as for example the Health Sector Performance Monitoring Framework 
(HPMF) in the case of the health sector. Together these are expected to provide a synthetic perfor-
mance measurement picture covering all levels of the results chain (from inputs to impact), and as such 
also the three “E”s of performance management (Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness).
115
 
The PRBS – MDG related indicators also ensure that General Budget Support (GBS) resources are 
“automatically” channelled to poverty reduction / alleviation sectors high (potential) impact sectors as 
education and health. This also has been an explicit objective of EU GBS as for example evidenced 
from the 2003 JAR which stated that as part of the EC support to the PRSP process, the Commission 
has committed itself to allocate 35% of the resources to the social sectors. In Zambia, 48.7 % of the “A” 
envelope of the NIP under the EDF9 is linked directly or indirectly to the social sectors. Under the NIP 
of the EDF9, the EC will support directly health (€10m) and education (€10m) sectors. As regards to the 
Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS), the disbursement of the variable tranche (€100m) will be 
linked to performance indicators related to expenditures in health and education as well as outcome 
indicators in both sectors.  
From the different monitoring and review documents, and as confirmed during the evaluation field inter-
views, there however appears an over-emphasis on the economy and effectiveness of the 3Es of per-
formance management and under-emphasis on the efficiency dimension (activities and direct outputs 
management) in the CSP/NIP management and monitoring. This appears to be conform a still ongoing 
balancing process in international development cooperation between on the one hand the traditional 
activities management from the early days of international cooperation and the tilted switch to the other 
extreme of results management (especially focused on the higher end results of outcomes and impact) 
in the more recent times, and now coming to an equilibrium situation of performance management 
equally focusing on all levels of the results chain and thus also on the 3Es of performance manage-
ment. This brings with it a renewed attention and valuation of operational management of “doing the 
job” on the ground, however now, different from the early days, in the perspective of a development 
results focus. 
As confirmed by the recent budget support evaluation, generally more coordination is needed on the 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) function. Information about issues related to budget support is often 
fragmented and not directly available or is not available in a structured and consistent way. The current 
practice – with consultants asking for the same information again and again – is inefficient and leads to 
high transaction costs for the MoFNP. The study in this regard recommends that apart from the need to 
enlarge the M&E Department within the MoFNP, it is also advisable to appoint a specific PRBS focal 
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  More details are provided in the discussion concerned under JC 8.1 “Several options of aid modalities have been discussed 
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point within that Department.  
In the recently approved JASZ-II document, management for results is highlighted as one of the main 
principles of cooperation amongst the CPs. To that effect a JASZ II Action Matrix has been agreed up-
on to improve aid effectiveness and mutual accountability. Annual work plans with realistic targets op-
erationalise the Action Matrix and facilitate monitoring of the implementation. This is expected to help 
GRZ and CPs to remain focused on development results as well as processes rather than getting di-
verted into short-term issues. The Mutual Accountability Group (MAG) is responsible for tracking and 
reviewing progress on the work plan during its monthly meetings and will revise / update the work plan 
on an annual basis. Another main tool to enable effective management for development results are the 
sector Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) selected from the SNDP monitoring framework representing 
those indicators which allow for assessing development progress. This is expected to help focus atten-
tion of sector CPs and the Cooperating Partners Group (CPG) on desired development results. Aid 
effectiveness indicators specifically assess individual and collective CP performance on aid effective-
ness commitments in the JASZ and ideally are expected to cover the contributions of all donors in 
Zambia, not just JASZ II signatories.  
Extracts: 
Pls. refer to the EQ-8 information matrix, more particularly to the extracts under indicators I-8.1.3 and 
I-8.3.3. 
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p3: Progress towards MDGs (2007): The assessment concluded 
that four targets are likely to be met (those related to hunger, universal primary education, gender 
equality, and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS). Five other targets will potentially be met (related to 
extreme poverty, under-5 mortality rate, maternal mortality rate, access to water and sanitation) while 
the environmental sustainability target is unlikely to be met. According to the latest available data, in-
terim targets in 2010 will likely only be met in net enrolment ratio and potentially in the prevalence of 
underweight children under 5. 
 
JAR 2003, p33; 5.2.1 Policy initiatives and commitments relevant to Zambia: As part of the EC sup-
port to the PRSP process, the Commission has committed itself to allocate 35% of the resources to 
the social sectors. In Zambia, 48.7 % of the “A” envelope of the NIP under the EDF9 is linked directly 
or indirectly to the social sectors. Under the NIP of the EDF9, the EC will support directly health 
(€10m) and education (€10m) sectors. As regards to the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS), 
the disbursement of the variable tranche (€100m) will be linked to performance indicators related to 
expenditures in health and education as well as outcome indicators in both sectors.  
FA 10-ACP-2A-005 SPSP Supporting Public Health Service Delivery in Zambia; TAPA p4 – 
Chapter 2.3. Performance monitoring and disbursement criteria: Performance monitoring is the re-
sponsibility of the Ministry of Health, while the Ministry of Finance and National Planning coordinates 
monitoring the implementation of the FNDP. In the health sector dialogue the progress in implement-
ing the National Health Strategic Plan is reported on through the routine Health Management Infor-
mation System (HMIS). The Health components of the PAF (Performance Assessment Framework 
under the PRBS) and the Health sector Performance Monitoring Framework (HPMF) will be in the 
coming years the main tools for performance assessment. They provide a synthetic picture – derived 
from the existing strategic policy frameworks and annual work plans – of the sector commitments, in 
terms of inputs, output and outcomes. The broad HPMF includes the DAC selected standard indica-
tors. 
 
“The lessons learnt from the MTR are crucial to ensure that the programme becomes again a reliable, 
realistic and affordable master document for the sector. Lessons learnt from the MTR of SPSP I, 
EDF9, have been used to formulate the EDF10 SPSP II subject to this fiche. Since 2005, EDF9 pro-
vides Sector Budget Support which is recognised as a most valuable financing modality. The major 
lessons learnt are that sector budget support has led (i) to reduced transaction and administrative 
costs, increased ownership and predictability of funds from the Government's perspective and (ii) in-
creased impact of aid, comprehensive sector dialogue, no more micromanagement of projects and 
contracts, ensuring a voice in coherent sector policy and strategy formulation from the EC's perspec-
tive. The targeted approach used under SPSP I will be changed to non-targeted support under SPSP 
II. Continuation of SBS under EDF10 is regarded as very important to the sustained success of 
ROADSIP II and is fully in line with Government and EC objectives as confirmed by the MTR of SPSP 
I.” SPSP2 Action Fiche 
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Field Visit Additional Information on JC 9.3: 
 
DIE & IOB (2011) p26; Evaluation Recommendations for MoFNP: More coordination is needed on the 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) function. Information about issues related to budget support is often 
fragmented and not directly available or is not available in a structured and consistent way. The cur-
rent practice – with consultants asking for the same information again and again – is inefficient and 
leads to high transaction costs for the MoFNP. Apart from the need to enlarge the M&E Department, it 
is also advisable to appoint a specific PRBS focal point within that department. 
 
JASZ-II (2011) p14; 3.Principles of Cooperation – 3.1.2 Managing for Results: What:  
The JASZ II Action Matrix focuses on necessary actions to improve on aid effectiveness and mutual 
accountability. An annual work plan with realistic targets operationalises the Action Matrix and facili-
tates monitoring of the implementation. This will help GRZ and CPs to remain focused on develop-
ment results as well as processes rather than getting diverted into short-term issues. The Mutual Ac-
countability Group (MAG) will be responsible for tracking and reviewing progress on the work plan 
during its monthly meetings and will revise the work plan on an annual basis.  
Sector Key Performance Indicators (see Annex 1) selected from the SNDP monitoring framework rep-
resent those indicators which allow for assessing development progress. This will help to focus atten-
tion of sector CPs and the Cooperating Partners Group (CPG) on desired development results. Aid 
effectiveness indicators specifically assess individual and collective CP performance on aid effective-
ness commitments in the JASZ and will ideally cover the contributions of all donors in Zambia, not just 
JASZ II signatories. 
 
JC 9.3:  The selection of focal sectors of intervention and subsequent changes in the EU strate-
gy were taken on the basis of the comparative advantages of the EU (e.g. experience 
and expertise in the sectors)? 
Judgement Criterion 9.3 formulated as “The selection of focal sectors of intervention and subsequent 
changes in the EU strategy were taken on the basis of the comparative advantages of the EU (e.g. 
experience and expertise in the sectors)” is based on the following three indicators: (i) I-9.3.1. “Exist-
ence of internal reports and notes defining comparative advantages of the various sectors in the con-
text”, (ii) I-9.3.2 “Evidence of integration of lessons learned from previous programmes or other cooper-
ating partners documented and integrated in strategic programming documents, and (iii) I-9.3.3. “Moni-
toring and evaluation focused on sector approach efficiency and ability to achieve EU assistance’s 
goals”. Mutatis mutandis, this Judgement Criterion 9.3 and its 3 indicators on the selection of focal sec-
tors where the EU has a comparative advance is similar to the Judgement Criteria 8.1 and 8.6 with their 
respective indicators under Evaluation Question EQ-8 related to the choice and combination / synergy 
of aid modalities. To avoid repetition in logical argumentation based on the indicator findings, the reader 
is referred to the JCs 8.1 and 8.6 with these indicators concerned.  
Generally can be concluded that the selection of focal sectors of intervention and subsequent changes 
in the EU strategy were taken on the basis of the comparative advantages of the EU (e.g. experience 
and expertise in the sectors). There are a few exceptions maybe to this general finding and judgement, 
including the dropping of education as a focal sector in the EDF10 CSP/NIP. The ultimate rationale for 
the selection of focal sectors however is with the JASZ, the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia, the 
institutionalised forum for policy dialogue between the Cooperating Partners (CPs) and the GRZ in ap-
plication of Division of Labour (DOL) principles adhered to and in line with the EU Code of Conduct on 
Complementarity (especially in as much as complementarity with the programmes of the EU Member 
States is concerned). Zambia, under the inspiration of the EU and other lead CPs, appears to be / have 
been a pioneer and trend setter of these DOL principles as a further concretisation of the Paris Declara-
tion principles regarding development effectiveness and the Accra Agenda of Action. 
A brief summary finding illustrating the above is the following summary excerpt of the EDF10 CSP/NIP 
Mid-Term Review: The comparative advantage of the EU in Zambia is demonstrated through its leader-
ship in the two focal areas of health and transport infrastructure and there is strong complementarity 
with other donors. These focal areas are vital in creating an enabling environment for Zambia to imple-
ment growth strategies. The non-focal areas, specifically those relating to agriculture and EPA support, 
are important in assisting the efforts of GRZ to diversify the economy. For the new 2012-2015 DOL in 
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relation to the Sixth National Development Plan, the EU was demanded by the GRZ to lead Govern-
ance, though it for itself had suggested a lower “active” status. This EU lead for Governance has been 
confirmed in the JASZ-II signed by the CPs on 18 November 2011, with furthermore also entrusted lead 
positions for the sectors of transport and of agriculture, livestock and fisheries. (I-9.3.1 and I-9.3.2) 
As far as indicator I-9.3.3. on the M&E focus on sector approach efficiency and ability to achieve EU 
assistance goals is concerned, the main conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the EDF10 CSP/NIP 
regarding programme progress towards the MDGs (which are the EU assistance goals in harmony with 
the MDG indicators forming the basis of General Budget Support (GBS) performance monitoring for 
decision making on the releases of the GBS variable tranches) have been summarised as follows: Four 
targets are likely to be met (those related to hunger, universal primary education, gender equality, and 
reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS). Five other targets will potentially be met (related to extreme poverty, 
under-5 mortality rate, maternal mortality rate, access to water and sanitation) while the environmental 
sustainability target is unlikely to be met. According to the latest available data, interim targets in 2010 
will likely only be met in net enrolment ratio and potentially in the prevalence of underweight children 
under 5. 
The general budget support monitoring and evaluation indicators basically focus on outcome and im-
pact indicators (PRSP related for the EDF9 CSP/NIP, FNDP and PAF / PRBS-MDG related for the 
EDF10 CSP/NIP) and inputs indicators (PEFA/PEMFA financial utilisation and good governance relat-
ed). As far as the sectors with sectoral budget support (SBS – SPSSP) are concerned, the above are 
complemented by the efficiency indicators (activities and direct outputs) from the sectoral performance 
M&E systems as for example the Health Sector Performance Monitoring Framework (HPMF) in the 
case of the health sector. Together these are expected to provide a synthetic performance measure-
ment picture covering all levels of the results chain (from inputs to impact), and as such also the three 
“E”s of performance management (Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness). 
The PRBS – MDG related indicators also ensure that General Budget Support (GBS) resources are 
“automatically” channelled to poverty reduction / alleviation sectors high (potential) impact sectors as 
education and health. This also has been an explicit objective of EU GBS as for example evidenced 
from the 2003 JAR which stated that as part of the EC support to the PRSP process, the Commission 
has committed itself to allocate 35% of the resources to the social sectors. In Zambia, 48.7 % of the “A” 
envelope of the NIP under the EDF9 is linked directly or indirectly to the social sectors. Under the NIP 
of the EDF9, the EC will support directly health (€10m) and education (€10m) sectors. As regards to the 
Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS), the disbursement of the variable tranche (€100m) will be 
linked to performance indicators related to expenditures in health and education as well as outcome 
indicators in both sectors. (I-9.3.3) 
From the different strategy and programmes/projects monitoring and review documents, and as con-
firmed during the evaluation field interviews, there however appears an over-emphasis on the economy 
and effectiveness of the “3Es” of performance management and under-emphasis on the efficiency di-
mension (activities and direct outputs management) in the CSP/NIP management and monitoring. This 
appears to be conform a still ongoing balancing process in international development cooperation be-
tween on the one hand the traditional activities management from the early days of international coop-
eration and the tilted switch to the other extreme of results management (especially focused on the 
higher end results of outcomes and impact) in the more recent times, and now coming to an equilibrium 
situation of performance management equally focusing on all levels of the results chain and thus also 
on the 3Es of performance management. This brings with it a renewed attention and valuation of opera-
tional management of “doing the job” on the ground, however now, different from the early days, in the 
perspective of a development results focus.  
As confirmed by the recent budget support evaluation, generally more coordination is needed on the 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) function. Information about issues related to budget support is often 
fragmented and not directly available or is not available in a structured and consistent way. The current 
practice – with consultants asking for the same information again and again – is inefficient and leads to 
high transaction costs for the MoFNP. The study in this regard recommends that apart from the need to 
enlarge the M&E Department within the MoFNP, it is also advisable to appoint a specific PRBS focal 
point within that Department.  
In the recently approved JASZ-II document, management for results is highlighted as one of the main 
principles of cooperation amongst the CPs. To that effect a JASZ II Action Matrix has been agreed up-
on to improve aid effectiveness and mutual accountability. Annual work plans with realistic targets op-
erationalise the Action Matrix and facilitate monitoring of the implementation. This is expected to help 
GRZ and CPs to remain focused on development results as well as processes rather than getting di-
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verted into short-term issues. The Mutual Accountability Group (MAG) is responsible for tracking and 
reviewing progress on the work plan during its monthly meetings and will revise / update the work plan 
on an annual basis. Another main tool to enable effective management for development results are the 
sector Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) selected from the SNDP monitoring framework representing 
those indicators which allow for assessing development progress. This is expected to help focus atten-
tion of sector CPs and the Cooperating Partners Group (CPG) on desired development results. Aid 
effectiveness indicators specifically assess individual and collective CP performance on aid effective-
ness commitments in the JASZ and ideally are expected to cover the contributions of all donors in 
Zambia, not just JASZ II signatories. (I-9.3.3) 
JC 9.4: The EU's co-operation strategy for Zambia and its regional strategy were mutually rein-
forcing 
Data, figures, tables: 
EAMR, Jan 2011, p23: 5. Regional project pipeline and work on new commitments: 5.1. EDF10 
RSP/RIP for the ESA-IO region 
 
REGIONAL Funding: 2010 Forecast 2010 Actual Actual v Forecast 
New Global 
Commitments: 
EDF10 RSP-RIP 
EDF Food Facility - HQ 
EDF Thematic - HQ 
150.973.960 € 
20.000.000 € 
4.000.000 € 
68.073.960 € 
20.000.000 € 
4.000.000 € 
45 % 
100 % 
100 % 
Total: Al 174.973.960 € 92.073.960 € 52 % 
 
Extracts: 
EAMR Jan 2011, p3; Nevertheless, the co-ordination of the RSP activities in the sphere of the IRCC 
has been difficult, and a reflection on how best to reinvigorate the co-ordination process was initiated. 
The absence of proper leadership on regional infrastructure continued to pose a problem. 
 
9-ACP RSA-40 pp. 2-3; Continuation of Support to the IRCC (Inter-regional Coordinating Committee) 
based at the COMESA Secretariat – ToR: Under the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement the re-
gional programming under the 9th and 10th European Development Funds for the Eastern and 
Southern African (ESA) – Indian Ocean (IO) region has been undertaken as a joint effort of the Re-
gional Integration Organisations (RIO) of Southern and Eastern Africa: Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), East African Community (EAC) 
and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). 
The EDF9 Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme (RSP/RIP) was signed by the 
concerned parties (European Commission and the RIOs of Eastern and Southern Africa) in Kampala, 
Uganda on 19th November 2002. The EDF10 RSP/RIP for the ESA-IO region was signed by all par-
ties on the 15th November 2008 in Strasbourg, France. 
The EDF9 RIP had three focal areas: regional economic integration, management of natural re-
sources; and transport and communications. Projects in the fourth non-focal area include capacity 
building and peace and security. Implementation of the EDF9 RSP/RIP, with an initial indicative budg-
et amounting to Euro 223m, has taken effect as from January 2003 with the establishment of the In-
ter-Regional Co-ordinating Committee (IRCC) Secretariat at the COMESA Secretariat. 
The regional organisations decided to establish an Inter-Regional Co-ordinating Committee (IRCC) 
which, under the authority of their respective Chief Executives in their roles as EDF Regional Author-
ising Officers (RAO), will be responsible for the design and implementation of the Regional Indicative 
Programme (RIP). The Secretariat of the IRCC, responsible for overall co-ordination and overseeing 
of the regional indicative programme (RIP) is based at the COMESA Secretariat, this being the re-
gional organisation with the largest geographical coverage of the entire region. 
With regard to the EDF10 RSP/RIP the European Commission puts 645m Euros of the European De-
velopment Fund (EDF) at the disposal of the four Regional Organisations to support the regional inte-
gration process. Implementation, as for the EDF9, is coordinated through the Inter-Regional Coordi-
nating Committee (IRCC), to contribute to the harmonisation of policies in line with the recommenda-
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tions of the African Union. The EDF10 RSP/RIP agreement also provides for the European Invest-
ment Bank to contribute to the Regional Strategy Paper by operations financed from the Investment 
Facility and/or from its own resources. It is set for implementation during the period 2008 – 2013, and 
has two concentration (focal) areas: (i) Focal Area 1 is Regional Economic Integration covering re-
gional integration policies, trade and EPA, and regional sector policies; (ii) Focal Area 2 is the Re-
gional Political Integration/Cooperation Agenda, through the development of a series of flanking 
measures aimed at assisting the region to tackle regional political problems in a coordinated fashion. 
 Indicator 9.4.1: Existence in EU programming and implementation documents of operation-
al links (TA missions, co-financed projects or events, etc.) between NIP and RIP strategic 
responses 
Under the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement the regional programming under EDF9 and EDF10 for 
the Eastern and Southern African (ESA) – Indian Ocean (IO) region has been undertaken as a joint 
effort of the Regional Organisations (RO) of Southern and Eastern Africa: The Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the East African Com-
munity (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). And then there is also the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) as regional organisation of which Zambia is a 
member state. 
The EDF9 RSP/RIP was signed in Kampala, Uganda on 19 November 2002. The EDF10 RSP/RIP for 
the ESA-IO region was signed by all parties on the 15th of November 2008 in Strasbourg, France. The 
EDF9 Regional Integration Programme (RIP) had three focal areas: Regional economic integration, 
management of natural resources; and transport and communications. Projects in the fourth non-focal 
area include capacity building and peace and security. Implementation of the EDF9 RSP/RIP, with an 
initial indicative budget amounting to Euro 223m, has taken effect as from January 2003 with the estab-
lishment of the Inter-Regional Co-ordinating Committee (IRCC) Secretariat at the COMESA Secretariat. 
The Secretariat of the IRCC, responsible for overall co-ordination and overseeing of the RIP is based at 
the COMESA Secretariat, this being the regional organisation with the largest geographical coverage of 
the entire region. 
For the EDF10 RSP/RIP the EC puts 645m € of EDF resources at the disposal of the four Regional 
Organisations to support the regional integration process. Implementation, as for the EDF9, is coordi-
nated through the IRCC to contribute to the harmonisation of policies in line with the recommendations 
of the African Union. The EDF10 RSP/RIP agreement also provides for the EIB to contribute to the RSP 
by operations financed from the Investment Facility and/or from its own resources. It is set for imple-
mentation during the period 2008 – 2013, and has two concentration (focal) areas: (i) Focal Area 1 is 
Regional Economic Integration covering regional integration policies, trade and EPA, and regional sec-
tor policies; (ii) Focal Area 2 is the Regional Political Integration / Cooperation Agenda, through the 
development of a series of flanking measures aimed at assisting the region to tackle regional political 
problems in a coordinated fashion. 
In relation to the other countries in the region, a comparatively high percentage of the 2008-2013 RIP 
resources is allocated to trade related infrastructure in Zambia (78.52 per cent as against 35.7 per cent 
for the region). This is also comparatively high in comparison with the Zambia NIP national allocation 
for focal sector 1 “Regional Integration / Transport infrastructure” with 24.6 per cent of the EDF10 
CSP/NIP resources allocated to this focal sector. 
The EDF10 CSP/NIP document has under Annex 10 a one page executive summary of the EDF10 
RSP-RIP for the 2008-2012 period. This is the documentary link to the RSP in the CSP. The incorpora-
tion of the regional integration agenda in the national development planning and the CSP/NIP is explic-
itly focused on in the MTR of the EDF10 CSP/NIP. The review concluded that the Infrastructure focal 
area of the EDF10 CSP for Zambia is couched in terms of regional integration, rather than simply rely-
ing only on national infrastructure (the Zimb-Livingstone road, the rehabilitation of sections of the Great 
East Road as elements of the North-South Corridor). As for the Sugar Accompanying Measures allo-
cated to Zambia are concerned, the RIP funded the identification / pre-feasibility study for a multi-modal 
dry-port in Chipata. 
Evidence of EU Delegation involvement in the preparation of the ESA RSP-RIP (EDF10) is provided in 
the July 2007 EAMR which mentioned that the Delegation attended two meetings on ESA-EPA negotia-
tions (Lilongwe in April and Brussels in June 2007). The January 2007 EAMR mentioned that EUD dis-
cussions with the regional authorities (mostly COMESA) focused on regional priorities for the EDF10 
(including issues linked to EPAs financing) as well as regular exchanges on on-going EDF9 projects 
including issues on transport & communication. During implementation the linkage between NIPs and 
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the RIP is exploited further by enhancing cooperation between the four RAOs and the ESA-IO NAOs, 
notably by organising annual meetings to discuss implementation of the EDF10 RIP and the NIPs. 
Vice versa, the RSP/RIP 2008-2013 document has a special annex 2 which provides a synoptic view of 
the linkages and complementarities between the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) and the ESA-IO 
National Indicative Programmes (NIPs). From this overview can be concluded that generally the NIPs of 
the ESA-IO region (incl. Zambia) have substantial linkages with the RIP. This particularly pertains to the 
large regional infrastructure projects. Other areas of complementarity between the NIPs and the RIP 
cover private sector development, food security, rural development and agricultural development, as 
well as specific activities for supporting the implementation of the regional and bilateral trade agenda 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA)s, customs unions, monetary unions, EPA, etc.). 
As part of the recently concluded MTR of the RSP-RIP, some key questions were posed to EU Delega-
tions in the ESA-IO region. Asked if regional integration features in the EUD dialogue with the national 
authorities, the Lusaka EUD replied positively, however only to the extent that it addresses the focal 
sector of the NIP (infrastructure – roads).  
Regarding the link between the regional and national levels, the 2011 review of the co-operation be-
tween the European Union and the ESA-IO Region indicated that ROs are quite adamant to affirm that 
Member States are duly involved through their instances (Council, etc.) and that this is the legitimate 
structure in place in the institutional architecture of the ROs. However, from the consultations with EU 
Delegations and national authorities a need was voiced for more funds/support at national level for re-
gional integration. EDF programming (both national and regional) is assessed a potentially of help for 
resolving regional integration obstacles, but for that the review concludes a different balance may be 
needed to better support implementation of regional commitments at national level. Remarkably how-
ever, Chapter II of the joint progress report which explicitly deals with “Coherence of RSP/RIP” assess-
es different coherence components at the regional level (e.g. with other regional strategies, with the 
SADC region, with the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, with the African Peace and Security Architec-
ture) but not with the CSP/NIPs at the level of the Member Countries. This focus of the progress report 
probably by itself is already an indication of the importance attached to RSP/RIP and CSP/NIP coher-
ence and complementarity, or better maybe of the status of progress in designing and operationalising 
such regional – national strategic coherence assessment (M&E) system. 
A major challenge remains to have the implementation of common regional programmes managed 
through Contribution Agreements (CAs) by the covered member countries concerned. This would be 
the preferred option from the perspective of programme ownership and enhanced regional-national 
coherence, impact and sustainability. The review however was to conclude that while such arrange-
ment is being promoted by COMESA (particular through the RISP programme) the other ROs proved 
not to be ready for it yet. 
MTR recommendations for the EDF11 to further strengthen RSP/RIP – CSP/NIP alignment include the 
following: (i) Elaborate a realistic regional integration strategy before embarking on writing CSPs/NIPs 
and then link CSPs to the RSP or at least ensure that the regional priorities are to some extent coupled 
by regional integration policies and budgets in the MS national development plans; (ii) Make explicit the 
roles of ROs and their Member States; (iii) Involve Member States in the regional integration process at 
all stages, from programming to implementation; (iv) Give more consideration to Member States and 
Civil Society (business fora) during the process of elaboration and implementation of the EDF11 
RSP/RIP; (v) Ensure that the RSP maintains some flexibility to adapt to the evolving needs of the re-
gion but at the same time focus the RIP to some key fields of actions and programmes to ensure con-
centration of efforts; (vi) Avoid as much as possible having ROs subcontracting each other as is the 
case now with RISP II; (vii) Envisage direct CA (or other modalities) with ROs eligible to CA status; (viii) 
Consider the possibility of reinforcing IRCC role in its core mandate of coordination and support mech-
anism to all stages of project cycle; (ix) Continue supporting the Secretariats in their efforts to monitor 
transposition of regional commitments at national level. (J.C. 9.4) 
Also during the current evaluation field visit interviews with different parties concerned at EUD, GRZ 
and COMESA the actual transposition of regional commitments into national, in this case Zambian, 
policies, systems and budgets, was identified as one of the, if not the key challenge for effective region-
al integration processes. The Adjustment Facility Window, which the RISM Programme has made op-
erational, is foreseen to support Member States to bear the cost of integration and to reward good per-
formers against tangible results. This entails the development of a system for monitoring regional inte-
gration at national level along key performance indicators derived from the regional integration strategic 
plans and programmes, complete with baseline data, “monitorable” target setting with periodic progress 
and results assessments / measurements on these indicators, which in turn can form the basis for per-
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formance scores, ratings and indices, scorecards and dashboards. During different field interviews the 
crucial need for such integrated regional-national transposition performance planning, measurement 
and monitoring systems involving both the regional and national levels was underscored.  
The just concluded MTR of the RSP-RIP confirmed in this respect that the effectiveness of RSP/RIP 
implementation is difficult to measure due to recognised lack of ROs and MS capacity to monitor im-
plementation of RI commitments at national level. Capacity of national delegations to deal with regional 
matters needs to be improved to support ESA-IO ROs members in fulfilling their responsibilities in im-
plementing the principle that regional cooperation and integration is ultimately dependent on the actions 
of the individual state ("think regionally, act locally"). 
Data, figures, tables: 
RSP & RIP 2008-2013; Annex 2: In relation to the other countries in the region, a comparatively high 
percentage of the 2008-2013 RIP resources is allocated to trade related infrastructure in Zambia 
(78.52 per cent as against 35.7 per cent for the region). This is also comparatively high in comparison 
with the Zambia NIP allocation for focal sector 1 “Regional Integration / Transport infrastructure” with 
24.6 per cent of the EDF10 CSP/NIP resources allocated to this focal sector 
Extracts: 
Jar 2010, p13: Coherence with regional programming: Several priority components of the North-
South corridor are located in Zambia (and some are potential subjects of funding under the EDF10 
ESA Regional Strategy). Two road projects in particular contribute to regional integration; the Zimba-
Livingstone road (the road was commissioned in November 2010) and the rehabilitation of the Great 
East Road (approved by the EDF committee in November 2010) are both elements of the North-South 
Corridor. The Sugar Accompanying Measures in Zambia funded the identification/pre-feasibility study 
for a multi-modal dry-port in Chipata. If viability is confirmed by the EU funded feasibility study, this dry 
port would improve linkages between rail and road transport along the Nacala corridor. 
 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p8: Incorporation of the regional integration agenda in the national 
development planning and the CSP/NIP: The Infrastructure focal area of the EDF10 CSP for Zambia 
is couched in terms of regional integration, rather than simply national infrastructure. Several priority 
components of the North-South corridor are located in Zambia (and some are potential subjects of 
funding under the EDF10 ESA Regional Strategy). Two projects in particular contribute to regional in-
tegration: the Zimba-Livingstone road (open for traffic and commissioned in November 2010) and the 
rehabilitation of sections of the Great East Road (Lusaka to Chipata on the Malawi border to be fi-
nanced under the EDF10). These are elements of the North-South Corridor and will act as a catalyst 
in promoting trade within the region while reducing transport costs for Zambian business. As for the 
Sugar Accompanying Measures allocated to Zambia, they funded the identification/pre-feasibility 
study for a multi-modal dry-port in Chipata, which will improve linkages between rail and road 
transport along the Nacala corridor. 
 
EAMR, July 2007, p4; Regional level (ESA RIP): A simplified desk study remains to be completed 
before signing the CA, and meanwhile the FP has been submitted to the EDF Committee of 4 July. 
Discussions continued with the region on the draft Regional Strategy Paper for the EDF10 formally 
submitted to Brussels in November 2006…The RSP-RIP is not yet approved, as discussions are now 
being linked by DG Dev to the ESA-EPA negotiations. To this effect, the Delegation attended two 
meetings on ESAEPA negotiations (Lilongwe in April, and Brussels in June). 
 
EAMR, Jan. 2007, p4: At the regional level, discussions with regional authorities (mostly COMESA) 
focused on regional priorities for the EDF10 (including issues linked to EPAs financing) as well as 
regular exchanges on on-going EDF9 projects including issues on transport & communication through 
the new TCS/PIP component. 
 
 RSP & RIP 2008-2013; Annex 2 - Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 
2008-2013 – Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean; 2007 - Annex 2: Linkages 
between the ESA-IO National Indicative Programmes and the Regional Indicative Programme 
This annex provides a synoptic view of the linkages and complementarities between the EDF10 Na-
tional Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and the ESA-IO Regional Indicative Programme (RIP). It builds 
on work carried out by a consultant in June 2008 (based on a sub-set of the countries part of the ESA-
IO region), as well as work carried out in the EC EuropeAid office, based on all the NIPs available as 
of June 2008. 
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The EDF10 ESA-IO RSP/RIP, with an indicative allocation of €645m, foresees interventions in two 
main focal areas, namely (1) Regional economic integration (85% of RIP), covering regional integra-
tion policies, trade and EPA, supply-side constraints (including infrastructure); and (2) Regional politi-
cal integration / cooperation (10% of RIP), such as Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention. Other 
programmes in the non-focal areas include Capacity Building, support to the IRCC, and regional edu-
cation networks. 
In conclusion, generally the NIPS of the ESA-IO region have substantial linkages with the RIP. Com-
plementarities clearly lie in the areas of internal (national-level) dimensions of regional economic inte-
gration interventions. All countries clearly see the need to address supply-side constraints in infra-
structure, and try as much as possible to inscribe interventions within the regional framework. This is 
fully in consonance with the RIP, which would allocate a large portion of its first focal area to this sec-
tor. For large regional infrastructure projects, the RIP recognises that the cost implication would be 
much higher than any single source of funding would be able to afford. It therefore tries to establish 
synergies with other initiatives, such as the EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure, in accordance 
with AU/NEPAD priorities. Similar synergies are foreseen in the NIPs. 
Other areas of consistent complementarity between the NIPs and the RIP cover private sector devel-
opment, food security, rural development and agricultural development, as well as specific activities 
for supporting the implementation of the regional and bilateral trade agenda (FTAs, customs unions, 
monetary unions, EPA, etc.) 
During implementation the linkage between NIPs and the RIP would be exploited further, by enhanc-
ing cooperation between the four RAOs and the ESA-IO NAOs, notably by organising annual meet-
ings to discuss implementation of the EDF10 RIP and the NIPs. 
 
EDF10 – CSP/NIP 2008-2013, Annex 10: Contains a one page executive summary of the EDF10 
RSP-RIP for the period 2008 – 2012 (draft version). This is the documentary link to the RSP in the 
CSP. 
 
EUD Lusaka; MTR RSP-RIP (2011) - Key questions to EU Delegations in East and Southern African 
and the Indian Ocean region, Zambia Delegation Contribution; (Q&A – Answers by EU DEL Section 
regional Cooperation); 22 Sep 2011:  
o Q1 - Is there evidence that the policies and priorities at national level are aligned to those at re-
gional level? Although not explicitly, this is evident for certain sectors, such as Infrastructure. 
The development of Regional Corridors as a means to promote regional Integration inevitably 
requires active participation at the national level, and therefore the alignment of policies and pri-
orities. 
o Q2 – Is the country taking advantage of the opportunities offered by regional integration? Yes, 
especially in the areas of Trade and the Roads Infrastructure investments. Recent statistics 
have indicated the increase in regional trade, owing to opportunities presented by regional initia-
tives such as the Free Trade Area (FTA) and the ongoing customs Union. Zambia, being a land-
locked country, relies very much on roads transportation for its exports and imports. The oppor-
tunities, therefore presented by the roads infrastructure investments would significant address 
these supply-side constraints, and therefore reduce the overall cost of doing business, which is 
currently very high.  
o Q3 – What are the weaknesses in terms of capacity that prevent MS from pursuing further the 
regional integration agenda? How is EU supporting these capacities at national level? In addi-
tion to regional transport infrastructure and linkages, the country lacks capacity in EPA/Trade-
Related Support. This is being addressed through various interventions. Projects under 8th and 
EDF9 have addressed the issues of institutional support for growth through regional integration 
and trade. These projects will bridge the gap to EDF10 interventions: 
 An EDF9 capacity-building project supports the Department of Foreign Trade in developing 
a good base of analytical and negotiating skills to improve the formulation of national trade 
policy and negotiating positions. Particular needs have been identified for improving analyt-
ical capacity in the Department by: (i) developing an in-house training package (which 
would also provide non-salary incentives to staff and hence ensure sustainability); (ii) mak-
ing use of specific technical expertise to assess the impact of EPAs on the Zambian econ-
omy/specific sectors and to assess and develop the legal aspects related to trade negotia-
tions (legal obligations and domestication); (iii) carrying out further studies on value chains 
analysis and identifying operational follow-up; (iv) sensitisation and involvement of the pri-
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vate sector. This project also supports legal and regulatory trade reforms and the capacity-
building of administrative services. 
 The EDF8 Export Development Programme II facilitated the setting up of national offices of 
the African Trade Insurance Agency (ATI) to expand its operations in Zambia. The ATI is 
dedicated to providing insurance, co-insurance, reinsurance and other financial services to 
foster trade with and investments in its African Member States.  
 Additionally, specific policy, regulatory and marketing interventions are envisaged under 
the EDF10 EPA/Trade related support component that will enhance sanitary and phyto-
sanitary standards, certification and marketing conditions, thereby improving product quali-
ty, health standards, branding opportunities, and market awareness and penetration. 
o Q4 - How would you describe the engagement and commitment of the national authorities vis-à-
vis the different regional integration processes. To what extent do they respect their commit-
ments to regional integration at national level? Difficult to describe due to lack of information on 
the extent of domestification of regional protocols.  
o Q5 - To what extent is coherence promoted between RIPs and NIPs? To what extent is coher-
ence necessary? Coherence has been promoted in the NIP through the inclusion of Transport 
Infrastructure as a focal sector. This is of high relevance for the development of the regional cor-
ridors. The ROs do not necessarily have the capacity to implement these infrastructure corridor 
projects, and therefore have to work very closely with the national counterparts. The role of the 
RO would be more suited to build capacity in the regional transport regulation aspect.  
o Q6 – Does regional integration feature in your dialogue with the national authorities? Yes, only 
to the extent that it addresses the focal sector of the NIP  
o Additional question: Do logical and functional cross-references exist between RIPs and NIPs 
and are regional aspects of NIPs sufficiently highlighted in RIPs? Links established however the 
difference in sequence and in process for the NIP and RIP formulation did not facilitate system-
atic cross-referencing. In particular, given the time constraints during drafting there was not a 
systematic effort at ensuring that the NIPs were coordinated with the RIP. During the drafting of 
the 2006 version of the RSP/RIP the relevant CSPs were reviewed and a questionnaire sent to 
the ESA-IO Delegations in early 2007 in order to examine how the integration of the NIPs in the 
RIP could be accomplished. This exercise was partially successful as many NIPs were not final-
ised by then, and it was not repeated during the drafting of the 2008 RSP/RIP. The fault lies on 
both the side of the Commission and the RIOs who consulted but who did not concentrate on 
the NIP/RIP coordination issues. More importantly, it is becoming more and more evident that 
national strategies (to which the NIPs are aligned) do not sufficiently take into account the re-
gional dimension and the commitments taken during the various RECs summits. 
 
EUD Lusaka; MTR of EU-SADC Co-Operation under the EDF10 (2011) - Evaluation of Regional 
(RSP/RIP) – National (CSP/NIP) Coherence, Zambia Delegation Contribution; 30 Aug 2011 
  
 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on I-9.4.1: 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) p. vi; Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: Joint 
Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011- Chapter 3.1: Efficiency of Regional Coopera-
tion – Current aid modalities and programmes in place:  
 
Box: EDF10 ESA-IO programmes (committed by end 2011)  
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Focal Sector – Regional Economic Integration 
 On the Horn of Africa Initiative: 
- Inland Water Resources Management Programme for the IGAD region (€14.70m) 
- Infrastructure: Horn of Africa Corridors -Carrefour Arta- Guélilé (€7.50m) 
- Detailed engineering study for the Berbera Corridor (€3.80m) 
 Other: 
- Implementation of a Regional Fisheries Strategy for the ESA-IO region (€21m) 
- Implementing the SIDS M.S in the ESA-IO region (€10m) 
- Support to Afritac - South and East (€15m) 
- MESA (€5m) 
- RIDER to the IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative (€1.098m) 
- Infrastructure : Energy transport RDC-Rwanda-Burundi (€30m) 
- Infrastructure : Kigali-Gatuna Road (€15m) 
- Continuation of the Regional Integration Support Programme (RISP) (€50m) 
- The preparations for the HOAI donors conference (€0.1m) 
Focal Sector – Regional Political Cooperation 
 
 Regional Political Integration and Human Security (€4.92m) 
 Support to Regional Action plan on Fight against maritime piracy I (€2m) 
Non-focal sectors: 
 Continuation of support to the IRCC (IRCC2) (€11.50m) 
 Regional Multi-Disciplinary Centre of Excellence ( RMCE) (€5.60m) 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) p. vi; Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: Joint 
Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011: Executive Summary – On the link between 
Regional and National Levels: (8) Member States are often reminding that the ROs emanate from 
them and that in no case decisions are imposed on them by the Secretariats. While Member States 
regularly make commitments in view of fostering the integration process, these commitments are 
made at a political level, and their effective transposition to the national level requires further local po-
litical will and technical means to put them in practice. ROs are quite adamant to affirm that Member 
States are duly involved through their instances (Council, etc.) and that this is the legitimate structure 
in place in the institutional architecture of the ROs. However, the consultation with EU Delegations 
and national authorities voiced a need for more funds/support at national level for regional integration. 
EDF programming (both national and regional) can be of help for resolving regional integration obsta-
cles. Therefore, having acknowledged that Member States are engaged in regional policy within the 
ROs instances, the following MTR finding remains legitimate: a different balance may be needed to 
better support implementation of regional commitments at national level. 
 
Remarkably however, Chapter II of the joint progress report which explicitly deals with “Coherence of 
RSP/RIP” assesses different coherence components at the regional level (with other regional strate-
gies, with the SADC region, with the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, with the African Peace and Se-
curity Architecture) but not with the CSP/NIPs at the level of the Member Countries. This focus of the 
progress report probably by itself is already an indication of the importance attached to RSP/RIP and 
CSP/NIP coherence and complementarity, or better maybe of the status of progress in designing and 
operationalising such regional – national strategic coherence assessment (M&E) system. 
 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) p. vi; Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: Joint 
Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011: Executive Summary – On the role of IRCC: 
(7) IRCC is recognised for having played so far a key coordinating role while ensuring the principle of 
ownership (it is a facilitation coordination modality, not an implementation unit) and is well accepted 
by all parties (ROs, EU). On the other hand, the leadership of COMESA in the case of implementation 
of common programmes managed through CAs (RISP in particular) was a not always welcome side-
effect of the fact that the other ROs were not ready for CAs. These ROs are all currently preparing 
themselves to meet the requirements for direct eligibility to EU CAs. 
 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) p. vii; Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: Joint 
Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011: Executive Summary – On RSP/RIP – 
CSP/NIP alignment for the next EDF11: (10) For the EDF11: elaborate a realistic regional integration 
strategy before embarking on writing CSPs/NIPs and then link CSPs to the RSP or at least ensure 
that the regional priorities are to some extent coupled by regional integration policies and budgets in 
the MS national development plans; make explicit the roles of ROs and their Member States; involve 
Member States in the regional integration process at all stages, from programming to implementation; 
give more consideration to Member States and Civil Society (business fora) during the process of 
elaboration and implementation of the EDF11 RSP/RIP. Ensure that the RSP maintains some flexibil-
ity to adapt to the evolving needs of the region but at the same time focus the RIP to some key fields 
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of actions and programmes to ensure concentration of efforts. Avoid as much as possible having ROs 
subcontracting each other as is the case now with RISP II.; envisage direct CA (or other modalities) 
with ROs eligible to CA status; consider the possibility of reinforcing IRCC role in its core mandate of 
coordination and support mechanism to all stages of project cycle; continue supporting the Secretari-
ats in their efforts to monitor transposition of regional commitments at national level. 
 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) pp. 1-6; Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: 
Joint Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011: Chapter 2: Relevance of RSP/RIP – 
Mechanisms in Place and Capacity of ROs to Monitor Transposition:  
 
The Regional – National Transposition Process and Mechanisms: 
Once decisions related to regional integration are taken by Member States (MS) within the respective 
instances of the ROs, they have to be implemented at national levels in terms of transposing regional 
commitments into national policies, systems and budgets. Transposition had been identified as one of 
the main challenges for regional integration processes. This was recognised by COMESA in its Trea-
ty, which gave impetus to the Protocol for Cooperation, Compensation and Development (the COME-
SA Fund). Specifically, the COMESA Adjustment Facility Window, which the RISM Programme has 
made operational, is foreseen to support Member States to bear the cost of integration and to reward 
good performers against tangible results. One key result is to support COMESA and EAC Member 
States in implementing their regional integration and trade commitments. This entails the development 
of a system for monitoring regional integration at national level in line with COMESA and EAC Medi-
um Term Strategic Plans and the establishment of baseline indicators to reflect the status of imple-
mentation of integration in MS. Under RISP and with IRCC Secretariat (IRCC-S) coordination is also 
foreseen to launch in 2012 a study for a transposition survey. 
 
Transposition Monitoring Systems:  
Indeed, it must be recognised that monitoring regional integration is not an easy task and that the 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Units of the Secretariats (and their respective monitoring commit-
tees at national level) need to be significantly upgraded if they are to succeed in this task. Developing 
a comprehensive framework to monitor progress regarding the implementation of regional commit-
ments (as was done in the EU through the EU Common Market Scoreboard) is still a pending issue. 
As a result, appreciation of the actual transposition of regional commitments at Member State level is 
based more on trends than on concrete data. In implementing national programmes, Member States 
take into account decisions made at the COMESA level. This is reflected for example in the imple-
mentation of agreed customs procedures and documents (rules of origin, automated customs sys-
tems, yellow card etc). Yet, according to EU, it appears that COMESA does not have detailed and 
systematic information on where each MS stand in terms of implementation of such commitments at 
national level. COMESA does have "project level indicators" (linked to the log frames of individual 
programmes) but consistent baselines for higher level indicators still do not exist. COMESA Medium 
Term Strategy 2011-2015 monitoring framework, for now, only sets ideal target indicators. COMESA 
has started to test the monitoring framework of its 2011-2015 Medium Term Strategic Plan with some 
MS, but much work still needs to be done. The EAC tried to formulate in the past a "monitoring mech-
anisms on NTBs", with the involvement of the East African Business Council. This mechanism has 
failed to be duly implemented and followed up. DFID/TMEA and the WB have partnered to include the 
development of a monitoring system in the work programme for TMEA. IGAD is building its capacity to 
streamline M&E activities which have been previously conducted at each programme level.  
 
Capacity and willingness of Member States to engage further in Regional Integration 
Countries remain sovereign and can decide at any time to discuss a policy or even to leave an organ-
isation. But what is observed in the ESA-IO domain is that Member States show a strong willingness 
to engage further in regional integration, as the progress of the Tripartite process shows. As under-
lined in the 2009 UNECA publication on transposition of regional agreements, national priorities 
sometimes take precedence over the regional integration agenda. Willingness appears to be there at 
the highest political level – but actions to follow up are more difficult. There is a mixed appetite for fur-
ther integration – variable geometry is floated as an approach, allowing some to proceed more rapidly. 
There is also a protectionism reflex, in particular when it comes to commodities such as maize and 
sugar. In any case there is a strong need to strengthen, at all-Africa country level, the financial, institu-
tional and human resources’ capacities to enhance the transposition processes.  
 
Use made of evaluations and lessons learnt in the design of new programmes 
The identification and formulation phases of the EDF10 programmes, across the different AAPs 
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and ad hoc programmes, have involved studies fed with available documentation on prior in-
terventions or other donor / stakeholder interventions; that include evaluations’ reports, prior 
projects reports (Steering Committees, etc). Some EDF10 programmes (for example, RISP2, 
the EDF10 regional food security programme, the new IOC biodiversity programme) have been for-
mulated to follow-up and enhance on EDF9 programmes. However, the design of the ESA-IO EDF10 
RSP/RIP was made when EDF9 programmes had not yet been fully implemented. Hence no evalua-
tion linked to EDF9 RSP/RIP implementation could be used to design the EDF10. Regardless of some 
positive signs, there was no structured follow-up – in some cases lessons are learned and incorpo-
rated, but generally findings and recommendations from evaluations are not used systematically. ROs 
and EU Delegations could look into extracting lessons more systematically from evaluations. IRCC-S 
should play an important role on this. 
 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) pp. 6-7; Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: 
Joint Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011: Chapter 1: Coherence of RSP/RIP - 
Coherence between the RSPs for the ESA-IO region and the one for the SADC region: (2.5) On pa-
per, coherence between the respective RSP/RIP for SADC and ESA-IO seems ensured, because with 
minor differences, focal sectors and priorities within those sectors look alike. However, according to 
EU, even if SADC is a full member at the IRCC (the Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee covering 
COMESA, EAC, IGAD and IOC), the ESA-IO and SADC programmes are independent of each other 
and there has been little coordination between them so far. Key recommendations of the SADC JPR 
are to keep the current EDF10 strategy as it is, with no change to the resource allocation of the RIP 
and to develop the institutional competency of the SADC Secretariat (which as of today does not qual-
ify to benefit from the CA instrument). It is even foreseen to request a reinforcement of the current al-
location to develop pilot actions such as project preparation and development fund, the trade-related 
facility, and political cooperation… Coherence between the ESA-IO and the SADC RSPs seems to be 
limited, but the IRCC asserts its role as a suitable coordinating body. 
 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) p18; Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: Joint 
Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011: Chapter 4: Effectiveness of regional coopera-
tion - Monitoring/reporting capacities of the ROs to assess the achievement of programmes’ results: 
The effectiveness of the RSP/RIP implementation is difficult to measure due to recognised lack of 
ROs and MS capacity to monitor implementation of RI commitments at national level. Capacity of na-
tional delegations to deal with regional matters needs to be improved to support ESA-IO ROs mem-
bers in fulfilling their responsibilities in implementing the principle that regional cooperation and inte-
gration is ultimately dependent on the actions of the individual state ("think regionally, act locally"). 
 Indicator 9.4.2: Timing of outputs from regional programmes facilitate implementation of 
national support, and vice versa 
Based on the desk study documents analysis, the copies of the EUD Lusaka answers to the key ques-
tions posed in connection with the just concluded MTR of the RSP/RIP and from the current field visit 
interviews one cannot conclude positively about an optimal timing of the outputs from regional pro-
grammes to facilitate implementation of national support and vice versa. 
As part of the ongoing MTR of the RSP-RIP, some key questions were posed to EU Delegations in the 
ESA-IO region. One question was if logical and functional cross-references exist between RIPs and 
NIPs and if regional aspects of NIPs are sufficiently highlighted in RIPs? To which the EUD Lusaka 
answered that links are established, however the differences in sequence and in process for the NIP 
and RIP formulation did not facilitate systematic cross-referencing. In particular, given the time con-
straints during drafting of the strategy documents there was not a systematic effort at ensuring that the 
NIPs were coordinated with the RIP. During the drafting of the 2006 version of the RSP/RIP the relevant 
CSPs were reviewed and a questionnaire sent to the ESA-IO Delegations in early 2007 in order to ex-
amine how the integration of the NIPs in the RIP could be accomplished. This exercise was partially 
successful as many NIPs were not finalised by then, and it was not repeated during the drafting of the 
2008 RSP/RIP. The shortcomings are at both the sides of the Commission and of the Regional Organi-
sations (ROs) who consulted but who did not concentrate on the NIP/RIP coordination issues. More 
importantly, it is becoming more and more evident that national strategies (to which the NIPs are 
aligned) do not sufficiently take into account the regional dimension and the commitments taken during 
the various ROs / RECs summits. 
This confirms the observations in the recent EAMR of January 2011 in relation to the progress in the 
harmonisation / alignment processes at both national and regional levels. Co-ordination at the regional 
level has progressed only slowly. Following the adoption of “Aims and Objectives” and engaging 
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COMESA in the process of dialogue, the Cooperating Partners group considered how far it should ad-
vance. This difficult coordination between the national and regional levels however is nothing new under 
the sun as also the EAMR of August 2004 already reported that while preparing the Capacity Building 
for Private Sector Development project, the Delegations has seen difficulties in obtaining information 
from AIDCO on the support to Zambia under regional/all ACP private sector projects. The EAMR rec-
ommended that such information should be transmitted to the Delegations concerned continuously in 
order to follow up and avoid overlapping with projects under the NIP. There is no evidence that this ac-
tually has happened in the meantime. 
There reportedly is a general absence of awareness by the national authorities of what is happening 
under the ESA-IO EDF programme. Symptomatic in this connection was the absence of any meaningful 
representation from Zambia at the High Level RAO-NAO meeting held in Lusaka (sic) in November 
2009. This reportedly actually was an embarrassment for the EU Delegation which had done it possibly 
could to ensure high level participation. (MTR RSP-RIP – 2011 – EUD questionnaire Q-9) 
A more efficient and effective Division of Labour (DOL) is proposed by the Lusaka EUD in reply to the 
MTR question if some part of the RIP could be implemented with more efficiency and effectiveness at 
the national level rather than at the REC level. This particularly pertains to roads infrastructure projects 
where implementation reportedly is better suited at the national level, as they have the necessary ca-
pacity in terms of personnel. The REC would be better suited to providing TA support in specific aspects 
of the programme such as regional transportation regulation. Such arrangement would also be more in 
line with the general principle of subsidiarity underlying the regional integration process.  
In the framework of the recently conducted mid-term review of the RSP-RIP, the EUD was posed the 
question if regional aspects of the Zambia NIP are sufficiently highlighted in the RIP. To this EUD Lusa-
ka answered in the positive as links are being established. However the EUD also pointed out that the 
differences in sequence and in process for the NIP and RIP formulation did not facilitate systematic 
cross-referencing. (I-9.4.2) 
The 2011 MTR of the co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region reported that, 
overall, the review consultations had provided a mixed picture of the current situation in terms of rele-
vance, coherence, efficiency and effectiveness of the RSP/RIP funds allocated by the EU to ESA-IO. 
The ROs tended to stress progress accomplished and asked for more time to convert ideas into pro-
jects. On the other hand, the EU representatives showed concern with the absorption capacity of the 
ROs and of the region at large, considering the low level of EDF10 commitments so far. If the same 
average of 10% yearly absorption of total RIP resources as during the three years of AAPs so far (2009 
to 2011) is maintained up to the end of the programming cycle (AAP 2012-2013), the Region will have 
absorbed only half of the RIP. Absorption of the totality of the RIP would require an increase of yearly 
absorption from 10% to 40%. The EU emphasised that, although the pipeline was streamlined with the 
Lusaka Declaration and is regularly endorsed at IRCC plenary meetings, it does not guarantee by itself 
that it will be fully implemented, given the substantial delays in the preparation of some of the pro-
grammes. The report also indicated EU’s concern about the risk of losing EDF10 funds if programmes 
cannot be approved by the end of 2013 because of late submission and/or lack of sufficient quality. 
Third, national and civil society representatives underlined their limited participation in the process and 
showed limited knowledge of the issues at stake. The above MRT conclusions regarding RSP/RIP effi-
ciency and absorptive capacity appear to provide further evidence of the crucial need for effective per-
formance planning, measurement and monitoring systems and tools, and for enhanced capacity 
strengthening of the key parties concerned on their actual use, both at regional and at national levels. 
(JC 9.4) 
Data, figures, tables: 
MTR EDF10 CSP Conclusions, p3; Regarding trade, regional cooperation and EPA – Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPS): “As for accompanying measures, Zambia is benefiting from direct sup-
port under the EDF10 national programme, notably in infrastructure, agriculture, improvement of sani-
tary and phyto-sanitary standards, as well as sugar measures under EC budget funding. Under the re-
gional envelope for ESA, Zambia lies at the heart of the North-South corridor project, and would bene-
fit from interventions targeted towards trade facilitation (one stop border posts) and light infrastructure 
rehabilitation.” 
 
Extracts: 
EAMR Jan 2011, p4; Progress in the harmonisation / alignment processes at both national and re-
gional levels: Co-ordination at the regional level has progressed only slowly. Following the adoption of 
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“Aims and objectives” and engaging COMESA in the process of dialogue, the CP group considered 
how far it should advance. 
 
EAMR, Aug 2004, p4: While preparing the Capacity Building for Private Sector Development project, 
the Delegations has seen difficulties in obtaining information from AIDCO on the support to Zambia 
under regional/all ACP private sector projects. Such information should be transmitted to the Delega-
tions concerned continuously in order to follow up and avoid overlapping with projects under the NIP. 
 
JAR 2003, p29; 4.7 Regional co-operation and trade: As member of COMESA, Zambia benefits from 
the wide range of COMESA projects related to regional co-operation and integration. Zambia has ac-
tively worked on the preparation of the COMESA Customs Union, which is to be launched in Decem-
ber 2004. Furthermore, Zambia participates in the harmonisation of customs practices. Under the 
COMESA umbrella, the country has continued the process of economic integration with its neighbour-
ing countries. Zambia will benefit from the EC regional facility, approved in 2003, to support multilat-
eral and regional trade negotiations with the ESA region. The main purpose of the project is to assist 
countries in the ESA region to develop trade negotiating capacities in the short term, in particular as 
regards EPA and WTO negotiations. 
 
EUD Lusaka; MTR RSP-RIP (2011); Key questions to EU Delegations in East and Southern African 
and the Indian Ocean region, Zambia Delegation Contribution; 22 Sep 2011 (Q&A – Answers by EU 
DEL Section regional Cooperation) - Questions related to Regional Programmes Implementation: 
o Q7 - Do you have an understanding of the RIP and of the projects which are implemented at 
regional level? Yes. 
o Q8 – Do you consider that the national authorities are sufficiently involved in the implementa-
tion of regional programmes? Not apparent. Currently national authorities are mainly involved 
in the Roads Infrastructure programmes of RISP II with the Serenje-Nakonde Road, an im-
portant stretch of the North-South Corridor, where COMESA, in collaboration with the Zambia 
Roads Development Agency (RDA) recently launched the study for the detailed design of the 
road.  
o Q9 – If not, what would be the reasons for this? Is there room for improvement? If so, what 
measures could be envisaged? Absence of awareness by the national authorities of what is 
happening under the ESA-IO EDF programme. Symptomatic was the absence of any mean-
ingful representation from Zambia at the High Level RAO-NAO meeting held in … Lusaka … in 
November 2009. This was actually an embarrassment for the EU Delegation which had done it 
possibly could to ensure high level participation.  
o Q10 –Do you believe that some part of the RIP could be implemented with more efficiency and 
effectiveness at the national level rather than at the REC level? Yes, especially with the Roads 
Infrastructure projects where implementation is better suited at the national level, as they have 
the necessary capacity in terms of personnel. The RECs would be better suited to providing 
TA support in specific aspects of the programme such as regional transportation regulation. 
o Q12 – Have EDF9 regional programmes (RISM, RISP I, REFORM, CPMR…) had concrete 
impact in your specific country? Can you give examples? Difficult to say at this stage for most 
programmes implemented by COMESA. We miss tangible evaluations. No in the case of 
RISM. 
o  Q14 - Have you seen any indication at the national level of a rationalisation of the relations be-
tween the regional and the continental level (African Union)? Have continental agendas 
(JAES) sufficiently trickled down at the national level where implementation is taking place? 
Difficult to say 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on I-9.4.2: 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) p11; Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: Joint 
Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011: Executive Summary – On efficiency and ab-
sorptive capacity: (4) Overall, the consultations provided a mixed picture of the current situation in 
terms of relevance, coherence, efficiency and effectiveness of the funds allocated by the EU to ESA-
IO. In first place, ROs tended to stress progress accomplished and asked for more time to convert 
ideas into projects. They trust that it will be possible to make good use of the €645m up to end of 
2013 and beyond. Second, EU representatives showed concern with the absorption capacity of the 
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ROs and of the region at large, considering the low level of EDF10 commitments so far. In three years 
of AAPs (2009-2010-2011) the Region has committed 194m EUR, corresponding to an average of 
64m EUR committed per year (10% yearly absorption). If the same average is maintained up to the 
end of the programming cycle (AAP 2012-2013), the Region will have absorbed 323m EUR, corre-
sponding to half of the RIP. Absorption of the totality of the RIP would require an increase of yearly 
absorption from 10% to 40%. The EU emphasised that, although the pipeline was streamlined with 
the Lusaka Declaration and is regularly endorsed at IRCC plenary meetings, it does not guarantee by 
itself that it will be fully implemented, given the substantial delays in the preparation of some of the 
programmes. The EU is also concerned about the risk of losing EDF10 funds if programmes cannot 
be approved by the end of 2013 because of late submission and/or lack of sufficient quality. Third, na-
tional and civil society representatives underlined their limited participation in the process and showed 
limited knowledge of the issues at stake. 
  
 Indicator 9.4.3: Level of coordination and complementarity between EC staff, projects man-
agers and technical assistance missions 
Based on the analysis of the Country Level Evaluation desk study documents and of the copies of the 
EUD Lusaka answers to the key questions posed in connection with the just concluded MTR of the 
RSP/RIP and the MTR of the EU-SADC co-operation, one cannot conclude to an optimal level of coor-
dination and complementarity between EC staff, project managers and technical assistance missions 
as of the present. This was also confirmed by the interviews with the EUD key parties concerned on the 
occasion of the evaluation field visit last December 2011. However substantive improvements are noted 
as a result of the upgrading and institutional anchoring of the regional cooperation concerns into a fully-
fledged EUD Operations Section (one of the four), its strengthening in terms of human resources, and a 
variety of concrete initiatives undertaken to strengthen communication, coordination and complementa-
rity between the different EU parties concerned (e.g. EU staff, project managers and technical assis-
tance missions). Also at the regional level coordination is improving as for example reported in the Jan-
uary 2011 EAMR, to a large extent thanks to a strengthened coordination of the Inter-Regional Co-
ordinating Committee (IRCC) Secretariat and its organisational systems now in place. The IRCC meet-
ings have taken on increased significance throughout the year with participation by senior EC staff, as 
well as by SADC and the ACP Secretariat.  
As part of the MTR of the RSP-RIP and of the EU-SADC co-operation under the EDF10 (2011), some 
key questions were posed to EU Delegations in the ESA-IO region. On the NAO knowledge and infor-
mation level about regional programmes, the EUD respondent briefly replied that certain aspects of the 
Regional Programme are discussed during the preparation phase of the NSP/NIP but that for the rest 
this is difficult to say. The EU institutional set-up at regional level is considered complex but compelled 
by the design of the ESA-IO RSP. Henceforth, much simplification will be required for the EDF11. 
Amongst the recommendations by the Lusaka EUD for a better integration of regional concerns at na-
tional level and vice versa were mentioned: (i) A more focussed programming limited to envelopes that 
would be managed by the respective ROs instead of such a large programme covering a 'region' which 
is artificial, and (ii) more emphasis on regional economic integration and on tripartite dynamics. (iii) The 
question if the Delegation would increase its involvement in the monitoring of regional programme im-
plementation was answered by a principle yes since monitoring should be a central part of the Delega-
tion’s work, but at the same time the EUD is generally constrained by low staffing levels. 
The coordination and co-operation with the SADC secretariat is one of the topics of the MTR of the EU-
SADC co-operation under the EDF10. The EUD reported that very little detail of SADC RSP pro-
grammes has filtered to the national level. The issues of overlapping regional economic communities 
and multiple memberships reportedly constitute a challenge, if not an obstacle to regional integration. 
Also, the current EU set-up gives too little room – or responsibility – to the national delegations in re-
gional programmes. To engage national delegations more fully, the strategy and programmes need to 
be conceived differently, ensuring that both funding and activities reach the national level, and requiring 
structured feedback from all. The overall, underlying principle is that the regional level cannot align to 
the national, but that it is to be a national alignment to the regional level. Alignment in first instance is 
needed at the policy level, not necessarily within the CSP. If the regional agenda is considered im-
portant, it should form part of the EUD’s objectives and be fed into the dialogue with the national author-
ities. 
Extracts: 
EAMR, Jan 2011, p3: The IRCC secretariat benefited from a competent Coordinator, and its organi-
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sational systems are now in place for smooth meeting execution. The IRCC meetings have taken on 
increased significance throughout the year, with participation by senior EC staff, as well as by SADC 
and the ACP secretariat. 
 
EAMR, Jan 2011, p3: Regional Political Integration focal sector - CRIS number: FED/2007/197 – 380 
- Project title: Conflict Prevention Management Resolution (CPMR) - COMESA War Economies Com-
ponent: 
 
EAMR, Jan 2007, p2: The NAO-Delegation working relationship continues to improve while the issue 
of resources available for NAO functions is still a great concern, particularly due to the absence of na-
tional counterparts to work with the technical support team and the general problem of resources at 
ETC-MFNP. This has been particularly problematic in the preparation of the EDF10 CSP/NIP and re-
lated processes (governance profile)… The absence of NAO representatives at important pro-
ject/programme decision-making events does also adversely affect project implementation. 
 
EDF10, CSP/NIP 2008-2013; Annex 12 Road transport 2.4) Lessons learnt pp. xcii-xciv; Based on the 
anticipated further success of the SPSP, the EDF10 programme is designed to continue with the sup-
port to the sector mainly through SBS. In that context, it will however be important to carry out an as-
sessment of the seven key areas according to the model approach of the relevant EC guidelines. This 
will be done in the framework of the Mid-Term Review of the SPSP which is scheduled for the end of 
the 2
nd
 semester 2007. A close collaboration between the economic section and the infrastructure 
section would then be required. The issue of sector financing will have to be critically looked at.  
 
EUD Lusaka; MTR RSP-RIP (2011) - Key questions to EU Delegations in East and Southern African 
and the Indian Ocean region, Zambia Delegation Contribution; 22 Sep 2011 (Q&A – Answers by EU 
DEL Section regional Cooperation) Questions related to Regional Programmes Management:  
o Q13 –Does the NAO appear informed of the activities carried out as part of the Regional 
programme funded by the EDF? Certain aspects of the Regional programmes are discussed 
during the preparation phase of the NSP/NIP. But for the rest, difficult to say. 
o Q15 – How do you assess the EU institutional set up (regional and non-regional Delega-
tions) in the programming, management and monitoring and management of regional pro-
grammes? Complex but compelled by the design of the ESA-IO RSP. Much simplification 
will be required for the EDF11. 
o Q16 – If you consider that there is room for progress, what measures could be envisaged? 
(Please consider roles and responsibilities of the different Delegations in a region, coordina-
tion mechanism between these Delegations, procedures, staffing capacities…) A more fo-
cussed programming limited to envelopes that would be managed by the respective ROs in-
stead of such a large programme covering a 'region' which is artificial. Emphasize on region-
al economic integration and Tripartite dynamic. 
o Q17 – Could your delegation increase its involvement in the monitoring of regional pro-
gramme implementation? Although monitoring should be a central part of the Delegation’s 
work, we are generally constrained by the low staffing levels.  
 
EUD Lusaka; MTR of EU-SADC Co-Operation under the EDF10 (2011); Evaluation of Regional 
(RSP/RIP) – National (CSP/NIP) Coherence, Zambia Delegation Contribution (Q&A – Answers by EU 
DEL Section regional Cooperation); 30 Aug 2011.  
Question: Are you familiar with the RISDP? No - Very little detail of SADC RSP programmes has fil-
tered to the national level.  
Question: Does the issue of overlapping regional economic communities and multiple memberships 
constitute an obstacle to regional integration? This remains an overwhelming obstacle to a coherent 
and streamlined agenda for countries to follow. It also undermines the role of the Secretariats in lead-
ing the process… In addition, SADC secretariat has capacity issues that go beyond the need for ra-
tionalisation of overlapping memberships. This capacity needs to be worked on. 
Part Five – Role of the EU Delegations in Regional Integration within SADC 
Question: Is the EU’s own institutional set up in the SADC region structured and organised so as to 
efficiently monitor and manage the regional programmes, (procedures, staffing capacities. Etc.)? The 
EU set-up gives too little room – or responsibility – to the national delegations in regional pro-
grammes. The same can be said for HQ. 
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Question: What are the regional roles and responsibilities of the country level Delegations in the 
SADC region? To engage the national delegations more fully, the strategy and programmes need to 
be conceived differently, ensuring that both funding and activities reach the national level, and requir-
ing structured feedback from all.  
Question: Is there a co-ordination mechanism for regional policy and operational issues between the 
country-level Delegations and the regional Delegation and, if so, is it effective? There is a degree of 
co-ordination – or information flow – between the national and regional delegations. 
Question: Is there room for improvement in national/regional co-ordination in the EU context? If so, 
what would be the recommendations and to what extent are they/will they be implemented? Regional 
cannot align to national. It has to be a national alignment to regional – alignment is needed at the poli-
cy level, not necessarily within the CSP. If the regional agenda is considered important, it should form 
part of DEL objectives, and be fed into the dialogue with national authorities. 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on I-9.4.3: 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) pp. v-vi: Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: 
Joint Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011: Executive Summary – On consultations 
with the national level and CSOs: (4) Overall, the consultations provided a mixed picture of the current 
situation in terms of relevance, coherence, efficiency and effectiveness of the funds allocated by the 
EU to ESA-IO... Third, national and civil society representatives underlined their limited participation in 
the process and showed limited knowledge of the issues at stake. 
 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) p13; Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: Joint 
Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011: Chapter 3 Efficiency of Regional Cooperation 
- Evaluation of IRCC and its role in programme design and/or implementation and coordination:  
(3.8) IRCC (Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee) is a unique body within the ACP configuration 
and constitutes the only inter-RO collective consultation and consensus-building instrument owned by 
COMESA, EAC, IGAD, IOC (with EU membership), not only in respect of the shared EDF funding but 
also on access to other EU funding (e.g. intra-ACP, ERDF). It deals with issues related to the wider RI 
agenda and regional aid effectiveness. IRCC has tried that the four ROs and EU work together and 
deliver collectively on expected results. The expertise acquired by its members in formulat-
ing/implementing EDF programmes facilitates faster coordination on the different areas of the ESA-IO 
programmes. While IRCC is considered an effective mechanism to coordinate, harmonise and avoid 
duplication of programming activities, the complexity of the current configuration should not be under-
estimated. Considering that the programming cycle of the EDF10 is reaching its final years of imple-
mentation, EU has voiced the need to undertake risks analysis of the programmes submitted by ROs 
to IRCC with a view of ensuring that an increased trend of absorption for the remaining two program-
mable years limits the risks of losing funds. EU believes that the strong added value of IRCC-S for the 
remaining EDF10 programme would be to concentrate on its role of ensuring quality conformity and 
good standards of submitted projects.  
(3.9) RISP (Regional Integration Support Programme) was the most significant instrument under the 
EDF9 to empower the Secretariats of the two RECs (COMESA and EAC). It is acknowledged that 
RISP I was too wide and unfocussed (it had 9 result areas, now reduced to 6 in RISP II). Following 
the European Court of Auditors (ECA) review in 2009, the programme has re-focussed its activities 
towards building the capacity of Member/Partner States to progress the RI agenda. The new pro-
gramme envisages an annual review of the benchmarks and the log frame indicators.  
 
 
JC 9.4:  The EU's co-operation strategy for Zambia and its regional strategy were mutually rein-
forcing 
Under the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement the regional programming under the 9th and EDF10 for 
the Eastern and Southern African (ESA) – Indian Ocean (IO) region has been undertaken as a joint 
effort of the Regional Organisations (RO) of Southern and Eastern Africa: the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the East African Com-
munity (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). And then there is also the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) as regional organisation of which Zambia is a 
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member state. The Secretariat of the Inter-Regional Co-ordinating Committee (IRCC), responsible for 
overall co-ordination and overseeing of the RIP is based at the COMESA Secretariat. 
The EDF9 RIP had three focal areas: (i) Regional economic integration; (ii) Management of natural 
resources, and; (iii) Transport and communications. Projects in the fourth non-focal area include capaci-
ty building, and peace and security. The EDF10 RSP/RIP (2008-2013) with a budget of 645m € at the 
disposal of the four Regional Organisations to support the regional integration process has two concen-
tration (focal) areas: (i) Regional Economic Integration covering regional integration policies, trade and 
EPA, and regional sector policies, and; (ii) the Regional Political Integration/Cooperation Agenda, 
through the development of a series of flanking measures aimed at assisting the region to tackle re-
gional political problems in a coordinated fashion. In the case of Zambia, a comparatively high percent-
age of the 2008-2013 RIP is allocated to trade related infrastructure (78.52% as against 35.7% for the 
region). This is also relatively high in comparison with the Zambia NIP allocation for focal sector 1 “Re-
gional Integration / Transport infrastructure” with 24.6% of the EDF10 CSP/NIP resources allocated to 
this focal sector. 
The EDF10 CSP/NIP document has an executive summary of the EDF10 RSP-RIP in an annex. This is 
the documentary link to the RSP in the CSP. The incorporation of the regional integration agenda in the 
national development planning and the CSP/NIP is explicitly focused on in the MTR of the EDF10 
CSP/NIP. The review concluded that the infrastructure focal area of the EDF10 CSP for Zambia is 
couched in terms of regional integration, rather than simply relying only on national infrastructure (the 
Zimba-Livingstone road, the rehabilitation of sections of the Great East Road as elements of the North-
South Corridor). As for the Sugar Accompanying Measures allocated to Zambia, the RIP funded the 
identification / pre-feasibility study for a multi-modal dry-port in Chipata. 
Evidence of EU Delegation involvement in the preparation of the ESA RSP-RIP (EDF10) is provided for 
example in the January and July 2007 EAMRs, including: (i) Delegation attendance of meetings on 
ESA-EPA negotiations, (ii) EUD discussions on regional priorities for the EDF10 including issues linked 
to EPAs financing, as well as (iii) Regular exchanges on on-going EDF9 projects as on transport & 
communication. During implementation the linkage between NIPs and the RIP is exploited further, by 
enhancing cooperation between the four RAOs and the ESA-IO NAOs (amongst which Zambia), nota-
bly by organising annual meetings to discuss implementation of the EDF10 RIP and the NIPs. Vice 
versa, the RSP/RIP 2008-2013 document has a special annex providing a synoptic view of the linkages 
and complementarities between the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) and the ESA-IO National 
Indicative Programmes (NIPs). From this overview can be concluded that generally the NIPs of the 
ESA-IO region (incl. Zambia) have substantial linkages with the RIP. This particularly pertains to the 
large regional infrastructure projects, but other areas of consistent complementarity between the NIPs 
and the RIP cover (i) private sector development, (ii) food security, (iii) rural development and agricul-
tural development, as well as (Iv) specific activities for supporting the implementation of the regional 
and bilateral trade agenda, including FTAs, customs unions, monetary unions, EPA, etc.  
As part of the recently concluded MTR of the RSP-RIP, some key questions were posed to EU Delega-
tions in the ESA-IO region. Asked if regional integration features in the EUD dialogue with the national 
authorities, the Lusaka EUD replied positively, however only to the extent that it addresses the focal 
sector of the NIP (infrastructure – roads). 
Regarding the link between the regional and national levels, the 2011 review of the co-operation be-
tween the European Union and the ESA-IO Region indicated that ROs are quite adamant to affirm that 
Member States are duly involved through their instances (Council, etc.) and that this is the legitimate 
structure in place in the institutional architecture of the ROs. However, from the consultations with EU 
Delegations and national authorities a need was voiced for more funds/support at national level for re-
gional integration. EDF programming (both national and regional) is assessed a potentially of help for 
resolving regional integration obstacles, but for that the review concludes a different balance may be 
needed to better support implementation of regional commitments at national level. Remarkably how-
ever, Chapter II of the joint progress report which explicitly deals with “Coherence of RSP/RIP” assess-
es different coherence components at the regional level (e.g. with other regional strategies, with the 
SADC region, with the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, with the African Peace and Security Architec-
ture) but not with the CSP/NIPs at the level of the Member Countries. This focus of the progress report 
probably by itself is already an indication of the importance attached to RSP/RIP and CSP/NIP coher-
ence and complementarity, or better maybe of the status of progress in designing and operationalising 
such regional – national strategic coherence assessment (M&E) system. 
A major challenge remains to have the implementation of common regional programmes managed 
through Contribution Agreements (CAs) by the covered member countries concerned. This would be 
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the preferred option from the perspective of programme ownership and enhanced regional-national 
coher-ence, impact and sustainability. The review however was to conclude that while such arrange-
ment is being promoted by COMESA (particular through the RISP programme) the other ROs proved 
not to be ready for it yet. 
MTR recommendations for the EDF11 to further strengthen RSP/RIP – CSP/NIP alignment include the 
following: (i) Elaborate a realistic regional integration strategy before embarking on writing CSPs/NIPs 
and then link CSPs to the RSP or at least ensure that the regional priorities are to some extent coupled 
by regional integration policies and budgets in the MS national development plans; (ii) Make explicit the 
roles of ROs and their Member States; (iii) Involve Member States in the regional integration process at 
all stages, from programming to implementation; (iv) Give more consideration to Member States and 
Civil Society (business fora) during the process of elaboration and implementation of the EDF11 
RSP/RIP; (v) Ensure that the RSP maintains some flexibility to adapt to the evolving needs of the re-
gion but at the same time focus the RIP to some key fields of actions and programmes to ensure con-
centration of efforts; (vi) Avoid as much as possible having ROs subcontracting each other as is the 
case now with RISP II; (vii) Envisage direct CA (or other modalities) with ROs eligible to CA status; (viii) 
Consider the possibility of reinforcing IRCC role in its core mandate of coordination and support mech-
anism to all stages of project cycle; (ix) Continue supporting the Secretariats in their efforts to monitor 
transposition of regional commitments at national level. (J.C. 9.4) 
Also during the current evaluation field visit interviews with different parties concerned at EUD, GRZ 
and COMESA the actual transposition of regional commitments into national, in this case Zambian, 
policies, systems and budgets, was identified as one of the, if not the key challenge for effective region-
al integration processes. The Adjustment Facility Window, which the RISM Programme has made op-
erational, is foreseen to support Member States to bear the cost of integration and to reward good per-
formers against tangible results. This entails the development of a system for monitoring regional inte-
gration at national level along key performance indicators derived from the regional integration strategic 
plans and programmes, complete with baseline data, “monitorable” target setting with periodic progress 
and results assessments / measurements on these indicators, which in turn can form the basis for per-
formance scores, ratings and indices, scorecards and dashboards. During different field interviews the 
crucial need for such integrated regional-national transposition performance planning, measurement 
and monitoring systems involving both the regional and national levels was underscored.  
The just concluded MTR of the RSP-RIP confirmed in this respect that the effectiveness of RSP/RIP 
implementation is difficult to measure due to recognised lack of ROs and MS capacity to monitor im-
plementation of RI commitments at national level. Capacity of national delegations to deal with regional 
matters needs to be improved to support ESA-IO ROs members in fulfilling their responsibilities in im-
plementing the principle that regional cooperation and integration is ultimately dependent on the actions 
of the individual state ("think regionally, act locally"). (I-9.4.1) 
Based on the desk study documents analysis, the copies of the EUD Lusaka answers to the key ques-
tions posed in connection with the just concluded MTR of the RSP/RIP and from the current evaluation 
field visit interviews one cannot conclude positively about an optimal timing of the outputs from regional 
programmes to facilitate implementation of national support and vice versa. 
Links are established; however the differences in sequence and in process for the NIP and RIP formu-
lation did not facilitate systematic cross-referencing. In particular, given the time constraints during 
drafting there was not a systematic effort at ensuring that the NIPs were coordinated with the RIP. More 
importantly, it is becoming evident that national strategies (to which the NIPs are aligned) do not suffi-
ciently take into account the regional dimension and the commitments taken during the various RECs 
summits. This confirms the January 2011 EAMR conclusion that co-ordination at the regional level had 
progressed only slowly. This difficult coordination between the national and regional levels however 
was already reported in the EAMR of August 2004 which recommended that regional information 
should be transmitted to the Delegations concerned continuously in order to follow up and avoid over-
lapping with projects under the NIP. There is no evidence that this actually has happened in the mean-
time.  
There reportedly is a general absence of awareness by the national authorities of what is happening 
under the ESA-IO EDF programme. A more efficient and effective Division of Labour (DOL) is proposed 
by the Lusaka EUD in reply to the MTR question if some part of the RIP could be implemented with 
more efficiency and effectiveness at the national level rather than at the REC level. This particularly 
pertains to roads infrastructure projects where implementation reportedly is better suited at the national 
level, as they have the necessary capacity in terms of personnel. The REC would be better suited to 
providing TA support in specific aspects of the programme such as regional transportation regulation. 
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Such arrangement would also be more in line with the general principle of subsidiarity underlying the 
regional integration process.  
In the framework of the recently conducted mid-term review of the RSP-RIP, the EUD was posed the 
question if regional aspects of the Zambia NIP are sufficiently highlighted in the RIP. To this EUD Lusa-
ka answered in the positive as links are being established. However the EUD also pointed out that the 
differences in sequence and in process for the NIP and RIP formulation did not facilitate systematic 
cross-referencing. (I-9.4.2) 
The 2011 MTR of the co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region reported that, 
overall, the review consultations had provided a mixed picture of the current situation in terms of rele-
vance, coherence, efficiency and effectiveness of the RSP/RIP funds allocated by the EU to ESA-IO. 
The ROs tended to stress progress accomplished and asked for more time to convert ideas into pro-
jects. On the other hand, the EU representatives showed concern with the absorption capacity of the 
ROs and of the region at large, considering the low level of EDF10 commitments so far. If the same 
average of 10% yearly absorption of total RIP resources as during the three years of AAPs so far (2009 
to 2011) is maintained up to the end of the programming cycle (AAP 2012-2013), the Region will have 
absorbed only half of the RIP. Absorption of the totality of the RIP would require an increase of yearly 
absorption from 10% to 40%. The EU emphasised that, although the pipeline was streamlined with the 
Lusaka Declaration and is regularly endorsed at IRCC plenary meetings, it does not guarantee by itself 
that it will be fully implemented, given the substantial delays in the preparation of some of the pro-
grammes. The report also indicated EU’s concern about the risk of losing EDF10 funds if programmes 
cannot be approved by the end of 2013 because of late submission and/or lack of sufficient quality. 
Third, national and civil society representatives underlined their limited participation in the process and 
showed limited knowledge of the issues at stake. The above MRT conclusions regarding RSP/RIP effi-
ciency and absorptive capacity appear to provide further evidence of the crucial need for effective per-
formance planning, measurement and monitoring systems and tools, and for enhanced capacity 
strengthening of the key parties concerned on their actual use, both at regional and at national levels. 
(JC 9.4) 
Overall, one cannot conclude to an optimal level of coordination and complementarity between EC staff, 
project managers and technical assistance missions regarding the EC’s regional programme and its 
national response strategy for Zambia. However substantive improvements are noted as a result of the 
upgrading and institutional anchoring of the regional cooperation concerns into a fully-fledged EUD 
Operations Section (one of the four), its strengthening in terms of human resources, and a variety of 
concrete initiatives undertaken to strengthen communication, coordination and complementarity be-
tween the different EU parties concerned (e.g. EU staff, project managers and technical assistance 
missions). Also at the regional level coordination is improving as for example reported in the January 
2011 EAMR, to a large extent thanks to a strengthened coordination of the Inter-Regional Co-ordinating 
Committee (IRCC) Secretariat and its organisational systems now in place. The IRCC meetings have 
taken on increased significance throughout the year with participation by senior EC staff, as well as by 
SADC and the ACP Secretariat.  
The EU institutional set-up at regional level is considered complex but compelled by the design of the 
ESA-IO RSP. Henceforth, much simplification will be required for the EDF11. Other EUD suggestions 
made in the framework of the currently ongoing MTR of the EDF10 RSP/RIP include a more focussed 
programming limited to envelopes that would be managed by the respective ROs, instead of such a 
large programme covering a 'region' which is artificial, and more emphasis on regional economic inte-
gration and on tripartite dynamics. In the framework of the MTR of the EU-SADC co-operation under 
the EDF10, the EUD reported that very little detail of SADC RSP programmes has filtered to the nation-
al level, and especially that issues of overlapping regional economic communities and multiple mem-
berships constitute an obstacle to regional integration. Moreover, the current EU set-up gives too little 
room or responsibility to the national Delegations in regional programmes. (I-9.4.3) 
 
Field Visit Additional Information on EQ9: 
 
MoFNP – 2011 Budget Address Minister of Finance and National Planning to Parliament; Macro 
Performance in 2010 
Par. 22-24: External Sector Performance: 22. Mr Speaker, Zambia’s external sector performance has 
improved significantly in 2010. This reflects the steady recovery in the global economy that has 
boosted both the demand and price of commodities such as copper. The pickup in domestic activity 
has also led to strong growth in the imports of goods and services. This year, the value of exports and 
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imports are expected to increase by 38.6 per cent and 36.5 per cent, respectively. 23. Mr Speaker, 
the current account deficit is expected to narrow to US $378m in 2010 from US $404m in 2009. This 
is mainly on account of an improvement in Zambia’s trade balance, which is projected to increase by 
46.5 per cent to a surplus of US $1,327m from US $906m in 2009. This is largely due to the strong 
growth in copper exports, which are expected to increase to US $4,612m from US $3,179m in 2009. 
24. Sir, Members of this House will be pleased to note that non-traditional exports have expanded by 
an average of 14.2 per cent over the past 9 years. The outlook for 2010 remains bright, with growth 
projected at 8.2 per cent to US $973.7m. Increased earnings from the export of products such as 
maize, sugar, tobacco, cotton, copper wire and gemstones will drive this growth in non-traditional ex-
ports. 25. Mr Speaker, by end-September 2010 Zambia’s gross international reserves had risen by 
US $197.6m to US $2,121.8m, another milestone in the economic performance of this Government. 
This growth in reserves largely reflected donor inflows, net proceeds from the sale of Zamtel, and in-
creased mining receipts. This level of reserves is sufficient to cover about 4 months of imports. 
Par. 41-43: Budget Performance in 2010: 41.Mr Speaker, the Government’s aim in the 2010 budget 
was to continue with prudent fiscal management and policies to sustain high economic growth. 42. 
Sir, the budget performance has so far been characterised by mixed outcomes. As at end-September 
2010, domestic revenues had performed well, and are now expected to over perform by 12 per cent 
by the end of the year. This performance is attributed to higher collections under income and value 
added taxes arising from the collection of tax arrears. I am also pleased to report that tax collections 
from mining companies have improved this year. With the current high copper prices and production, I 
expect even higher tax payments from mining companies. 43. Sir, notwithstanding this positive per-
formance, customs and excise duties continue to underperform, and are expected to be below target 
by 1.6 per cent by the end of the year. Receipts from our Cooperating Partners have so far underper-
formed by 36.8 per cent. 
 
MoFNP – 2011 Budget Address Minister of Finance and National Planning to Parliament; Part III 
Economic Objectives and Policies for the 2011 Budget: Monitoring and Evaluation; Par. 97-98  
Par. 97: Mr Speaker, nationwide monitoring of projects requires active participation of all stakehold-
ers, including local communities. This is to ensure that projects are completed in a timely manner and 
to the required standard. To this effect, all Sector Advisory Groups, and Provincial and District Devel-
opment Coordinating Committees are encouraged to form monitoring and evaluation sub-committees. 
These committees are, in turn, encouraged to partner with my Ministry to monitor various develop-
ment projects in their areas. This will promote local ownership and enhance transparency and ac-
countability in the use of public resources.  
Par. 98: Sir, one of the lessons learned from the implementation of the Fifth National Development 
Plan was the need for a more effective, results-driven, monitoring and evaluation framework. As we 
launch the SNDP, public institutions will be required to be more accountable to their beneficiaries on 
the expected deliverables of the projects they undertake. In the 2011 Budget, and over the course of 
the SNDP, the Government will ensure that each public institution is held accountable for delivering its 
development outputs. 
 
MoFNP – 2011 Budget Address Minister of Finance and National Planning to Parliament; Part 
IV Conclusion: Par. 179-182: ` 
Par. 179: Mr Speaker, in a little over a month, the MMD Government will have the privilege of starting 
its twentieth year as the chosen representatives of our great people. As we step into this twentieth 
year, there is much to celebrate. 180. In what has been a difficult decade for the agriculture sector, 
the performance of our farmers over the last two years has been extraordinary. The prospects for ag-
riculture in Zambia have always looked promising, but never as bright as they look today.  
Par. 181: Today, we stand on the threshold of a new era for the mining sector in Zambia. A sector that 
is now driven by the spirit of entrepreneurship and private enterprise. A sector whose future is no 
longer only dependent on just the shine of our copper, but the allure of our gemstones, the lustre of 
our gold, the power of our uranium, the abundance of our manganese, and the promise of our oil. 
Par. 182: Sir, as we reflect on these successes, we should not forget that Zambia was once a middle-
income country. In 1964, Zambia’s per capita income was just over US $1500, far higher than in Bot-
swana, South Korea or Thailand. In just two decades, it had fallen by almost half, reaching US $785 in 
1984. By the start of the new millennium, our per capita income had again fallen by half, to US $365, 
one quarter of what it was at independence. 
MoFNP Development Cooperation Report (2010) p3: Chapter 1.2 – Trends in External Assistance: 
Total External Financing to Zambia 
Total External Financing to Zambia, 2006-2009 
EVA 2007/geo-acp: Evaluation of the EU support to Zambia – Final Report 
ECO Consult – AGEG – APRI – Euronet – IRAM – NCG 
 
Page - 409 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MoFNP Development Cooperation Report (2010) pp. 20-21: Chapter 4.2.1 – External Assistance 
Disbursement by Sector: (Below) Table 4.3 shows that Government in collaboration with Cooperating 
Partners projected to mobilise up to US$ 3,319m as external assistance. Key sectors that were pro-
jected to receive this funding were infrastructure, health and HIV/AIDS, education, and agriculture with 
projected proportions of 25, 23, 14, and 12 per cent of the mobilised external resources. Actual dis-
bursements to the sectors between 2006 and 2009 are shown in Column 4 of Table 4.3, while Column 
5 gives the corresponding shares. Over the four years 2006 to 2009 about US$ 2,212.9m, or 67 per 
cent of projected external financing for the FNDP period, was disbursed to the various sectors. In ad-
dition, US$ 758.3 million was disbursed as non-sector allocable funding, including general budget 
support. Sectors such as Education, Health and HIV/AIDS received close to the projected external re-
sources and in cases such as Governance more than the projected amounts. Other sectors such as 
Agriculture, Energy and Mining, Environment, Lands and Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Tourism 
and Water and Sanitation received far much less than was projected. 
 
Development Assistance Disbursements by Sector, 2006-2009 
(Projected External Financing and Actual Disbursements) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MoFNP Development Cooperation Report (2010) pp. 17-18: Chapter 4. Aid Modalities and Align-
ment – 4.1 Budget Support and Common Basket Funding: Following the 2005 Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness and the adoption of the Zambia Aid Policy and Strategy in 2007, budget support has 
become Government’s preferred mode of assistance. Budget support is disbursed through the budget 
system and allows Government to use these resources in line with the country’s priorities. The propor-
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tion of assistance provided as budget support is, therefore, often used as a measure of alignment with 
government policy. Out of the 23 Cooperating Partners who disbursed their support to the Govern-
ment, 14 provided part of their assistance in the form of budget support and/or common basket fund-
ing, while the Global Fund disbursed all its funds through these two modalities (see below Table). The 
United Kingdom and the European Union provided over 65 per cent of their assistance through budg-
et support over the four years. Norway was the only other CP to exceed 50 per cent. Budget support 
represented 42 per cent of AfDB assistance. Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany and the 
Global Fund were also significant contributors of budget support. The World Bank only started dis-
bursing budget support in 2009 (earlier disbursements supporting the budget were in form of balance 
of payments support, fiscal transparency, structural adjustment facility). Nine of the CPs disbursed 
more than 60 per cent of their assistance as budget support and/or common basket funding, indicat-
ing a high degree of alignment with Government’s preferred mode of assistance (see below Table). 
 
Budget Support and Basket Funding as Shares of Total Assistance, 
by Cooperating Partner (period 2006-2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While they did not provide budget support, Denmark, Ireland and the USA contributed to the Educa-
tion SWAp while Canada and the USA contributed to the Health SWAp. All Global Fund support was 
provided through sector budget support and the Health SWAp, while the Netherlands disbursed 96 
per cent of its assistance through budget support, SWAps and the Rural Electrification Authority bas-
ket. The United Kingdom and Norway both disbursed over 80 per cent of their total assistance through 
budget support and basket funds. In other words, less than 20 per cent of their assistance was deliv-
ered through projects over the period. Finland, Ireland, Sweden, the European Union and Canada al-
so had high ratios of budget support and common basket funding to total assistance, ranging from 60 
per cent to 71 per cent. The contributions of individual CPs to total budget support (PRBS and SBS) 
between 2006 and 2009 are shown in Figure 4.1. The European Union contributed the most at 38 per 
cent, followed by the United Kingdom 24 per cent, Norway 12 per cent, AfDB 7 per cent and the 
Netherlands 6 per cent. Sweden, Germany, Finland, the World Bank and the Global Fund also pro-
vided budget support. 
 
JASZ-II (2011) pp. 4-6; Zambia’s changing development context requiring updating development co-
operation strategy and tools: Both Zambia and the global context for ODA have changed since the 
JASZ was developed in 2007. The JASZ II needs to reflect these changes if aid is to further increase 
its effectiveness and to contribute to poverty reduction, sustained growth and human development.  
Zambia’s economy is growing and has reached lower middle income status. After two decades of 
economic and human development decline, there has been significant progress since 2000. The 
Zambian economy has grown at over 5% for a decade. The private sector plays an increasing role in 
driving the economy and contributing to growth. The government has overseen and implemented 
sound macro-economic policies, and external investment has been high. Zambia is very close to be-
coming a lower middle income country in terms of per capita income.  
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Zambia’s progress on reducing poverty has 
been mixed with rural areas lagging behind 
urban areas: The overall number of Zambians 
living in poverty has declined (the poverty fell 
from 69% in 1996 to 64% in 2006, LCMS 
2006). But these gains have mainly been con-
centrated in urban areas. A quarter of urban 
dwellers are poor, while three quarters of rural 
Zambians continue to live in poverty. Despite a 
growing economy, human development re-
mains low. According to the Human Develop-
ment Index, Zambia ranks 150 out of 169 
countries (UN, 2010). The gap between Zam-
bia’s richest and poorest citizens remains sig-
nificant; Zambia’s Gini coefficient of 0.60 (in 
2006) is among the highest in Africa. Signifi-
cant progress has been made on MDG targets 
on child health, education and HIV/AIDS. How-
However, the global MDG targets to reduce extreme poverty, hunger and improve maternal health 
and environmental sustainability are unlikely to be reached by 2015.  
Zambia’s economy continues to be dominated by copper mining: Copper accounts for 75% of the 
country’s exports and the rise in the global price for copper has fuelled much of the Zambian econo-
my’s recent growth. Notwithstanding GRZ’s efforts to promoted diversification in agriculture and tour-
ism, the still limited amount of economic diversity makes Zambia vulnerable to external shocks. Fur-
ther diversifying the economy would improve its resilience and broaden the benefits of growth to more 
Zambians. 
ODA remains important, but less so than in the past: Historically Zambia has had a high level of aid 
dependency; from 1990-2005 the average ratio of ODA to Gross National Income (GNI) was 23%. 
ODA continues to make a significant contribution to public finances, but as the economy has grown, 
the relative importance of ODA has declined as a proportion of GNI (below 20% in 2010-2011) and as 
a proportion of the national budget. As Zambia achieves lower middle income status, it is likely that 
some CPs will scale down their support to Zambia. Over the course of the SNDP, GRZ and CPs will 
need to develop a strategy for Zambia’s transition from ODA.  
Other (non-ODA) sources of development financing are increasingly important as the Zambian econ-
omy grows and attracts outside investment. In recent years, Zambia has been a destination for con-
siderable investment from South Africa and the BRICS countries (Brazil, India, Russia, China, South 
Africa), reflecting the huge potential of the country. In particular China is providing significant invest-
ment, financing and some development aid to Zambia. The Zambian government is also increasingly 
looking to borrow on regional and international financial markets. The prospects for external borrowing 
are supported by the recently improved credit rating. However, to maintain debt sustainability and de-
velopment impact improvement in investment and project planning orientation of public and private 
resources towards initiatives with higher economic returns and social impact through increased em-
ployment generation, economic diversification and technological upgrading in agriculture and manu-
facturing is needed. 
Overall the quality of governance in Zambia has improved over the past decade albeit with slower 
progress in the last year. Zambia is one of the most stable democracies in Southern Africa. The pro-
cess of holding multiparty elections over the past 20 years appears to be fostering democratic norms 
among citizens. According to most comparative governance indicators, the Zambian state is gradually 
becoming more capable (the state is increasingly able to set and enforce rules and regulations, man-
age finances, and deliver basic services), accountable (citizens, civil society and the private sector are 
increasingly able to scrutinise public institutions and government to hold them to account), and re-
sponsive (public policies and institutions respond to the needs of citizens and uphold their rights).  
Zambia however, continues to face some domestic governance challenges. Despite the improve-
ments further reduction of corruption and safeguarding freedom of press and a vocal civil society re-
main challenges and require continued attention. Political authority in Zambia remains relatively cen-
tralised. Parliament and other oversight institutions are still consolidating in the multi-party era, and 
the participation of non-state actors in the policy process has been limited. Poverty and the patrimoni-
al character of politics have slowed the emergence of issues-based politics and hinder the effective-
ness of formal institutions of government.  
The international context for ODA has also changed since 2007 when the JASZ was initially launched. 
Zambia Poverty Ratio 1196 - 2006
Source:  Central Statistical Office
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The global financial crisis and high fiscal deficits are placing pressure on the budgets of many bilateral 
and multilateral donors. Thus like GRZ, Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) 
governments are increasingly emphasising value for money and the achievement of measurable de-
velopment results for their ODA. As a result, there will likely be a greater focus on showing the impact 
of aid on development outcomes. 
The JASZ II reflects Zambia’s changing development context. In particular:  
 It builds on the lessons learnt from the JASZ 1, as well as priorities identified in the SNDP and 
aims to channel CPs’ investment in Zambia to efforts that aim to address rural poverty and in-
clusive growth; 
 It aims to support Zambia’s longer term transition away from ODA by supporting the govern-
ment’s capacity to mobilise and coordinate its own resources, analyse potential investments and 
optimise returns from regional and international markets; and 
 It contains a more robust focus on performance measurement, management and accountability 
as a means to deliver development results and value for money for Zambian and CP taxpayers; 
 It aims to improve the flow and quality of information and dialogue between CPs, GRZ and non-
state actors 
 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) pp. 6-7; Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: Joint 
Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011: Chapter 2: Coherence of RSP/RIP - Conclu-
sion: (2.10) The EDF10 programming guidelines specifically address the issue of subsidiarity and con-
sistency between regional and national programming in section 2.4. In Paragraph 3, it instructs about 
preparation of draft Country and Regional strategy papers, defining the responsibilities between the 
RAOs, Heads of Delegations and Commission headquarters. Strategies and interventions at national 
and regional level have been designed, to the extent possible, to ensure close interaction between the 
two levels. Specific efforts are ongoing to improve coherence between NIPs and RIPs. Regional semi-
nars were held in 2009 at NAO and RAO level to improve coherence between national and regional 
strategies, such as the East Africa (Lusaka, September 2009) and the West Africa Regional (Abuja, 
October 2009) seminars. Concrete examples were provided by EU stakeholders consulted during the 
MTR process. Three of them deserve special attention, amongst which two directly or indirectly con-
cern Zambia: - In the context of the SADC MTR, it was discussed the possibility to earmark a C-
envelope in the NIPs of SADC countries for actions in favour of regional integration. - In Zambia, the 
RIP and the NIP include strategic links, in particular in the field of transport infrastructure. The NIP in-
deed includes as focal point funding for road investments which are part of the North-South corridor. 
 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) p13; Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: Joint 
Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011: Chapter 3 Efficiency of Regional Cooperation 
– On subsidiarity between national and regional level in implementing regional programmes: 
Regional programmes were often designed without considering sufficiently activities at national level 
as these were supposed to be supported by CSPs/NIPs. In that case support is focused to RECs Sec-
retariats only. RISP2 has a specific result to support Member States capacity to address trade related 
issues and to implement trade liberalisation and regional integration commitments. However, up to 
now, it was used to monitor implementation rather than assist MS in actual domestication. Yet, in spe-
cific projects (i.e., fisheries, Small Arms and Light Weapons), subsidiarity is ensured via the National 
Focal Point in each beneficiary country, which follows implementation at national level whereas the 
project unit has a coordination role. EAC considers itself only as a coordination agency for its MS and 
implementing all its activities for their benefit, e.g. common market protocol, EPA negotiations, cus-
toms union activities, harmonisation etc. It is hoped that when a strong M&E system will be in place, it 
will follow up and control that the principle of subsidiarity is effectively applied in all programmes. 
 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) p19; Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: Joint 
Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011: Chapter 4 Effectiveness of Regional Cooper-
ation – Conclusion: (4.14) The ESA-IO EDF10 RSP/RIP is insufficiently focussed because of very 
broad regional strategies; an unclear response strategy by the Commission; poor coordination with 
the national development plans and NIPs of the individual MS; and weak coordination with other de-
velopment partners. However, stakeholders indicated that efforts are being made to align pro-
jects/programmes with regional strategies (example: fisheries). Some reforms in MS are starting to 
get aligned with commitments made at the regional level. Monitoring is weak both at the level of the 
regional integration agenda in general and at the level of regional implementation at national level. It 
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is not much stronger in terms of programme results and impact. Despite IRCC Secretariat’s optimism, 
other stakeholders believe that without greater focus on core areas, and increased drive to attain 
meaningful results with the available funds, prospects for achieving expected results by the end of the 
period of implementation are limited. 
 
ESA-IO - EU (2011) pp. 21-22; Co-operation between the European Union and the ESA-IO Region: 
Joint Progress Report (EDF10 Mid-Term Review), Nov 2011: Chapter 5 Recommendations 
Short-term (EDF10): 
- Involvement of National Authorities 
5. Improve coordination of projects funded through the regional ESA-IO envelope with MS poli-
cies;  
6. Promote ownership of all regional programmes by the concerned ESA-IO Member States. 
This cannot be done by simply devolving all functions to the national level. Identification and 
preparation need skills that will only be available at the RO level and should remain there, 
while MS should be more involved. Implementation should be undertaken by MS, wherever 
possible, also with a view to motivate MS to implement their RI commitments. 
- Implementation Modalities 
9. For physical infrastructure projects with regional dimension, place funds in a regional basket, 
making sure that chosen management modalities involve the participation of NAOs and ex-
isting instruments (COMESA Infrastructure Fund; EIB; etc.).  
10. Focus the role of the ROs for the coordination of infrastructure policies, protocols, standards, 
and facilitation of regional planning/prioritisation. 
11. Improve ROs’ monitoring systems. 
Long Term (EDF11) 
Programming and Institutional Set Up 
13. Carry out programming jointly between ROs and National Authorities. When relevant, projects 
should be implemented and monitored by National Authorities, who would also carry out 
evaluations of projects with a regional dimension in association with the ROs. 
15. Give more consideration to national authorities and civil society during the process of 
elaboration of the EDF11 RSP/RIP to better identify the real obstacles to regional integration 
at the national level and to better fine tune the focal axes of interventions. 
17. If it is decided to keep the current arrangement, re-consider EU position on funding similar 
programmes in ROs, like the SADC, EAC and COMESA Customs Union / Common Market. 
Assign priority to programmes aimed at consolidating the Tripartite FTA and consider the 
possibility to have only one envelope for the Tripartite, ensuring that IGAD and IOC are 
properly associated.  
 
DIE & IOB (2011) p26; Evaluation Summary Recommendations: (3) Ensure that government policies 
are more effectively oriented towards reducing poverty (particularly rural poverty) and improving the 
quality of life of the poor. While expectations about the reduction of poverty were overly optimistic, the 
evaluation also concludes that government interventions could have been more effective. It will be a 
challenge for the new, Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) to translate objectives more effec-
tively into concrete actions to improve the lives of the poor, especially in rural areas. The impact anal-
ysis of several sectors recommends the following: 
 reconsider the Farmer Input Support Programme and ask the M&E department of the MoFNP to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the programme in the fight against (rural) poverty; 
 
 give higher priority to public works such as water and sanitation programmes and road projects 
in rural areas; 
 evaluate the effectiveness of financial incentives for health and education workers in rural areas; 
 give high priority to the construction of houses for teachers in rural areas; 
 evaluate the effectiveness of the primary reading programme and pay more attention to 
 language challenges in rural areas; and 
 carry out more analysis of the causes of regional imbalances, rather than just monitoring them. 
 
